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Preface
Writing this book has taken me on a journey of many years. Originally, I was 
urged on by Associate Professor Raimo Hakola, my dear friend and colleague. 
For some periods, I was part of his research project Enemies in the Making, 
funded by the Academy of Finland. Apologies, Raimo, that it took longer to 
reach the goal than expected. Thank you for your support, which got me off 
to a good start. Raimo’s project, however, was not the beginning. There is also 
a prehistory. Some years before Enemies, Professor Antti Marjanen urged me 
to write an article on soldiers for his research project Gender, Social Roles and 
Occupations in Early Christianity. This project, also funded by the Academy 
of Finland, provided me an initial platform for discussion. Later, Professor 
Risto Saarinen invited me into the Academy of Finland’s Centre of Excellence, 
Reason and Religious Recognition, based in the Faculty of Theology, University 
of Helsinki. One might note that the key concept “recognition” originates 
here. I wrote the current book alongside my official duties, first as a lecturer of 
New Testament Greek in the Faculty of Theology during the years 2013–2017, 
and later as a translator in the Finnish Bible Society, where I prepared a new 
Finnish translation of the New Testament. Now it appears that the day has 
come for this book to finally emerge from the sidelines.
Within this range of years, many persons both in Finland and abroad have 
contributed to my research by commenting on and discussing it. Any list of 
names would be incomplete, as I would surely forget to mention them all, so 
numerous you are! If you have ever commented on my texts and/or discussed 
them with me, you are worthy of my warmest thanks. I will just mention 
Professor Ismo Dunderberg, who commented on the manuscript at its late 
stage, and the anonymous peer reviewer at Brill, whose critiques and sug-
gestions were very helpful. My thanks are also extended to those who have 
contributed to any of my earlier articles, of which I have incorporated material 
into this volume in a more or less modified form. No article is incorporated 
without modifications. These articles are as follows:
Stoic Law in Paul? Stoicism in Early Christianity. Ed. by Ismo Dunderberg, 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Tuomas Rasimus. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2010, 39–58 (Excerpt from Stoicism in early Christanity edited 
by Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg, 
copyright © 2010. Used by permission of Baker Academic, a division of 
Baker Publishing Group.);
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viii Preface
 In the Category of Philosophy: Christians in Early Pagan Accounts. 
“Others” and the Construction of Early Christian Identity. Ed. by Raimo 
Hakola, Nina Nikki, and Ulla Tervahauta. Publications of the Finnish 
Exegetical Society 106. Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 2013, 239–281;
The Centurion’s Faith in the Gospels and Soldiers in Early Christian 
Imagination. Christ and the Emperor. Ed. by J. Verheyden and G. van Belle. 
Biblical Tools and Studies 20. Leuven: Peeters, 2014, 301–314;
How Fantasy Comes True: Paul between Political Realism and Escha-
tological Fantasy. Stasis 2/2015, 90–109;
Epictetus’ View on Christians: A Closed Case Revisited. Ancient 
 Philosophy and Religion: Religio-Philosophical Discourses within the Greco-
Roman, Jewish and Early Christian World. Ed. by Anders Klostergaard 
Petersen and George van Kooten. Ancient Philosophy & Religion 1. 
Leiden: Brill, 2017, 306–322;
Powers, Baptism, and the Ethics of the Stronger: Paul among the 
Ancient Political Philosophers. Paul and the Greco-Roman Philosophical 
Tradition. Ed. by Joseph R. Dodson and Andrew W. Pitts. London: T&T 
Clark, 2017, 101–116 (used by permission of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc);
Early Christians on Philosophy: Seeking Recognition in Greco-Roman 
Culture. Reflections on Recognition: Contemporary and Historical 
Perspectives. Ed. by M. Kahlos, H. J. Koskinen, and R. Palmén. London: 
Routledge, 2019, 90–108 (Reproduced with permission of the Licensor 
through PLSclear);
Esivalta: The Religious Roots of the Finnish Moral View of Society. 
On the Legacy of Lutheranism in Finland: Societal Perspectives. Ed. by 
K. Sinnemäki, A. Portman, J. Tilli, and R. H. Nelson. Studia Fennica 
Historica 25. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2019, 257–272;
After Anti-Imperial Readings: Early Christians in the Empire Re- 
Examined. Nordic Interpretations of the New Testament: Challenging Texts 
and Perspectives. Ed. by M. B. Kartzow, L. Heldgaard, and R. Falkenberg, 
Studia Aarhusiana Neotestamentica 5. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht (forthcoming);
Brothers in Arms: Soldiers in Early Christianity. Gender, Social Roles 
and Occupations in Early Christianity (the name of the book remains 
unconfirmed). Ed. by Antti Marjanen (forthcoming).
The translations of the biblical texts are from the New Revised Standard Version 
unless otherwise indicated. In the case that I use existing translations of other 
ancient texts, I always indicate this. As my native language is not English, I 
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
ixPreface
have consulted Lisa Muszynski, Ph.D. and Albion M. Butters, Ph.D., who have 
carefully corrected my numerous mistakes. I deeply thank you for your toil. All 
the remaining shortcomings are due to my negligence. I also express my grati-
tude to Professor Margaret M. Mitchell and Professor David P. Moessner, who 
as editors of the series made it possible in several ways to publish this book. 
I also thank the whole Brill staff, who greatly contributed to the publication.
I have dedicated all my previous books to my beloved wife Tarja and to my 
lovely daughter Liina. I do it again. This book is dedicated to you, Tarja and 
Liina, the best earthly gifts of God.
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chapter 1
Introduction: Recognition between Anti- and 
Pro-imperial Readings
Paul opposed Rome with Christ against Caesar, not because that empire 
was particularly unjust or oppressive, but because he questioned the nor-
malcy of civilization itself, since civilization has always been imperial, 
that is, unjust and oppressive.1
This is how John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed positioned Paul in 
their In Search of Paul: How Jesus’ Apostle Opposed Rome’s Empire with God’s 
Kingdom. Several scholars have pronounced views similar to those of Crossan 
and Reed, not only on Paul but also on the New Testament as a whole. The 
scholarly situation can easily be grasped by reading, for example, Judy Diehl’s 
tripartite review on recent anti-imperial readings of the New Testament.2 
Roland Boer puts it illustratively:
The fact that so many books published in the last few years on the New 
Testament have “empire” somewhere in the title is an indication of a sig-
nificant shift in scholarship. Four streams have come together to form 
what is now a wide and full river: older Marxist-inspired studies that have 
sought the historical conditions of a rebellious movement, liberation-
theological approaches to the Bible, more recent postcolonial approaches 
and the growing sense (not new in itself) that the New Testament cannot 
be understood without considering its place within the Roman Empire. 
A significant feature of many of these studies is that they find deeply anti-
imperial themes in the biblical texts. Or at least one can find, they argue, 
a consistent anti-imperial theme running through them. Invariably, the 
comparison is made with our own times, whether it is the imperialism 
of the United States, or the global ravages of transnational corporations, 
or the profound difference between the majority of impoverished peo-
ples of the world and the small number of the obscenely rich.3
1   Crossan and Reed 2005, x–xi.
2   Diehl 2011; 2012; 2013. See also, e.g., Barclay 2011, 364–365.
3   Boer 2013, 181–182.
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As Boer points out, these studies are often tinged by an impulse for mod-
ern applications.4 This is also the case with Crossan and Reed, who ask: “To 
what extent can America be Christian? We are now the greatest postindustrial 
civilization as Rome was then the greatest preindustrial one. That is precisely 
what makes Paul’s challenge equally forceful for now and as for then, for here 
as for there, for Senatus Populusque Romanus as for Senatus Populusque 
Americanus.”5 Basically, there is nothing wrong in these intentions to present 
modern applications. It is a problem if a reading pretends to be historical but 
is actually steered by modern goals. I like to point out the split between “what 
it meant” and “what it means,” as Krister Stendahl once highlighted.6
As far as is hermeneutically possible, scholars should allow the text to com-
municate its own intentions, even if its message is strange or displeasing—and 
there is at least one displeasing passage in the New Testament, Romans 13:1–7. 
Roland Boer aptly states that it is “the stumbling block … for those who inter-
pret the New Testament as an anti-imperial and anti-colonial collection of 
texts.”7 The discomfort of scholars reading this passage is almost tangible. I 
once again take Crossan and Reed as an example. In their book of 450 pages, 
they discuss these verses in just two pages. There is good reason to limit this 
discussion to a minimum. If one wants to write of an apostle opposing the 
Roman Empire, there is not much to say about Romans 13:1–7. It is another 
matter, however, for the reader to get an accurate picture of what Paul thought 
of the Empire without a close look at Romans 13:1–7. This passage is the only 
one in Paul’s epistles where he intentionally speaks about the state.
The anti-imperial reading finds its home mainly in the USA. In my opinion, 
such a reading reflects the American political tradition. Stephen Kalberg (refer-
ring to Max Weber) notes that the Puritan tradition, which is so effective in the 
USA, is suspicious or even hostile toward human authority. The Protestants of 
the 17th century believed that “should rulers violate God’s decrees, the faithful 
stood under religious obligation to protest against and overthrow such illegiti-
mate and unjust authority.”8 One can easily see the same tradition behind the 
US Declaration of Independence.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
4   See, e.g., Diehl’s articles; Lehtipuu and Labahn 2015, 8; Barclay 2011, 367.
5   Crossan and Reed 2005, xi.
6   Stendahl 2000, 70 (originally 1962).
7   Boer 2013, 179–180.
8   Kalberg 2016, 43 (original emphasis).
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that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness … when-
ever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it 
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing 
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness…. [W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations, 
pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them 
under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off 
such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.
The Declaration supports Americans to maintain sharp eyes to see any limi-
tations placed on their freedom. It promulgates the continuous “Right of the 
People” to alter or to abolish governments. I suggest that American eyes also 
explain the recent anti-imperial reading of the New Testament. For those raised 
in American culture, anti-imperialism is the given position. Crossan and Reed 
were educated into this same culture, but their American eyes have turned 
a critical gaze toward the USA. These are self-critical eyes, but they are still 
the same culturally American eyes in search of freedom from tyranny. Europe 
trusts more in the centralized state, although it has had its own turmoils. It is 
noteworthy that the Declaration blames the king of Great Britain for establish-
ing “an absolute tyranny.” Such hard words naturally had a reason within the 
historical situation in which they were composed, but they also reflect certain 
differences in the political culture on both the western and eastern banks of 
the Atlantic Ocean.
This difference is especially true when the USA is compared to Northern 
Europe, where the Lutheran political tradition recognizes Romans 13:1–7 as 
one of the culturally key texts, which repels any revolutionary spirit.9 To my 
Northern European eyes, the US Declaration of Independence resembles 
the constitution proposed by the Finnish revolutionaries in 1918. They were 
inspired by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and stated in their constitution 
that, should the parliament remove the constitution, “let the people arise and 
dissolve that parliament.”10 The similarity between the US Declaration and the 
Finnish red constitution is not accidental. Besides the fact that the authors 
of the red constitution consulted US constitutional documents,11 they both 
belong to the apocalyptic tradition. The presence of apocalyptic themes in 
9    Nelson 2017, 87–105; Huttunen 2019.
10   § 43 (my translation from Finnish).
11   Rinta-Tassi 1986, 330.
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American political culture is conspicuous,12 like it is in Marxism. The Marxist 
philosophy of history is a secularized modification of Jewish-Christian 
apocalypticism.13 Even the sentiments sound similar, as the anarchist Emma 
Goldman once noted when intuitively depicting the Bolsheviks as puritans: 
“The Bolsheviki were social puritans who sincerely believed that they alone 
were ordained to save mankind.”14 Americans and Bolsheviks are in many 
respects strange bedfellows, but the revolutionary tendency to oppose the 
powers that be is similar. Northern Europe has been a hard soil for such 
tendencies. The religious heritage of Romans 13:1–7 resulted in the fact that—
borrowing the words of Anthony F. Upton—“from the Finnish revolution 
some vital spark was missing.”15 Revolution is an anomaly in Finnish political 
culture, and in the other Nordic countries revolution never broke out. To me, 
therefore, the anti-imperial reading appears somewhat strange.
After recognizing the differences between the political traditions on both 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean, it probably comes as no surprise that European 
scholars are somewhat critical toward the anti-imperial reading of the New 
Testament. The Belgian scholar Joseph Verheyden notes that in the anti-imperial 
readings there is a risk of interpreting specific passages too exclusively “in light 
of the overall thesis at the cost of obscuring the immediate context in which 
a particular passage occurs.” Verheyden gives an elaborate example of an anti-
imperial interpretation of the yoke analogy in the Gospel of Matthew (11:28–30). 
He concludes that the result is “too simplistic” and that “early Christianity can-
not be captured under this sole header,” namely anti-imperialism.16 In a similar 
vein, Outi Lehtipuu and Michael Labahn, the European editors of People under 
Power, describe the essays in the book as follows:
The task of the present volume is to show that the topic is more compli-
cated than often assumed and that relations between the empire and the 
12   See, e.g., Jewett and Lawrence 2003.
13   See, e.g., Zimdars-Schwartz and Zimdars-Schwartz 1998, 286–289; Baumgartner 1999, 
201–202. Boer (2010; 2012, 289–290) is somewhat suspicious of this view, but I think that 
the numerous similarities in the apocalyptic and Marxist visions of history cannot be 
accidental. Boer notes that Engels’ interest in Revelation had not so much to do with 
the historical vision but the revolutionary spirit. I have no reason to doubt this claim. 
However, I guess that the Marxist philosophy of history finds its apocalyptic roots through 
several adaptations. Hegel was the immediate predecessor.
14   Goldman 1923, 112.
15   Upton 1980, 395. I just need to add that in the 1930s, the Nordic countries were resis-
tant also to right-wing politics. The Nazis received acceptance in the multi-confessional 
Germany, but not in the Nordic countries (Nelson 2017, 100–104).
16   Verheyden 2014, xvi–xxi.
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Jews and Christians living within its limits cannot simply be described 
in terms of conflict, clash, and opposition. As several recent studies have 
made clear, early Christianity and early Judaism were diverse movements 
that included various versions of how to be and live as a Christian or Jew. 
The attitudes toward the Empire also varied and differed both geographi-
cally and temporally. There is no such thing as the Christian or the Jewish 
response to imperial rule and ideology. The attitudes of peasants living in 
the Roman Galilee, for example, were not the same as those of the urban 
dwellers living outside of the region who wrote about them. The further 
the Jesus movement expanded, the more diversified it became, while reac-
tions toward the Roman authorities proliferated. Moreover, the Roman 
world was no less diverse; the faces of the empire did not look the same for 
all its inhabitants. This profound diversity is mirrored in manifold ways 
in the ancient sources and is also reflected in the essays of this volume.17
European scholars seem to be much more cautious with the anti-imperial 
interpretations than the Americans.18 However, it would also be a mistake to 
pass anti-imperial readings off as pure eisegesis. One can even find sympathy 
for anti-imperial readings from surprising quarters. For example, Leopold von 
Ranke, who is famous for the paradigm he introduced into subsequent his-
torical research, supported an anti-imperial reading. Ranke was a conservative 
thinker who had been ennobled by the Prussian king and had no apparent 
reason to introduce an anti-imperial agenda into the New Testament texts. In 
his writings, however, he constructed a political problem at the center of early 
Christianity. Obedience toward the Empire and toward the Kingdom of God 
ran into an undeniable conflict, Ranke claims.19
Denying the anti-imperial potential of the New Testament is meaningless, 
because right at the heart of Christianity lies a person executed by the Roman 
authorities. In his First Letter to the Corinthians, Paul prefers to know noth-
ing but “Jesus Christ, him crucified.” He continues by proclaiming that it was 
“the rulers of this age” who “crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Cor 2:2,8). However, 
with the power structure changing, Paul is convinced that Christ is alive and 
he will give the kingdom to God after destroying “every ruler and every author-
ity and power” (1 Cor 15:24). This is not only an anti-Roman claim. This is an 
17   Lehtipuu and Labahn 2015, 9. I would like to mention Anders Klostergaard Petersen’s 
(2015) chapter in People under Power, as it elegantly exemplifies balanced cautiousness 
toward anti-imperial readings.
18   There are surely exceptions to this European/American divide (see, e.g., Harrill 2011), but 
it does indeed reflect a general pattern.
19   Ranke 1883, 182, 184.
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anti-imperial claim, anarchistically directed against any political use of power, 
“the normalcy of civilization itself,” as Crossan and Reed put it in the epigraph 
that heads this chapter. This did not remain the case only at the theoretical level 
but was realized in actual tensions with the contemporary political powers of 
the day. Paul was put to death in Rome, and this was not an isolated incident. 
Even non-Christian sources report on tensions between the early Christians 
and Roman society. Describing Nero’s persecution in Rome in the 60s CE, 
Tacitus maintains that the Emperor falsely blamed Christians for the burning 
of the city, but that Christians got what they deserved anyway (Tacitus, Ann. 
15.44). Suetonius praises Nero’s response as a good action (Nero 16). And Pliny 
the Younger reports on his problems with Christians in Asia Minor (Ep. 10.96).20
Both the Christian and the Roman sources demonstrate the real ten-
sions that existed between Christians and Roman society. Therefore, aside 
from some overly daring interpretations of single statements exemplified 
by Verheyden, what—if anything—is unsound or amiss in the anti-imperial 
readings? I claim that the overall thesis is too daring: the early Christians and 
Roman society were not in constant tension. Even according to Verheyden, 
the picture is a “much more colourful one and cannot fully be grasped under 
this one perspective.”21 In other words, the early Christians were not only anti-
imperial. There is also much evidence of pro-imperial perspectives in the 
early Christian sources.22 How can this be understood? Were there different 
kinds of Christians? Absolutely. Commenting on the anti-Roman message in 
Revelation, Henk Jan de Jonge puts it as follows:
The anti-Roman stance of the author of Revelation need not be taken as 
representative of early Christianity in Ephesus, or in Asia, or in Anatolia, 
at the beginning of the second century CE. On the contrary, 1 Peter 2:13–17 
… and 1 Tim. 2:2, possibly also written in Ephesus at the beginning of the 
second century, show that when Revelation was written, other Christians 
in Asia Minor succeeded in coming to terms with Rome. That was 
indeed the more usual attitude of Christians towards Rome, at least in 
20   Cook (2010) presents a careful reading of these texts. It may be added that the historicity 
of Nero’s persecution has been recently questioned by Shaw (2015, 2018), but without suc-
cess (Jones 2017; van der Lans and Bremmer 2017). From my point of view, it is essential 
to note that the accounts themselves attest to tensions at least in Tacitus’ own time in the 
beginning of the second century. Even Shaw does not deny this.
21   Verheyden 2014, xxii.
22   Boer 2012, 293: “We do not find that the Bible and theology are squarely with the oppres-
sors and powers-that-be, nor do we find it gives voice solely to the aspirations of the 
downtrodden. Rather, in that vast mix of literature and thought, we find both.”
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the first century CE, as appears from Paul (Rom. 13:1–7), Mark (12:17), and 
1 Clement (61:1–2).23
One can even find pro- and anti-imperial tendencies expressed by a single 
author. I remarked on the difference between Paul’s sayings in Romans and 
in 1 Corinthians above. On the other hand, in the Book of Revelation, Christ 
finally gets the upper hand as a military conqueror, which bears a striking 
resemblance to Roman ideology. Thus, it is a simplification to label early 
Christianity, the New Testament, or even an individual author anti- or pro-
imperial. How might this tension in political attitudes be resolved or explained? 
John S. Kloppenborg has made several helpful observations based on postcolo-
nial studies. His material deals with the figure of the Judge in Q, but his insights 
bear a more general validity. Kloppenborg notes that the imitation of the dom-
inant discourse by the subaltern has two functions. First, “the subaltern adopts 
the language of the dominant culture in order to reduce alterity.” Kloppenborg 
presents Romans 13:1–7 as an example. Second, the imitation of the dominant 
discourse is incomplete. By partial imitation, the subaltern “both disguises her-
self as compliant, and creates room for identity in a new discursive space.”24 
I argue that the anti-imperial reading of the New Testament cannot grasp this 
complexity. It is too indulgent of a strict opposition between the oppressor 
and the oppressed to do justice to the varied modes of contact between the 
hegemonic and the non-hegemonic. It narrows this interaction into a conflict. 
In her Imperial Eyes, Mary Louise Pratt prefers the term “contact zone” to make 
room for the agency of the dominated:
By using the term “contact,” I aim to foreground the interactive, impro-
visational dimensions of colonial encounters so easily ignored or 
suppressed by diffusionist accounts of conquest and domination. A “con-
tact” perspective emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by their 
relations to each other. It treats the relations … not in terms of separated-
ness or apartheid, but in terms of copresence, interaction, interlocking 
understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical rela-
tions of power.25
One can easily see that in Romans 13, Paul is addressing an audience that does 
not have authority within the state. The addressees are subjects, like Paul 
23   De Jonge 2002, 140.
24   Kloppenborg 2014, 181.
25   Pratt 1995, 7.
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himself, “within radically asymmetrical relations of power.” Yet, Paul does not 
offer resistance as a cure. Instead, he creates a new discursive space. This is 
what Pratt calls “autoethnography” or “autoethnographic expression.” She 
uses “these terms to refer to instances in which colonized subjects undertake 
to represent themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer’s own terms.” 
Autoethnographic texts are constructed in response to or in dialogue with 
the colonizing representations.26 My aim is to show how Paul’s thoughts in 
Romans 13 interact with Greco-Roman mainstream thinking. His admonition 
to obey is a piece of political realism in a society where opposition would have 
led to disaster. However, Paul creates a discursive space where a Christian 
identity can breathe and keep distance from the authorities. His message was 
neither that of a political revolutionary, nor that of an eager loyalist. I ques-
tion the paradigm of polar opposites; I question that the early Christians were 
either resisting the authorities or conforming to them. There are many more 
positions, which I gather under the concept of “recognition.” Here I follow the 
heuristic findings of Risto Saarinen in his recent book Recognition and Religion. 
Recognition describes a situation in which the parties can come to terms with 
each other in several ways, that is, without full agreement. Recognition resem-
bles tolerance, but these concepts are not synonymous:
While both recognition and toleration assume a lasting disagreement 
between two or more parties, the attitude of recognizing another per-
son or group typically means something ‘more’ than mere toleration. 
This ‘more’ may consist in a commitment to work together, respect other 
convictions, and approve a general societal or ideological framework in 
which the coexistence takes place.27
Recognition does not have the prerequisite that the parties be equal. Instead, 
there are cases of downward and upward recognition.28 Upward recogni-
tion is an act of submission to an authority, something that clearly happens 
in Romans 13. This is important for my study, because Christians were clearly in 
the minor position in the vast Empire; they granted recognition to the author-
ities and the society of which they were a part. At the same time, however, 
they sought recognition for themselves. Moreover, recognition can be medi-
ated, such that the parties cannot recognize each other but they recognize a 
26   Pratt 1995, 7 (original emphasis).
27   Saarinen 2016, 1.
28   Saarinen 2016, 32–33, 35–36.
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third party, which can be, for example, a person or set of rules.29 For instance, 
Christians could be recognized as a philosophical school and, thus, in such a 
way, they were able to find a position in Greco-Roman culture, although the 
content of their thoughts was not recognized on their own merit. In this case, 
philosophy is mediating the recognition. Finally, one should note that the pro-
cess of recognition does not always appear in concepts or conceptions, but also 
within actual practices.30 An example of recognition in practice is Christians 
who were in service to the Roman imperial army. Service itself proved recogni-
tion of the Empire from the side of the Christian soldiers, while the Empire 
recognized the Christian soldiers as its legitimate servants. As a heuristic tool, 
the concept of recognition is employed to avoid black-and-white interpreta-
tions of Christian-Empire relationships. The alternatives are not only full 
denial and full acceptance but much more in-between these two extremes. 
In this book, I discuss the relationship between the early Christians and the 
Roman Empire on three levels: cultural, political, and practical.
In Chapter 2, I concentrate on the cultural level. There is a long tradition 
attempting to split Christian religiosity from ancient philosophy. In contrast 
to that, I show that the contact zone between them was not only hostile, but 
also a place for mutual recognition. In section 1 of this chapter, I concentrate 
on some non-Christian philosophers of the second century. A close read-
ing of the accounts of Christians by Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Lucian, and 
Galen leads me to the conclusion that these philosophers saw Christians in 
the category of philosophers. In this way, they recognized Christians as a rival 
philosophical school and a legitimate group in society. The recognition was 
real, despite the fact that the philosophers found deficiencies in Christian 
teachings. In section 2, I claim that non-Christian philosophers recognized 
Christians as philosophers, after the latter sought recognition as such. I start 
with Tertullian’s famous sentence on Athens and Jerusalem. Its heightened 
antagonism between ancient philosophy and Christianity should be seen as 
a rhetorical exaggeration. I claim that Tertullian’s sentence describes neither 
his own position nor that of the biblical passages (Acts 17, Col 2) he uses to 
warrant the antagonism. I also show how Paul’s words against human wisdom 
in 1 Corinthians 1–2 participate in the contemporary philosophical discourse 
of the day, although scholars have routinely read the text as a misrecognition of 
philosophy. Later in the same epistle, in 1 Corinthians 7, Paul shows clear affini-
ties with Stoicism. I conclude that philosophical elements are present already 
in the earliest Christian documents and, thus, philosophy forms a recognized 
29   Saarinen 2016, 33, 41.
30   Saarinen 2016, 34–35.
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part of the Christian identity, not a later lapse from pristine piety, as Tertullian 
and others have claimed.
In Chapter 3, I deal with the political level, including the theme I have 
already touched on above. I take a fresh look at Romans 13:1–7 and put it 
into the context of ancient political philosophy. Instead of looking for the 
ancient theories of ideal kings and political structures, I look at how ancient 
people constructed sources of power. I claim that the context of Paul’s words 
on earthly authorities is the law of the stronger that has permeated ancient 
texts for centuries. The readers of Paul have always seen the theological edge: 
authorities are instituted by God. One has less often discussed how the institu-
tion can be identified. What is the hallmark of God’s institution? In the social 
reality, it is the sword. According to the law of the stronger, power is a witness 
of divine favor. Paul seems to follow this pattern, providing a Jewish variant, 
which is also known from Josephus. There are no Roman gods, but rather the 
God of Israel showing His favor for the Empire. This was a theological expli-
cation for the ruthless political realism, with brutal force being the leading 
factor in political life. On the other hand, this was not all that Paul said on 
the topic. In reality, he was a kind of Christian anarchist waiting for the end 
of all human hierarchies. This eschatological expectation reflected by intra-
Christian morals and, during the centuries, the larger society. In this way, at 
least some eschatological hopes, which Marxists have criticized as a fantasy, 
have been gradually realized. This is the paradox of political quietism. In turn, 
the Marxist revolutions which ideologically stemmed from apocalypticism 
and aimed at realizing its hopes resulted in oppressive empires. I have framed 
this chapter around a discussion with Marxists and anarchists. I also note the 
ways that scholars and general audiences have tried to cope with the unlimited 
obedience of authorities required by Romans 13:1–7.
Chapter 4 deals with the practical level of recognition. This represents a vast 
area of topics to be studied. However, I have chosen to focus on the problem 
of Christian soldiers. What do we know of them in the first two centuries and 
what was their position among the early Christians? This part of my study is 
a voice from the margins, as there is little discussion on the topic, apart from 
the modern ethical discourse often lacking understanding of the ancient social 
world and the army as part of it. In section 1 of this chapter, I read the mili-
tary characters presented in the gospels as part of the ancient social world. 
Unlike most modern studies seem to assume, military characters in the texts 
do not aim to present a moral stance vis-à-vis military service as such. They 
may reveal something about this matter, too, but this is not their function in 
the narrative. I suggest, rather, that the main factor in understanding military 
figures is the difference between rank-and-file soldiers and centurions. In the 
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ancient sources, the former are mainly negative figures and the latter positive 
ones. The gospels seem to repeat this general view. This division was depen-
dent on how the civil population experienced soldiers in their everyday life. 
The modern moral discussion has also narrowed the view on soldiers, as it has 
failed to see that the role of the army was broader than that of modern armies. 
This is not to say that there was never any moral discussion on military service 
in early Christianity. As I show in section 2 of chapter 4, many literate early 
Christian theologians shared the evasive or negative attitude of the philosoph-
ical authors of the time. Their statements should not be read as the Christian 
statements. Actually, they often betray the fact that some Christians served in 
the army and thereby recognized the Roman Empire on the practical level of 
their daily life. Despite occasional tensions, the army seemed more or less to 
recognize its Christian soldiers as legitimate servants of the Empire.
In the final chapter, I summarize the main results of my study. The aim of 
this book is to propose a balance against the black-and-white claims of resis-
tance and conformism. The political history of the early Christians cannot be 
reduced into the positions of anti- or pro-imperialism. I claim that recognition 
is a good concept with which to analyze the variegated modes of interaction 
between the Roman Empire and the early Christians.
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chapter 2
Imperial Recognition in the Intellectual Sphere: 
Christians and Philosophers
1 Almost Philosophers: Pagan Philosophers Recognizing Christians
The earliest Roman sources on Christians are dated to the beginning of the 
second century. Three famous accounts of Christians are quoted repeatedly: 
Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny the Younger. In their view, Christianity is a crimi-
nal superstition. In this chapter, I argue that these authors present only one 
side of the coin. Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Lucian, and Galen provide more 
positive accounts. Thus, the image of Christians among ancient pagans was 
not a purely negative one; in a sense, they recognized Christianity as belonging 
to the category of philosophy.
Tacitus’ Annals contain a well-known account of Emperor Nero’s perse-
cutions. Tacitus calls Christianity “the deadly superstition,” one among “the 
shocking and shameful things” which flow into the city of Rome. He explains 
that the Christians were “hated for their crimes” and reports that they were 
brought to trial for hatred of the human race. Tacitus admits that Nero made 
the Christians scapegoats in order to deflect the scandalous rumors surround-
ing him. In the same breath, Tacitus adds that the Christians really “were guilty 
and deserving of the most unusual exemplary punishments” (Ann. 15.44.2–5).
The claim of Christianity as superstition recurs in Suetonius’ book The Lives 
of the Twelve Caesars. While Suetonius lists Nero’s evil deeds, he also mentions 
the good ones. Among these, he lists the fact that “punishment was inflicted 
on the Christians, a class of men given to a new and mischievous supersti-
tion” (Nero 16.2; trans. Rolfe, LCL).1 The third Roman author recurrently 
quoted is Pliny the Younger. As a propraetor of the province of Bithynia and 
Pontus, he had to handle legal procedures against local Christians. Pliny seems 
to be conscious that they are not guilty of grave crimes, and he is somewhat 
uncomfortable with his task. Pliny, however, sees Christianity as a “corrupt and 
1   According to another passage, which is often presented as a reference to Christ (Claudius 
5.25), a certain Chrestus has caused disturbances among the Jews, but it is not clear if 
Chrestus actually means Christ or not (for the differing views, see, e.g., Benko 1980, 1056–1059; 
Thorsteinsson 2003, 92–96; Cook 2010, 11–28). Whatever the case may be, it does not change 
the picture of Christians that Suetonius gives in Nero 16.
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immoderate superstition,” a kind of disease, which menaces the traditional 
cults but which can be remedied. He is ready to punish the pure “defiance and 
inflexible obstinacy” of Christians which he also calls “madness” (amentia) 
(Ep. 10.96).
John Granger Cook has written an excellent book, Roman Attitudes Towards 
Christians: From Claudius to Hadrian, where he extensively analyzes these 
three and some other Roman texts on Christians. In the introduction, Cook 
suggests that the concept of “othering” is useful for understanding the relation-
ship between the Romans and the Christians. He continues: “There were some 
Roman intellectuals and officials who viewed (‘constructed’) the Christians as 
‘the other’—a novum that they comprehended with difficulty.”2 Cook formu-
lates this “otherness” of Christianity:
Probably the Roman intellectuals and governors like Tacitus and Pliny 
were so disgusted at the phenomenon of Christianity that they lacked the 
inclination to make any profound explorations into the nature of early 
Christian faith, morality, and ritual practice. What I have sought to do 
during this project is develop a sympathy for the Romans’ shock when 
they had to deal with this ‘other’—these Christians who were so difficult 
to conceive using the categories they were familiar with.3
Cook’s view of Christians as “others” is fully justified. Tacitus, Suetonius, and 
Pliny attest that the Romans had a tendency to count Christianity among 
the dangerous superstitions. Cook’s presentation, however, has a deficiency: 
it presumes that “otherness” is always coupled with a negative image of 
the “other.” This is not the case. “Otherness” mirrors the identity of the observer; 
“other” demarcates what the observer is not. For example, Tacitus, Suetonius, 
and Pliny portrayed Christianity as a superstition—something that they did 
not think that they themselves held. Yet, although the indications of otherness 
tend to be negative, they can also be neutral or even laudatory.4 “Otherness,” 
therefore, is not a purely negative category.
Images of others can contain positive elements, “depending on the relation-
ship between the subject of the image and the examiner’s hopes, interests, or 
fears and what the environmental circumstances, such as the political and 
economic factors, are at each given time.”5 The reasons can be even purely 
2   Cook 2010, 2; see Barclay 2014, 323–324.
3   Cook 2010, 2.
4   Rauhala 2013, 286.
5   Fält 2008, 41.
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rhetorical. For example, in Romans 1, Paul provides a picture of the pagans as a 
massa perditionis. In Romans 2, he turns the critical view toward the Jews and 
blames them, for example, by claiming that some pagans, unconsciously ful-
filling the requirements of the Law, are better than Jews transgressing the Law 
they know (Rom. 2:14–29).6 Thus, Paul’s view of pagans is turned on its head in 
consecutive chapters. Early Christian theologians, who usually labeled pagans 
negatively, could present images of good pagans.7
Similarly, pagans did not always present only negative images of Christians. 
Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny provide only a partial sample of the whole. When 
looking at philosophical accounts, one can find more relaxed attitudes.8 While 
far from promoting Christianity, they can nonetheless see some positive traits 
in Christians. I will take a look at the Stoic Epictetus, the Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius, the satirist Lucian, and Galen, the famous physician and philosopher. 
Their images of Christians contain positive elements. The chief indication is 
the fact that Christians are assessed in the category of philosophers—albeit 
with certain limitations.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to Epictetus, who is the earliest 
and perhaps the most interesting case. I claim that there is still much mate-
rial left out of the scholarly discussion. The latter section is devoted to Marcus 
Aurelius, Lucian, and Galen, who were roughly contemporary with each other.
1.1 Epictetus: Fearless People in Sympathy with Their Words
The earliest philosopher to speak of Christians is the Stoic Epictetus (ca. 50– 
130). His Discourses and Enchiridion were written just at the beginning of the 
second century.9 It is possible—but far from certain—that Epictetus knew 
Christians from his childhood in Hierapolis, Asia Minor, where there was a 
Christian community (according to Colossians 4:13). Born as a slave, Epictetus 
was sold to Rome, where he had close contacts to the court of Nero in the 
60s CE.10 We can suppose that he knew about Nero’s persecution of Christians 
(Tacitus, Ann. 15.44; Suetonius, Nero 16.2).11 Epictetus studied Stoic philosophy 
under the Stoic Musonius Rufus, the most distinguished Roman philosopher of 
his time. After gaining his freedom, Epictetus started his own career as a teacher 
of philosophy. Possibly in the ’80s or ’90s, he resettled in Nicopolis, which 
6    Räisänen 1987, 97–109.
7    See, e.g., Kahlos 2008 and Tervahauta 2013.
8    See Wilken 1980, 108.
9    For Epictetus’ life and works, see Huttunen 2009, 4–5, and the literature cited there.
10   Millar (1965) has helpfully gathered the evidence of these contacts.
11   This requires the historicity of the persecution recently questioned by Shaw (2015, 2018), 
but whose view has not gained ground (Jones 2017; van der Lans and Bremmer 2017).
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today is situated close in Greece to the Albanian border; there he founded a 
school which became quite famous and attracted students of wealthy fami-
lies. Nicopolis is also mentioned in the New Testament (Tit 3:12), but it is not 
certain if there was a Christian community during Epictetus’ lifetime. The city 
was an important harbor on the way to Rome, however, which hardly escaped 
Christian influence.12
Epictetus never unambiguously speaks of Christians, but—as I will show—
two passages actually mention them: Discourses 2.9.19–21 and 4.7.6. In his 
profound study, Cook addresses the latter briefly,13 while the former he does 
not mention at all. His procedure is indicative of a more general tendency in 
the scholarship. The scholarly negligence is due to Adolf Bonhöffer’s classic 
Epiktet und das Neue Testament (1911), which deals with parallel texts in depth 
but delivers only a short discussion on Discourses 4.7.6, while glossing the 
other passage with superficial references.14 Bonhöffer refuted all attempts to 
find Christian influences in Epictetus’ texts. His main goal of attack, however, 
was Theodor Zahn’s inaugural speech as a vice-principal of the University 
of Erlangen. In this speech, Zahn proposed that Epictetus knew of the New 
Testament writings and embraced ideas from it, “as long as … not in contrast 
to his dogma.”15
Zahn emphasized that Epictetus differed from Christians on many points, 
and “he did not become a Christian, because he was a Stoic and wished to 
die as a Stoic.” He was not even a friend of Christianity or Christians.16 Even 
this moderate statement was too much for Bonhöffer. Zahn claimed that 
Epictetus’ views were not fully coherent, basically due to the inconsisten-
cies in the old Stoic theory but strengthened because of non-Stoic influences. 
Bonhöffer defended Epictetus’ consistency, and in a detailed analysis—partly 
based on an article by Franz Mörth, who had already criticized Zahn—shot 
down every sporadic parallel Zahn presented as a proof of Christian influences 
on Epictetus. A few years after Bonhöffer’s Epiktet und das Neue Testament, 
Douglas S. Sharp published his Epictetus and the New Testament. Sharp con-
cluded that “it is doubtful whether Epictetus was acquainted with the New 
Testament,” the linguistic similarities being mostly due to the fact that both 
were written in the koine of their time. The case was closed, and Bonhöffer 
12   For the character of the city, see, e.g., Quinn 1990, 255.
13   Cook 2010, 173.
14   Bonhöffer 1911, 41–44, 72, 273.
15   Zahn 1895, 29; my translation.
16   Zahn 1895, 33–34; my translation.
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became the main authority of the consensus since then. Scholars routinely 
refer to Bonhöffer’s classic work on the matter.17
A recent example of Bonhöffer’s authority is A. A. Long’s magnificent 
monograph on Epictetus. Long’s subject is not Epictetus’ relationship toward 
Christians, and it is understandable that he addresses the theme in passing. 
Long supposes that Epictetus mentions Christians,18 but he shares Bonhöffer’s 
view of the very remote relationship between Epictetus’ thinking and the New 
Testament: “Notwithstanding striking verbal parallels, there is no strong reason 
to think that one has directly influenced the other.”19 As we see here, the discus-
sion on Epictetus’ view of Christians continues to be steered by Bonhöffer still 
in the 21st century. Without questioning Bonhöffer’s great merits, one should 
nonetheless be judicious when approaching his work. In a response to Rudolf 
Bultmann’s article which questions Epictetus’ Stoic orthodoxy, Bonhöffer 
claims in an offended tone that his scholarly life’s work was dedicated to prove 
that Epictetus presents “the pure, the genuine and the coherent theory of the 
old Stoicism.”20 Here we see his tendency, which is later questioned. Long 
points out that, despite the fact that Bonhöffer’s works are “indispensable for 
close study of Epictetus’ relation to the Stoic tradition … they tend to overem-
phasize his doctrinal orthodoxy.”21
I claim that Bonhöffer’s tendency also affects his assessment of the pas-
sages on Christians. It is surprising how briefly he comments on Discourses 
2.9.19–21 and 4.7.6. It is especially eye-catching that he does not comment 
on the word πάθος, which occurs in the former passage with a positive con-
notation. I will later come back to this term below, but here it is enough to 
note that the Stoics understood it in the negative sense. Bonhöffer claims that 
17   For the significance of Bonhöffer’s view in terms of subsequent studies, see Hersbell 
1989, 2161. Spanneut (1962, 630–631) lists the scholars who have considered it possible 
that Epictetus did encounter some Christian influence. Recently, Simon Gathercole 
(2017, 280–282) has treated Discourses 4.7.6 in three pages, which is more than usual. 
He addresses Discourses 2.9.19–21 in a footnote, but notes it as “a fascinating section.” 
Surprisingly, Gathercole does not mention Bonhöffer at all.
18   Long 2002, 17, 110.
19   Long 2002, 35.
20   “Ich darf wolhl darauf hinweisen, daß meine wissenschaftliche Lebensarbeit 
hauptsächlich dem Nachweis gewidmet ist, daß wir dem kostbaren Vermächtnis, das uns 
Arrian von seinem Lehrer hinterlassen hat, im wesentlichen die reine, unverfälschte und 
konsequente Lehre der alten Stoa, deren ursprüngiche Zeugnisse uns fast ganz verloren 
gegangen sind, vor uns haben” (Bonhöffer 1912, 282; partial English translation above 
by me).
21   Long 2002, 36.
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
17Imperial Recognition in the Intellectual Sphere
“Epictetus’ conception of the essence and the origin of the πάθη is completely 
similar to the old and the genuine Stoicism.”22 Surprisingly, he does not dis-
cuss Discourses 2.9.20 in his lengthy chapter on the passions. I cannot avoid 
having the impression that a profound discussion on Epictetus’ references to 
the Christians would have contributed toward ruining the rigid view of Stoic 
orthodoxy. As this view is relativized today, one can be open to a more relaxed 
assessment of Epictetus’ relationship with early Christianity.
In the following, I first analyze Discourses 4.7.6, as it is a more clear case. 
Then I proceed to Discourses 2.9.19–21, before concluding with suggestions for 
further study. In both passages, Epictetus seems to link Christians to Judaism 
in a way that has continuously confused scholars. A close reading of these two 
passages shows that against all suspicions they do speak of Christians and 
that Epictetus knew something about Christians as a distinct group, as well 
as their teachings. In addition to attesting to the fact that Epictetus spoke of 
Christians, analysis of these two passages is significant in several ways. First, I 
will demonstrate that Epictetus borrowed some expressions from Christians. 
This opens a discussion that Bonhöffer and some others closed a full century 
ago: because Epictetus cited Christian expressions, there may be more of them 
in the Discourses. This presents a path for further study. Second, the analysis 
contributes to our knowledge of early Christianity. Epictetus has been under-
estimated as a source for early Christianity until now, despite the fact that his 
texts are contemporary with much of the New Testament and many other of 
the earliest Christian writings. Third, a close reading of these passages reveals 
that the Roman attitude toward Christians was not hostile only, but that there 
was room for more relaxed assessments than what Epictetus’ contemporaries 
Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny provided.
1.1.1 Christians as Fearless Galileans
In Discourses 4.7, Epictetus speaks of fearlessness and makes a throwaway 
remark on fearless Galileans. The discourse begins with a description of 
uncomprehending children and maniacs who do not fear a tyrant, his guards, 
and their swords. Lack of comprehension or madness explains fearlessness in 
the face of these threats (section 1–5). Then, Epictetus proceeds with other 
bases of fearlessness.
22   “Epictets Ansicht über das Wesen und den Ursprung der πάθη entspricht vollständig den 
Anschauungen der Alten, echten Stoa” (Bonhöffer 1890, 278; my English translation).
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εἶτα ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτως διατεθῆναι πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ 
Γαλιλαῖοι· ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πάντα 
πεποίηκεν τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ.
Therefore, if madness can produce this attitude of mind toward the things 
which have just been mentioned, and also habit, as with the Galilaeans, 
cannot reason and demonstration teach a man that God has made all 
things in the universe …? 
Disc. 4.7.6; trans. Oldfather, LCL
The reference to God, who has made all things, begins a long argumentation 
(sections 6–11) having the aim of proving that one can philosophically justify 
fearlessness. Epictetus recommends just the philosophical version of fearless-
ness. Children, maniacs, and Galileans are nothing but the starting point of his 
argumentation: as they are not afraid of tyrants, guards, and swords, fear or 
fearlessness cannot be conditioned by these outer circumstances but by the 
persons themselves. Thus, Epictetus reasons, it is meaningful to seek a philo-
sophical state of mind that enables fearlessness. He mentions Galileans only 
incidentally, however, without displaying any further interest in them.
At least in the Middle Ages, Galileans were understood as a reference to 
Christians. A Christian commentator, possibly Arethas of Caesarea (9th–10th 
century), noted: “I said above that he seems to have read the Gospels. Now he, 
however, remembers the Christians themselves though it was not unavoidable. 
The Lacedaemonians did nothing less.”23 For the commentator, the reference 
to Galileans seems to attest to his (or her?) earlier assumption that Epictetus 
had read the Gospels. The assumption was based on Discourses 3.22.53, which 
provides a close analogy with Jesus’ command to express love toward the 
enemy.24 Though Bonhöffer denied any Christian influence on Epictetus’ phi-
losophy, he did not deny that Epictetus knew of the existence of Christians. 
According to Bonhöffer, Galileans meant Christians, and most scholars have 
subsequently held that as a self-evident fact.25 Eduard Meyer also considered 
another alternative: Galileans stood for Zealots. Meyer denied this correla-
tion, as one cannot reliably explain why Epictetus would incidentally refer to 
23   My translation. Schenkl has published all the Greek comments in his edition on Epictetus. 
On the commentator, see Spanneut 1962, 674–675.
24   The comment is found under Disc. 3.22.58, but it quite certainly addresses the abovemen-
tioned section (Oldfather 1928b, 151 n. 2).
25   Bonhöffer 1911, 41–43; Hartmann 1905, 267; Oldfather 1928a, xxvi; 1928b, 363 n. 1; Stellwag 
1933, 173; Karpp 1954, 1131; Spanneut 1962, 628; Sevenster 1966, 254–255; Benko 1980, 1077; 
1985, 40; Hershbell 1989, 2161; Engberg-Pedersen 2010, 132–133.
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a group that was defeated several decades ago in the Jewish war. Thus, Meyer 
concluded that Galileans must mean Christians.26
Martin Hengel, however, became a powerful spokesman of the “Zealot inter-
pretation.” He cited the fact that Epictetus lived in Rome during the Jewish war, 
where he had an opportunity to get to know details of the conflict in Palestine. 
Hengel also notes that, according to Josephus, the fame of the Jewish resis-
tance movement sicarii—which he lumps together with the Zealots, against 
his own differentiation between these two—became very famous (Bell. 7.409–
421, 433–450).27 It is possible that Epictetus knew about the Zealots. Yet, it is 
very improbable that he would incidentally refer to them. His students would 
hardly have understood such a reference several decades after the Jewish war. 
For the same reason, it is also improbable that Epictetus referred to any other 
Jewish resistance movement during the Jewish war.28
Somewhat more probable is a reference to the sicarii who were still active 
in Egypt and Cyrenaica after the Jewish war, as Josephus has it. In these areas, 
a Jewish uprising broke out in 115 CE, and it may have been contemporary with 
Epictetus’ discourses.29 Arrian, who wrote down Epictetus’ discourses, was 
present in Nicopolis in the first or the second decade of the second century.30 
Thus, in theory, Galileans can mean a group of Jewish rebels who continued the 
tradition of the sicarii. This is nothing but guesswork, however, as we have no 
evidence of this kind of group called Galileans. Later, in the 130s, Bar Kokhba 
spoke of Galileans, but this should apparently be understood as a purely geo-
graphical definition of certain people.31 Moreover, Arrian, the actual author of 
the Discourses, was a student prior to Bar Kokhba’s uprising.
26   Meyer 1923, 530 n. 1.
27   Hengel 1976, 60–61. For differentiation between the sicarii and the Zealots, see Hengel 
1976, 49. Applebaum (1971, 164) had identified Galileans with Zealots before Hengel.
28   Zeitlin (1974) supposes that there was a resistance movement called the Galileans. 
Feldman (1981) has criticized this suggestion.
29   The uprising broke out also in Crete and Syria. See Hengel 1983. Epictetus possibly refers 
to this event when he speaks of “the conflict between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians 
and Romans” (Disc. 1.22.4; trans. Oldfather, LCL). Although there is a question of differ-
ent views on holiness, it is remarkable that Epictetus mentions the parties of the Jewish 
uprising.
30   Hartmann 1905, 254; Long 2002, 38. The actual contribution of Epictetus to the Discourses 
has been widely discussed. Wirth (1967) prefers the view that they are essentially Arrian’s 
production. Some, such as Dobbin (1998, xx–xxiii), prefer the other extreme, claiming 
that the Discourses were written by Epictetus himself, despite Arrian’s claim that he wrote 
them down. Most scholars, Long (2002, 40–41) among them, trust Arrian’s claim.
31   Wise 1992, 605.
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Two second-century Christians, Justin Martyr (Dial. 80) and Hegesippus 
(Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 4.22.7), mention Galileans as a Jewish sect without any 
further qualification. It is temporally possible that Epictetus denotes this sect 
of Galileans. According to the Mishnah, the Galileans criticized the practice of 
putting the name of the governor with the name of Moses on the bill of divorce 
(m. Yad. 4:8). This critical attitude toward the authorities fits well with the 
fearlessness in the face of a tyrant characteristic of the Galileans in Epictetus’ 
reference. Nevertheless, it is improbable that Epictetus meant this Jewish sect. 
The sect should have been famous enough that Epictetus’ incidental reference 
could have been understandable for his students. This was not the case. The 
little information we have on the sect proves the opposite.32
Epictetus’ incidental reference to the Galileans presumes that the group 
is known to the students without further explications, and Christians are the 
clearest candidate for this. Though we have no information of a Christian 
community in Nicopolis during the first decades of the second century, the 
presence of Christians in the town is more than probable. There were Christians 
in other Greek cities and in Rome, and Epictetus had connections to Rome and 
other cities.33 It is much more likely that the Galileans are Christians rather 
than Zealots or members of a Jewish sect called Galileans by Justin, Hegesippus, 
and the Mishnah. Zealots or sect members would have been too remote from 
the students to be instantly recognized from Epictetus’ incidental reference.
Yet, there is one problem in identifying the Galileans as Christians: the desig-
nation “Galileans” itself. The designation unequivocally refers to Christians first 
in the writings of Emperor Julian in the 4th century.34 In the New Testament, 
the designation refers to a person’s birthplace or living place. For example, 
Peter is identified as a Galilean because of his dialect (Matt. 26:69, 73). Also the 
designation of the disciples as ἄνδρες Γαλιλαῖοι (Acts 1:11) should be understood 
as a reference to their birthplace. Philip S. Esler has shed light on the fact that 
groups that have a designation originating in geography also have a connec-
tion to the geographic area. For example, according to Esler, Ἰουδαῖοι should be 
translated as “Judeans,” not “Jews.”35 Geography was also on Julian’s mind when 
32   Hengel (1976, 58–60) claims that the Galileans in the Mishnah refer to the Zealots. If this 
is so, it does not help to identify the Galileans in Epictetus’ text.
33   Hock (1991) has charted Epictetus’ network.
34   Hengel 1976, 60–61. According to a source, the gnostic Valentinus called Christians who 
believed in Christ’s two natures “Galileans.” The source is late, however, and it hardly 
describes Valentinus in a reliable way (Markschies 1992, 270–275).
35   Esler 2003, 40–76. Cohen (1999, 69–101) thinks that “Jews” is an apt translation when the 
connotation is clearly religious, not national.
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he called Christians “Galileans.” Julian’s Neoplatonic worldview underlined the 
local bond of Christianity; it thus denied the universality of Christianity.36
For Epictetus, the designation seemingly does not have any ideological 
significance. Unlike Julian, Epictetus does not particularly resist the group 
of Galileans, but just uses the designation he knows. The designation surely 
betrays a connection to Galilee, but it does not imply that every Galilean 
was born in Galilee. Similarly, “Nazarenes” became a group name which was 
largely divested of its local overtones. In the Book of Acts, “Nazarenes” means 
Christians in general (Acts 24:5) and later it is used in reference to a Jewish 
Christian group.37 Furthermore, the designation “Galileans” seems to have 
turned into a group designation without indicating Galilee as the birthplace 
of its members. It can be easily understood as a nickname for Christians 
in general.
The fact that besides Epictetus’ text the term “Galileans” is not deployed 
as a general term for Christians before the 4th century may justify question-
ing its originality in Epictetus’ text. The text of the Discourses is preserved 
in a medieval manuscript and later copies. One cannot rule out changes in 
the manuscript tradition. In theory, it is possible that a Christian copyist has 
confused another word with the more familiar Galileans. Epictetus speaks of 
Γάλλοι, the priests of Cybele (Disc. 2.20.17), which is the closest to Γαλιλαῖοι in 
the words he uses in the Discourses. Γάλλοι means the priests of Cybele (galli), 
and one could form a cognate, a substantivized adjective Γαλλαῖοι (cf. Suda, 
Lexicon γ 23). According to Epictetus, μανία and wine compel the galli to per-
form what they perform. Epictetus does not qualify the performance, as it is 
apparently familiar to the audience.38 The word μανία is also mentioned in the 
section on the Galileans, but it does not mean religious ecstasy, as in the case of 
galli, but pure foolishness. Moreover, Galileans are characterized on the basis 
of habit, and not by madness. Therefore, it is quite improbable that Γαλιλαῖοι 
was originally Γάλλοι (or Γαλλαῖοι).
Johannes Schweighäuser proposed that the words οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι were origi-
nally a marginal comment and then copied into the text itself. Schweighäuser 
based his solution on Paul, who says that Christianity is nothing but foolish-
ness (μωρία) for the gentiles (1 Cor 1:23). This made Schweighäuser argue that 
Epictetus cannot see the ground of Christian fearlessness on the basis of habit, 
36   Hargis 1999, 117–118; see Gathercole 2017, 281. Quite surprising is Gathercole’s (2017, 
282) claim that an ethnic designation would prove that Epictetus treats the Christians 
as anything like a philosophical school. At least there was a philosophical school called 
Cyrenaics (e.g., Diogenes Laërtius 2.85).
37   For the Nazarenes as a Jewish group, see Luomanen 2005.
38   See Rauhala (2012) on the image of the Cybele cult.
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but on the basis of foolishness. Since the ground is habit in the text, a refer-
ence to the Galileans must be a later emendation.39 More recently, Jonathan 
Barnes has endorsed Schweighäuser’s view.40 Schweighäuser’s argumentation 
is not very cogent. It strangely attributes authority to Paul to define what all 
gentiles thought about Christians. In fact, a gentile could see Christians more 
positively, as is evident in Galen’s account from the late second century. He 
admired the Christian lifestyle and finds fault only in the lack of philosophical 
argumentation.41 A gentile did not necessarily see Christians as errant fools.
There is more scholarly discussion on the originality of the word for habit, 
ἔθος. Many scholars have held it as nothing short of incredible that Epictetus 
would have seen habit as grounds for Christian fearlessness. Contrary to 
Schweighäuser, they have usually maintained the term “Galileans” but emended 
the grounds, namely, the word ἔθος. The earliest emendations are ἀπόνοια 
(insanity) and ἐνθουσιασμός (enthusiasm).42 The latter is a pure guess, lacking 
any basis in Epictetus’ works. The word does not occur in the extant Discourses 
or Encheiridion. The former emendation, ἀπόνοια, is based on the previous sec-
tion (Disc. 4.7.5), where ἀπόνοια is used as a parallel for μανία (ὑπό τινος μανίας 
καὶ ἀπονοίας). There is, however, no similar parallelism in Discourses 4.7.6. The 
grounds for the Galilean fearlessness is an afterthought too far removed from 
the word μανία to create a parallelism. Actually, the syntax requires that the 
grounds for the Galilean fearlessness differs from that of madness. Repeating 
the same grounds (i.e., madness) under another word would be unnecessary 
and confusing.43
There are also some other emendations. One scholar proposes the substan-
tive πειθώ (conviction) instead of ἔθος, because Lucian says that Christians, 
being convinced (πεπείκασι) of immortality, despise death (Lucian, Peregr. 13).44 
Another scholar responds that the neutral conviction—that is, besides 
madness—is as unsatisfactory as habit. Resting on what Pliny the Younger 
(Ep. 10.96) and Marcus Aurelius (Med. 11.3) say about Christians, this second 
scholar finds ἀπείθεια (obstinacy) to be an apt emendation.45 A third scholar 
develops these two considerations. He remarks that Epictetus has a techni-
39   Schweighäuser 1799c, 913–915.
40   Barnes 1997, 63 n. 157.
41   See my discussion on Galen in this chapter.
42   See the textual apparatus in Schenkl’s edition.
43   The parallelism would require that ἀπόνοια is closely connected with μανία. Had Epictetus 
said that the Galilean fearlessness is based on madness, the end of the clause might go: 
εἶτα ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ ἀπονοίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτως διατεθῆναι πρὸς ταῦτα ὡς οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι.
44   Meiser 1910.
45   Corssen 1910.
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cal word for irrational conviction (πάθος) and emends the text with it. He 
argues further that Epictetus characterizes Christians with the same word in 
Discourses 2.9.20.46 All these emendations of ἔθος are highly hypothetical and 
unnecessary. The text is understandable in its textual context and does not 
appreciate Christians in a way that would make questionable a non-Christian 
authorship.47 Syntactically (μέν - δέ) Christians are on the side of the mani-
acs against those whose fearlessness is based on reason and demonstration. 
Thus, Christians are as unphilosophical as maniacs. But this does not mean 
that Christians are maniacs. Actually, Christian fearlessness is not based on 
madness but on habit.48
What, then, is this habit? According to Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Epictetus 
perhaps “means that the Christians were brought up more or less blindly, that 
is, without ‘reason and demonstration’, to have their strange beliefs.”49 As we 
saw, the syntax betrays that Christians are without “reason and demonstra-
tion.” Their beliefs were surely strange to Epictetus. Yet, we can be more precise, 
since ἔθος (‘habit’) and its cognate ἐθίζω are technical terms in his philosophy.50 
According to Epictetus, habit has no unequivocal relationship with rationality 
or irrationality. It means just the thinking and acting we are habituated to. In 
other words, the “normal” decisions and value judgements we make without 
46   Kronenberg 1910. As we will see below, Epictetus speaks of Christians in Disc. 2.9.20, but 
this is not as self-evident as Kronenberg suggests.
47   See the account on Christ in Josephus’ Antiquitates judaicae. The account is surely a 
Christian addition or—if Josephus himself wrote something on Jesus—fully rewritten 
by a Christian. The tone is unmistakably that of a Christian: “About this time there lived 
Jesus, a wise man, if indeed one ought to call him a man. For he was one who wrought 
surprising feats and was a teacher of such people as accept the truth gladly. He won over 
many Jews and many of the Greeks. He was the Messiah. When Pilate, upon hearing him 
accused by men of the highest standing amongst us, had condemned him to be crucified, 
those who had in the first come to love him did not give up their affection for him. On the 
third day he appeared to them restored to life, for the prophets of God had prophesied 
these and countless other marvelous things about him. And the tribe of the Christians, 
so called after him, has still to this day not disappeared” (Josephus, Ant. 18.63–64; trans. 
Feldman, LCL.). Ulrich Victor (2010) defends the authenticity of this passage. While he 
argues with certain success that the words “if indeed one ought to call him a man” is a 
fixed topos in antiquity and that “the Messiah” should be understood as the proper name 
“Christ,” he does not explain how a Jew would admit that prophets were speaking of 
Christ. This idea sounds too Christian to be from Josephus’ pen.
48   Similarly Ramelli 2015, 127.
49   Engberg-Pedersen 2010, 133.
50   It may be added that Epictetus also uses the word ἕξις as an equivalent of ἔθος. For ‘habit’ 
in Epictetus, see Hijmans 1959, 64–65 and Huttunen 2009, 127–128. Gathercole (2017, 282) 
also notes the technical role of habit in philosophy, but for some reason or other he does 
not refer to its use in Epictetus’ works.
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elaborated consideration are based on habit. Everyone has habits developed 
since childhood. Even those who have learned the philosophical truths can 
act against such truths on the basis of habit: “In the course of years we have 
acquired the habit (εἰθίσμεθα) of doing the opposite of what we learn and 
have in use opinions which are the opposite of the correct ones” (Disc. 2.9.14; 
trans. Oldfather, LCL; cf. 3.19.4–6). Thus, the roots of habits are strong. The 
uprooting and the changing of bad habits require hard practical training 
(ἄσκησις) after one has learned theoretical truths (μάθησις) and meditated on 
the practical application of those truths (μελέτη) (cf. Disc. 2.9.13).51 The anti-
dote to bad habits is the opposite habit:
(4) What reinforcements, then, is it possible to find with which to oppose 
habit (ἔθος)? Why, the contrary habit (ἔθος). (5) You hear the common 
folk saying, “That poor man! He is dead; his father perished, and his 
mother; he was cut off, yes, and before his time, and in a foreign land.” 
(6) Listen to the arguments on the other side, tear yourself away from 
these expressions, set over against one habit the contrary habit (τῷ ἔθει τὸ 
ἐναντίον ἔθος). 
Disc. 1.27.4–6; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Epictetus’ text presents nicely how one has to be habituated into a philosophi-
cal value judgment of death. Of practical help are short sentences, or “canons” 
(κανόνες), which crystallize the philosophical principles. One should memo-
rize these in order to have them at hand in practical situations. Epictetus gives 
an example of two canons that are useful “when death appears to be an evil”: 
“It is a duty to avoid evils” and “Death is an inevitable thing” (Disc. 1.27.7; trans. 
W. A. Oldfather, LCL, revised).52
When Epictetus speaks about the habit of the Galileans, he presupposes 
that Christians are brought up to be fearless, either from childhood or after 
their conversion. He also possibly knows that Christians had canons of their 
own.53 For example, Paul presents the sentence “Neither circumcision nor 
uncircumcision is anything; but a new creation is everything!” as a canon 
(Gal. 6:15–16; cf. 1 Cor. 7:19.). Thus, Paul’s canon has nothing to do with fearless-
ness, but 4 Maccabees does speak of such a canon: vicious emotions (πάθη) are 
ruled by those who “philosophize the whole canon of the philosophy” (πρός 
51   For the threefold division, see Bonhöffer 1890, 10; 1894, 147; 1911, 14; Hijmans 1959, 64–68; 
Barnes 1997, 47–48.
52   For the canons in Epictetus, see Newman 1989, 1496–1502.
53   For the use of the word κανών in Christian writings, see, e.g., Beyer 1974.
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ὅλον τὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας κανόνα φιλοσοφῶν), believe in God, and know that it 
is blessed by virtue of enduring all pain (4 Macc 7:21–22; my trans.). Though 
4 Maccabees clearly embraces Stoic ideas,54 Adolf Bonhöffer aptly notes that 
κανών is not at all a distinctively Stoic technical term. He concludes that the 
use of the word in Paul or in 4 Maccabees does not attest to any particular con-
nection between those texts and Epictetus.55
However, Paul makes clear that Christians also used short sentences as 
canons. These canons surely were—as Engberg-Pedersen puts it—“strange 
beliefs” for Epictetus, something which could be lumped together with mad-
ness, but only when compared with “reason and demonstration.” At the same 
time, Engberg-Pedersen acknowledges that these “strange beliefs” were not 
an equivalent to madness in every respect. Christians were so well trained in 
their beliefs that they were actually fearless in front of threats. In Epictetus’ 
ranking, Christian fearlessness is an admirable result, albeit on the wrong 
grounds. While this conclusion does not presume that Epictetus’ knowledge of 
Christians or Christianity was deep, he still seems to know more than he says, 
expecting the same knowledge of his audience. Otherwise a passing reference 
could not be understandable.
Epictetus’ words do not reflect Tacitus’, Suetonius’ or Pliny’s preju-
dices against Christian beliefs as a superstition. Although Epictetus lumps 
Christianity together with madness, this is not a polemical claim. He merely 
points out that Christians are not real philosophers. Their fearlessness is not 
based on madness but on habituation without apt philosophical grounds. 
Actually, he thinks that Christians are as fearless as philosophers should be.
1.1.2 Christians as Real Jews Practice What They Preach
What Epictetus says of Galileans in Discourses 4.7.6 shows that he knew 
Christians as a group of its own. In Discourses 2.9.19–21, he compares Stoics 
to Jews. This connection is not without parallels. For example, Josephus 
compared the Pharisees to the Stoics (Vita 12). Epictetus’ passage, however, 
contains some features that may make the reader ask if Epictetus in fact is 
speaking about Christians. I am not claiming that Epictetus mistook Christians 
as Jews. As I said, Discourses 4.7.6 shows that Epictetus identified Christians as 
comprising a group of their own. On the other hand, Epictetus knew Jews 
54   According to Renehan (1972) and Klostergaard Petersen (2017a, 148), 4 Macc is usually 
seen as vacillating between Stoicism and Platonism. Renehan supposes that this is due 
to the influence of Middle Stoicism. Renehan’s highly erudite article shows verbal simi-
larities with texts which seem to originate with the Middle Stoic philosopher Posidonius. 
Posidonius adapted certain Platonic components into his philosophy.
55   Bonhöffer 1911, 119–120.
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as a people parallel to Syrians and Egyptians (Disc. 1.22.4). Thus, instead of 
claiming that ‘Jews’ in Epictetus’ parlance simply means Christians, I suggest 
a more nuanced relationship between Jews and Christians in his understand-
ing. Epictetus makes a distinction between the Jews and the real Jews. I claim 
that the latter group actually denotes Christians. The distinction is anti-Jewish 
and, thus, it seemingly originates from Christians who claimed to be the real 
heirs of God’s promises. In other words, Discourses 2.9.19–21 reflects Christian 
suprasessionist theology. This is an unexpected detail in a philosophical text of 
the early second century. On the other hand, Epictetus himself does not have 
any deeper interest in the Jewish-Christian relationship. The issue illustrates 
in passing his main point regarding philosophical lifestyle. In the Discourses, 
Epictetus includes details from every branch of life in order to illustrate his 
philosophical teachings. Christians are just one illustrative analogy among 
many others. However, it is interesting that Christians are mentioned at all. 
Moreover, it is important to note that Epictetus had such a close knowledge of 
the Jewish-Christian debate.
The complexities of Discourses 2.9.19–21 require a careful and close reading 
in three stages. First, I prove that scholars have seriously misunderstood the 
passage because of an unnecessary emendation of the text in the standard edi-
tions. I read the original text of the passage and present its message as a part 
of Epictetus teaching. This prepares one to observe details in the second stage, 
where I show that Epictetus uses several loan expressions. Above I mentioned 
that πάθος unexpectedly occurs with a positive meaning. There are also other 
expressions that strikingly differ from Epictetus’ normal parlance. The deviant 
features indicate loans. The third stage is to specify the origin of these loans. 
I give proofs that the loans most probably go back to Christian usage. The 
most indicative is the understanding of baptism as a non-recurrent rite. Jewish 
ablutions were typically recurrent. The Jewish baptism of proselytes was non-
recurrent, but it does not fit with the original text of the passage. While the 
emended text speaks of a non-Jew becoming a Jew, the original text speaks 
of a Jew becoming a real Jew. In the original text, Christian baptism seems to 
be the only explanation for a baptism occurring only one time. In addition 
to the fact that the Christian practice of baptism suits Epictetus’ text, the clos-
est analogies also lie in Christian texts. Now it is time to enter the first stage of 
my analysis.
1.1.2.1 The Passage and Its Message
The passage I am analyzing is an integral part of Discourses 2.9, headed “That 
although we are unable to fulfil the profession of a man, we adopt that of a 
philosopher” (trans. Oldfather, LCL). Epictetus claims that each profession 
(ἐπαγγελία)—for example, that of a carpenter or grammarian—requires 
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conduct corresponding to the profession. The corresponding conduct pre-
serves (σῴζω) the profession while deviant conduct destroys (ἀπολλύμι) it. 
After this general introduction, Epictetus turns to the profession of a philoso-
pher. A Stoic philosopher should live like a philosopher, in harmony with the 
philosophical doctrines. As indicated above, it is not enough to learn philo-
sophical truths, but it is also necessary to meditate on them and practically 
train in them as an antidote to bad habits (Disc. 2.9.13–14). Mere technical dis-
cussion of philosophical doctrines does not make anyone a philosopher.56 In 
this context follows the passage I am going to analyze.
(19) τί γὰρ διαφέρει ταῦτα ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων; τεχνολόγει νῦν 
καθίσας τὰ Ἐπικούρου καὶ τάχα ἐκείνου χρηστικώτερον τεχνολογήσεις. τί 
οὖν Στωικὸν λέγεις σεαυτόν, τί ἐξαπατᾷς τοὺς πολλούς, τί ὑποκρίνῃ Ἰουδαῖος 
ὢν Ἕλληνας; (20) οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς ἕκαστος λέγεται Ἰουδαῖος, πῶς Σύρος, πῶς 
Αἰγύπτιος; καὶ ὅταν τινὰ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα ἴδωμεν, εἰώθαμεν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν 
Ἰουδαῖος, ἀλλ’ ὑποκρίνεται’. ὅταν δ’ ἀναλάβῃ τὸ πάθος τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ 
ᾑρημένου, τότε καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ καλεῖται Ἰουδαῖος. (21) οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς 
παραβαπτισταί, λόγῳ μὲν Ἰουδαῖοι, ἔργῳ δ’ ἄλλο τι, ἀσυμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὸν 
λόγον, μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ λέγομεν, ἐφ’ οἷς ὡς εἰδότες αὐτὰ 
ἐπαιρόμεθα.
(19) For how much better is it to set forth these principles than those of 
the other schools of thought? Sit down now and give a philosophical dis-
course upon the principles of Epicurus, and perhaps you will discourse 
more effectively than Epicurus himself. Why, then, do you call yourself 
a Stoic, why do you deceive the multitude, why do you being a Jew act 
the parts of Greeks? (20) Do you not see in what sense men are sever-
ally called Jew, Syrian, or Egyptian? For example, whenever we see a man 
halting between two faiths, we are in the habit of saying, “He is not a Jew, 
he is only acting the part.” But when he adopts the pathos57 of the one 
who has been baptized and has made his choice, then he both is a Jew in 
fact and is also called one. (21) So we are also counterfeit “baptists,” Jews 
in words, but in deeds something else, not in sympathy with our own 
words,58 far from applying the principles which we profess, yet priding 
ourselves upon them as being men who know them. 
Disc. 2.9.19–21; trans. Oldfather, LCL, revised
56   See also Bonhöffer 1890, 11–13; Long 2002, 107–112.
57   The word is not translated here. Possible translations are discussed below.
58   An alternative translation for ‘words’ is ‘reason,’ but the context here prefers the former.
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Epictetus’ basic message in this passage seems to be clear: one’s words and 
deeds should correspond. However, the abrupt change of the grammatical 
person is somewhat confusing. In section 19, Epictetus blames ‘you’ (singu-
lar) for non-corresponding words and deeds. In section 21, all those present 
(‘we’) are blamed for the same vice. ‘You’ is best understood as a rhetorical 
appeal to each of Epictetus’ listeners and, thus, he addresses no individual. 
Actually, ‘you’ refers all those present, including Epictetus.59 In section 20, the 
grammatical person varies. In the beginning, Epictetus uses ‘you,’ then moves 
to the passive voice to illustrate what people generally say, and then exem-
plifies the general attitude by referring to ‘us.’ Thus, there is a transition from 
‘you’ to ‘we’ in section 20. However, Epictetus is all the while addressing the 
same people, his audience. Another, more confusing feature in the passage is 
the metaphorical use of the designation “Jews.” Does Epictetus assume that the 
audience consists of Jews who are acting the parts of Greeks (section 19)? Or 
are they non-Jews acting the part of Jews (section 20)? Or are they something 
in between, Jews in word and non-Jews in deed (section 21)? The most serious 
problem concerns sections 19 and 20: is the basic identity that of a Jew (section 
19) or that of a non-Jew (section 20)? Section 21 can be harmonized with either, 
though in this section Epictetus clearly prefers being a wholehearted Jew.
The tension between sections 19 and 20 has traditionally been resolved by 
means of an emendation. Heinrich Schenkl embraced this solution in his criti-
cal editions of Epictetus’ Discourses (1894 and 1916 repr. 1965).60 He makes a 
text-critical conjecture in the end of section 19. Instead of the reading that ‘you’ 
are a Jew acting the part of the Greeks (Ἰουδαῖος ὢν Ἕλληνας), he emends the 
text to say that ‘you’ are a Greek acting the part of a Jew (Ἰουδαῖον ὢν Ἕλλην). 
This emendation was then accepted by W. A. Oldfather in his edition pub-
lished in the Loeb Classical Library series (1925–1928; several reprints) and 
by Joseph Souilhé in his Budé edition (1948–1965). Schenkl’s, Oldfather’s, 
and Souilhé’s emended editions are standard reference books, which practi-
cally all scholars use without further text-critical discussion. The emendation 
creates the impression that Epictetus is speaking of Greeks who partly embrace 
Judaism (sections 19–20), but who should embrace it wholeheartedly in order 
to become real Jews (section 21). It is no wonder that in scholarly literature this 
passage is usually presented as a reference to pagan sympathizers of Judaism 
(sections 19–20), who are assumed to have become proselytes (section 21). 
59   The rhetorical change of the grammatical person is very common in Epictetus. A good 
example is Disc. 2.17.13–18, where Epictetus changes the grammatical person from ‘we’ to 
‘you’ (singular) and finally to ‘I,’ as a rhetorical device. See Huttunen 2009, 101–102.
60   For the earlier emendations, see Schenkl’s text-critical notes.
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For example, John G. Gager writes: “The context indicates clearly that he is 
speaking of converts to Judaism.”61 This assumption, however, is based on the 
emended text.
The emendation can be supported by one testimony, John Upton’s com-
mentary on Epictetus published sometime between the years 1739 and 1741. 
Upton cites the first printed version of Discourses from 1535, which is not 
preserved.62 Upton reads ‘you’ as a Greek acting the part of the Jews (Ἰουδαίους 
ὢν Ἕλλην). The difference between Upton and the modern editions is minor: 
modern editions read Jew in the singular, while Upton provides a plural form. 
This does not affect the basic logic. However, Upton is quite vague as to any 
external evidence. The modern editors do not fully trust Upton, as attested 
by the change from the plural to the singular. Upton is also quite late com-
pared to the oldest remaining manuscript. That manuscript originates from 
the Middle Ages, probably from the 11th or 12th century, and there are several 
copies of it without changes in this reading.63 What comes to the internal 
evidence, one must admit that the manuscript reading is logically difficult. 
Upton’s reading and the modern editions obviously improve the logic in the 
passage. Yet, the manuscript reading is not so completely nonsensical that one 
must reject it. Next, I will show how the manuscript reading makes sense.
Section 19 presumes that the difference between a Greek and a Jew has 
something to say about the difference between a Stoic who just speaks of philo-
sophical principles and the Stoic who also follows those principles in their life. 
Section 21 assumes that one should live in accordance with Jewish principles. 
The wholehearted Jewish lifestyle is a metaphor for the ideal Stoic lifestyle, 
and the Jew is a metaphor for the Stoic. In his rhetoric, Epictetus assumes that 
his audience consists of Stoics who—alas!—do not practice what they preach. 
As the audience is put in the place of Jews (that is, Stoics), the basic iden-
tity constructed in the passage is that of a Jew. This is his definition, while in 
section 20 he describes the understanding of “the multitudes” (οἱ πολλοί); the 
word for the common people is clearly degrading, and it refers to their lack of 
instruction.64 They simply define a person’s identity by his or her conduct.
61   Gager 1983, 77.
62   On this printed version, see Sicherl 1993.
63   The basic facts on the manuscripts and sources are found in the modern editions. See also 
Dobbin 1998, xxiii–xxiv.
64   “We should not trust the multitude (τοῖς πολλοῖς),” whose views are indiscriminate and 
unphilosophical, Epictetus says (Disc. 2.1.22; trans. Oldfather, LCL). On this saying, see 
Huttunen 2009, 106–107. Here Epictetus is in the line of the early Stoic Cleanthes, who 
advised not to fear the indiscriminate utterances of the multitude (πολλῶν) (Stoicorum 
veterum fragmenta 1.559).
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This simple definition is no mistake as such. Epictetus continues that this is 
the way ‘we,’ the educated, also define identity. The general criteria for defining 
people’s identity are given in the passive voice (λέγεται, καλεῖται). The problem 
is the contradiction between words and deeds, which is a central theme in 
Epictetus’ Discourses.65 The multitudes, however, do not realize this complex 
identity. For them, the basic Jewish identity remains secret because of the defi-
ciency in Jewish conduct. In the case of the tension between Jewish words and 
non-Jewish deeds, they base their understanding on deeds and, consequently, 
define the basic identity as a non-Jewish one. In section 21, Epictetus admits 
that the simple definition of the multitudes is in some sense right. Jews are 
really Jews only when their words and deeds are concomitantly Jewish. In real-
ity, Epictetus sees the identity of his audience as being more complex. Their 
basic identity is that of Jews, though their conduct is deficient and deceives the 
multitudes to form a problematic conclusion.
What makes the logic of the passage difficult is the twofold use of the word 
ὑποκρίνομαι (‘act a part’). For a scholar of the New Testament, it may sound neg-
ative that something is labeled as hypocrisy. For Epictetus, however, the word 
is quite neutral. It hints at the idea that the world is like a theater. This idea is 
well known in antiquity, and Epictetus also embraces it (Disc. 1.29.41–47; fr. 11; 
Ench. 17).66 He understood God as the director of this divine play, assigning to 
everyone her or his own role (τοῦ προσώπου ἐπαγγελία) (Disc. 2.10.7). The prob-
lem is not that people act their parts, but that they act the wrong parts, which 
God has not assigned to them. In section 19, the problem is that this ‘you’ acts 
the parts of Greeks instead of the right part of a Jew. In section 20, Epictetus 
presents how people generally define the identities of a Jew and a non-Jew. He 
speaks of the conclusion that anyone, even Epictetus himself and his audience, 
are wont (εἰώθαμεν)67 to make if the identity is based on the non-Jewish con-
duct of a Jew. In section 20, he uses the word ὑποκρίνομαι in another sense than 
in section 19. Here he deviates from its philosophical usage, moving instead to 
the vernacular. In the vernacular usage, it means something detached, superfi-
cial, and spurious, acting in contrast to a genuine lifestyle. Thus, there is close 
similarity with the idea of hypocrisy in the New Testament (e.g., Gal. 2:13–14).68
The passage and its message are understandable without emendations. 
The key to following the manuscript reading is to recognize that in section 20, 
65   See, e.g., Huttunen 2009, 101–112.
66   For the idea of the world as a theater in Epictetus, see, e.g., Gretenkord 1981, 227–230, and 
Huttunen 2009, 45.
67   According to Nolland (1981, 181), the word εἰώθαμεν proves that the following saying is an 
established proverb.
68   See Wilckens, Kehl, and Hoheisel 1988, 1209.
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Epictetus embraces a more general level in common with the multitudes. He 
does this in order to point out that not even the common people—however 
indiscriminate and foolish their views are otherwise—identify the audi-
ence as Jews (that is, Stoics) as long as deeds do not follow words. Epictetus 
basically agrees that one should practice what one preaches. Still, the actual 
identity of the audience is more complex, basically being Jewish but remain-
ing incomplete and unrecognizable until they practice what they preach. The 
incomplete Jewish identity is a metaphor for the present and incomplete Stoic 
identity of the audience. In the following, I am interested in what information 
the metaphor provides about the Jews. The emended text promotes the com-
mon scholarly view that Epictetus is speaking about sympathizers of Judaism 
who should become proselytes. The manuscript reading does not lend support 
to such view. As Epictetus is speaking of Jews from the outset (instead of a 
Greek acting the part of a Jew), he is not speaking of sympathizers or wannabe 
Jews. He speaks of two kinds of Jews: those who do not practice what they 
preach and those who do. The manuscript provides a situation where Jews not 
following their faith are supposed to make a change in their conduct after bap-
tism and make a choice—although Epictetus does not say what this choice 
involves. As I will demonstrate, this lack of clarity is one indication of loan 
expressions.
1.1.2.2 Loan Expressions
The reference to baptism has made some scholars—for example, Oldfather in 
his edition—suppose that Epictetus is actually speaking of Christians. Other 
features raise similar thoughts. Before prematurely hastening to such conclu-
sions, however, it is necessary to read the text carefully. I claim that several 
expressions are loans in Epictetus’ usage and that they have a Christian origin.
As I briefly noted above, the word πάθος instantly catches the eye of one 
who is familiar with Epictetus’ philosophy or Stoic philosophy in general. 
Besides this passage, Epictetus uses the word ten times.69 In all of these ten 
occurrences, πάθος is something negative, in accordance with the Stoic phi-
losophy in general.70 Epictetus tells us that πάθος is the emotion that arises 
when people do not get what they like or when they receive something that 
they actively dislike. Symptoms of this πάθος include, for example, sorrow, lam-
entation, and envy (Disc. 3.2.3; cf. 1.27.9–10); it is said to be like a disease or scar 
69   Disc. 1.4.26; 1.27.10; 2.18.11; 3.1.8; 3.2.3 (two times); 4.1.57, 115; 4.8.28; fr. 20.
70   For the Stoic definition of πάθος, see, e.g., Forschner 1995, 114–123, and Brennan 1999, 
21–39. Bonhöffer (1890, 276–280) has analyzed Epictetus’ use of the Stoic philosophy vis-
à-vis πάθος rather than the use of the word itself.
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which requires careful treatment (Disc. 2.18.10–11; 4.8.27–29). Epictetus states 
that a person without πάθος is morally good: she or he praises just people (Disc. 
3.1.8). It goes without saying what kinds of people praise a person with πάθος—
namely, πάθος and vices are two sides of the same coin. Keeping this general 
background in mind, it is baffling that Epictetus makes a moral example of a 
Jew with πάθος. Readers seem to have intuitively seen that the standard Stoic 
or Epictetan understanding of πάθος does not fit here. There is a wide range of 
translations, but they usually refer to a mental disposition or conduct, or some 
kind of persecution.71
Theoretically speaking, πάθος might be taken within the context of its 
ordinary Stoic meaning here. A Jew with πάθος would be just an example of a 
wholehearted life: just as πάθος makes a real Jew, some more positive feature 
similarly makes a real Stoic. This would require that Epictetus has a negative 
picture of the Jews, which is improbable. Elsewhere he mentions the Jews 
when discussing disputes about dietary laws. Epictetus claims that one can 
find clarity for the problem with the help of philosophy (Disc. 1.11.12–15; 1.22.4). 
In these passages, Epictetus clearly thinks that Judaism has its own philosoph-
ical deficiencies. However, he also saw deficiencies in other peoples. Hence, 
nothing indicates that Epictetus would have labeled one of those peoples 
with the word πάθος.72 It is therefore better to hold to the intuitive impression 
that the Jewish πάθος indicates something positive. This means that the mean-
ing of the word πάθος in Discourses 2.9.20 radically deviates from its usual 
meaning in the Epictetan texts.
The word πάθος, derived from the same root as the verb πάσχω (“to suffer”), 
has the added nuance of being a passive object. The context, however, assumes 
that πάθος unfolds itself in daily activity. This communicates Epictetus’ basic 
point of the passage: to not only speak but also practice the philosophical truths. 
A Jew with πάθος exemplifies that. As πάθος is somehow related to conduct, the 
passively labeled πάθος is quite unexpected. Instead of πάθος, the reader would 
71   Translation terms indicating a mental disposition: adfectus, animi sensus (Schweighäuser; 
Schweighäuser 1799b, 420), ‘sentiments’ (Sharp 1914, 134), ‘attitude of mind’ (Oldfather), 
‘Erlebnis’ (Bauer 1963, βάπτω), ‘Gemütsart’ (Berger and Colpe 1987, 269). Oepke’s (1974, 
535) translations ‘uncomfortable manner of life’ (‘Unbequeme lebensweise’) and ‘per-
secution’ (‘Verfolgung’) clearly indicate conduct or persecution, as do possibly also 
Whittaker’s (1984, 89) ‘consequences’ and Long’s (2002, 110) ‘condition.’ Hartmann under-
stands πάθος with the word ᾑρημένου as ‘die gerichtliche Verfolgung.’ See also Bonhöffer 
1911, 41 n. 2.
72   See also what Gager (1983, 77) writes on the passage without discussing the word πάθος: 
“as the sequel makes clear, far from offering any criticism of such converts [to Judaism], 
he presents them as models for the full acceptance of Stoicism. These comments need not 
be interpreted so as to make Epictetus an admirer of Judaism.”
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expect, say, the habit which, according to Epictetus, makes Galileans fearless. 
This reading would make better sense in Epictetus’ philosophy, but it would 
require a textual emendation (ἔθος pro πάθος). Alternatively one can suppose 
that Epictetus borrows a word, which is strange for his philosophical termi-
nology. I prefer this latter alternative, because a textual emendation is always 
a highly hypothetical solution and, therefore, the last alternative. Moreover, 
there seems to be even stranger features in the same passage, which—as we 
will see below—are probably due to borrowing.
It is not just πάθος but also its qualification, in tension with the context, 
that makes one suspect a loan expression. Epictetus qualifies πάθος as the 
πάθος of the one who is baptized and has made the choice. This expression 
assumes that persons have πάθος if they are both baptized and have made the 
choice. This is in tension with Epictetus’ addition that a person should adopt 
(ἀναλάβῃ) the πάθος of the one who is baptized and has made the choice. It 
becomes unclear why a person should adopt πάθος, which she or he already 
has as a baptized person and as a person who has made the choice. The bap-
tism and the choice qualifying πάθος do not fit with the requirement to adopt 
πάθος. The tension between the verbs ἀναλαμβάνω and αἱρέω is especially clear. 
In Epictetus’ vocabulary, these terms bear practically the same meaning. The 
way Epictetus uses them in this passage creates a tautology.
The verb ἀναλαμβάνω in Epictetus’ texts can be translated in several ways. The 
basic meaning is ‘to take up’ or ‘to pick up’ (Disc. 1.11.27; 3.25.4). Yet, this mean-
ing can be adapted to various contexts. In some cases it refers to taking up 
clothes in order to put them on; hence, the meaning is ‘to put on [clothes]’ 
(Disc. 1.29.45; 4.8.15, 34). Three times the verb figuratively refers to memory: 
taking up words in order to remember them, hence ‘to memorize’ (Disc. 2.16.5), 
and taking up things from memory, hence ‘to summon up’ (Disc. 2.16.5; 3.25.1). 
Only the figurative meaning is possible in the passage we are dealing with. If 
the verb was understood in that way, Epictetus would say that the conduct is 
better when a Jew memorizes or summons up πάθος. This, however, is anything 
but probable. Epictetus surely emphasizes mental operations as prerequisites 
for right conduct, and sometimes he speaks in a way such that the reader may 
forget that this is not enough. Theoretical study and meditation on the philo-
sophical truths should be followed by practical training (ἄσκησις), as I noted 
above when discussing the habituation of the Galileans. This threefold cur-
riculum is mentioned also in the context of the passage we are dealing with 
(Disc.2.9.13). So, merely ‘summoning up’ is not enough for the right conduct.
Fortunately, Epictetus adapts the verb ἀναλαμβάνω in other contexts. The 
most usual meaning of the verb is ‘to adopt’ a skill or doctrine (Disc. 1.20.13; 
2.19 title; 3.5.4; 3.21.1,3,16; 3.26.13; 4.8.11), or a role (πρόσωπον) and a way of life 
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(Disc. 1.29.57; 3.20.6; 4.8.16; Ench. 37). This last meaning fits well with the pas-
sage we are dealing with. The passage seems to suppose the idea of persons 
acting their parts in the divine play. In some other passages, Epictetus clearly 
describes the universe as a theater (Disc. 1.29.41–47; fr. 11; Ench. 17), a common 
idea in antiquity.73 Note the similar vocabulary in the passage we are dealing 
with and the Stoic Aristo. According to Diogenes Laërtius (7.160), Aristo com-
pared a wise person “to a good actor (ὑποκριτῇ) who, if called upon to take the 
part (πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ) of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate 
them both completely” (Trans. Hicks, LCL). Epictetus seems to suppose that 
πάθος is a substantial part of a Jewish role. Thus, one should adopt πάθος in 
order to properly play the part of a Jew in this theater called life.
It seems that in the present passage the verb αἱρέω means quite the same 
thing as ἀναλαμβάνω. Basically, αἱρέω refers to different choices: people make 
choices in practical life (Disc. 1.28.6; 1.29.28; 2.22.8; 2.23.35; 3.24.44) and such 
judgments are based on rational choice (Disc. 2.2.20; 3.24.58; Ench. 32.3). 
Closest to our passage are the parts of the text where Epictetus speaks of a 
choice between a right and a wrong way of life (Disc. 1.9.24; 4.2.3,7; 4.6.13). An 
especially good analog for our passage is Discourses 4.2.3–7, where Epictetus 
repeatedly exhorts the hearer to choose (αἱρέω) between two ways of life, 
because a life that hesitates between two opposing options (ἐπαμφοτερίζω) 
cannot progress.
(3) Choose (ἑλοῦ), therefore, which you prefer; either to be loved just as 
much as you used to be by the same persons, remaining like your for-
mer self, or else, by being superior to your former self, to lose the same 
affection. (4) Because if this latter alternative is the better choice, turn 
forthwith in that direction, and let not the other considerations draw you 
away; for no man is able to make progress when he is facing both ways 
(ἐπαμφοτερίζων). (5) But if you have preferred this course to every other, if 
you wish to devote yourself to this alone, and labour to perfect it, give up 
everything else. Otherwise this facing both ways (οὗτος ὁ ἐπαμφοτερισμός) 
will bring about a double result: You will neither make progress as you 
ought, nor will you get what you used to get before. (6) For before, when 
you frankly aimed at nothing worthwhile, you made a pleasant compan-
ion. (7) You cannot achieve distinction along both lines, but you must 
73   Cf. Plato, Phileb. 50b; Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes 1.1; Suetonius, Aug. 99.1; Marcus 
Aurelius 12.36; Diogenes Laërtius 7.160. See also Bonhöffer (1911, 39 note 1); Billerbeck 
(1978, 50–51); Long 2002, 242–243; and Stephens 2012, 68–70.
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needs fall short in the one to the degree in which you take part in the 
other. If you do not drink with those you used to drink with, you can-
not in their eyes be as pleasant a companion as you used to be; choose, 
therefore, whether you wish to be a hard drinker and pleasant to those 
persons, or a sober man and unpleasant. If you do not sing with those you 
used to sing with, you cannot be loved by them as you used to be; choose 
(ἑλοῦ), therefore, here also, which you wish. 
Disc. 4.2.3–7; trans. Oldfather, LCL
This passage is closely reminiscent of the passage we are dealing with. Both 
discuss two alternative ways of life, but also hesitating (ἐπαμφοτερίζω) between 
them. Yet, there is one terminological difference. The other passage admon-
ishes the hearer to choose (αἱρέω) between one of the alternatives, while the 
other speaks of adopting (ἀναλαμβάνω) one of them. In Epictetus’ parlance it 
seems to be a matter of indifference whether to use αἱρέω or ἀναλαμβάνω in 
such contexts. Thus, it is tautological to say that the one hesitating between 
two faiths adopts πάθος after already choosing it. I am inclined to argue that 
αἱρέω is also a loan expression. I have a couple of reasons for this suggestion. 
First, this is the only time that Epictetus uses the perfect tense of the verb. 
Second, the verb ἀναλαμβάνω is the predicate in the clause and, therefore, more 
emphatic than the participle of αἱρέω. Third, as πάθος seems to be a loan, this 
is also quite naturally the case with its participle qualifier. Fourth, it remains 
unclear what the choice involves. I prefer to conclude that αἱρέω has lost its 
meaning in Epictetus’ usage. This is understandable, if the verb was part of the 
loan expression.
Between πάθος and the participle of the verb ‘to choose’ is the participle of the 
verb ‘to baptize.’ This verb is a hapax legomenon in the extant Epictetan texts. 
Between the probable loan expressions, the substantive pathos and the verb ‘to 
choose,’ it also seems to be a loan. Thus, the whole Greek expression τὸ πάθος 
τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ᾑρημένου is best understood as a loan. The other expres-
sion related to baptism, the substantive ‘counterfeit baptist’ (παραβαπτιστής), 
is also a hapax legomenon in the Epictetan corpus and otherwise rare in Greek. 
It should also be counted among the loan expressions. There are similar logi-
cal problems with baptism as with the choice, because both qualify πάθος. The 
expression assumes that a person has πάθος as a result of baptism and choice. 
Yet, Epictetus still requires that a Jew should adopt πάθος. This is certainly due 
to his view that a ritual is effective only if one interprets it rationally.
Epictetus’ rationalizing tendency to interpret rituals is apparent when he 
speaks of the Eleusinian mysteries (Disc. 3.21.13–16). He considers the mysteries 
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with piety,74 but does not refer to the conventional idea that mere attendance 
at them guarantees immortality.75 Actually, Epictetus believed neither in 
personal immortality nor in any effect based on attending such mysteries.76 
According to Epictetus, the most important thing is the attitude of the attend-
ees at the mysteries: “Only thus do the Mysteries become helpful, only thus 
do we arrive at the impression that all these things were established by men 
of old time for the purpose of education and for the amendment of our life” 
(Disc. 3.21.15; trans. Oldfather, LCL). Epictetus expects that the attendees at the 
mysteries understand rationally the moral message of the rite. A similar moral 
emphasis is visible when he speaks about baptism. The baptism itself is not 
important, but πάθος which one should consciously adopt. Actually, the word-
ing Epictetus borrows betrays that baptism is comprehended as a mystery. 
Fritz Graf points out that the perfect participle is typically the linguistic form 
which is used in describing the effect of the mystery rites.
These rituals very often transformed the person who underwent them. 
The linguistic for this transformation is, as we saw, the participle per-
fect. These participles not only express the lasting effect of the rites of 
Bakchos, the Korybantes or Kouretes—the initiates actually have become 
Bakchoi and Korybantes, they have exchanged a former identity against 
one which is as close to their gods as a human being can get; and even 
having served as an Ephesian Kouretes left its imprint for the rest of 
one’s life.77
In Epictetus’ passage the perfect participle forms are βεβαμμένου and 
ᾑρημένου in the borrowed expression. Thus, he understood these rites as a 
mystery cult, which he rationalized similarly to those of the Eleusinian myster-
ies. In both cases, Epictetus’ treatment created a tension between the claimed 
ritual effect of the rites and Epictetus’ moral requirement. However, in the case 
of the Eleusinian mysteries, it is clear which rites he refers to. In the passage we 
are dealing with, it is not so obvious. As stated above, I suggest that Epictetus 
speaks of Christians. Next, I will prove that this is quite probably the case by 
considering the different possible sources of the loan expressions.
74   Bonhöffer 1911, 321.
75   Klauck 2003, 103–105.
76   For Epictetus’ view on the postmortal state, see Bonhöffer 1890, 65; 1894, 28; 1911, 293; Benz 
1929, 36–41.
77   Graf 2003, 256; see also Graf 2003, 252.
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1.1.2.3 Source of the Loans
When searching for the source of the loans, it is natural to start with Epictetus’ 
philosophical context. I look at some similar sounding expressions in philo-
sophical texts. After that, I consider some Jewish texts. However, neither the 
former nor the latter provide any good alternative. Lastly, I show that certain 
Christian texts provide the closest analogies for Epictetus’ loan expressions.
Emperor Marcus Aurelius provides an analogy for Epictetus’ loan expression, 
as he uses the words πάθος and βάπτω in the same context. Marcus Aurelius 
says that the divine element78 in the human being makes “a champion in 
the highest of championships—that of never being overthrown by any pas-
sion (πάθους)—dyed in grain with justice” (δικαιοσύνῃ βεβαμμένον εἰς βάθος) 
(Med. 3.4.3; trans. Haines, LCL). The translation suggests that the verb βάπτω 
denotes dyeing, a common metaphor in the ancient moral discourse.79 In this 
case, dye is justice, as openly stated with the instrumental dative δικαιοσύνῃ. 
With the help of the divine element, one can metaphorically immerse oneself 
in justice and thus be blameless inside and out. In Greek, there is certainly 
an easy shift from dyeing to baptizing, as is evident from the Gospel of Philip, 
which for dyeing uses the Greek loan word βαπτίζω.
God is a dyer. As the good dyes, which are called “true,” dissolve with the 
things dyed in them, so it is with those whom God has dyed. Since his 
dyes are immortal, they become immortal by means of his colors. Now 
God dips what he dips in water. 
Gospel of Philip 61:14–20; trans. Isenberg
The author of the Gospel of Philip clearly makes use of the common ancient 
metaphor of dyeing and applies it to baptism. Marcus Aurelius, in contrast, 
does not make any shift to baptism, while Epictetus does not refer to dyeing in 
any way. An interpretation that would have Epictetus use dying metaphorically 
makes things too complex: it would introduce a new metaphor (dye) inside 
the existing metaphor (Jew). Moreover, Marcus speaks of πάθος in its usual 
Stoic sense as denoting vicious emotions, while Epictetus indicates something 
positive.80 Marcus admired Epictetus and knew his writings (Med. 1.7.3, 4.41, 
7.19, 11.34), but he does not comment on Epictetus’ words concerning Jews 
78   This interpretation of the philologically difficult sentence is based on Farquharson’s 
(1968b, 560) solution.
79   Farquharson 1968b, 561. For the meaning of dyeing for βάπτω, see Ferguson 2009, 43–46.
80   Some manuscripts of Marcus’ text read βεβλαμμένον εἰς πάθος (something like “caught in 
pathos”) instead of βεβαμμένον εἰς βάθος. Even the alternative reading does not provide 
any effective analogy for Epictetus, as it suggests a negative meaning for πάθος. Moreover, 
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and baptism. Therefore, Marcus’ writings do not help to clarify the source 
of Epictetus’ words.
Epictetus’ terminology of a performance refers to acting in a play and pos-
sibly to rhetorical skills. In rhetoric, πάθος means the emotion that the speaker 
should expediently excite and steer (Aristotle, Rhet. 1356a, 1378a–1389a). In 
the De sublimitate, Pseudo-Longinus says that πάθος is one of the sources of 
sublimity, as it does not denote anything base like pity, sorrow, or fear (8.1–2). 
Epictetus also shuns these emotions, usually referring to them with the word 
πάθος. They are the result of philosophical errors properly exhibited in tragic 
plays: “For what are tragedies but the portrayal in tragic verse of the suffer-
ings (πάθη) of men who have admired things external?” (Disc. 1.4.26; trans. 
Oldfather, LCL). In the Epictetan passage that we are concerned with, πάθος 
cannot mean emotions but something that is intimately joined with a con-
duct or way of life. These things were usually called ἦθος in the art of rhetoric.81 
Moreover, in the art of rhetoric it would be meaningless to qualify πάθος with 
baptism and choice. Therefore, the loans do not stem from the art of rhetoric.
The fact that Epictetus speaks of a πάθος that is characteristic of Jews makes 
it natural to search for the origin of the loans in Judaism. The word βεβαμμένου 
is in the perfect tense denoting ‘a completed action, the effects of which still 
continue in the present.’82 Thus, Epictetus does not indicate renewed purifica-
tion rites83 but a single baptism, which has an ongoing effect, seemingly in 
the form of the πάθος. In the Jewish context, a single baptism would mean 
a proselyte baptism. According to the Talmud, conversion to Judaism hap-
pened through circumcision, proselyte baptism and sacrifice (e.g., b. Ker. 9a), 
but the last part was waived after the destruction of the temple (70 CE). Before 
the circumcision and the proselyte baptism, the convert was asked about the 
reason of the conversion (b. Yebam. 47a–b).84 Is this the choice that Epictetus 
mentions?
For several reasons it is problematic to accept that Epictetus speaks of a 
proselyte baptism. First, this would be the first reference to the practice. Even if 
there is no mention of dye or baptism, as βλάπτω replaces βάπτω. Lastly, one can note that 
the alternative reading hardly makes sense in its larger context.
81   See, e.g., Kraftchick 2001, 49–57.
82   Smyth 1984, 434 (§ 1945). This is the basic meaning of the perfect tense. Smyth also lists 
other meanings, but the context of Epictetus’ passage does not indicate any of them. It is 
safest and most natural to keep the basic meaning here.
83   On the purification rites, see, e.g., Oepke 1974, 530–536; Thomas 1950, 1167–1172; Sanders 
1992, 222–230. See also Ferguson 2009, 79.
84   For more on the conversion, see, e.g., Moore 1955, 331–335; Bamberger 1968, 31–52; 
Schiffman 1985, 19–39; Cohen 1999, 198–238; Ferguson 2009, 76–82.
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this does not rule out the possibility of such a reference,85 it sheds a shadow on 
it. Second, why does Epictetus not speak a word about circumcision, which was 
certainly a better known mark of Judaism than proselyte baptism.86 Attempts 
to find circumcision in the text has not won favor.87 Neither have scholars 
accepted the theory that Epictetus’ words reflect a practice of conversion with-
out circumcision.88 These two arguments may not be fully decisive, while the 
third is: the passage does not speak of a non-Jew converting to Judaism. As 
I showed above, the common scholarly misunderstanding that Epictetus is 
speaking of proselytes is based on the emended text. This emendation has cre-
ated the odd impression of uncircumcised proselytes, which the scholars have 
been at pains to explain. Instead of proselytes, Epictetus is speaking of two 
kinds of Jews: those who do not practice what they preach and those who—
after they have adopted the πάθος of one who is baptized and has made the 
choice—practice what they preach. There is no mention of a gentile becoming 
a Jew, but of a Jew becoming a real Jew. In this context, it is quite natural that 
circumcision is not mentioned. In this context the proselyte baptism is mean-
ingless. Epictetus must be thinking of another baptism, which must be a single 
event indicated by the perfect tense.
Actually, Epictetus does not speak of one baptism but two. As we saw, there 
are real Jews whose conduct is in harmony with their words. However, he also 
speaks of baptism in terms of those whose words and deeds are not in har-
mony: “we are also counterfeit ‘baptists’ (παραβαπτισταί).” Thus, there are two 
baptized groups: those who keep words and deeds in harmony and those who 
do not. This may seem confusing, as people usually take the word βαπτιστής as 
meaning the one who baptizes in contrast to the baptized person. This con-
fusion, however, stems from the Christian preconception. Actually, the word 
βαπτιστής fits to those who baptize themselves. It is used with varying prefixes 
for several Jewish sects, which practiced repeating self-immersions.89 Epictetus 
hardly knew these remote sects. However, the names of the sects attest that the 
85   Donaldson (2007, 391), who picks up the chronology, continues: “Still, there are good rea-
sons for believing that the immersion was already a common practice. For one thing, it 
arises logically from the ritual immersions that formed a normal part of Jewish purity 
practice. Proselytes would eventually need to undergo the ritual in any event, and it is 
easy to see how the first instance of this could take initiatory significance.”
86   On the general knowledge of circumcision, see, e.g., Schiffman 1985, 24–25; Sanders 1992, 
213; Feldman 1993, 155–158.
87   Ysebaert (1962, 20 n. 2; see also Ferguson 2009, 78 n. 99) proposes that πάθος denotes cir-
cumcision, while Sharp (1914, 134–135) argues that the participle ᾑρημένου means that.
88   Conversion without circumcision is proposed by McEleney (1974, 332) but rejected by 
Nolland (1981, 179–182).
89   On the sects and their names, see Rudolph 1999.
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word βαπτιστής can philologically denote both the one who takes the proselyte 
baptism and the one who practices repeated ablutions of mainstream Judaism 
(see, e.g., Lev. 15; Num. 19).
Epictetus assumes that all Jews are baptized,90 albeit in two different ways: 
the prefix παρα- makes plain that the other baptism is somehow invalid.91 This 
seems to reflect disputes over baptism: some Jews have an invalid baptism 
(section 21) while real Jews have a valid baptism (section 20). I have argued 
that the valid baptism can be nothing but the Christian baptism. While the 
word παραβαπτισταί can well denote the practicers of repeated ablutions, 
the perfect tense of βεβαμμένου cannot. Because the latter cannot be the pros-
elyte baptism, the next alternative for a definitive baptism, performed once 
and for all, is the Christian baptism. This creates a picture where the bap-
tized person with πάθος is a Christian while the counterfeit baptists are Jews. 
This scenario is anti-Jewish, and it betrays that Epictetus’ loans are from a 
Christian source.
It does not matter if βεβαμμένου is interpreted as the middle or the pas-
sive voice. In basic grammar teaching, they are usually differentiated sharply, 
but actually their nuances can be quite close to each other.92 In Acts 9:18, 
Paul is baptized (passive), but in Acts 22:16 Ananias admonishes Paul with a 
word in the middle voice: “Get up, be baptized (βάπτισαι) and have your sins 
washed away, calling on his name.”93 Thus, the middle voice can be used for 
the Christian baptism, too. The middle voice emphasizes the role of the per-
son who takes baptism or lets it happen. Even a clearer reflexive meaning for 
the middle voice is possible, as self-baptism is not entirely unknown in early 
Christianity (see the Acts of Paul and Thecla in ANF 8:490). Without speculat-
ing further about Christian baptismal practices, I summarize that the voice of 
βεβαμμένου is of no consequence for its interpretation as a Christian baptism.
The idea of real and counterfeit baptisms corresponds to the Jewish-Christian 
relationship in the second century. There are examples of baptismal rivalry 
between the Jews and the Christians.94 According to Luke, John’s baptism is 
insufficient (Acts 19:3–6). Justin Martyr makes plain that Christians do not 
accept Jewish ablutions but prefer the Christian baptism (Dial. 14.1; 19.2). This 
is similar to Epictetus’ words, though chronological reasons restrain Epictetus’ 
90   Rightly Wander 1998, 167.
91   This is the earliest occurrence of the word παραβαπτιστής. Later we encounter it in the 
church fathers, who use it to refer to the persons who commit schismatic baptisms 
(Lampe 1961, παραβαπτιστής).
92   See Smyth 1984, 390–398.
93   For the discussion on this middle voice, see Porter 2002.
94   Rudolph (1999, 482) speaks of a rivalry between Christian and proselyte baptism.
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dependence on Justin. Moreover, the word βαπτιστής and its derivates are phil-
ologically a Christian phenomenon, as they occur only in Christian texts—with 
two exceptions. These exceptions are Epictetus and Josephus. In Epictetus, it 
seems to be a Christian loan, while Josephus only uses it when speaking of 
“John called the Baptist” (Ant. 18.116; my trans.). Possibly Josephus also was 
dependent on a Christian source. Justin also speaks of a choice in the context 
of baptism. According to him, converts are baptized so that they become chil-
dren of free choice (προαιρέσεως) and knowledge. They have chosen (ἑλομένῳ) 
the rebirth (1 Apol. 61.10.). Justin speaks of Christ’s πάθος, meaning his suffering 
(e.g., Dial. 74.3; 97.3), but not in the context of a baptized Christian.
There are closer analogies for πάθος in the epistles of Ignatius of Antioch, 
a contemporary of Epictetus. For Ignatius, πάθος is an important concept 
which, one way or another, is always combined with Christ’s suffering (πάθος).95 
Christ’s πάθος is central for the Christian communities (see, e.g., the introduc-
tory salutations in Ign. Eph. and Ign. Trall.). It also ensures the effectiveness 
of baptism. As Christ was baptized, he cleansed water through his suffering 
(Ign. Eph. 18.2).96 Ignatius also speaks of choice and πάθος in the same con-
text. He says that Christians should freely choose (αὐθαιρέτως) death and thus 
adhere to Christ’s suffering (Ign. Magn. 5.2). Ignatius himself likes to imitate 
Christ’s suffering in his death (Ign. Rom. 6.3). A heretic, in contrast, is not in 
harmony with πάθος (Ign. Phld. 3.3). For Ignatius, πάθος is exclusively the virtue 
of an orthodox Christian. Ignatius distinguishes between a real Christian and 
a Christian by name only (Ign. Rom. 3.2; Ign. Magn. 4). Thus, πάθος is a marker 
defining the group of real Christians. In the Gospel of Philip, a similar distinc-
tion is made in terms of baptism.
If one goes down into the water and comes up without having received 
anything and says, “I am Christian,” he has borrowed the name with inter-
est. But if he receives the holy spirit he has the name as a gift. 
Gospel of Philip 64:22–26; trans. Isenberg, revised
The examples in Ignatius’ epistles and the Gospel of Philip do not fully fit with 
Epictetus, who distinguishes between a Jew and a real Jew. However, it is 
interesting that there is a distinction between a counterfeit and a real adher-
ent, even in terms of baptism. This shows that the distinction in Epictetus’ 
texts was possible in Christian parlance. On the other hand, Ignatius differs 
from Epictetus, as the former does not present Christians as Jews. Ignatius’ 
95  Paulsen and Bauer 1985, 21; Schoedel 1985, 85–86; Brown 2000, 33–37.
96  Paulsen and Bauer 1985, 42.
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relationship to Judaism is critical, but even this criticism has similarities with 
Epictetus’ words. In the spirit of Epictetus, Ignatius criticizes the conflict 
between Christian words and Jewish practice: “It is outlandish to proclaim 
Jesus Christ and practice Judaism. For Christianity did not believe in Judaism, 
but Judaism in Christianity” (Ign. Magn. 10.3; trans. Ehrman, LCL; cf. Ign. 
Phld. 6.1).97 Interestingly, in the same context Ignatius reminds that con-
duct is reflected in the popular designation: “Let us learn to live according to 
Christianity. For whoever is called by a name other than this does not belong 
to God” (Ign. Magn. 10.1). Moreover, Ignatius presented Christianity as a mys-
tery cult (Ign. Eph. 12.2; 19.1),98 which is similar to Epictetus. As we saw earlier, 
Epictetus interpreted baptism as a moral lesson, as he did with the Eleusinian 
mysteries. I also showed that Epictetus’ wording of the Christian ritual closely 
follows the expressions used in the mystery cults.
Epictetus’ expressions—“the πάθος of the person who has been baptized 
and has made the choice” and παραβαπτισταί—seem to be loan expressions 
that he does not fully incorporate, as there remains the tension noted above. 
Even single words betray that they do not belong to Epictetus’ normal usage. 
I showed earlier that πάθος has an unusual meaning, that the words βάπτω 
and παραβαπτιστής are hapax legomena in the Epictetan corpus, and that the 
perfect tense of the word αἱρέω occurs only here. The contents of the loan 
expression seemingly refer to Christianity. There are good Christian analo-
gies for the supposed loan expressions, especially in the writings of Ignatius of 
Antioch, although one cannot pinpoint any unambiguous source for Epictetus’ 
loans. Ignatius’ suffering, however, makes sense as one meaning of πάθος in 
Epictetus’ loan. Epictetus’ words would refer to a Christian who is ready to suffer 
because of her or his beliefs. Such a Christian maintains the harmony between 
words and deeds. This interpretation is also in accord with what Epictetus says 
of Galileans—meaning, as we saw, Christians—and their fearless exposure 
to violence. The requirement that a Jew should also live like a Jew is found 
in Paul (Rom. 2). Paul also speaks of a Jew who has adopted Greek customs 
(Gal. 2:12–14). Though these texts are close to Epictetus, there is no clear link 
to Paul. The idea that one should overcome the conflict between theory and 
practice or between words and deeds is more or less clearly present in ancient 
literature in general (cf., e.g., Thucydides 2.8; 4.67; 5.55; 6.18). A further analogy 
for Epictetus’ words is found in Revelation: “I know the slander on the part of 
those who say that they are Jews (ἐκ τῶν λεγόντων Ἰουδαίους εἶναι ἑαυτούς) and 
97   On Ignatius’ view of Judaism, see Wilson 2004, 162–164; Robinson 2009 offers an even 
more profound perspective.
98   Harland 2009, 47–49.
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are not, but are a synagogue of Satan. Do not fear what you are about to suf-
fer (ἃ μέλλεις πάσχειν)” (Rev. 2:9–10). The common features with Epictetus are 
the counterfeit Jews and suffering—if Epictetus’ πάθος is interpreted as such. 
Although there is no exact parallel to Epictetus’ loan words, they seem to suit 
Christian parlance.
Epictetus’ words about Christians who are real Jews undoubtedly reflect 
a Christian self-understanding. This self-understanding—seen in the New 
Testament (Rom. 9:6–8), not to speak of later Christian literature99—has a 
taste of Christian suprasessionist theology. Epictetus, however, does not pres-
ent Christian self-understanding as a theological reconstruction but as an 
ethnic definition. Christians are Jews, whom he compares with Syrians and 
Egyptians. This is possibly not a misunderstanding on Epictetus’ part. Scholars 
have often seen the Bar Kokhba revolt as a milestone, namely, the definitive 
point at which the Christian and Jewish ways clearly parted.100 Epictetus wrote 
before this revolt. While ‘Galileans’ undoubtedly refers to the geographical ori-
gin of the movement, ‘Jews’ (Ἰουδαῖοι) does not. In Epictetus’ time, the word 
Ἰουδαῖοι no longer denoted only the inhabitants of Judea, the Judeans, but a 
larger group. Galileans could also be called Jews (Ἰουδαῖοι).101 Stephen G. Wilson 
notes that the shift from geography and ethnicity (‘Judean’) to include people 
with other backgrounds (‘Jew’) opened a possibility for “the opportunistic 
appropriation of Jewish terminology and identity by dissident groups such as 
the early Christians.”102 It seems that Epictetus’ source has utilized this pos-
sibility in describing Christians as real Jews.
1.1.3 Conclusions on Epictetus’ Views on Christians
Epictetus’ views on Christians are often ignored. In particular, his Discourses 
2.9.19–21 has not gained the attention it deserves. This is due to the difficul-
ties in the text and the unfortunate emendations in the standard editions, 
which have misled many scholars into putting it in the category of Jewish pros-
elyte baptism. The other reason is the weight of Adolf Bonhöffer’s authority 
among scholars. Bonhöffer was probably the most distinguished scholar on 
Epictetus ever. Questioning him is a scholarly risk. I have taken this risk and 
maintain with A. A. Long that Bonhöffer tended to overemphasize Epictetus’ 
99   Feldman 1993, 196–200; Wilson 1995, 295–296.
100   Schiffman 1985, 75–78; Wilson 1995, 287–288, 299.
101   Wilson 2004, 158; Hakola 2005, 10–11. Esler (2003, 62–74) thinks that Ἰουδαῖοι should be 
translated as ‘Judeans,’ but he admits that a Judean can also bear another geographical 
definition.
102   Wilson 2004, 159.
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doctrinal orthodoxy.103 This made him blind to the nuances in two passages 
on Christians.
Discourses 4.7.6 suggests that Epictetus knew Christians and their use of 
canons in habituation. The passage on Jews and real Jews (Disc. 2.9.19–21) 
utilizes Christian views and refers to baptism. Epictetus even borrows expres-
sions from an unknown Christian source, textual or not. Both passages have 
received only superficial mentions, and deep analyses have been non-existent 
before my study. While deepening the understanding of Discourses 4.7.6, my 
analysis radically changes the picture of Discourses 2.9.19–21. I argue that the 
dominant reading of the passage is based on an unnecessary emendation of 
the text. The original text cannot speak of a non-Jew becoming a Jew, but a Jew 
becoming a real Jew. Therefore, the one-time baptism of the real Jew cannot 
refer to proselyte baptism. Instead, the only alternative is Christian baptism. 
The distinction between the counterfeit Jew and the real Jew seems to reflect 
Christian suprasessionist theology. The closest analogies for Epictetus’ expres-
sions are in the letters of Ignatius of Antioch, but no exact source can be 
attested. What is interesting in these two passages is the fact that Epictetus 
refers to Christians in passing. Granted that these passages do not betray any 
interest in Christianity per se, they do betray a self-evident knowledge of them, 
even among the audience. Epictetus does not explain who these Christians 
are or what their beliefs are. He seems to expect that his audience knows 
enough to understand his points. He even expects that the audience knows the 
Christian suprasessionist theology, which proclaims Christians as the real heirs 
of Judaism. Thus, the passing references to Christians indicate a surprisingly 
profound knowledge of Christians. Everything is mentioned in passing with-
out hostility or contempt.
These findings reopen the discussion of Epictetus’ relationship to Christians, 
which Adolf Bonhöffer shut down a century ago. The discussion, however, 
should be framed anew. Bonhöffer was right when he supposed that Epictetus 
would not have supplemented his philosophical system with Christian 
thoughts. His Discourses, however, shows that Epictetus used different motives 
from those of everyday life to illustrate his Stoic philosophy. Christians were 
presented as examples of fearless people whose words and deeds are in har-
mony. As Epictetus even uses some expressions from Christian sources, one 
can legitimately ask if there are even more references to Christians—or even 
Christian loans—in the Discourses. The case dismissed by Bonhöffer, I suggest, 
should be reframed in the following manner. First, it is unnecessary to limit 
the study to Epictetus’ relationship to the New Testament. There is much more 
103   Long 2002, 36.
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early Christian literature that is relevant for the comparison. Epictetus’ πάθος 
has a good equivalent in Ignatius’ epistles. Second, after Mörth’s, Bonhöffer’s, 
and Sharp’s evaluations, one should not simply pick up parallels and make 
claims of dependences in a parallelomanic way. This was Zahn’s deficiency. 
In many cases, the similarities between Epictetus’ and Christian texts can be 
explained by their common cultural and linguistic background, that is, with-
out forgetting the philosophical elements in the Christian literature.104 On 
the other hand, the fact that Epictetus cites Christian expressions increases the 
probability that some similarities are due to Epictetus’ contact with Christians.
In order not to fall into parallelomania, one should concentrate on such 
Epictetan passages that include a special hint, for example the quiet waiting 
of the cross in Discourses 2.2.19–20. In the context of these sections, Epictetus 
blames those who incite judges in court, as this procedure will just ruin the 
case. On the other hand, if one likes to provoke the judges, why not keep quiet: 
“Why do you mount the platform at all, why answer the summons? For if you 
wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come (εἰ γὰρ σταυρωθῆναι θέλεις, 
ἔκδεξαι καὶ ἥξει ὁ σταυρός)” (trans. Oldfather, LCL). Two points in Epictetus’ 
words attract interest. First, one should wait for the cross without answering 
the summons, like Jesus who did not “answer, not even to a single charge, so 
that the governor was greatly amazed” (Matt 27:14). Jesus’ silence became para-
digmatic, as attested by the wide use of Isa 53:7 as a prophecy foretelling Jesus. 
There are several references to the following words of Isaiah in early Christian 
literature (Acts 8:32; 1 Clem. 16; Barn. 5.2; Justin, 1. Apol. 50.1–11).105
He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he did not open his mouth; 
like a lamb that is led to the slaughter, and like a sheep that before its 
shearers is silent, so he did not open his mouth. 
Isa 53:7
104   Some examples illustrate this. In Discourses 1.2.3, Epictetus speaks of a person who goes 
and hangs himself (ἀπελθὼν ἀπήγξατο). Even Sharp (1914, 3) speculates that this has 
something to do with Judas, whose suicide is reported in a similar phrase (Matt 27:5). 
I think that Epictetus’ aorist is naturally understood as a gnomic one and not as a refer-
ence to some person, which Sharp also understands. Thus, there is no real dependence. 
Discourses 2.20.21 includes the phrase ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἀλήθειας, which is not found in clas-
sical philosophy (Saarinen 2016, 45) but appears in 1 Tim 2:4 and Titus 1:1. However, the 
phrase is used by Diogenes Laërtius (7.42) and Sextus Empiricus (Math. 7.259), both of 
whom use it for epistemological matters, like Epictetus. Thus, I suggest that Epictetus is 
dependent on philosophical usage instead of Christian terminology.
105   Cf. also 1. Pet 2:21–25, which extensively uses Isa 53 (though not exactly verse 7). On the 
use of Isa 53 in early Christian tradition, see, e.g., Elliott 2000, 546–548.
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Second, Epictetus’ students were from well-to-do families, presumably 
Roman citizens and other upper-class people for whom the cross was no real 
threat. Admittedly, there were rare cases when citizens were punished by the 
cross. Yet, “there was a distinction between the punishments suffered by citi-
zens and slaves, and those of higher rank suffered less severe penalties than 
those of lower rank.”106 To be sentenced to death on the cross is just a theo-
retical or symbolical threat for Epictetus’ students. Just before the reference 
to the cross, Epictetus presents Socrates as an example. Socrates did not die 
on the cross. Does Epictetus hint at Jesus as an example? A further analysis of 
this and possibly other passages may reveal if there are more contacts between 
Epictetus and early Christians in addition to Discourses 2.9.19–21 and 4.7.6.
In his references to Christians, Epictetus is not as polemical as Tacitus, 
Suetonius, and Pliny. While Pliny thought that Christianity is madness (amentia) 
(Ep. 10.96.4), Epictetus held a different view. Epictetus thought that Christians 
and madmen had a similar lack of philosophical grounds for fearlessness, 
but he did not lump these groups together. He admits that Galileans bravely 
attained virtuous conduct through habituation. In this respect, Christians are 
braver than the common people, who are not trained for a fearless encounter 
of threats. Thus, Epictetus’ statement is quite a laudable one. This raises the 
question of the relationship between early Christian religion and ancient phi-
losophy. In a way, Epictetus counted Christians as being above-average people, 
close to the level of philosophers. Yet, while Christians were not madmen, they 
were not fully philosophers either. They did not belong to the multitudes but 
to the Jews who practice what they preach. Christians can thus be compared to 
real Stoics. Epictetus put Christians in the category of “other,” but it is prob-
able that this categorization also led him to be benevolent to the Christians. 
Gerard J. Boter has convincingly demonstrated that Epictetus shows kindness 
toward laymen in philosophy, as they err unknowingly.107 In Epictetus’ view, 
Christians are the noblest among the laymen, as they—without adequate phil-
osophical knowledge even—have attained virtues through habituation.
Epictetus shows that otherness does not always mean hostility. This fact is 
seen again when we proceed some decades, from the beginning of the second 
century to the end of it. While the Christians still belong to the category of 
“other” in their views, the pictures painted by Marcus Aurelius, Lucian, and 
Galen are somewhat sympathetic.
106   Cook 2014, 362. In his book, Cook extensively discusses the practice of crucifixion in 
antiquity.
107   Boter 2010.
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1.2 Christians and Philosophers at the End of the Second Century
In this section I am going to study what Marcus Aurelius, Lucian, and Galen 
wrote about Christians. Before I dig deeper into their texts, I take a general 
look at the Christians in the society at that time, at the end of the second 
century. I also make a brief summary of Celsus’ views. His work The True 
Word has a reputation of calling the Christians’ beliefs base and stupid, but 
even a short look reveals that this is a rhetorical strategy in a situation where 
Christians were rising. During the second century, Christian philosophers and 
teachers were flourishing around the Empire: Basilides in Alexandria, Justin 
Martyr and Valentinus in Rome, Irenaeus in Lyon—just to mention a few. They 
became so visible in the intellectual sphere that Christians also met with philo-
sophical criticism, as is evident in Celsus’ treatise The True Word. Celsus’ case 
is a good reminder of not taking every statement at face value. One should also 
note the rhetorical tactic which leads the author to represent and choose argu-
ments in a certain way. There were enough unfavorable stories to pick from 
in order to present Christians in a questionable light. An example is a female 
character in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, who is probably a Christian:
That vile woman lacked not a single fault. Her soul was like some muddy 
latrine into which absolutely every vice had flowed. She was cruel and 
perverse, crazy for men and wine, headstrong and obstinate, grasping 
in her mean thefts and a spendthrift in her loathsome extravagances, 
an enemy of fidelity and a foe to chastity. Furthermore she scorned and 
spurned all the gods in heaven, and, instead of holding a definite faith, 
she used the false sacrilegious presumption of a god, whom she would 
call “one and only” (quem praedicaret unicum), to invent meaningless 
rites to cheat everyone and deceive her wretched husband, having sold 
her body to drink from dawn and to debauchery the whole day. 
Apuleius, Metamorphoses 9.14; trans. Hanson, LCL
Simon Gathercole opens the earlier scholarly discussion on this passage by sug-
gesting that Apuleius is really referring to Christians. He thinks this not only 
due to the monotheism mentioned, but also because of the early wine drink-
ing (assumed to refer to the Eucharist) and lexical resemblances to Tacitus’ 
account of Christians; together these tip the balance in favor of a Christian 
reference.108 If Apuleius referred to Christians, the account is an exaggerated 
and negative one meant to inspire something close to a horror story. In the hor-
ror stories, Christians were associated with the old topos of vicious nocturnal 
108   Gathercole 2017, 285–287.
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rites.109 Minucius Felix had one of the characters of his dialogue recount 
grotesque tales of infanticide, cannibalism, obscure rites, and promiscuous 
sexuality. Christians “establish a herd of a profane conspiracy, which is leagued 
together by nightly meetings, and solemn fasts and inhuman meats” (Minucius 
Felix, Oct. 7–8; ANF 4:177–178).
Andrew McGowan has rightly pointed out that these circulating stories 
probably have nothing to do with the actual practices of the labeled groups. 
The labeling “expresses a fantasy whose real substance is the anxiety thus 
expressed about the internal structure and external boundaries of society.”110 
Minucius refers to Marcus Cornelius Fronto, a famous orator, as one source 
of the rumors; he also says, however, that they belong to the general talk of 
people.111 Rude criticism and malicious storytelling indirectly prove the rising 
threat that Christianity posed. For Celsus, Christianity was not only a social but 
also a philosophical menace.112
Celsus’ literary reply to Christianity was a symptom of the progress his 
opponents had made over the previous hundred years; when Christianity 
was little more than a secretive sect of Judaism, there had been no need 
for philosophical opposition. By the time Celsus and the other polemi-
cists began their attack, however, their enemy had become a force to be 
reckoned with.113
Generally, scholars date Celsus’ The True Word to the late 170s, but the evidence 
is not conclusive. Some scholars date it a few years or even a few decades later.114 
In any case, it mirrors the atmosphere at the end of the second century. It is 
debated whether Celsus was an Epicurean or Platonist. Even Origen seems 
to be uncertain of Celsus’ philosophical affinities (Origen, Cels. 4.54), but the 
argumentation tends to the Platonic.115 However, there is no debate over 
the philosophical character of the work, despite its stigmatizing storytelling. 
109   See Kahlos 2013 and Rauhala 2013. Later these stories were associated with Gnostics (see, 
e.g., Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 4.7.9–11 and Benko 1980, 1083–1089).
110   McGowan 1990, 441.
111   On the relationship between Fronto and Minucius’ text, see Baldwin 1990.
112   Gathercole 2017, 299.
113   Hargis 1999, 15.
114   Pichler 1980, 94–97; Hargis 1999, 20–24; Cook 2000, 23–24; Arnold 2016, 3 n. 9. Hargis 
defends a much later dating (around 200) while Mitchell (2007, 235 n. 94) modestly pro-
poses the 180s. Mitchell reliably shows that the text cannot be dated earlier than 177.
115   On the discussion of Celsus’ philosophical background, see Dörrie 1967, 52–53; Pichler 
1980, 27–38; Cook 2000, 18–22. Andresen (1955, 72–78) also discusses Celsus’ relationship 
to Stoicism.
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For example, Celsus reports that Jesus is not born of a virgin (παρθένος), but 
Mary was impregnated by a Roman soldier called Panthera (Πανθήρα) (Origen, 
Cels. 1.32).116 In general, Celsus reported what he actually knew of Christians 
and Christianity,117 but in an uncompromisingly unfavorable light. Rhetorically 
Celsus tries to show that there is a gaping chasm between Christianity and 
the Greco-Roman culture, pressing time and again that Christianity is phil-
osophically nonsensical and that Christians are even encouraged to despise 
understanding and take things without any grounds. Origen paraphrases 
Celsus’ point as follows:
He next proceeds to recommend, that in adopting opinions we should 
follow reason and a rational guide, since he who assents to opinions with-
out following this course is very liable to be deceived. And he compares 
inconsiderate believers to Metragyrtæ, and soothsayers, and Mithræ, and 
Sabbadians, and to anything else that one may fall in with, and to the 
phantoms of Hecate, or any other demon or demons. For as amongst such 
persons are frequently to be found wicked men, who, taking advantage of 
the ignorance of those who are easily deceived, lead them away whither 
they will, so also, he says, is the case among Christians. And he asserts 
that certain persons who do not wish either to give or receive a reason 
for their belief, keep repeating, “Do not examine, but believe!” and, “Your 
faith will save you!” And he alleges that such also say, “The wisdom of this 
life is bad, but that foolishness is a good thing!” 
Origen, Cels. 1.9; trans. ANF 4:399–400
Originally Moses has deluded some “herdsmen and shepherds” into believ-
ing that there is only one God (Origen, Cels. 1.23). For Celsus, the problem is 
not monotheism itself but its exclusive Christian (and Jewish) form. He states 
that contrary to the Christian view, the supreme god is worshiped by different 
names in various nations and there are also several lower deities which must 
be worshiped. In this opinion, he followed the standard Platonic theology of 
his time.118 Against this, Christianity is vulgar doctrine “and on account of its 
vulgarity and its want of reasoning power, obtained a hold only over the igno-
rant (οὐδαμῶς ἐν λόγοις δυνατὸν ἰδιωτῶν μόνων κρατήσασαν)” (Origen, Cels. 1.27; 
trans. ANF 4:408). Jesus’ disciples were “the very wickedest of tax-gatherers 
and sailors” (Origen, Cels. 1.62; trans. ANF 4:423–424), and this is mirrored in 
116   On the text-critical problems in this passage, see Arnold 2016, 85–87.
117   Hargis 1999, 20.
118   Hargis 1999, 54–59.
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Christianity and its followers. Celsus represents Christianity as a radically and 
consciously alliterate faction.
The following are the rules laid down by them. Let no one come to us who 
has been instructed, or who is wise or prudent (for such qualifications are 
deemed evil by us); but if there be any ignorant, or unintelligent, or unin-
structed, or foolish persons, let them come with confidence. By which 
words, acknowledging that such individuals are worthy of their God, they 
manifestly show that they desire and are able to gain over only the silly, 
and the mean, and the stupid, with women and children. 
Origen, Cels. 3.44; trans. ANF 4:481–482
In sum, Christians have a low social background and, therefore, they can-
not understand philosophical truths.119 They are “utter boors,” as Cook puts 
it, following Celsus’ view.120 Asking if Celsus maliciously undervalued the 
philosophical capacity of the Christians, Heinrich Dörrie then answers: 
“Unfortunately not.” Dörrie maintains that the chasm between the two camps 
was really so deep that they could not understand each other.121
On the other hand, Jeffrey W. Hargis laments these kinds of conclusions.
Scholarship on Celsus has historically tended to treat him as an impar-
tial observer, perhaps forgetting that his was a polemic work intended for 
rhetorical effect, not a record for church historians of a later era.122
When one considers Celsus’ work from a rhetorical point of view, the situation 
seems different. First of all, it is symptomatic that Celsus considers Christianity 
to be worth a philosophical response. It is surely possible to philosophically 
examine an unphilosophical subject. However, a close reading of Celsus’ 
rhetoric reveals that the educational differences between Christians and 
philosophers are not as great as he tries to maintain. According to Johannes 
Arnold, the rhetorical key to The True Word is the passage which reveals that 
every Christian is not just stupid-minded and unlearned.123
119   Hargis 1999, 51–54.
120   Cook 2000, 88.
121   Dörrie 1967, 48.
122   Hargis 1999, 60.
123   Arnold 2016, 403–405.
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He continues, moreover, to linger over the accusations which he brings 
against the diversity of sects which exist, but does not appear to me to 
be accurate in the language which he employs, nor to have carefully 
observed or understood how it is that those Christians who have made 
progress in their studies (οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διαβεβηκότες Χριστιανοί) say that 
they are possessed of greater knowledge than the Jews; and also, whether 
they acknowledge the same Scriptures, but interpret them differently, or 
whether they do not recognise these books as divine. 
Origen, Cels. 5.65; trans. ANF 4:571
In theory, the expression ἐν τοῖς λόγοις can mean deeper knowledge of faith, 
Christian doctrine, or Scriptures, but Arnold argues for general higher edu-
cation, and he is not alone.124 In other words, Celsus admits here that there 
are Christians who have a philosophical education. What follows in Celsus’ 
work after this remark is a comparison of Christian and Platonic views, which 
suggests that his Christian audience has at least a basic knowledge of Plato’s 
philosophy.125 Celsus asks the Christians who can to follow his arguments 
(Origen, Cels. 7.45; cf. 6.3). Obviously he is suggesting that there are some 
Christians who fulfill the requirements; otherwise he would not be address-
ing them. These Christians are even capable of independently gaining more 
knowledge (Origen, Cels. 4.61; 7.58). According to Arnold, the further Celsus’ 
work proceeds, the more philosophical expertise he calls into play and, conse-
quently, the narrower audience he has in mind.126
It is true that there were a lot of common, uneducated Christians, but even 
Celsus’ own text betrays that there were also educated ones. It is his rhetori-
cal tactic that created an insuperable barrier between Christians and educated 
philosophers. Celsus did not really think that Christianity “obtained a hold 
only over the ignorant” (my emphasis). Origen himself notes immediately after 
these words that Celsus’ words are an exaggeration. He adds that Celsus himself 
admits “that there were amongst them some persons of moderate intelligence, 
and gentle disposition, and possessed of understanding, and capable of com-
prehending allegories” (Origen, Cels. 1.27; trans. ANF 4:408).
Celsus’ case gives the proper frame to see how other non-Christian philos-
ophers considered Christians. Marcus Aurelius and Lucian127 did not lack a 
124   Arnold 2016, 403–404. Similarly, see Andresen 1955, 184–185; Pichler 1980, 155; and 
Chadwick in his translation of Origen’s work.
125   Arnold 2016, 428 n. 65; see also Pichler 1980, 153–169.
126   Arnold 2016, 427–430.
127   Lucian and Celsus seem to have been in contact (see, e.g., Mitchell 2007, 232–236).
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critical eye toward Christians, but in the manner of Celsus they acknowledged 
the different philosophical strains that existed among this group. And Galen 
openly praised Christians in relation to philosophy. Next, I will take a look at 
what these three said about Christians.
1.2.1 Marcus Aurelius: Christians and the Military Metaphor of 
Philosophy
Fronto was the tutor of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (reigned 161–180), with whom 
he had a lively correspondence.128 Thus, Marcus Aurelius surely had access to 
the horror stories of Christians. There is a saying in the Meditations where the 
common themes of these stories come up:
Yet to have the intelligence a guide to what they deem their duty is an 
attribute of those also who do not believe in Gods and those who fail 
their country in its need and those who do their deeds behind closed 
doors. 
Marcus Aurelius, Med. 3.16; trans. Haines, LCL
C. R. Haines straightforwardly assumes that this passage “must undoubtedly 
refer to the Christians, who were accused precisely of these three things—
atheism, want of patriotism, and secret orgies.” He also assumes several other 
passages (Med. 1.6; 7.68; 8.48; 8.51) to be indirect references to the Christians.129 
Simon Gathercole rightly comments: “Marcus may have had Christians in 
mind in some of these places, but the references are too general to be certain.”130 
This fits also with the horror stories referred to in Marcus’ passage above. As 
noted, these were stock stories used to label various groups regarded as devi-
ant. Thus, there is no solid ground for discussion, except in one case. Keeping 
in mind that Marcus was under the influence of malicious stories and that 
there were harsh persecutions in Lyon and Vienne during his reign (Eusebius, 
Hist. eccl. 5.1–4),131 his overt reference to Christians is decent. He wrote about 
them only once in his Meditations:
Οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἕτοιμος, ἐὰν ἤδη ἀπολυθῆναι δέῃ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἤτοι 
σβεσθῆναι ἢ σκεδασθῆναι ἢ συμμεῖναι. τὸ δὲ ἕτοιμον τοῦτο, ἵνα ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς 
128   Birley 1987, 69–86.
129   Haines 1916, 63 n. 1. See also Haines 1916, 383–385.
130   Gathercole 2017, 287 n. 35.
131   On Christianity in relation to Marcus Aurelius, see, e.g., Birley 1987, 256–265.
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κρίσεως ἔρχηται, μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν, ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί, ἀλλὰ λελογισμέ-
νως καὶ σεμνῶς, καὶ ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον πεῖσαι, ἀτραγῴδως.
What a soul is that which is ready to be released from the body at any req-
uisite moment, and be quenched or dissipated or hold together! But the 
readiness must spring from one’s own judgment, and not be the result of 
mere opposition as is the case with the Christians. It must be associated 
with deliberation and dignity and, if others too are to be convinced, with 
nothing like tragic actors. 
Marcus Aurelius, Med. 11.3; trans. Haines, LCL; slightly revised
Christians are associated with the words “the mere opposition,” but only as an 
exemplary case. Syntactically, the words “the mere opposition” are contrasted 
(indicated by μή and ἀλλά) with the previous words of one’s own judgment 
and the following words on deliberation and dignity. After dignity (σεμνῶς), 
the sentence is possible to understand either as a further contrast to the “mere 
opposition” or independently as a continuing list of recommended character-
istics. I prefer the latter interpretation, as it is hard to see the words κατὰ ψιλὴν 
παράταξιν in contrast with the word ἀτραγῴδως. It is widely acknowledged 
that παράταξις basically denotes the battle array, and that it is employed in 
metaphorical use here.132 Marcus Aurelius metaphorically refers to soldiers 
who face death strenuously, that is, with energy and strength. This strenuous 
fighting surely happens without tragic lamentation.133 Fighting in battle does 
not contrast with a non-tragic way of facing death. Therefore, the expression 
κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν is qualified only in contrast with one’s own judgment (ἀπὸ 
ἰδικῆς κρίσεως), rational deliberation, and dignity (λελογισμένως καὶ σεμνῶς).
Some scholars have doubted that Marcus originally spoke of Christians, 
considering instead the possibility that there is a later addition to the text.134 
The expression ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί, which appears in passing, seems like an addi-
tional thought, as it does not grammatically fit in with the rest of the clause. 
The text qualifies the manner of the agency (κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν) with a sub-
stantive, as though Christians were some kind of manner (aiming to say that 
Christians shared the manner), but the syntactical construction is incorrect. 
132   Brunt 1979, 488; Birley 1987, 264; Motschmann 2002, 265.
133   Birley (1987, 264) understands the word ἀτραγῴδως after Farquharson’s translation as 
‘without histrionic display,’ but Marcus Aurelius’ references to tragedies make clear that 
there is a question of lamentation (Med. 3.7; 3.8; 5.28; 9.29; 11.6) (see Brunt 1979, 487 n. 11). 
The last reference is the clearest and has weight, as it belongs to the close textual context 
of Med. 11.3.
134   See also Gathercole 2017, 288–291.
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As the expression is incorrect, one can therefore ask whether it is original at 
all. In his edition of Marcus Aurelius’ text, C. R. Haines put the words ὡς οἱ 
Χριστιανοί in brackets, indicating that they do not belong to the original text; 
he thought that it is a margin comment later inserted into the text.135 However, 
A. S. L. Farquharson pointed out several parallels of Marcus’ syntactical 
incongruencies.136 Later P. A. Brunt accepted Farquharson’s note, but also 
followed Haines’ omission. Brunt thought that a reference to the Christians 
does not suit Marcus Aurelius’ thought.137 Anthony Birley, on the other hand, 
expressed that he was “totally unconvinced” by Brunt’s arguments.138
Brunt provided four arguments to prove the inauthenticity of the expression. 
First, as the word παράταξις actually means ‘battle array,’ it would be absurd to 
describe Christians in this light.139 Birley rightly rebuts that Christians widely 
used military metaphors, and thus the metaphor here is by no means absurd.140 
Farquharson and Birley exemplified the sense of παράταξις and its cognates in 
the Christian usage. They referred to a letter (cited by Eusebius) on the mar-
tyrs in Lyon and Vienne during Marcus Aurelius’ reign.141 According to the 
letter, God’s mercy led the army (ἀντεστρατήγει) and marshaled pillars against 
(ἀντιπαρέτασσε δὲ στύλους) the devil’s adherents (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.6). The 
deacon Sanctus remained steadfastly opposed (ἀντιπαρετάξατο) to the tortur-
ers (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.1.20).
Second, Brunt claims that references to the lamentation of the tragic 
actors do not fit with the Christians, “who accepted their fate calmly and even 
joyfully.”142 Actually, it is difficult to associate tragic lamentation with the dis-
ciplinary contempt of death in a battle array, even if one omits the words ὡς οἱ 
Χριστιανοί. As I argued above, one should not syntactically understand tragic 
lamentation in contrast to a battle array. Marcus contrasts the standing in 
the battle array with deliberation and dignity. The non-tragical death is just 
an additional qualification of ars moriendi, and one should not understand it 
135   Haines 1916, 382. He also claims that Χριστιανοί is a vulgar expression, which Marcus 
Aurelius could not have used, while admitting that Pliny and Lucian did use it. Thus, the 
claim is not very strong, and Farquharson (1944, 859) rightly rejects it.
136   Farquharson 1944, 859.
137   Brunt 1979, 484–498.
138   Birley 1987, 264. Rutherford (1989b, 178) claims that Brunt’s claim of inauthenticity “is less 
persuasive.” This is surprising, as Rutherford accepts Brunt’s stance with caution in his 
study published in the same year (1989, 188)!
139   Brunt 1979, 488.
140   Birley 1987, 264. On the Christian use of military metaphors, see Chapter 4 in this book.
141   Farquharson 1944, 859; Birley 1987, 264.
142   Brunt 1979, 487 n. 11.
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in opposition to the standing in the battle array. Thus, unlike Brunt suggests, 
Marcus does not claim that Christians in the battle array lament tragically.
Third, Brunt rightly assumes that Marcus Aurelius is primarily thinking of 
suicide in the Meditations 11.3. He thinks that it would be difficult to find here 
an allusion to Christians, who only in exceptional cases denounced themselves 
in order to become martyrs.143 However, as Brunt himself notes, it is easy to 
bring martyrdom and suicide into parallel relation, as martyrs preferred 
death to apostasy. The Christian readiness to die was well known, as Pliny and 
Epictetus attest. I cannot see any argument against the originality of the text.
Fourth, Brunt points out that Christian martyrs opposed Marcus Aurelius’ 
government. As Brunt reasons, it would therefore be odd if Marcus Aurelius 
reminded himself not to die like Christians who oppose the Emperor. Brunt 
rightly claims, however, that Marcus Aurelius is speaking of an opposition to 
divine rationality: death should happen according to that reason (λελογισμένως) 
which is also the divine rationality permeating the universe (cf. Med. 7.9). 
Marcus Aurelius thus blames Christians for opposing rationality, instead of 
opposing his government, which is not even hinted at in the context. In sum, 
Brunt’s arguments against the originality are not convincing.
Cornelius Motschmann skillfully associates Marcus Aurelius’ words with 
those of Epictetus in Discourses 4.7.6.144 The fact that there really is something 
similar should not come as a surprise, considering that Marcus Aurelius knew 
Epictetus’ writings (Med. 1.7; 4.41; 11.34, 36). According to Epictetus, Christians 
face death fearlessly, not due to rational reasons, but out of habit (ἔθος) 
achieved by training. It is quite apparent that Marcus Aurelius also contrasts 
Christian opposition with reasonable judgment. In describing the motivation 
of Christians, he does not use Epictetus’ technical term ἔθος, but the analogi-
cal idea, mapped from the military metaphor deployed in this context, onto 
Christian believers. The battle array thus stands for the continual training 
which “instilled a habit of obedience to instructions, and which, combined 
with a fear of punishment, kept a soldier in his place in his unit’s formation.”145 
Similarly, Marcus Aurelius assumes that Christians were like soldiers who do 
not withdraw, thanks to their committed training. William O. Stephens aptly 
assumes that Marcus “may have meant that the Christians were not making 
their own individual choices to die as martyrs, but were being pressured into 
143   Brunt 1979, 491–493.
144   Motschmann 2002, 266. See also Gathercole 2017, 291 n. 56.
145   Goldsworthy 1996, 251.
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it by their peers in the cult, like soldiers trained to line up and get bowled over 
like pins.”146
The military metaphor gives the impression that Christians were drilled to 
face death. Their steadfastness did not arise out of their own rational judgment 
(ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς κρίσεως, λελογισμένως) but authoritative commands, as in the case 
of trained soldiers. Moreover, Christians did not die with dignity (σεμνῶς)—a 
word that also bears religious overtones.147 These expressions make it explicit 
that these Christians were “others” to Marcus Aurelius, albeit clearly not in 
the sensational sense of Fronto. Interestingly, there were also Christians who 
discussed martyrdom in a critical tone.148 Marcus Aurelius’ view was not nec-
essarily far from the inter-Christian discussion, although the emperor lumped 
all Christian martyrs together.
The military metaphor reveals that Marcus Aurelius counted Christians 
on the same level as his soldiers.149 This means that the Christians were “others” 
in the same sense that soldiers were. Military pride in victories is seen as mor-
ally questionable (Med. 10.10), but Marcus Aurelius nonetheless honored his 
duty to command the army.150 Christians were—like soldiers—philosophically 
“others.” It is, however, indicative that Marcus Aurelius described Christians by 
employing a military metaphor. These kinds of metaphors belonged to a long 
philosophical tradition.151 In spite of Marcus Aurelius’ philosophical reserva-
tions toward war and soldiers, he used military metaphors in a positive sense: 
“Life is a war and a campaign in a foreign land” (Med. 2.17) during which one 
should stay on guard (Med. 2.7; 7.45). It is noteworthy that shortly after men-
tioning Christians, Marcus Aurelius reminds himself of his own guard duty: 
both to become angry and to give in to the opposition (οἱ ἐνιστάμενοι), thus 
rendering one a deserter by leaving one’s post (Med. 11.9).
Marcus Aurelius follows Epictetus’ path: Christian conduct is outwardly 
acceptable and even laudable to the extent that soldiers are laudable. There 
is actually nothing wrong with standing resolute in the battle array, but 
rational opposition has an additional benefit, as it frees one from internal 
passions. Even if one—note the similarity of the expression with the passage 
146   Stephens 2012, 28–29.
147   Liddell, Scott and Jones 2011, σεμνός.
148   Dunderberg 2013.
149   One may ask if this has something to do with the probable fact that there were Christian 
soldiers in his army, who were claimed to have been present in witnessing a miracle. The 
miracle incident is communicated through both Christian and pagan sources. See, e.g., 
Helgeland 1979, 766–773, and Kovács 2009.
150   Birley 1987, 216–217.
151   Emonds 1963. See also Chapter 4.2 in this book.
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on Christians—stands in irrational opposition (κἂν ἀλόγως παρατάξηται), 
she or he is nevertheless psychologically an invincible acropolis (Med. 8.48). 
Christians are invincible, but they just lack the right principles to attain inner 
serenity. This is a moderate assessment, far from Fronto’s horror stories or the 
“Romans’ shock” of which Cook speaks.
1.2.2 Lucian: Pseudo-philosophy of the Poor Wretches
Lucian was a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius but died some years after him, 
as he once mentions the deification of Marcus Aurelius (Alex. 48). Lucian 
was a satirist who ridiculed the oddities of human life. Thus, though he was 
acquainted with philosophy, he was not a philosopher in the full sense of the 
word.152 Lucian mentions Christians in two of his numerous books, presenting 
Christianity as a mystery cult with certain affinities to philosophy. The mixture 
of philosophy and a mystery cult is not considered blame as such, as there 
was no clear-cut division between philosophy and religion in the ancient view.153 
For example, Epictetus could praise the Eleusinian mysteries, as I showed 
above. Lucian’s ridiculing tone, however, undoubtedly betrays that Christians 
are “others” whom at best he might pity: Christians are just poor wretches 
(κακοδαίμονες) (Peregr. 13).154
In the book Alexander the False Prophet, Christians are mentioned three 
times. Lucian tells a story of Alexander, a religious impostor, who scapegoats 
his adversaries by claiming that “atheists and Christians” crowd the whole 
area.155 According to Alexander, these suspicious persons blaspheme him and 
should be expelled with stones (Alex. 25). Later, Alexander begins his own mys-
teries with the outcry: “If any atheist or Christian or Epicurean has come to spy 
upon the rites (τῶν ὀργίων), let him be off, and let those who believe in the god 
perform the mysteries (τελείσθωσαν), under the blessing of Heaven.”156 He then 
adds ceremonially “Out with the Christians!” and the multitude responds “Out 
with the Epicureans!” (Alex. 38; trans. Harmon, LCL).157 The outcry expresses 
152   Betz 1961, 4–5.
153   See, e.g., Betegh 2009.
154   Betz 1961, 11.
155   Victor (1997, 149) states that the “crowding” should not be understood as an overstate-
ment of the situation in Pontus, the area where everything happens in the account. 
Victor shows that the New Testament (Acts 2:9; 1 Pet 1:1) and Pliny (Ep. 10.96) both report 
Christians there.
156   Lucian interchangeably uses the words ὄργια and τελετή to denote the mystery rites 
(Schuddeboom 2009, 66, 168–169). The latter is used just before the citation. The verb 
τελέω (instead of ὀργιάζω) also indicates the interchangeableness.
157   Outcries at the beginning of the mysteries were standard (Victor 1997, 156). Just the con-
tent of Alexander’s outcry is exceptional.
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a hostility which possibly indicates religious rivalry with the Christian rites.158 
As I noted above, the loan expression that Epictetus uses reflects a theology in 
which baptism was understood as a kind of mystery rite.
In Alexander the False Prophet, Lucian describes Christians as a minority 
that can be used as scapegoats. Lucian possibly was an Epicurean, but placing 
the Epicureans and the Christians in parallel does not lend any special sym-
pathy toward the latter.159 At least there is no trace of it in the text. However, 
the paralleling itself is worth noting. As the paralleling of the Christians 
and the atheists reflect one strand of the popular notion (cf. Mart. Pol. 3.2; 
9.2),160 the parallel with the Epicureans is also indicative. There really were 
some similarities, as both the Christians and the Epicureans challenged com-
monly accepted religious views.161 However, the paralleling of Christians with 
a philosophical school is noteworthy in a more general sense. In the following, 
I will show that this reflects the fact that Christianity was increasingly under-
stood in terms of philosophy in the second century.162
A more detailed description of Christians is found in the book The Passing 
of Peregrinus. Peregrinus is a picaresque character who wanders as a Cynic phi-
losopher, encounters Christians, and becomes popular among them. Lucian 
describes Christianity as a religious association, claiming that soon after the 
encounter Peregrinus became their θιασάρχης, a leader of their θίασος (Peregr. 11). 
The word θίασος is one of the many names for an association, which usually 
had a connection to a cult.163 Lucian also identifies Christianity more specifi-
cally by saying that it is a τελετή, a mystery cult of Eastern origin (Peregr. 11).164 
The character of a religious association is strengthened when it is said that 
Peregrinus encountered Christian priests (ἱερεῖς). As Christian sources do not 
158   Victor 1997, 155–156.
159   See Betz 1961, 7. Victor (1997) claims that the paralleling of the Epicureans and the 
Christians originates in Alexander and not in Lucian, who could not parallel these 
two groups. Lucian, however, sketched a satirical image of Alexander and the words in 
Alexander’s mouth should not be read as though Lucian would prefer this kind of paral-
leling. One should also note that Lucian’s sympathy for Epicurus in Alex. is questionable, 
as it can be read ironically (Branham 1989, 181–210).
160   On the association between Christianity and atheism, see Walsh 1991.
161   On the similarities, especially in relation to the popular mind, see Simpson 1941. See also 
Glad 1995.
162   See Benko 1980, 1097.
163   Goulet-Cazé 2016, 218–219. For a short and informative introduction on the associations, 
see Harland 2009, 26–29; Kloppenborg and Ascough 2011, 1–13. Pliny already saw Christian 
gatherings as associations (collegia) (Ep. 10.96).
164   Schuddeboom (2009, 67) constructs Lucian’s meaning of the word more specifically: it 
denotes “the circle of regular participants,” hence a “sect.”
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know any Christian priest in the second century, Lucian just associates a word 
known in the cult associations at that time.165 Besides being a leader of the 
Christian association, Peregrinus is identified as a προφήτης and a ξυναγωγεύς. 
Although these are ordinary words in the Jewish and Christian texts, they do 
not necessarily have anything to do with these traditions. The word ‘prophecy’ 
and its cognates recur several times in the pagan context (e.g., Lucian, Alex. 
11, 22, 24, 40, 43, 55, 60) and even in the New Testament to refer to a pagan 
prophet (Tit 1:12).166 The word ξυναγωγεύς belongs to general Greek for the one 
who assembles. Just to give an example, there were leaders of “synagogues” 
(ἀρχισυναγωγοί) without any connection to Judaism or Christianity.167
The picture of a religious association is enriched by its philosophical 
character—or pseudo-philosophical, as Lucian ridicules Christians. He 
explains that Christians called Peregrinus “the New Socrates” (Peregr. 12). This is 
surely an ironic statement on the part of Lucian, but at the same time it betrays 
the fact that Christians associated themselves with philosophy. Socrates in this 
context is no surprise after reading Justin Martyr, who inferred that Socrates 
was Christian insofar as he was so closely associated with the divine Logos 
(1. Apol. 46.3). Lucian relays the fact that Christians admired and used philoso-
phy, although he laughs at this.168 Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé interestingly notes 
that even Peregrinus’ own character speaks for the harmonization between 
philosophy and Christianity. He was even a Cynic and a Christian at the 
same time.169
I am inclined to associate the literary character of Christianity with philos-
ophy. Lucian made it known that there were Christian scholars (γραμματεῖς) 
(Peregr. 11).170 Peregrinus explained their books and even composed new 
ones (Peregr. 11).171 There surely can be books within a mystery cult (cf. Alex. 11), 
but the literate character is more easily associated with philosophy. Ilaria 
Ramelli rightly notes that Lucian “knew that Christianity in fact was not only 
a religion for simpletons, but an intellectual movement that was constructing 
itself as a philosophy in his day.”172 Another feature which can be associated 
165   Pilhofer 2005, 58.
166   See further Liddell, Scott, and Jones 2011, προφήτης.
167   Kloppenborg and Ascough 2011, 311–312. See Pilhofer 2005, 60; Goulet-Cazé 2016, 219–221.
168   Edwards 1989, 94.
169   Goulet-Cazé 2016, 224–226.
170   Christian scholars are already mentioned in Matt 13:52 (Betz 1961, 8). However, this word 
was also commonly known in the ancient world (Pilhofer 2005, 59).
171   There are apologies that are ascribed to Peregrinus and mentioned in the Christian 
sources (Pilhofer 2005a, 98–100). We do not know if this is the same person as the one 
mentioned in Lucian’s treatise.
172   Ramelli 2015, 150.
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with philosophy is the interest in lawgivers. Lawgivers primarily refer to the 
political sphere, but the meaning of the word can be enlarged. What seems to 
be essential is the setting of rules, be it by God, who gives each man his wife 
(Epictetus, Disc. 2.4.10),173 or reason as a source of morality (Marcus Aurelius, 
Med. 4.12).
Lucian uses a satirical overstatement to say that Christians revered 
Peregrinus “as a god (ὡς θεόν),174 made use of him as a lawgiver (νομοθέτῃ), 
and set him down as a protector (προστάτην), next after that other, to be sure, 
whom they still worship, the man who was crucified in Palestine” (Peregr. 11; 
trans. Harmon, LCL). Later, Lucian identifies Jesus (without saying his name) 
as the first lawgiver, who promised an eternal life for those who live according 
to his laws (κατὰ τοὺς ἐκείνου νόμους βιῶσιν) (Peregr. 13). As the word ‘lawgiver’ 
resonates with how the ancient world regarded older lawgivers like Solon and 
Lycurgus, Lucian uses this resonance to ridicule Christians who so easily make 
big claims. The pseudo-philosophical character of Christianity is expressed 
by saying that Jesus is a “crucified sophist” (Peregr. 13). The word ‘sophist’ 
(σοφιστής) is here used in a negative sense to denote a charlatan.175 Lucian 
describes Jesus as a sophist who gave stupid laws to his followers.176 He misled 
simple folk who were exposed to financial exploitation. This becomes clear 
after Lucian describes the energetic acts of Christians to free or at least to 
relieve Peregrinus’ stay in prison:
They show incredible speed whenever any such public action is taken; for 
in no time they lavish their all. So it was then in the case of Peregrinus; 
much money came to him from them by reason of his imprisonment, 
and he procured not a little revenue from it. The poor wretches have 
convinced themselves (πεπείκασι γὰρ αὑτοὺς οἱ κακοδαίμονες), first and 
foremost, that they are going to be immortal and live for all time, in 
consequence of which they despise death and even willingly give them-
selves into custody, most of them. Furthermore, their first lawgiver per-
suaded them that they are all brothers of one another after they have 
transgressed once for all by denying the Greek gods and by worshipping 
173   On the identification of the lawgiver, see Huttunen 2009, 78–79.
174   The translation “like a god” would suit Christians better.
175   Betz 1961, 11. Interestingly, Plato linked sophists with mysteries (Schuddeboom 2009, 27). 
See also the ironic characterization of Christianity as the “wondrous wisdom” (Peregr. 11).
176   Pilhofer (2005a, 64; 2005b, 105–107) thinks that the lawgiver is Paul and not the same 
person as the crucified sophist. Yet, Lucian says earlier that Peregrinus was a lawgiver 
“next after that other … the man who was crucified in Palestine” (Peregr. 11; trans. Harmon, 
LCL). This indicates that Jesus was the lawgiver.
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that crucified sophist himself and living under his laws. Therefore they 
despise all things indiscriminately and consider them common prop-
erty, receiving such doctrines traditionally without any definite evidence 
(ἄνευ τινὸς ἀκριβοῦς πίστεως τὰ τοιαῦτα παραδεξάμενοι). So if any charlatan 
and trickster, able to profit by occasions, comes among them, he quickly 
acquires sudden wealth by imposing upon simple folk. 
Peregr. 13; trans. Harmon, LCL
Jesus as a sophist opened the way for any kind of charlatan, including Peregrinus, 
to exploit people. There are, however, certain details of Christianity that are 
unrelated to the main claim of easy exploitation: belief in immortality, con-
tempt of death, brotherhood, being an exclusive cult, and common property. 
Later Lucian assumes that Peregrinus ate something forbidden and thus broke 
the laws (παρανομήσας) (Peregr. 16). It is easy to find parallels for these ideas in 
early Christian writings, but actually all of them are also found in ancient phi-
losophy, even being an exclusive cult.177 In this light it is understandable that 
Lucian hastens to add that Christians accept these doctrines without adequate 
demonstration. They are pseudo-philosophers of a new mystery cult.
Lucian’s irony belongs to his wish to describe Christians as an “other.” The 
category of philosophy is the vehicle of his irony. Lucian makes plain that one 
cannot take Christians seriously in this category as they embrace doctrines 
“without any definite evidence.” However, the basic tone is not abhorrent or 
aggressive—as it is in Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny—but pitying: Christians 
are “poor wretches” who are easily tricked. Their beliefs are a simple-minded 
mimicry of philosophy. Thus, Christians are the “others” of philosophy. This cat-
egorization is understandable in the historical context where many Christians 
themselves presented their faith as a true philosophy. As I will demonstrate in 
what follows, one finds the same category in Galen as used by Lucian.
1.2.3 Galen and the Others of Philosophy
After Hippocrates, Galen was the most famous medical doctor of antiquity. He 
died around 200, or some years after, so that his sayings on Christians are dated 
to the turn of the 2nd century. A profound student of philosophy and medicine, 
177   On Pythagoras, see, e.g., Diogenes Laërtius, 8.10, 13, 19, 28. Some have tried to reconstruct 
what Peregrinus may have eaten, but Goulet-Cazé (2016, 223–224) rightly notes that Lucian 
just speculates about forbidden food. Thus, Lucian did not actually know the reason why 
Peregrinus left Christianity. Whether Lucian’s story mirrors some Jewish-Christian sect, 
Montanism, or something else is difficult to prove (see Ramelli 2015, 146–148; Goulet-Cazé 
2016, 223–224).
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Galen served for a while as a court physician to the emperor Marcus Aurelius.178 
Four texts by Galen on Christians have been preserved, two in Greek and two 
in Arabic translations. In addition, there is one Greek text discussing the cre-
ation of the world with a reference to Genesis. I argue that this can also be 
read in relationship to Christianity.
In the book De pulsuum differentiis, Galen discusses with a certain Archigenes 
who, following the Stoics, assumes eight qualities of the pulse without giving 
adequate reasons for it. Galen marvels at those prominent people whose view 
is worth following.179
νυνὶ δὲ, εἰ τοὺς καθαρείους ἀντὶ τῶν σοφῶν χρὴ νοεῖν, οὐκ οἶδα. κάλλιον δ’ ἂν ἦν 
πολλῷ προσθεῖναί τινα, εἰ καὶ μὴ βεβαίαν ἀπόδειξιν, παραμυθίαν γ’ οὖν ἱκανὴν 
τῷ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ὀκτὼ ποιοτήτων, ἵνα μή τις εὐθὺς κατ’ ἀρχὰς, ὡς εἰς Μωϋσοῦ 
καὶ Χριστοῦ διατριβὴν ἀφιγμένος, νόμων ἀναποδείκτων ἀκούῃ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν 
οἷς ἥκιστα χρή.
Now, however, I wonder whether one ought to take the “prominent” peo-
ple in place of the wise; it would at any rate be much better to add to 
the statement about the eight qualities, if not a cogent demonstration 
at least a reassuring and sufficient explanation so that one should not at 
the very beginning, as if one had come into the school of Moses and 
Christ, hear talk of undemonstrated laws, and particularly where this is 
least appropriate. 
De pulsuum differentiis Kühn 8, p. 579; trans. Walzer,180 slightly revised
The school of Moses and Christ is placed on the same level with Archigenes, 
both being said to put forward undemonstrated claims. Two things are worth 
noting here. First, Galen speaks of a διατριβή. The word has several meanings, 
but here it can mean nothing but a philosophical school.181 This definition 
as a school is not praise from Galen’s side, but proves rather that he saw the 
Christians as comparable with the other philosophical schools, or at least 
comparable to the Stoic school of Archigenes.182 Second, there is one school 
of Moses and Christ. It is actually a Christian school, as both Moses and Christ 
can be associated only with the Christians.183 Galen did not confuse Christians 
178   See, e.g., Martin 2004, 109–110.
179   Walzer 1949, 45–46.
180   Walzer 1949, 46.
181   Liddell, Scott, and Jones 2011, διατριβή.
182   See Flemming 2017, 185.
183   Similarly Gathercole 2017, 292–293.
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and Jews; otherwise he speaks of them as separate groups. He is familiar with 
the distinctively Christian standards of morality (see below) while also cer-
tainly knowing that Moses “gave laws to the Jewish people” (Ibn Abu Usaibi’ah, 
History of Physicians, p. 151; trans. Kopf). Galen returns to the school of Moses 
and Christ later in the same book. He is criticizing the strict adherence of a 
certain school as it prevents one from acquiring new insights. Therefore, it is of 
no use to discuss with them. Even the people in the school of Moses and Christ 
are more ready to change their minds.
θᾶττον γὰρ ἄν τις τοὺς ἀπὸ Μωϋσοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ μεταδιδάξειεν ἢ τοὺς ταῖς 
αἱρέσεσι προστετηκότας ἰατρούς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους.
One might more easily teach novelties to the followers of Moses and 
Christ than to the physicians and philosophers who cling fast to their 
schools. 
De pulsuum differentiis Kühn 8, p. 657; trans. Walzer,184 slightly revised
Here Galen does not literally speak of a Christian school, but of people 
“from Moses and Christ.” However, it is obvious that he is again speaking 
of the school, as the comparison to medical and philosophical schools implies. 
The comparison is possibly a sarcastic remark meant to blame other physi-
cians and philosophers; even Christians who are famous for their obstinacy 
(cf. Pliny’s and Marcus Aurelius’ views) are more easily converted than dog-
matic philosophers.185 There is still one fragment preserved in Arabic where 
Galen blames Christians (and possibly also Jews) for accepting everything 
without any definitions:
If I had seen people who taught their disciples in the same way as the 
disciples of Moses and Christ were taught—that is, who ordered them 
to accept everything on trust—then I would not have given you any 
definitions. 
Ibn Abu Usaibi’ah, History of Physicians p. 151; trans. Kopf; slightly revised
In this text, Galen not only blames Christians for inadequate arguments but 
also reveals the basis upon which they present such arguments: trust—or faith, 
as one also can translate the Arabic word.186 One should not assume a contra-
184   Walzer 1949, 38.
185   See Sprengling 1917, 107.
186   As Walzer (1949, 15, 49) translates this.
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diction between faith and reason, as Galen is ready to believe what is “said and 
believed by everybody” (κατὰ τοῦ παρὰ πᾶσι λεγομένου τε καὶ πεπιστευμένου). 
This he has been taught by Aristotle (De pulsuum differentiis Kühn 8, p. 579; 
trans. Walzer).187 The mistake is to take everything on faith. Galen traces the 
lack of demonstration back to Genesis, which was evidently known to many 
philosophers.188 In a fragment, Galen seems to focus on the wording of Genesis 
1: Moses “wrote his books without adducing proofs, he merely said: God has 
ordered, or, God has said” (Ibn Abu Usaibi’ah, History of Physicians p. 151; trans. 
Kopf). A pagan rhetorician commented similarly on the word of God, though 
in the positive sense: “So, too, the lawgiver of the Jews, no ordinary man, having 
formed a worthy conception of divine power, gave expression to it at the very 
threshold of his Laws where he says: ‘God said’—what?’ ‘Let there be light,’ and 
there was light. ‘Let there be earth,’ and there was earth’ ” (Longinus, [Subl.] 9.9; 
trans. Fyfe, LCL).
There are clear assessments of Genesis in the De usu partium, where Galen 
aims at proving that “every part of the body is perfectly formed and arranged 
to fulfill its preordained purpose or function.”189 In Galen’s theology, it means 
that Nature, God or a demiurge—he uses these words interchangeably—is in 
control of creation. When commenting on the hair of the eyelashes, for exam-
ple, he reflects on how the divine has functioned, and he also refers to Moses 
and Epicurus:
Did our demiurge simply enjoin this hair to preserve its length always 
equal, and does it strictly observe this order either from fear of its mas-
ter’s command, or from reverence for the god who gave this order, or is 
it because it itself believes it better to do this? Is not this Moses’ way of 
treating Nature and is it not superior to that of Epicurus? The best way, 
of course, is to follow neither of these but to maintain like Moses the 
principle of the demiurge as the origin of every created thing, while add-
ing the material principle to it. 
De usu partium Helmreich, p. 158; trans. Walzer190
Galen proceeds to show that God must have structured the eyelashes in a cer-
tain way, as material principles have their own limitations. It would not have 
187   Walzer 1949, 46.
188   Walzer 1949, 20–23; Gager 1972.
189   Martin 2004, 120.
190   Walzer 1949, 11–12.
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been possible to make a human being out of stone just by willing it, as Moses 
thinks.
It is precisely this point in which our own opinion and that of Plato and 
of the other Greeks who follow the right method in natural science dif-
fers from the position taken up by Moses. For the latter it seems enough 
to say that God simply willed the arrangement of matter and it was pres-
ently arranged in due order; for he believes everything to be possible with 
God, even should He wish to make a bull or a horse out of ashes. We how-
ever do not hold this; we say that certain things are impossible by nature 
and that God does not even attempt such things at all but that he chooses 
the best out of the possibilities of becoming. 
De usu partium Helmreich, p. 158–159; trans. Walzer191
Galen discusses the details of the structure of the eyelashes and their attach-
ment to the rest of the human body, for it is significant that the demiurge 
planted them in a cartilaginous part of the body: “If He had planted them in 
a soft and fleshy substance He would have suffered a worse failure not only 
than Moses but also than a bad general who plants a wall or a camp in marshy 
ground” (De usu partium Helmreich, p. 906; trans. Walzer).192 This is the last 
reference to Moses in Galen’s book. Nothing implies that Galen is speaking 
only of the Jews when referring to Moses.193 As earlier noted, the reference 
to one school of Moses and Christ must be a reference to the Christians. It 
is logical that even these assessments of Genesis can be seen in relation to 
Christians, though one cannot exclude Jews. The simple explanations in 
reference to God’s will are also similar to the simplicity of the “undemon-
strated laws” in the school of Moses and Christ. Galen does not view Genesis 
very highly.
Despite his reserved or even ridiculing attitude toward Genesis, Galen 
discusses it in the same category as Plato’s Timaeus. He associates Plato’s demi-
urge with the biblical God without any hesitation.194 Galen admits that Moses 
is right in his belief in the demiurge; for this reason, he places the prophet 
on a higher level than Epicurus. But Genesis is just too simple, as it passes 
191   Walzer 1949, 11–12.
192   Walzer 1949, 11–12.
193   Walzer (1949, 23) understands these texts as references to Jews, but without questioning 
this assumption.
194   Walzer 1949, 26.
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over the details of creation and attributes of God with impossible conditions.195 
Dale B. Martin balances this critique with Galen’s theology of the best possible 
world with its political implications: the teleological view was conservative, 
while the Jewish-Christian apocalypticism with its hope for a better world 
in the future was revolutionary. If God could break the limits of the possible, 
it would open a door to the impiety of thinking that God’s creation is not 
perfect.196 There is, however, no criticism of the Christians for their apocalyp-
tic or non-conservative views in the Galenic corpus. While Galen expressed 
philosophical criticism of their theoretical views, he saw nothing wrong with 
their actual practice or way of life. In a text preserved in quotations, Galen 
praised Christians in a way not seen before in the pagan texts.
Most people are unable to follow any demonstrative argument consecu-
tively; hence they need parables, and benefit from them—and he (Galen) 
understands by parables tales of rewards and punishments in a future 
life197—just as now we see the people called Christians drawing their 
faith from parables [and miracles], and yet sometimes acting in the same 
way [as those who philosophize]. For their contempt of death [and of its 
sequel] is patent to us every day, and likewise their restraint in cohabita-
tion. For they include not only men but also women who refrain from 
cohabiting all through their lives; and they also number individuals who, 
in self-discipline and self-control in matters of food and drink, and in 
their keen pursuit of justice, have attained a pitch not inferior to that of 
genuine philosophers. 
Trans. Walzer198
The transmission of this passage raises questions of its authenticity of the 
text. It has been transmitted in two seemingly independent traditions, say, 
“Republican” and “Phaedonian.” One tradition in Arabic maintains that this 
passage on Christians is actually a comment on Plato’s Republic X. Another 
195   Van der Eijk 2014, 351–354. Walzer (1949, 26) assumes that Galen refers to creatio ex nihilo 
when requiring the material principle to be counted. I think that Galen just refers to the 
limitations of different materials, so that God cannot create, say, a horse out of ashes.
196   Martin 2004, 123–124.
197   As one sees, this is a clarifying interpretation within the quotation. It was seemingly not 
clear enough as to what rumūz means. Walzer preferred “parable” (παραβολαί) but there 
are other alternatives discussed by Gero (1990, 405). This is of minor interest here, as Gero 
concludes: “The general intention of Galen’s comment is in any case obvious enough.”
198   The translation is based on several versions; see Walzer 1949, 15–16. The Syriac text was 
published as an English translation by Levi Della Vida (1950, 184).
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tradition transmitted in Arabic and Syriac speaks of a comment on Plato’s 
Phaedo.199 Both traditions convey a roughly similar text, meaning that there 
must have been a common original, seemingly in Greek. Martin Sprengling 
claims that the Greek under the Arabic “is fairly apparent” and that it is 
Galen’s Greek. Sprengling boldly maintains that “it would be an easy matter to 
retranslate Abulfeda’s Arabic into Greek composed of Galen’s own words and 
phrases.”200 Scholars do not usually question the suggestion of a Greek origi-
nal, but the idea of verbatim translation. The existence of two slightly different 
traditions and the differences even within both traditions show that the text 
has been revised. Probably close to the truth is Stephen Gero’s cautious view 
that Galen really wrote something like this, which the remaining texts witness, 
but that some details are elaborated. Gero singles out the comment admir-
ing sexual abstinence, which seems to contrast against Galen’s more moderate 
view in other texts.201 However, one can assume that the transmitted texts 
express Galen’s general tone, even if some details are later revisions.
One thing that connects this text to Galen’s other texts on Christians is the 
claim that Christians do not follow demonstrative arguments. Their myths, 
however, seem to be a short cut to virtuous conduct. The idea fits with the 
structure of the tenth book of Plato’s Republic, where there is the famous myth 
at the end. However, the idea that the myth is not literally true is not pres-
ent in the tenth book. In Phaedo 114d, Plato hints that it is morally useful to 
believe in myths but leaves open whether they are literally true or not. Galen 
seems to remain within the non-literal tradition.202 He saw the benefits of 
these tales, which he thought served the same ethical purpose as philosophi-
cal argumentation.
Though presenting Christians in an admirable light, Galen counts them 
among the οἱ πολλοί, or common people. In this way, he certainly intended to 
put them in their right place. There were, however, features that elevated them 
above this category and, in other passages, Galen also seems to assume that 
one can include them within the philosophical categories. Genesis is placed in 
parallel with Plato’s Timaeus, and Moses is at least placed on a higher level than 
199   Walzer (1949) sees that the “Phaedonian” tradition is dependent on the “Republican” 
one. Thus, the former is a modification of the latter. Levi Della Vida (1950), in turn, is 
convinced that the traditions are independent. This view has won sympathy in the subse-
quent scholarly discussion. See Köbert 1956; Pines 1971, 73–83; Gero 1990; Gathercole 2017, 
292–296.
200   Sprengling 1917, 106.
201   Gero 1990, 404, 407–411.
202   Walzer 1949, 60–61, 70. It is not worth pinpointing any exact passage in Plato to which 
Galen refers (see Sprengling 1917, 108).
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Epicurus. There is a school of Moses and Christ comparable to the other philo-
sophical schools. This certainly has something to do with how the Christians 
presented themselves. An anonymous Christian author around the year 200 
criticizes some Christians for treating the Holy Scriptures without fear, eagerly 
seeking to find syllogisms in the Scriptures instead of learning what they 
declare. They even devote themselves to secular sciences like geometry, and 
study Euclid, Aristotle, and Theophrastus laboriously. The anonymous author 
supposes that some perhaps even worship Galen (Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 5.28.14). 
This is clearly a polemical overstatement, although it is completely credible 
that some Christians were acquainted with Galen’s works.
According to Gero, “there is no evidence that Galen puts the Christians 
and philosophers on the same level.”203 This is simply not true, as Galen does 
speak of a Christian school. He did not approve of its doctrines that highly, 
but neither did he approve of Archigenes’ Stoicism or the Epicureans. Loveday 
Alexander puts it aptly:
Galen places most of his Greek and Roman contemporaries, including 
the adherents of the philosophical and medical schools, on the same side 
of the gulf as the Jews and Christians. The essential point … is that the 
“followers of Moses and Christ,” whatever their deficiencies as philoso-
phers, are in this respect no worse than—in fact may even be superior 
to—the adherents of the schools…. In fact, for Galen “the followers of 
Moses and Christ” are treated here as two among many contemporary 
schools which show a devoted—and in Galen’s eyes culpable—loyalty to 
their own particular dogmas.204
I concur with Alexander’s statement, adding only the minor comment that 
Galen—as I have argued above—did not speak of Jewish and Christian 
schools, but only a Christian school. There is, however, one aspect that sepa-
rated Christians from other schools. While some Christians were educated in 
philosophy, others were ordinary people without any formal instruction in it. 
This is certainly one reason for Galen’s vacillation between different views on 
Christians. In some sense, Christians were a school, but in another sense they 
were common people with a belief in myths. If one is to follow Pierre Hadot, 
it was not critical for a philosopher to have certain theoretical convictions, 
203   Gero 1990, 407.
204   Alexander 1995, 65–66.
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but rather to have a brave life.205 In this light, it would have been natural to 
accept virtuous Christians as philosophers, but Galen resisted this idea. The 
Christians remained “others” to him, but certainly “others” of philosophy. They 
lived like “genuine philosophers” without being philosophers.
1.3 Conclusions
Richard Walzer maintains that Galen was the first philosopher in Rome to make 
a sympathetic assessment of the Christians for philosophical reasons.206 I have 
argued that there were positive assessments already existing before Galen. 
Indeed, something similar was already present in the remarks and comments 
of both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Even Lucian’s satirical view lent some 
sympathy toward Christians. All of these accounts were far from the abhorrent 
reports of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny.207 One characterization is common to 
all authors I have engaged with here: the contempt of death expressed by the 
Christians. However, there are also other features. Galen and Epictetus main-
tained that Christian conduct was quite praiseworthy. While Epictetus made 
this point by way of analogy—with Christians following rules as do the 
Stoics—Galen directly assumed that Christians followed philosophical prin-
ciples. Another “pair” can be found in Epictetus’ and Lucian’s description of 
Christianity as a mystery cult, which seems to be due to the self-representation 
of Christians themselves.
All the pagan authors I have treated here saw Christians in one way or 
another in relation to philosophy. This is probably a mirror effect of the 
Christian self-representation.208 In pagan eyes, Christians were perplexingly 
situated between categories. Marcus Aurelius found them a place with the help 
of his military metaphor. On the one hand, it mapped the attributes of philoso-
phers onto those of Christians, as the metaphor was often used to describe the 
philosophical stance. On the other hand, the metaphor showed that Christian 
steadfastness is not due to reasonable argumentation but rather training in 
obedience to commandments. For Galen, the Christians were a conundrum: 
while they could be counted among the philosophical schools, they were also 
common people with a belief in myths.
205   Hadot 2002.
206   Walzer 1949, 69.
207   Alexander (2002, 245–246) makes a similar contrast between Epictetus and Galen, on the 
one hand, and Tacitus and Pliny, on the other.
208   Wilken 1980, 109–110.
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It is understandable that the confusion created both sympathetic and hos-
tile images of the Christians. John Granger Cook showed the Romans’ shock in 
the face of the otherness of Christianity.209 It tells the other side of the story. 
Epictetus—as a contemporary of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny—had a quite 
different tone when speaking of Christians. At the end of the second century, 
the dual views were still present. Fronto and Celsus represented the hostile 
front, while Lucian and especially Galen saw positive elements in Christianity: 
Lucian ridiculed Christian simplicity but not without a certain sympathy, while 
Galen saw that such simplicity was no hindrance to a conduct comparable to 
that of the true philosophers. The partially positive view of Christians among 
some pagan authors of the second century proves that the category of “other” 
was not always loaded with pure hostility. Although the gentile philosophers 
did not acknowledge Christians fully as their peers, they granted them a cer-
tain amount of recognition. There was certain positive value in Christianity. 
For their part, Christians clearly sought philosophical recognition, understand-
ing philosophy as a positive category. Next, I wish to show that this pursuit of 
philosophical recognition was not merely a second-century phenomenon. It 
was apparent already in the first century.
2 Early Christians Seeking Recognition in Greco-Roman Culture
Tertullian, an early Christian theologian from around 200 CE, has won a place 
in history as a paradigmatic Christian character who misrecognized philoso-
phy with his words “What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” (Praescr. 7; 
ANF 3.246). Since Athens represented philosophy and Jerusalem the Christian 
faith, the question deals with the relationship between faith and philosophy. 
Tertullian’s question is rhetorical, as is evident from its textual context. The 
unstated answer is self-evidently: “They have nothing do with each other.” One 
can speak of a blatant misrecognition of philosophy.
In this section, I question whether Tertullian really represented the standard 
Christian position. The philosophical assessments of Christians presented in 
the previous section would be incomprehensible if Christians had misrecog-
nized philosophy in the uncompromising manner that Tertullian’s statement 
seems to presume. Misrecognition is not the only available way of reading the 
dynamic—and this applies even in Tertullian’s own writings. The later his-
tory of theology shows that philosophy was assimilated into the developing 
209   Cook 2010, 2. See also Wagemakers’ (2010) article on anti-Christian accusations of immoral 
sexual behavior and cannibalism.
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Christianity. Did this represent a fall from an original purity, and is Tertullian 
reacting to this later shift to philosophy, seeing it as a decline? My answer is 
in the negative. There was an interaction with philosophy from the earliest 
Christian sources onward.
However, Tertullian’s misrecognition of philosophy gave voice to a lasting 
tradition. With his anti-philosophical ethos, Tertullian is not a unique case 
in the history of Western thought. One could list multiple names, but I will 
refer to just two cases after Tertullian, who exemplify the continuing tradition 
from antiquity until modern times: Martin Luther and Bertrand Russell. Luther 
states that Aristotle is a heathen who “has caught and made fools” (vorfuret 
und narret hat) of even the best of the Christians. In a nutshell: “Using him 
God has plagued us for our sins” (got hat uns also mit yhm plagt umb unser sund 
willen). Luther criticizes the use of Aristotle, whose understanding is limited, 
as the Holy Scriptures teach everything that is necessary.210 Bertrand Russell 
makes the same division as Luther, but preferring philosophy to Scripture: 
“A good world needs knowledge, kindliness, and courage; it does not need a 
regretful hankering after the past or a fettering of the free intelligence by the 
words uttered long ago by ignorant men. It needs a fearless outlook and a free 
intelligence.”211
From ancient times to the present day, there seems to be a tradition of mak-
ing a clear-cut separation between religion and philosophy.212 In line with 
this, Jerusalem and Athens withheld recognition from each other. The sepa-
ration between religion and philosophy can be specified—at least from one 
important angle—as an opposition of free intellectual exploration and the 
Bible. Both Luther and Russell spoke of this contrast. One may respond that 
Tertullian, Luther, and Russell spoke within their own personal and existential 
spheres. I must note that this division between faith and philosophy is pres-
ent also in academic work. Many scholars seem to put ancient texts more or 
less unconsciously into this matrix with the result that the division is seen 
everywhere.213 In academic work, we should get rid of this division and study 
the relationship between philosophy and religion in more general and non-
subjective terms. I take my examples of this division in academic work with 
an eye to my study and, therefore, I quote some classics on the relationship of 
Galen and Epictetus to the Christians.
210   WA 6.458. On Luther’s attitude toward Aristotle, see, e.g., Dieter 2001.
211   Russell 1957, 23.
212   On the relationship between religion and philosophy, see, e.g., Ebeling 1962.
213   See Engberg-Pedersen 2001, 11.
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In his Galen on Jews and Christians, Richard Walzer reconstructs an oppo-
sition between faith and reason. The foundation is one sentence, where 
Galen criticizes “the followers of Moses and Christ” for accepting everything 
on faith (or trust). As I showed in the previous section, this saying does not 
blame faith (πίστις) as such. Yet, it is worth noting that Walzer constructs a 
philosophy/ religion distinction on the basis of this statement. Walzer argues 
that the Greek intellectuals did not understand faith in terms similar to those 
of Philo or the Christians.214 As George van Kooten notes, the philological divi-
sion characterized by the term πίστις has the undesirable result “that early 
Christian sources have become disconnected from their natural habitat in 
the ancient world at large.”215 He shows that there is no clear-cut distinction 
between the way the Christians and Plutarch used the word πίστις. Van Kooten 
concludes: “Further comparative research into early Christian and ancient 
philosophical notions, values and virtues might show that, in many respects, 
they are more closely related than a modern, anachronistic understanding of 
the difference between philosophy and religion seems to allow.”216
One should not limit van Kooten’s view only to the interpretation of a single 
term. In contrast to the modern philosophy/religion distinction, ancient phi-
losophers were quite religious. Philosophers spoke intimately of God(s) and 
composed hymns like the Hymn to Zeus by Cleanthes the Stoic. The adherents 
of a school were religiously committed to founder figures, whose divine nature 
was emphasized and whose texts were treated as authoritative.217 Anders 
Klostergaard Petersen has convincingly shown that Plato’s philosophy is 
religion from our modern point of view.218 Many scholars have noted the ten-
dency to adhere to authoritative texts in ancient philosophy. Here, the effort 
to maintain the difference between religion and philosophy can lead scholars 
into difficulties. In his Epiktet und das Neue Testament, Adolf Bonhöffer charac-
terizes the difference between early Christianity and Stoicism by noting that, 
despite its religious traits, Stoicism was a philosophy based on reason and not 
on revelation.219 In the same book, however, he admits that Epictetus celebrated 
Zeno and Chrysippus in a similar fashion as Christians celebrated divine reve-
lation: in a fixed moment of history, rational truth (Vernunftwahrheit) emerged 
through these founding figures. Is this so different from Christianity? When we 
214   Walzer 1949, 48–56.
215   Van Kooten 2014, 216.
216   Van Kooten 2014, 233. For profound analysis of πίστις, see also Morgan 2015.
217   Van Kooten 2010, 6–8. See also Alexander 2001.
218   Klostergaard Petersen 2017.
219   Bonhöffer 1911, 354.
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take a look at Bonhöffer’s earlier book Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, the picture 
of Epictetus’ position becomes even more confusing:
Yes, he [Epictetus] also knows the concept of revelation: the writings of 
Chrysippus, whom he praises as the greatest benefactor of humankind, 
because through him the gods have shown the truth leading to happi-
ness (Disc. 1.4.28, etc.). The writings also function for him in a sense like a 
sacred codex and ground both his teaching and homilies in the same way 
as the biblical texts do for Christian preaching.220
Bonhöffer’s and Walzer’s attempts to maintain the philosophy/religion distinc-
tion are dubious even in light of their own studies. Walzer admits that, at least 
socially, Christians resembled philosophers:
It would be natural, even had we no particular evidence, for Galen’s 
contemporaries to mistake a religion of this unusual kind for a new philo-
sophical school. For religious teachers who offered guidance in conduct 
and a scheme of the universe were so different from the priests of tra-
ditional Greek rites and cults that it is not at all astonishing that they 
should be looked on as philosophers.221
Loveday Alexander has put forth the same argument. The role of philosopher 
provided the Jews and the Christians with a template within the structures of 
imperial public life. Through the channels of philosophy these foreign groups 
could gain power, while philosophy also provided a culturally recognized 
arena for resistance.222 During recent years, several scholars have emphasized 
that the early Christians actually took part in the philosophical discourse.223 
I showed above that the philosophical character of early Christianity is not 
only a modern reconstruction. Several second-century Roman philosophers 
220   “Ja er kennt auch den Begriff der Offenbarung: die Schriften des Chrysipp, den er als den 
grössten Wohlthäter der Menscheit preist, weil durch ihn die Götter die zur Glückseligkeit 
führende Wahrheit gezeigt haben (I, 4, 28 etc.), gelten ihm gewissermassen auch als ein 
heiliger Kodex und bilden für seinen Unterricht und seine Homilieen in ähnlicher Weise 
die Grundlage wie die biblischen Texte für die christliche Predigt” (Bonhöffer 1896, 2; 
translated by myself and Lisa Muszynski, emphasis in the original).
221   Walzer 1949, 51.
222   Alexander 2002.
223   In addition to those mentioned above e.g., Engberg-Pedersen 2000; 2010; Huttunen 2009; 
van Kooten 2008; Thorsteinsson 2010; Wasserman 2008. The views naturally diverge in the 
details, but the general tendency is to see early Christianity in the philosophical context.
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acknowledged the philosophical cast of Christians. Next, I will show that these 
non-Christian accounts of Christians mirror Christian self-representation.
I concentrate on several New Testament texts often presented as a founda-
tional justification for the misrecognition of philosophy: Colossians 2, Acts 17, 
and 1 Corinthians 1–2. I argue that these texts actually make good use of the 
ancient philosophical discourse, so that one can read them as seeking recog-
nition in the Greco-Roman intellectual milieu. I claim that the philosophical 
tendency was present already in the earliest extant Christian texts. After that, 
I will briefly present 1 Corinthians 7 as an example of philosophy. This case 
shows that philosophy was not taken up only in cases that marked the 
boundaries between its relationship with Christianity. Instead, I show that 
philosophical arguments are a natural part of Paul’s argumentation. Thus, the 
later mutual recognition between Christians and philosophers had its neces-
sary background in what the earliest Christians presented in their writings. 
This section makes comprehensible the partial recognition of Christianity 
from the side of pagan philosophers. I argue that this philosophical rec-
ognition was only a mirror of the Christians pursuing it. At the end of this 
section, I briefly discuss Justin Martyr as an example of the intellectual and 
philosophical development among the early Christians. In the following cen-
turies, the intellectual spheres of society were Christianized, which helps to 
clarify the view that the religion/philosophy division is a biased way of con-
struing history.
2.1 Athens and Jerusalem—Still Something in Common
Tertullian justifies his misrecognition of philosophy with two references to 
the Bible: Colossians 2:8 and Acts 17:17–18 (Praescr. 7; trans. ANF 3.246). These 
verses are the only ones in the entire New Testament to mention philosophy 
and philosophers.224 Colossians mentions philosophy:
See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy (διὰ τῆς 
φιλοσοφίας) and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according 
to the elemental spirits of the universe, and not according to Christ. 
Col 2:8
224   In the Greek Old Testament (Septuagint), philosophers and philosophy are mentioned 
only in Dan 1:20 and several times in 4 Macc. According to Otto Michel (1973, 176), in 4 
Macc 5 King Antiochus and the Jew Eleazar discuss whether Judaism can be recognized 
as a philosophical lifestyle (“als φιλοσοφεῖν anerkannt werden kann”).
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Tertullian emphasizes that Paul (or so Tertullian believes the author to 
be—the epistle’s authorship is a controversial topic)225 explicitly names “phi-
losophy as that which he would have us be on our guard against.” The second 
biblical reference Tertullian uses is the story of Paul’s visit to Athens:
So he argued (διελέγετο) in the synagogue with the Jews and the devout 
persons, and also in the marketplace every day with those who happened 
to be there (ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν πρὸς τοὺς παρατυγχάνοντας). 
Also some Epicurean and Stoic philosophers (τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων 
καὶ Στοϊκῶν φιλοσόφων) debated with him. Some said, “What does this 
babbler want to say?” Others said, “He seems to be a proclaimer of foreign 
divinities (ξένων δαιμονίων).” 
Acts 17:17–18
On Paul, Tertullian notes: “He had been at Athens, and had in his interviews 
(with its philosophers) become acquainted with that human wisdom which 
pretends to know the truth, whilst it only corrupts it.” As Acts mentions two 
different philosophical schools, the Epicureans and Stoics, Tertullian hastens 
to argue that philosophy is “divided into its own manifold heresies, by the vari-
ety of its mutually repugnant sects.” Reflecting on Paul’s visit to Athens actually 
leads Tertullian to the rhetorical question: “What indeed has Athens to do with 
Jerusalem?”
However, the implied negative answer is prescriptive, not descriptive. 
Tertullian means that Athens and Jerusalem should not have anything in 
common—but in fact they do have a lot in common. The context of Tertullian’s 
attack on philosophy has a background in his attack on Christian theologians 
whose views he did not accept. He blamed them for heresies arising from 
blending faith and philosophy. “Away with all attempts to produce a mottled 
Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition!” Tertullian exclaims. 
However, if blending philosophy and Christianity is a brand of heresy, 
Tertullian himself is heretical. It is widely known that his theology is deeply 
in debt to philosophy, especially Stoicism. The polemics against philosophy 
is in fact nothing but polemics against heresies. Outside this constellation, he 
225   Most scholars assume that Colossians was written after Paul, despite the fact that the 
epistle presents itself as written by him. On the discussion, see standard scholarly com-
mentaries on the epistle or, for example, Leppä 2003.
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can “call on the Stoics also to help” and then praise Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, 
and Chrysippus (An. 5; trans. ANF 3.184–185).226
Tertullian’s harsh criticism of philosophy seems to be an occasional rhetori-
cal device rather than a conscious theological position. A careful reading also 
reveals that Tertullian’s biblical references do not present an uncompromising 
position regarding philosophy. A few verses after condemning philosophy, the 
author of Colossians admonishes:
Do not let anyone condemn you in matters of food and drink or of observ-
ing festivals, new moons, or sabbaths. These are only a shadow (σκιά) of 
what is to come, but the substance (σῶμα) belongs to Christ. 
Col 2:16–17
A philosophically trained reader may notice that here we encounter a variation 
of Plato’s allegory of the cave (Resp. 514a–518b). Plato tells the story of people 
chained in a cave, where shadows on the walls present everything they know 
of the world outside. According to Plato, material facts are like the shadows of 
immaterial ideas. Colossians adapts the Platonic allegory to the apocalyptic, 
temporally oriented linear worldview. The true substance is to come, but its 
shadow is already visible in the present. Lacking this temporal dimension, 
Plato’s allegory does not speak of the present and the future. Instead, the 
shadows and the ideas are present at the same time. Despite this difference, 
Colossians shares the contemporary philosophical discourse.227 The author 
of Colossians adapts the Platonic allegory to her or his own purposes: Jewish 
ritual practices are but a shadow of the substance, and ignorance in these 
matters should not lead to condemnation (hinting at a potential conflict with 
Jewish Christians). A conflict is also present in Plato’s text. The philosopher 
who knows the ideas
is forced to plead in the law courts, or anywhere else, about the shadows 
(σκιῶν) of justice, or the images whose shadows (σκιαί) they are, and dis-
pute about it on the basis of how these things are understood by those 
who have never yet seen actual justice. 
Resp. 517d; trans. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL
226   On Tertullian’s slogan, its interpretation, and his use of philosophy, see, e.g., Osborn 1997, 
27–47.
227   Sometimes scholars note that the pair σῶμα and σκιά are unusual, as one usually speaks of 
εὶκών instead of σῶμα. There are, however, other examples of the pair σῶμα and σκιά, too 
(see, e.g., O’Brien 1982, 139–140). Moreover, Plato does not use any fixed terminology for 
the substance in his allegory.
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Although the Platonic theory is modified into a Jewish-Christian dialogue, 
its philosophical source can still be felt. Does this use of philosophy go directly 
against the condemnation of philosophy only some verses earlier in the same 
text? It may well be that the condemnation is a rhetorical move, just as we saw 
in Tertullian’s case. The other—and more probable—explanation is that the 
rejection of philosophy by the author of Colossians does not involve general 
condemnation. Scholars usually note that the author is speaking of her or his 
adversaries and, thus, of their particular philosophy.228 As the adversaries seem 
to be obliged to adhere to some Jewish ritual practices, it may seem extraordi-
nary to call their views “philosophy.” Yet, we have several examples of Judaism 
or some of its sects presented in that way.229 This wide understanding of phi-
losophy is by no means limited to Judaism. In fact, the separation between 
religion and philosophy is extraordinary in ancient culture. According to Pierre 
Hadot, even Epicureans who denied vernacular beliefs participated in the cult.
In antiquity, the philosopher encountered religion in his social life (in 
the form of the official cult) and in his cultural life (in the forms of art 
and of literature), yet he lived religion philosophically by transforming 
it into philosophy. If Epicurus recommended participation in civic fes-
tivals and even prayer, this was to allow the Epicurean philosopher to 
contemplate the gods as conceived by the Epicurean theory of nature…. 
The philosophical way of life never entered into competition with reli-
gion in antiquity, because at the time religion was not a way of life which 
included all of existence and all of inner life, as it was in Christianity.230
This philosophical attitude toward religion is present also in the philosophy 
which the author of Colossians opposes. Gregory E. Sterling notes how the 
Colossian philosophy coheres with the philosophical views of the Hellenistic 
Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, who in turn owes much to the Middle 
Platonic demonology. Sterling supposes that the author of Colossians seem-
ingly knew the Middle Platonic scale of being. Sterling says:
The scale they knew placed the angels or daemons in the intermediate 
zones between God and humanity. Their fasting practices suggest that 
228   Michel 1973, 183–184; Bormann 2012, 126.
229   O’Brien 1982, 109; Bormann 2012, 127.
230   Hadot 2002, 271–272. See Maisch 2003, 153: “Philosophie bezeichnet im Hellenismus nicht 
ein theoretisches Lehrgebäude, sondern ein umfassendes System, das Weltdeutung, 
Identitätsstiftung, Spiritualität, Einsicht in den rechten Lebensvollzug und sogar 
magische Praktiken in sich vereinigt.”
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they thought of these beings negatively: their asceticism served as a pro-
tection against injurious elemental spirits. It is likely that they observed 
their fasts in conjunction with a Jewish liturgical calendar.231
The Colossian philosophy is what Hadot describes as practicing religious 
rites with a philosophical mindset. The author of the epistle philosophically 
responds to this practice by placing such rites in the lower level of shadows. It 
remains unclear if this is a carefully considered answer to the scale of being. 
The scale cannot explain the temporal dimension introduced by the author, 
but this difficulty should not be overestimated. Hebrews (8:5; 10:1) contains 
temporal and non-temporal adaptations of the Platonic allegory, side by side. 
The discrepancy between the eschatological and non-eschatological adapta-
tions, however, is not enough to dismiss philosophical influences in Colossians. 
Both the author of Colossians and her or his adversaries seem to participate in 
a discussion which one can describe as being philosophical in nature.
The case of Acts is clearer. One cannot avoid noticing that its relationship 
with philosophy is much more positive than Tertullian claims. Actually, Paul’s 
figure in the narrative hints at Socrates.232 David M. Reis has called Acts 17 an 
echo chamber, which not only provides an opportunity to hear Socratic rever-
berations in the figure of Paul, but also Pauline echoes in the figure of Socrates. 
Justin Martyr invoked the latter when describing Socrates as Paul at the 
Areopagus (2 Apol. 10).233 With the help of the Socratic echoes, the Areopagus 
episode positions Christian identity within the Greco-Roman intellectual 
culture and thus sets a standard for the recognition that Christians sought 
among the philosophers.
The author of Acts234 opens the episode by narrating Paul’s sightseeing in 
Athens. The apostle roams in public every day, arguing (διελέγετο) in the syn-
agogue and in the marketplace (ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ) with “those who happen to be 
there.” This is what Socrates did:
Socrates lived ever in the open; for early in the morning he went to the 
public promenades and training grounds; in the forenoon he was seen in 
the market (ἀγορᾶς); and the rest of the day he passed just where most 
people were to be met: he was generally talking, and anyone might listen. 
Xenophon, Mem. 1.1.10; trans. Marchant, LCL
231   Sterling 1998, 270.
232   This observation is commonplace among scholars. See Sandnes 1993, 20.
233   Reis 2002, 260, 273–274.
234   In fact, we do not know the name of the author who is responsible for Acts and the gospel 
bearing Luke’s name. The scholarly commentaries discuss the question of authorship.
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
79Imperial Recognition in the Intellectual Sphere
I have never been anyone’s teacher, but if anyone, young or old, is keen to 
hear me speak and getting on with my activities, I have never begrudged 
anyone; I don’t charge for conversation (διαλέγομαι), nor do I refuse if 
no money is offered, but I make myself available to rich and poor alike 
for questioning as well as if anyone wants to hear and give an answer to 
whatever I have to say. 
Plato, Apol. 33a; trans. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL
Paul is reproached for being a proclaimer of foreign divinities (ξένων δαιμονίων) 
and Socrates for proclaiming novel divinities (καινὰ δαιμόνια) (Xenophon, 
Mem. 1.1.1; Plato, Apol. 24c). When the story continues in Acts, Paul is taken 
to the Areopagus to report his teaching (Acts 17:19). Again, Luke’s choice of 
words echoes the story of Socrates, who was sentenced to death there. In 
Paul’s time, the Areopagus possibly functioned as a city council,235 but this is 
a moot point. The name Areopagus in the story merely serves to create a new 
echo of Socrates. Even Luke’s ambiguous word choice is evocative. The verb 
ἐπιλαμβάνομαι may mean ‘arrest’ but also well-intentioned attachment.236 Luke 
“appears simply to evoke the image of trial and arrest, allowing it to resonate in 
the reader’s mind without feeling the need to make the connection explicit.”237 
Furthermore, both Socrates and Paul began their speeches at the Areopagus 
with the words “Men of Athens” (ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι) (Plato, Apol. 17a; Acts 17:22).
As a result, one can easily agree with Sandnes’ observation that there is “a 
firm basis for saying that the prelude to the Areopagus speech involves a clear 
comparison between Paul and Socrates.” Sandnes emphasizes that readers 
were aware of this comparison, since Socrates’ figure was well known. Sandnes 
cites Lucian’s words to illustrate the situation: “His praises are sung by every-
one” (Gall. 12).238 Socrates’ reputation was impeccable among the majority of 
the educated, but some did not praise him. Scholars have mainly missed that 
Luke uses the Socratic echoes to locate Paul more closely with one of the two 
previously mentioned philosophical schools: namely, closer to the Stoics than 
to the Epicureans. The Stoics eagerly invoked Socrates, while the Epicureans 
despised him. According to A. A. Long, “from Zeno to Epictetus, that is to say 
throughout the history of the Stoa, Socrates is the philosopher with whom the 
Stoics most closely aligned themselves.” Three stories of Zeno, who founded 
the Stoic school, tell of his devotion to philosophy, pointing out that Socrates 
inspired him in one way or another. Long accurately notes the function of 
235   Barrett 2004, 831–832.
236   Barrett 2004, 831.
237   Reis 2002, 270–271.
238   Sandnes 1993, 22. Similarly many others; see, e.g., Alexander 2002, 230.
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these diverging accounts: “The literal truth of these stories is unimportant. 
What they attest to is a tradition, which Zeno’s followers must have encour-
aged, that Socrates was the primary inspiration of his philosophy.” One source 
even claims that the Stoics wanted to be called Socratics.239 The contrary was 
true of the Epicureans:
If Epicurus was fairly restrained in his remarks about Socrates, his imme-
diate followers were not. From Metrodorus and Idomeneus, extending 
through Zeno of Sidon and Philodemus down to Diogenes of Oenoanda, 
a tradition of hostility to Socrates was established that is virulent even by 
the standards of ancient polemic. In their writings, Socrates was portrayed 
as the complete anti-Epicurean—a sophist, a rhetorician, a sceptic, and 
someone whose ethical inquiries turn human life into chaos.240
Thus, Paul’s Socratic characterization associates the apostle with the Stoics. 
This association becomes clearer in the speech that Luke has him deliver at the 
Areopagus. Of the several Stoic themes of the speech,241 it is enough to men-
tion only one, the quotation: “For we too are his offspring (τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος 
ἐσμέν)” (Acts 17:28). These words belong to the opening verses of the poem 
Phaenomena by the Stoic Aratus:
From Zeus let us begin; him do we mortals never leave unnamed; full of 
Zeus are all the streets and all the market-places of men; full is the sea 
and the havens thereof; always we all have need of Zeus. For we are also 
his offspring (τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰμέν). 
Aratus, Phaen. 1–5; trans. Mair and Mair, LCL
Aratus’ poem was famous and celebrated in antiquity. Its reputation is illus-
trated by the fact that the poem was translated several times into Latin (for 
example, by Cicero and Ovid).242 The Jew Aristobulus of Alexandria cited it in 
the 2nd century BCE, which shows that the poem was also known within the 
Jewish sphere (Eusebius, Praep. ev. 13.12.1–8). Aratus’ Stoic idea of God perme-
ating the whole universe accords well with Paul’s Areopagus speech, in which 
239   Long 1988, 151, 160–161. Long (1988, 150) also states: “Socrates’ presence in Epictetus’ 
Discourses—which I must pass over here—could be the topic of a monograph.” This task 
was completed in 2002 in his book Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life.
240   Long 1988, 155.
241   Scholars routinely note the Stoic coloring of the speech. See, e.g., Barrett 2004. This does 
not exclude, however, the possibility of also finding parallels with the Jewish texts.
242   Fantuzzi 1996, 959–960.
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he preaches: “In him [i.e., God] we live and move and have our being” (Acts 
17:28). However, at the end of his speech Paul diverges from the Stoics by saying 
that God has overlooked ignorance until now (Acts 17:30). This is an implicit 
placing of the Stoics among other ignorant people. The sudden turn of the 
speech after a Stoic-sounding proclamation is a slap in the face of the Stoics, 
who claimed to know the truth and—contrary to the Sceptics—claimed that 
virtue is nothing other than knowledge.243 The Stoics associated their teach-
ing with Socrates, but the Socrates figure here nullifies their knowledge. In a 
way, Paul fulfills Socrates’ prophecy: “you’d spend the rest of your lives asleep, 
unless the god were to send you someone else, in his care for you” (Plato, Apol. 
31a; trans. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL).244 Paul is the prophesied person in 
Luke’s narration, the real follower of Socrates.
From the perspective of seeking recognition, the Areopagus episode is inter-
esting. Paul debates with the philosophers with the consequence that he is 
challenged to report his teaching at the Areopagus. It is as if the Athenians 
were considering their recognition of Paul. Paul, in turn, seeks recognition by 
adhering to the Stoics in his speech. At the end of the speech, the constel-
lation turns upside down: Paul proclaims that everything up to that point 
has been ignorance. The apostle assumes the role of granting or withhold-
ing recognition—in this case the latter. The audience becomes irritated with 
Paul’s idea of resurrection. They seemingly interrupt the speech and, in turn, 
withhold their recognition. Only a small group joins Paul, like those who 
remained faithful to Socrates during his trial (Plato, Apol. 38b; Xenophon, Apol. 
27–28). The mutual misrecognition, however, is not the whole story. In the eyes 
of the reader, through the character of Paul Christianity attains its place among 
the philosophical schools. Ries comments aptly:
Luke constructs a Socratic Paul who deftly negotiates among his enemies 
with rhetorical skill, first by developing an argument for reality of the 
one true God based on common Hellenistic philosophical principles, and 
then by proclaiming the decidedly Christian teaching about the resur-
rection and judgment, which elicits among his audience consternation, 
intrigue, and conversion.245
243   Long 1988, 158.
244   One may note that the idea of a prophecy did not sound strange to Stoic ears. The Stoics 
firmly believed in divination, and Cicero relates that the Stoic Antipater “gathered a mass 
of remarkable premonitions received by Socrates” (Div. 1.123; trans. Falconer, LCL).
245   Ries 2002, 272–273.
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Paradoxically, the fact that the encounter with philosophers at the Areopagus 
terminates in mutual misrecognition may be the ultimate catalyst for locating 
Christianity among the philosophers. Hubert Cancik notes that the recurrent 
disputes in Acts elevated Christianity from a cult to a philosophical school:
It is furthermore highly remarkable, so far as I see, that this kind of dis-
pute over unity, inheritance, and continuity does not occur in Greek and 
Roman religion. Controversies over “worldview,” moral behavior, the rela-
tion of the individual to the state, marriage, work, war, and death, so far 
as these can be rationalized, are dealt with in Greco-Roman culture by 
means of philosophy, not religion.246
Luke’s picture of Paul disputing with philosophers did not propagate an 
anti-philosophical tendency. The episode is rather a claim of Christianity 
as the most truthful philosophy, which surpasses other schools. Tertullian’s 
anti-philosophical reading of this text seems more than questionable. I will 
still widen the discussion on the first two chapters of 1 Corinthians, which 
Tertullian did not use, but which are often thought of as representing an anti-
philosophical attitude.
2.2 Paul, Philosophy and the Torah
2.2.1 Corinthians—Philosophical Folly in the World
“Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?” Paul247 asks rhetorically 
(1 Cor 1:20). Paul answers in the affirmative, as he also points out several times 
in 1 Corinthians 1–2. After the salutation, Paul briefly relates what he has heard 
of the Corinthians and then, from 1:18 onwards, proceeds to his criticism of 
worldly wisdom: The Greeks have searched for wisdom without acknowledg-
ing God. Therefore, God decided to save the world through foolishness (μωρία), 
through the proclamation of Christ crucified. Paul stresses that he did not pro-
claim this “in lofty words or wisdom” (2:1). He even denies knowing something, 
with one exception: “I decided to know nothing (οὐ γὰρ ἔκρινά τι εἰδέναι) among 
you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified” (2:2). Yet, Paul’s proclamation is 
wisdom nonetheless: not “a wisdom of this age” (2:6), but God’s wisdom so that 
“faith might rest not on human wisdom but on the power of God (ἐν δυνάμει 
θεοῦ)” (2:5). Christians, he says, speak “in words not taught by human wisdom 
but taught by the Spirit.”
246   Cancik 1997, 693.
247   Contrary to Colossians, the authorship of 1 Corinthians is not disputed. The author is Paul 
himself.
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In his commentary, Gordon D. Fee summarizes the main thesis of 1 
Corinthians 1–2: “The gospel is not some new sophia (wisdom, or philosophy), 
not even a new divine sophia. For sophia allows for human judgments or evalua-
tions of God’s activity.”248 What is this but a total misrecognition of philosophy? 
Loveday Alexander plainly speaks of an “apparently anti-philosophical stance 
adopted by Paul himself in the letter of Corinthians.”249 Should Tertullian refer 
to this text? No. When Paul’s words are placed in a philosophical context, they 
no longer seem so anti-philosophical. My aim is to show that there are several 
contact points with philosophy and that Paul’s text therefore participates in 
philosophical discourse. I mostly cite Plato, but this does not indicate Paul’s 
particular attachment to Platonism. Plato’s texts were also used outside the 
Platonic school and interpreted differently by various schools.250 Instead of 
trying to link Paul to a certain philosophical school,251 I generally argue that 
the ostensibly anti-philosophical words themselves belong to the philosophi-
cal discourse.
Fee’s claim that the gospel is no divine sophia is forced. In fact, he later has 
to admit that Paul speaks of divine wisdom in opposition to human wisdom. 
Fee explains that Paul “transformed ‘wisdom’ from a philosophical, rhetori-
cal term into a historical, soteriological one.”252 True, Paul identified salvific 
wisdom with the crucified Christ; thus, divine wisdom really is historical and 
soteriological. I argue, however, that these features do not rule out philoso-
phy. One can find a similar opposition between human and divine wisdom in 
Plato’s texts. In the Apology, Socrates states that Apollo called him the wisest 
human being. Socrates wanted to prove this claim wrong—without success. 
Socrates explains: “the god is in truth wise and this is what he means in this 
oracle: that human wisdom (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία) is of little worth, even worth-
less.” (Plato, Apol. 23a; trans. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL). Here the most 
famous representative of ancient philosophy differentiates between divine 
and human wisdom.
Plato’s Sophist repeats the same opposition, adapting it to the division 
between the philosophers and the sophists. The latter imitates the former 
and, therefore, what the sophists represent does not belong to the divine, but 
248   Fee 1987, 68, 98.
249   Alexander 2002, 230.
250   Long 1988, 152. For example, Long (2002, 70) suggests that the Stoic Epictetus “knew the 
Gorgias more or less by heart.”
251   Some have seen similarities between Paul and the Stoics (e.g., Engberg-Pedersen 2000; 
2010; Huttunen 2009; Thorsteinsson 2010), others between Paul and the Platonists (e.g., 
van Kooten 2008; Wasserman 2008). Downing (1998) prefers the Cynic Paul.
252   Fee 1987, 73.
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to the human (οὐ θεῖον ἀλλ᾿ ἀνθρωπικὸν) category (Plato, Soph. 268c–d). The 
background is Plato’s theory of ideas: unlike the true philosophers, the sophists 
just imitate the divine wisdom of ideas. As imitators, the sophists remain on 
the worldly level. In 1 Corinthians, Paul does not represent the Platonic theory 
of ideas. Nevertheless, the opposition between human and divine wisdom is 
present in both Plato’s and Paul’s texts. This similarity is quite general, but it 
proves that the differentiation between divine and human wisdom created by 
Paul should not be straightforwardly explained as anti-philosophical.
Plato’s dialogue Ion253 comes closer to Paul, who associates divine wis-
dom with the power of God. Meeting Ion, who is specialized in performing 
Homer’s poetry, we are told that he is not at all interested in other poets and 
cannot even form any clear opinions about them. Socrates infers that Ion is not 
actually skilled in the art of poetry, for if he were, he would have been able to 
perform any work of it. As this is not the case, the conclusion is that Ion’s skill 
to perform poetry—or anyone’s, for that matter—cannot be of human origin. 
The skill must originate via divine influence, that is, divine power.
For not by art do they utter these things, but by divine influence (θείᾳ 
δυνάμει); since, if they had fully learnt by art to speak on one kind of 
theme, they would know how to speak on all. And for this reason God 
takes away the mind of these men and uses them as his ministers, just as 
he does soothsayers and godly seers, in order that we who hear them may 
know that it is not they who utter these words of great price, when they 
are out of their wits, but that it is God himself who speaks and addresses 
us through them. 
Plato, Ion 534c–d; trans. Fowler and Lamb, LCL
One may recall that in the Republic, Plato openly expresses his disgust of 
poetry, which is just an imitation of reality: “Starting with Homer, all compos-
ers of poetry are imitators of images of virtue and of every other subject they 
deal with, but they don’t grasp the truth” (Resp. 600e; trans. Emlyn-Jones and 
Preddy, LCL). Thus, poetry as an imitation is on the level of sophistic arguments. 
It is thus possible, though not obvious, that Plato’s praise of divine inspira-
tion in Ion is ironic; in reality, Plato might be hinting that poetry is nothing 
but foolishness.254 Be that as it may, Plato is not the only philosopher to pres-
ent the concept of divine power. In Xenophon’s version of Socrates’ Apology, 
253   It is possible that Ion was not written by Plato himself, but somewhat after him (Thesleff 
1982, 221–223).
254   Thesleff 1982, 222.
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Socrates says that the daimonion speaking to him is no novel idea, as people 
traditionally believe in omens coming through birds, thunder, and the Pythia.
The only difference between them and me is that whereas they call the 
sources of their forewarning ‘birds,’ ‘utterances,’ ‘chance meetings,’ 
‘prophets,’ I call mine a ‘divine’ thing (δαιμόνιον), and I think that in using 
such a term I am speaking with greater truth and piety than those who 
ascribe the gods’ power to birds (τῶν τοῖς ὄρνισιν ἀνατιθέντων τὴν τῶν θεῶν 
δύναμιν). 
Xenophon, Apol. 13; trans. Marchant, LCL
A later philosopher presenting the idea of divine power can be found in the 
text of the Stoic Epictetus at the beginning of the 2nd century CE. Epictetus 
may be basing himself on Xenophon’s words, as his argumentation is quite 
similar.255 Epictetus creates an opposition between the divine message and 
the human message, with the former originating in divine power.
Once you have heard these words go away and say to yourself, “It was not 
Epictetus who said these things to me; why, how could they have occurred 
to him? but it was some kindly god or other speaking through him. For 
it would not have occurred to Epictetus to say these things, because he 
is not in the habit of speaking to anyone. Come then, let us obey God, 
that we rest not under His wrath.” Nay, but if a raven gives you a sign by 
his croaking, it is not the raven that gives the sign, but God through the 
raven; whereas if He gives you a sign through a human voice, will you pre-
tend that it is the man who is saying these things to you, so that you may 
remain ignorant of the power of the divinity (τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ δαιμονίου), 
that He gives signs to some men in this way, and to others in that, but that 
in the greatest and most sovereign matters He gives His sign through His 
noblest messenger (διὰ καλλίστου ἀγγέλου) [i.e., Hermes; Epictetus con-
tinues by citing the Odyssey]? 
Epictetus, Disc. 3.1.36–37; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Epictetus does not seriously claim to be an oracle in the normal sense of the 
word.256 However, he surely understood his philosophical message as divine 
wisdom, which makes the comparison to oracles understandable. As a Stoic, 
255   Long (1988, 151) holds it as certain that “Epictetus has reflected hard on the Socratic writ-
ings of Plato and Xenophon.”
256   Huttunen 2009, 21.
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Epictetus believed in the god within, which he calls by many names. Here he 
speaks of the power of δαιμονίον, which denotes the divine and the rational part 
of the human being.257 Thus, “the power of the divinity” simply means human 
rationality. This is not what Paul thinks.258 However, his concept of the divine 
Spirit abiding within Christians comes close. He makes it clear that the Spirit 
boosts cognitive capacity (1 Cor. 2:10–16).259 Stoics could also call the divinity 
‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα), though the word is quite rare in Epictetus’ usage.260
Finally, I would like to treat Paul’s report of his earlier sojourn, found in 1 
Corinthians: “I did not come proclaiming the mystery of God to you in lofty 
words or wisdom. For I decided to know nothing (οὐ γὰρ ἔκρινά τι εἰδέναι) 
among you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified” (1 Cor. 2:1–2).261 Fee under-
stands this non-knowing as a rejection of philosophical reasoning,262 but even 
this saying has its parallel in Plato’s Apology (21b,d; trans. Emlyn-Jones and 
Preddy, LCL): “I assure you I’m conscious that I’m not wise in any way great or 
small,” and “It’s probable, of course, that neither of us knows anything that is 
fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something without knowing it, 
whereas I, just as I don’t know, I don’t think I do either. At least it seems I’m 
wiser than this man in just this one minor respect, that I don’t even think I 
know what I don’t know.” (οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν 
οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, 
ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι.)
This sounds similar to Paul.263 Both Socrates and Paul reflect on their 
knowledge and make decisions accordingly. Paul does not claim to be igno-
rant, however, but reports about his decision to be ignorant except in what 
comes to Christ. Anthony A. Thiselton is right when he states that this inter-
pretation releases Paul from any anti-intellectualism.264 Yet, if ignorance is 
257   Bonhöffer 1890, 83–86. Bonhöffer’s work is still worth consulting, despite its age. He pro-
foundly contextualizes the philosophical concepts that Epictetus uses.
258   In Romans, there is a closer parallel to Epictetus. Paul presents the devotion to the ratio-
nal cult (τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν) as an ideal (Rom. 12:1), similarly to Epictetus (Disc. 1.6.20).
259   On the cognitive role of the Spirit and its relationship to Stoicism, see Engberg-Pedersen 
2010, 76–80.
260   SVF 1.121.6; 2.112.31; 2.299.11; 2.306.21; 2.307.21. In Epictetus’ texts, the word πνεῦμα or its 
derivatives occur only in Disc. 2.1.17; 2.23.3; 3.3.22; 3.13.15.
261   Paul’s word order is somewhat surprising. The more precise translation may be “I did not 
decide to know something …” However, I do not see any difference in the meaning. On the 
translation, see Thiselton 2000, 211–212.
262   Fee 1987, 92.
263   The former sentence (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν) is close to 1 Cor. 4:4 
(οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα).
264   Thiselton 2000, 212.
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anti-intellectualism, is Socrates anti-intellectual? It depends on the philo-
sophical school. As it turns out, the Sceptic school “invented” the Socrates who 
knows nothing. Conversely, the Stoic Socrates knows a lot of things.265 It is 
difficult to say what Paul’s position on these epistemological questions was—if 
he even had strong attachments to any position. It is possible, however, that 
his words echo these discussions. In any case, the contemporary philosophical 
discussions prove that Paul’s words are in no self-evident way directed against 
philosophy.
In sum, it seems plausible that Paul was partaking in the general philosophi-
cal discourse. The division between worldly and divine wisdom is present in 
the philosophical texts. Plato, Xenophon, and Epictetus refer to divine power. 
Although Paul emphasized his ignorance (except in matters of Christ), he 
does not seem to reject knowledge—and if he did, he would come close to 
the Sceptic school. These similarities do not diminish the dissimilarities. For 
example, Paul and Epictetus share a conviction regarding the divine power 
within human beings, but Paul restricts it to Christians, who are the only ones 
to receive the divine Spirit (1 Cor. 2:12). Stoics thought spirit to be present in 
every human being. Dissimilarities between Paul and Epictetus are clear, but 
there are also dissimilarities, say, between Plato and Epictetus. I cannot see 
that Paul’s discourse categorically deviates from the philosophical discourse.
This being the case, I would like to question the traditional reading of 1 
Corinthians 1 and 2. Paul does not try to deviate from philosophy, and he is 
not presenting a categorical alternative to what is earlier presented in philoso-
phy. Quite the contrary, he joins in the contemporary philosophical discourse. 
In fact, Paul’s words against specious human wisdom can be seen as a search 
for recognition in the intellectual culture of the day. In this discourse, truth 
was presented as a divine essence, opposite to that of worldly wisdom. Paul 
presents himself as the most truthful philosopher, a messenger by divine 
call (κλητὸς ἀπόστολος) (1 Cor. 1:1), who reliably presents the divine myster-
ies, “God’s wisdom, secret and hidden” (1 Cor. 2:7). Paul’s revelatory character 
or invocation of the authority of the Septuagint do not make him a deviant 
either. As Pierre Hadot points out, in many philosophical schools of the impe-
rial period, natural revelation “was augmented by what the Greeks have always 
believed: revelations made by gods to a few inspired mortals.” The texts of 
Plato, Xenophon, and Epictetus quoted above exemplify this well. Hadot notes, 
“Also sought-after were revelations made to the barbarians: Jews, Egyptians, 
Assyrians, and inhabitants of India.” Philosophical teaching took the form of 
265   On the Sceptic and Stoic interpretations of Socrates, see Long 1988, 156–160.
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
88 chapter 2
commenting on authoritative texts.266 In this tradition, 1 Corinthians 1–2 is not 
a misrecognition of philosophy.
But am I forgetting Paul’s Judaism? If we look at his epistles, they are full 
of biblical citations and allusions. Equally clear references to philosophical 
authors are non-existent. Admittedly, Paul did not discuss philosophers in his 
epistles. Still, I maintain that his thoughts can be read within the context of 
philosophical discourse. The similarities are sufficiently recognizable. Next, 
I will support my claim by a short analysis of Paul’s thoughts on law, which 
are routinely associated with the Torah. This is mostly right, but does not 
rule out the use of philosophy. If philosophy and the Torah were impossible 
bedfellows, Philo’s Jewish philosophy should be an impossibility—which it is 
evidently not. We can expect that Paul could likewise combine the Torah and 
philosophical discourse.
2.2.2 Paul’s Philosophical Interpretation of the Torah
It is well known that Jews in diaspora interpreted the Torah in terms of philo-
sophical categories.267 Anyone can acknowledge this fact when reading, say, 
Philo’s treatises where the Torah, as anything else, is interpreted in philosophi-
cal categories. Paul in this respect was surely not an exception among diaspora 
Jews. It is quite natural that Greco-Roman interpretations were not alien to 
the apostle, whose liberal views of gentile inclusion tested the boundaries 
of Judaism. It is also worth noting that the Greek expressions for “law,” “com-
mandment,” “ordinance,” etc. do not necessarily refer to the Torah. When Paul 
uses these, he does not necessarily mean the Torah and its regulations. Heikki 
Räisänen has shown that in some cases it is difficult to interpret ὁ νόμος as 
the Torah.268
It is misleading, however, to track whether Paul is speaking of the Jewish 
law or law in Greco-Roman terms. As it is invariably a question of the same 
Greek terms, some strict dividing line is hard or even impossible to make. This 
is to follow the program of Troels Engberg-Pedersen, who demanded an end to 
using “any form of the Judaism/Hellenism divide as an interpretive lens.” One 
should stop reading the comparative material “as if either the Jewish or the 
Hellenistic material is in the end the really important one.”269 The purpose is 
not to abandon Judaism or Greco-Roman categories, but to stop seeing them 
as mutually exclusive categories. If these categories can overlap in Philo, why 
266   Hadot 2002, 149–153.
267   See, e.g., Weber 2000.
268   Räisänen 1992, 48–94.
269   Engberg-Pedersen 2001, 3–4.
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would they not overlap in Paul? Here my aim is to see how philosophical and 
Jewish elements overlap in one passage, 1 Corinthians 7:17–24. I make my point 
by comparing Paul’s words to Epictetus’ sayings. This is not to claim any direct 
dependence but to illustrate that Paul’s words on the law and commands do 
not exclude philosophy.
As Paul was a diaspora Jew, it might seem reasonable to compare his views 
with those of other diaspora Jews, especially with those who have philosophi-
cal inclinations, such as Philo. However, I avoid this kind of comparison for 
methodological reasons. A comparison with diaspora Jews would lead to 
asking whether the similarities between potentially compared parts merely 
proves Paul’s Jewishness. If Paul and another diaspora Jew were to present sim-
ilar views, the easiest interpretation for the similarities would be their shared 
Jewish—not Greco-Roman—background. This would lead to again falling 
back on the Judaism/Hellenism divide. Therefore, I preclude the problem by 
comparing the views of Paul and a pagan thinker. In this comparison we see 
how much Paul resembles the latter’s philosophical context, even when speak-
ing of the law and commandments.
My procedure is as follows. First, I take a short look at 1 Corinthians 7:17–24 
to illustrate the basic problem in Paul’s statements on the commandments. 
Second, I present relevant passages in Epictetus’ texts so that we can, third, 
turn back to Paul with the information gathered from Epictetus. I would like to 
show that Paul’s thinking is heavily indebted to ideas that are similar to those 
of Epictetus. I do not hesitate to call Paul’s thinking in 1 Corinthians 7:17–24 
“Christian Stoicism.” In this regard, Paul’s Jewish and philosophical elements 
do not exclude each other.
In 1 Corinthians 7:17–24, Paul admonishes Christians to stay in their pres-
ent social position and make use of it. Circumcision and uncircumcision are 
nothing, while “obeying the commandments of God (τήρησις ἐντολῶν θεοῦ) is 
everything” (1 Cor 7:19). The expression has solid parallels in the Jewish litera-
ture. The Wisdom of Solomon states: “The beginning of wisdom is the most 
sincere desire for instruction, and concern for instruction is love of her, and 
love of her is the keeping of her laws (τήρησις νόμων αὐτῆς)” (Wis 6:18). Sirach, 
in turn, admonishes: “Guard yourself in every act, for this is the keeping of 
the commandments (τήρησις ἐντολῶν)” (Sir 32:23). In both instances, laws and 
commands denote the Torah.270 Initially it makes sense to think that Paul also 
speaks of the commandments in the Torah. However, in closer analysis this 
interpretation becomes dubious. If Paul is thinking of the Torah, how could 
he say that circumcision is nothing (οὐδέν ἐστιν)? It is well known that in the 
270   Lang 1986, 96; Räisänen 1987, 68.
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contemporary Judaism of the day, circumcision was held as one of the main 
expressions of obedience to the Torah.
Philo tells of so-called allegorists, who made a spiritual reinterpretation of 
the circumcision command (Philo, Migr. 89–93). Was Paul spiritualizing the 
circumcision? Had he meant this, circumcision would not be nothing but some-
thing, namely something spiritual, for example, similar to the circumcision of 
the heart in Romans 2:28–29. This, however, is not the case in 1 Corinthians 
7:19, where circumcision is simply nothing. Another option is to interpret the 
commandments so that they refer to the love command (Lev 19:18). In Romans 
and in Galatians, Paul compresses the Torah to the love command (Rom 13:9; 
Gal. 5:14), but even this interpretation seems to be false. It is difficult to think 
that a plural “commandments” would refer to the one command.271 There is 
even a further difficulty, as love is not mentioned in the context. Neither the 
spiritualization nor the love command provides an interpretive option.
The meaning of the commandments must be primarily and closely exam-
ined in the textual context. In the larger passage (1 Cor 7:17–24), Paul discusses 
social positions. Therefore, the “commandments” probably have something 
to do with them. Many scholars have noted resemblances between Stoicism 
and Paul’s teachings on social positions. In his Epiktet und das Neue Testament, 
Adolf Bonhöffer states: “There is no doubt that here exists one of the most 
important similarities between Stoicism and Christianity.”272 Next I look at 
how Epictetus deals with social positions and how this theme sheds light 
on “the commandments of God” in Paul’s text. I start quite far, in order to 
adequately place Epictetus’ individual sayings on social positions within his 
larger philosophical system. In this way one can be sure that the similarities 
concern the contents and not only the wording.273
The nucleus of Epictetus’ philosophy is the right division of things 
and the moral value or the lack of value. The division is aptly summarized in 
the opening section of Epictetus’ Encheiridion.274 It begins with the fundamen-
tal division between the things, which are our own and under our control, and 
the things which are not our own (τὰ ἀλλότρια) and not under our control.
271   Lindemann 2000, 171.
272   Bonhöffer 1911, 171. See also, e.g., Jones 1987, 37, 53; Vollenweider 1989, 211, 241; Deming 
1995, 159; Dautzenberg 2001, 61–62.
273   On the methodological considerations, see Huttunen 2009, 10–19.
274   The author of Encheiridion is not Epictetus but his student Arrian, who has summarized 
the main points of Epictetus’ philosophy. On Encheiridion, see Brandt 2015. For Epictetus’ 
philosophy in general, see Long 2002 and Bonhöffer 1890 and 1894. Bonhöffer’s studies are 
still held in high regard and worth consulting, regardless of their age and a certain ten-
dency to overemphasize Epictetus’ philosophical orthodoxy. Long’s immensely learned 
study is the first comprehensive survey after Bonhöffer.
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
91Imperial Recognition in the Intellectual Sphere
Some things are under our control, while others are not under our con-
trol. Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in 
a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our 
body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is 
not our own doing. 
Ench. 1.1; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Epictetus uses several names for the things which are not our own and not 
under our control. They are, for example, external things (τὰ ἐκτός) or materials 
(ὗλαι) (Disc. 1.29.2). According to Epictetus, material things are indifferent (αἱ 
ὗλαι ἀδιάφοροι) (Disc. 2.5.1), while our conceptions, choices, desires, and aver-
sions are not. These mental operations follow our value judgements (δόγματα) 
on external things. According to Epictetus, all external things are indifferent as 
such. It is our judgements that make them good or bad. In other words, that 
which is good or bad lies not in external things as such but solely in our judge-
ments of them. This is his Stoic theory of value. Embracing this theory has 
an effect on one’s mental state. As external things are indifferent, they cannot 
disturb us. “What, then, are the things that weigh upon us and drive us out of 
our senses? Why, what else but our judgements” (Disc. 2.16.24; trans. Oldfather, 
LCL). For example, a tyrant can imprison, behead, or exile anyone, but those 
who have embraced philosophy can remain undisturbed in spite of all these 
tyrannical operations. Tyrants threaten only external things. One can remain 
calm “if I feel that all this is nothing (οὐδέν ἐστι) to me” (Disc. 1.29.5–7; trans. 
Oldfather, LCL).
On the other hand, one can ask if this theory of value makes one totally 
negligent in one’s responsibilities and even one’s own life. Why did Epictetus 
continue to live, eat, and teach in his school in spite of the fact that these all 
constitute indifferent external things? In his answer, Epictetus emphasizes 
that the indifference to external things does not determine the use of those 
things: “Materials are indifferent, but the use of which we make of them is not 
a matter of indifference (ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδιάφορος)” (Disc. 2.5.1; trans. 
Oldfather, LCL). In Discourses 2.16, Epictetus presents the right use of exter-
nal things as the law of God. The starting point is the fundamental division 
between the things which are our own and which are not.
(28) And what is the law of God (ὁ νόμος ὁ θεῖος)? To guard (τηρεῖν) what is 
his own, not to lay claim to what is not his own, but to make use (χρῆσθαι) 
of what is given to him, and not to yearn for what has not been given; 
when something is taken away, to give it up readily and without delay, 
being grateful for the time in which he had the use (ἐχρήσατο) of it. 
Disc. 2.16.28; trans. Oldfather, LCL
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Now I approach our theme more directly. Keeping an eye on Paul, one can 
see here a certain terminological similarity. According to Epictetus, people 
should guard (τηρεῖν) what the law of God commands, that is, one’s judgements. 
People should be content with the things which God has loaned us, make use 
(χρῆσθαι) of them, and give them away if it is God’s will (cf. Disc. 2.5.22; Ench. 11). 
This attitude also concerns social positions. They belong to the external things 
of which people should make use. In the same text, Epictetus presents this atti-
tude in an exemplary prayer: “Wouldst Thou have me to hold office, or remain 
in private life; to remain here or go into exile; to be poor or be rich? I will defend 
all these Thy acts before men” (Disc. 2.16.42). It does not matter what the social 
position is. Slaves and masters are brothers under God (Disc. 1.13). What makes 
a difference is the careful use of the position which God has provided.
A similar attitude toward social positions is found in Discourses 3.24, where 
Epictetus also speaks of God’s commands. Epictetus says that a good and excel-
lent man fills his place (χώρα) “with due obedience to God” until it is time to 
depart (Disc. 3.24.95–97; trans. Oldfather, LCL).
(98) “How do you depart?” “Again (πάλιν), as Thou didst wish it, as a free 
man (ἐλεύθερος), as Thy servant (ὑπηρέτης), as one who has perceived Thy 
commands and Thy prohibitions (τῶν προσταγμάτων καὶ ἀπαγορευμάτων). 
(99) But so long as I continue to live in Thy service, what manner of man 
wouldst Thou have me be? An official or a private citizen, a senator or 
one of the common people, a soldier or a general, a teacher or a head of 
a household? Whatsoever station and post (χώραν καὶ τάξιν) Thou assign 
me, I will die ten thousand times, as Socrates says, or ever I abandon it.”275 
Disc. 3.24.98–99; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Epictetus says that one should depart from life in accordance with God’s “com-
mands and prohibitions,” which is a Stoic definition of law.276 The word ‘again’ 
indicates that God’s law regulates not only dying but also life. Obedience to 
God’s law must happen freely. One should serve God as a free man or as a 
free servant (ὑπηρέτης), not as a compelled slave (δοῦλος).277 Freedom is one 
of Epictetus’ main themes, and it recurs in the pages of Discourses time and 
again.278 I add just one further example: “I am a free man and a friend of God, 
so as to obey Him of my own free will. No other thing ought I to claim, not body, 
275   This may be a paraphrasing of Plato, Apol. 28e–29a (cf. Disc. 1.9.23–24; 3.1.19–20).
276   Bonhöffer 1911, 231; SVF 3.314.
277   For the difference between ὑπηρέτης and δοῦλος, see Rengstorf 1974, 532–533.
278   Epictetus’ emphasis on freedom can be illustrated by the fact that the longest discourse 
(Disc. 4.1) deals with this theme. Willms (2011) has recently written an in-depth commen-
tary on this discourse and provides secondary literature.
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or property, or office, or reputation … I cannot transgress any of His commands 
(τῶν ἐντολῶν)” (Disc. 4.3.9–10; trans. Oldfather, LCL). For Epictetus, obedience 
to God’s law brings freedom.279 Later in Discourses 3.24, Epictetus explains that 
one is a witness in service to God, showing that social positions are indifferent, 
while obedience to God’s commands is everything:
He is training me, and making use of me as a witness to the rest of men 
(μάρτυρι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους χρώμενος). When I have been appointed to such 
a service, am I any longer to take thought as to where I am, or with whom, 
or what men say about me? Am I not wholly intent upon God, and His 
commands and ordinances (οὐχὶ δ᾿ ὅλος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τέταμαι καὶ τὰς 
ἐκείνου ἐντολὰς καὶ τὰ προστάγματα)? 
Disc. 3.24.114; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Remembering 1 Corinthians 7, it is worth adding that an exemplary person is “a 
witness summoned by God” (μάρτυς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκλημένος) and one should 
not disgrace “the summons which He gave you” (τὴν κλῆσιν ἣν κέκληκεν) (Disc. 
1.29.46, 49; trans. Oldfather, LCL). One should face difficulties “with trust in 
Him who has called you to face them and deemed you worthy of this position” 
(πεποιθότως τῷ κεκληκότι σε ἐπ᾿ αὐτά, τῷ ἄξιον τῆς χώρας ταύτης κεκρικότι) (Disc. 
2.1.39; trans. Oldfather, LCL).
Before revisiting what Paul might have meant with “the commandments of 
God” (1 Cor. 7:19), I briefly summarize previous findings on Epictetus’ thought. 
First, the external things like social positions are adiaphora, but their use is 
not. Actually, God has decreed different kinds of external things for different 
people. This decreeing Epictetus calls divine law, using such Greek terms as 
νόμος and ἐντολαί. One should guard (τηρέω) this law by using (χράομαι) the 
external things. The social position can be understood not only as a divine 
law but also God’s call (καλέω, κλῆσις). I claim that Epictetus’ thoughts shed 
light on what Paul meant with “the commandments of God.” If Paul means 
the commandments of the Torah, his idea is totally blurred, as evidenced 
by the indifference toward circumcision. And being so blurred, it does not 
explain what the content of the “commandments” might be. In this context, 
Paul does not speak of the Torah but of social positions.
In 1 Cor. 7:17–24, Paul stresses that God calls (καλέω, κλῆσις) each person 
within his or her social position, not beyond or outside it. The position is thus 
279   Gretenkord 1981, 217–218. Gretenkord juxtaposes this against what Paul states, but actu-
ally Gretenkord is discussing with Bultmann’s interpretation of Paul. The new perspective 
on Paul may see the relationship as less oppositional. The covenantal nomism projected 
onto Paul and Judaism, however, may also fit with Greco-Roman religion (Roitto 2013).
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indifferent. This is immediately clear when Paul says that circumcision and 
uncircumcision are nothing. The indifference of status seems to also be the 
background when he states that a slave should not be concerned about his 
or her status. In this regard, any concern with status seems to be out of place 
since statuses are indifferent. Paul qualifies the positions by saying that slaves 
are freedmen of the Lord, while free persons are the Lord’s slaves. Then, he 
immediately continues by calling all Christians slaves bought by the Lord.280 
This change of viewpoints illustrates the relativity of social positions: anyone 
can be called free or slave. Thus, the external social positions are nothing that 
one should concern oneself with. This view is just a variation of Epictetus’ logic 
when he says that one can remain calm when losing everything, because those 
things are nothing (οὐδέν ἐστι) (Disc. 1.29.5–7). Paul seems to share the Stoic 
theory of value: external things are indifferent and therefore do not have an 
effect on our inner selves.
Paul strongly stresses that Christians should remain in their social posi-
tions. If social positions are indifferent, why should anyone foster, attend to, or 
take care of them? Epictetus’ philosophy makes this paradox understandable: 
external things are indifferent, but their use (χρῆσις) is not. Paul even uses the 
Stoic technical verb χράομαι in verse 21. This idea has both Paul and Epictetus 
generally emphasizing that one should remain in one’s position. Paul possibly 
speaks of changing social status in verse 1 of Cor 7:21. This verse is linguistically 
unclear: what is the object of the verb χράομαι? Should the slave continue to 
make use of her or his position as a slave or use the opportunity to become free? 
Both interpretations can be understood along the lines of Stoic philosophy.
The choice between freedom and slavery was officially in the hands of the 
owner, not in the hands of the slave.281 If Paul admonishes one to remain in 
slavery, he means that slaves should not make any unofficial petitions to their 
owners for this freedom. Such a petition would express a striving for an exter-
nal social position, and this is something that Stoics do not accept. According 
to the Stoics, social freedom is indifferent and, therefore, it is not worth striving 
for. Still, if the owner just asks what the slave would like to happen, there is no 
striving; Stoics would surely advise the slave to gain his or her freedom.282 Thus, 
both interpretations of 1 Cor. 7:21 can (but must not) be read along the lines of 
Stoic philosophy. The Stoic reading is very probable, since Paul stands close 
to the Stoic theory of value and Stoic admonitions to remain in one’s social 
280   The Greek verb ἀγοράζω denotes the buying of a slave for service, not making a payment 
for freedom (Jones 1987, 31; Martin 1990, 63). Cf. 1 Cor. 6:19–20.
281   Bartchy 1973, 106–109. Bartchy himself tries to interpret the verse in a third way, that Paul 
is admonishing manumitted slaves to remain Christians.
282   Bonhöffer 1911, 170–172. Linguistically I prefer the first interpretative option: the slave 
should remain in slavery. See Huttunen 2009, 28–29.
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position. Moreover, there is the Stoic technical verb χράομαι in the verse. In the 
last analysis, it is quite unimportant whether or not Paul admonishes slaves to 
make use of the opportunity to become free or continue to make use of their 
position as a slave. What is decisive here is that Paul is probably presenting the 
Stoic idea that one should make use of indifferent things—whatever they are.
All this Stoic philosophy of life can be viewed in theological terms. Epictetus 
utters prayers to express his fealty in any social position that God decrees. 
Whatever the position is, Epictetus promises to remain in it, because God pre-
fers such conduct. Epictetus says that God summons or calls (καλέω, κλῆσις) 
people to be his witness. The idea of the divine calling is also central in Paul’s 
passage. The idea differs only slightly from that of Epictetus. For Paul, God’s 
call has a double meaning: it is at the same time a call to remain in a social 
position and to also become a Christian.283 For Epictetus, the connection 
between the call and the social position is vaguer. He says that God calls peo-
ple to be his witness. Although Epictetus does not explicitly say that God calls 
us to a certain social position, it is clear that the positions are given by God. The 
philosophical differences between Paul and Epictetus are minor, and they do 
not diminish the general philosophical similarity.
God’s call is a Stoic idea and Paul seems to adjust it in the context of a Stoic 
theory of value. The distinct Stoic coloring in the passage leads to a Stoic expla-
nation for the commandments of God in 1 Corinthians 7:19. Here again occurs a 
term with a Stoic ring. The word τήρησις is suggestive of τηρέω, which Epictetus 
uses in the context of a divine law (Disc. 2.16.28). The divine law stresses the 
importance of the Stoic theory of value and admonishes one to make use 
(χράομαι) of any external thing that God has given. Epictetus also speaks of 
God’s commandments (ἐντολαί), and he uses other similar expressions when 
speaking of social positions. This theological parlance serves to instruct the 
Stoic theory of value. This theory is present in 1 Corinthians 7:17–24 with sev-
eral other Stoic features. In this context, the commandments of God are easily 
interpreted in a manner that is similar to that in Epictetus: the command-
ments refer to the different social positions. Each position imposes differing 
demands, which explains the plural form.
This Stoic interpretation of the commandments makes excellent sense in 
the context of 1 Corinthians 7:17–24. It is much more difficult to interpret the 
relevant commandments in relation to either the love command or the Mosaic 
commandments in general. The context does not speak in favor of love or the 
Torah. However, Paul can sometimes blur the line between the Stoic natural law 
and the Torah, as exemplified in Romans 2:14. It would be unwise, therefore, to 
totally exclude the possibility that Paul may have had the commandments of 
283   Plank 1987, 26; Schrage 1995, 137.
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the Torah in mind. If he can blur the line between philosophy and the Torah in 
Romans 2, why could it not happen here? Be that as it may, the actual content 
of the commandments is a version of Stoic philosophy. If Paul had the Torah in 
mind, he must have thought of it in strongly philosophical terms. In this sense, 
the Torah and philosophy do not exclude each other.
After noting the strong Stoic flavor in 1 Corinthians 7:17–24, one clear dif-
ference between Paul and Epictetus should be added. For Paul, only Christ 
relativizes the indifference of social positions. He speaks of an equality 
between Christians within different statuses and of no equality between all 
people, as Epictetus has it. One can safely assume that at this point Paul dif-
fered from all Stoics—or at least from non-Christian Stoics. Paul’s thought in 
this passage has such a clear Stoic character that it is a matter of preference if 
one chooses to call it Stoicism or not. Probably Christian Stoicism is a more 
apt characterization. Moreover, Paul’s Jewish heritage does not exclude philo-
sophical elements in his thought. We can find similar features in Paul’s other 
epistles as well. Romans 1 presents a gentile lapse as a shift from the aniconic 
monotheism to a polytheistic image cult, which can be understood in both 
Jewish and philosophical terms.284 Romans 7 presents the problem of the 
Torah as a soliloquy of a divided self. This divided self is a topos in the philo-
sophical literature.285
In this section, I have gone through a sample of the earliest remaining 
Christian texts that exhibit philosophical elements. One can safely assume 
that there has been an interaction between Jerusalem and Athens from the 
beginnings of Christianity, despite what Tertullian may have claimed. The use 
of philosophy by Christians was not a later innovation and the recognition 
from the side of non-Christian philosophers was based on the actual reality 
of the early Christians. The early Christians presented philosophical elements, 
as is evident in Paul’s texts. It can still be discussed if Paul already sought 
philosophical recognition, but the picture that Acts presents of Athens pro-
grammatically shows him as a new Socrates among the philosophers, thereby 
making a claim that Christianity should be seen as a philosophy. Acts reflects 
what became mainstream in the following centuries.
2.3 Mutual Recognition Becomes Mainstream
About one hundred years after Paul, the Christian apologist Justin Martyr 
wrote about his conversion to Christianity. After vainly seeking the truth in 
284   Van Kooten 2008, 343–356; Huttunen 2009, 37–62.
285   Wasserman (2008) has proposed that Paul’s background is Platonic philosophy, while I 
prefer to see Paul’s words as a variation of the Stoic version of the inner conflict (Huttunen 
2009, 101–126).
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numerous philosophical schools, one day he encountered a mysterious old 
man on a lonely shore. The characterization of the old man hints at the figure of 
Socrates and, in a sense, Socrates becomes the midwife of Justin’s conversion.286 
The man tells him about Christianity and then leaves, but not without making 
a lasting impression:
I have not seen him since. But straightway a flame was kindled in my soul; 
and a love of the prophets, and of those men who are friends of Christ, 
possessed me; and whilst revolving his words in my mind, I found this 
philosophy alone to be safe and profitable. Thus, and for this reason, I am 
a philosopher. 
Dial. 8; trans. ANF 1.198
Justin’s conversion to Christianity was no abrupt shift from philosophy to 
religion. As Runar Thorsteinsson notes: “Justin’s new identity as a Christian 
philosopher became readily integrated with his identity as a Platonist.”287 His 
recognition of philosophy becomes clear when he assesses it quite positively. 
Christianity, the true philosophy, was fragmentarily present already in the 
ancient tradition: “There seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they 
are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert 
contradictories” (1 Apol. 44; trans. ANF 1.177). As there were excellent pre-
Christian philosophers, Justin reasons that they must have been Christians, 
since they stuck to reason, which he identifies with Christ (cf. John 1:1–3): “He 
[Christ] is the Word (λόγον ὄντα) of whom every race of men were partakers; 
and those who lived reasonably (μετὰ λόγου) are Christians, even though they 
have been thought atheists; as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, 
and men like them” (Justin Martyr, 1 Apol. 46; trans. ANF 1.178). Justin in a way 
Christianizes the Greek intellectual tradition by saying that Christianity does 
not contradict but completes it. This apologetic strategy to seek recognition in 
the Greco-Roman intellectual milieu continued after Justin.288
The standard picture is that Paul’s, Justin’s, and other Christians’ bold claims 
of Christianity as the supreme philosophy were received with disgust.289 Three 
famous accounts of Christians are quoted time and again: those of Tacitus (Ann. 
15.44.2–5), Suetonius (Nero 16), and Pliny the Younger (Ep. 10.96), according to 
which Christianity is a criminal superstition. However, this is only a partial 
286   Thorsteinsson 2012, 496, 502.
287   Thorsteinsson 2012, 509; see Klostergaard Petersen 2017a, 11–12: “Justin did not conceive of 
Christianity as something so different from philosophy that it would preclude a descrip-
tion of Christianity in terms of philosophy.”
288   Hadot 2002, 239–240.
289   See, e.g., Cook 2010, 2.
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truth, as I argued in the previous section. The Stoic Epictetus, the Emperor 
Marcus Aurelius, the satirist Lucian, and Galen described Christians more or 
less positively. The chief indicator of recognition is the fact that Christians 
are assessed in the category of philosophers—albeit with certain failures. 
The most positive is Galen, who explicitly mentions “the school of Moses and 
Christ” (Μωϋσοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ διατριβή) (De pulsuum differentiis; Kühn 8, p. 579). 
Although Christians belong to the people who are unable to follow demon-
strative arguments, they have attained virtue “not inferior to that of genuine 
philosophers.”
It would require a more profound analysis to position early Christianity on 
the intellectual map of the ancient philosophical schools. However, none of 
the texts (Colossians 2, Acts 17, 1 Corinthians 1–2) present a blatant misrecogni-
tion of philosophy in the manner of Tertullian’s Jerusalem/Athens opposition. 
Actually, there are clearly philosophical elements in them, just as in other 
texts, which do not overtly discuss philosophy. I presented 1 Corinthians 7, 
which clearly utilizes Stoic philosophy as a natural part of argumentation. 
Justin proves that by the mid-2nd century at the latest, a Christian could rec-
ognize himself as a philosopher. But this development must have begun also 
earlier. The Epistle to the Colossians attests that around the year 100 CE, some 
Christians called their religious conviction “philosophy.” Around the same 
time, Luke “Socratized” Paul, and in the early 2nd century, Epictetus included 
the Christians in the category of philosophy, in spite of whatever deficiencies 
Christianity had from his Stoic point of view.
Early Christians recognized ancient philosophy as a legitimate part of their 
faith and searched for recognition in that intellectual milieu. The relationship 
was not equal, however, as Christianity was a novelty in Greco-Roman culture. 
Some pagan authors attest to being disgusted by Christianity. But this is not the 
whole picture. From the early 2nd century onwards, we also have information 
of pagans granting recognition to Christians. This was the strengthening devel-
opment that led finally to the Christianization of the whole Greco-Roman 
intellectual world in the following centuries. The popular tradition that sepa-
rates philosophy from religion does not recognize this strong and—I would 
say—mainstream course of Western intellectual history. The separation is 
more of an ideological attempt either to secure a non-human and divine sta-
tus for Christianity or to dismiss Christianity as non-intellectual nonsense. 
Responsible scholarly work must transcend ideological biases. If the ancient 
situation has any significance for modern discussions, it will show that mutual 
misrecognition is not the only possibility. Non-Christian philosophers and 
Christians recognized each other at least partially.
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chapter 3
Imagination Made Real: Paul between Political 
Realism and Eschatological Hope
1 Paul and His Readers
“The invisible Kingdom of God, the realm of Messiah, ran into an undeniable 
conflict with the idea of unconditional obedience to Imperial authority.” With 
these words Leopold von Ranke, the “father” of modern history, constructed 
the political problem of early Christianity. In the third volume of his massive 
world history, Ranke extols Paul as the person who successfully united the 
new faith with the Empire.1 It is true that Romans 13:1–7 is a loyal paean to 
the divinely instituted state. In these verses, Paul claims that God has insti-
tuted all governing authorities and that every person must be subject to them. 
Ranke’s progressive contemporaries were less convinced of the blessings to 
unite Christian convictions and the state. Karl Marx saw religion as the reflec-
tion of a human self “in the fantastic reality of heaven,” although people should 
seek “true reality.” It is an oppressive society, the state that creates the need of 
a religious fantasy. “This state and this society produce religion,” Marx stated 
in an introduction written in 1844 for his earlier treatise A Contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.2 He famously called religion an opiate 
that eased the distress of real conditions.
Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and 
also the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed 
creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless 
conditions. It is the opium of the people. To abolish religion as the illusory 
happiness of the people is to demand their real happiness. The demand 
to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the demand to 
give up a state of affairs which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is 
therefore in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of which 
is religion…. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the 
1   Ranke 1883, 182, 184; my translation.
2   Marx 1975, 175.
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earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of 
theology into the criticism of politics.3
The union of faith and empire is just to let the oppressive society get on. 
Developing the Marxist criticism of religion, Mikhail Bakunin, one of the 
founders of anarchist theory, required the end of religion, as it is the root of all 
exercises of power. Whoever invokes the divine revelation enslaves the other, 
he promulgated in God and State, published posthumously in 1882:
These, once recognized as the representatives of divinity on earth, as the 
holy instructors of humanity, chosen by God himself to direct it in the path 
of salvation, necessarily exercise absolute power. All men owe them pas-
sive and unlimited obedience; for against the divine reason there is no 
human reason, and against the justice of God no terrestrial justice holds. 
Slaves of God, men must also be slaves of Church and State, in so far as 
the State is consecrated by the Church. This truth Christianity, better 
than all other religions that exist or have existed, understood…. The idea 
of God implies the abdication of human reason and justice; it is the most 
decisive negation of human liberty, and necessarily ends in the enslave-
ment of mankind, both in theory and practice…. If God is, man is a slave.4
One may marshal Romans 13 to prove Bakunin’s point. Paul seems to bring a 
divine consecration for earthly rulers—and this is celebrated by conservatives 
like Ranke. The conservatives were, however, heavily challenged by Marxists, 
anarchists, and other revolutionary forces of the time. In the 20th century, 
the social criticism of religion really took wing in the communist societies. 
According to Vladimir Lenin, religion is an instrument used to maintain capi-
talist society, where the “free” workers receive just minimum subsistence to 
uphold this capitalist slavery.5 In his Socialism and Religion (1905), Lenin pro-
claimed that religion is like an opiate or booze.
Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere 
weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, overburdened by 
their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation…. Those who toil 
and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and 
patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly 
3   Marx 1975, 175–176; original emphases.
4   Bakunin 1907, 24–25.
5   Lenin 1978, 83.
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reward. But those who live by the labour of others are taught by religion 
to practise charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of 
justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moder-
ate price tickets to well-being in heaven. Religion is opium for the people. 
Religion is a sort of spiritual booze, in which the slaves of capital drown 
their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man.6
The metaphors of opium and booze do not simply label religion as a tool to 
dull the senses of the oppressed in order that they remain in their place. They 
also ease the pains of those in an oppressive society, and this seems to con-
tain elements of medicine.7 Interestingly enough, Lenin went even further, 
in passing acknowledging the revolutionary spirit in early Christianity, which 
was “forgotten” with Constantine’s turn in the fourth century: “Christians, after 
their religion had been given the status of state religion, ‘forgot’ the ‘naïveté’ 
of primitive Christianity with its democratic revolutionary spirit.”8 This comes 
close to Ranke who, however, dated the extinction of the revolutionary enthu-
siasm back to Paul and Romans 13. Interestingly, both conservatives like Ranke 
and progressives like Lenin acknowledged revolutionary and loyalist sides 
in Christianity. They differed only in their sympathy for the opposite sides. 
Ranke is right in invoking Romans 13. Paul really contributed to the maintain-
ing of state authorities, as shown by the history of influence. Still, one may 
ask whether this is the whole truth of the early Christians or even of Paul. I 
claim that the revolutionary spirit is hidden in what Marx and his followers 
arrogantly labeled as a fantasy and what I think of in positive terms as the 
active imagination. Paul was a kind of political realist, but he does not exem-
plify Bakunin’s mechanism between religion and the state. My claim is that 
Paul provides little support to Marx’s and Lenin’s view that eschatology was 
only a narcotic fantasy meant to dull the senses of the oppressed, in order to 
keep them passively in their existential conditions. Instead, eschatology is a 
force for change in society, that is, by turning what is actively imagined into 
something true and real.
I start this chapter by positioning Paul among his fellow Christians. Paul 
is quite open toward the Empire—at least in comparison with John the Seer, 
who seems to be openly hostile toward it. Romans 13 is the antithesis to John’s 
6   Lenin 1978, 83–84. In his State and Revolution (1918), Lenin castigated those German Social 
Democrats, who renounce “the party struggle against the opium of religion which stupefies 
the people” (Lenin 1974, 455).
7   For the dual implication of these metaphors, see Boer 2013a, 9–30.
8   Lenin 1974, 425. The idea is older and one encounters it, for example, in Friedrich Engels 
(1894–1895).
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eschatology. Its call for unlimited obedience has always posed a problem for 
interpreters. I go through the exegetical and other efforts to find a principle 
that relativizes absolute obedience, but I keep them factitious. Next, I show 
how Paul’s thought belonged to the philosophy of the stronger in ancient 
tradition, as well as the positive outcome that Paul expected of it. Last, I dem-
onstrate how Paul’s eschatology provides a detour regarding social change. 
This change does not come in terms of the revolutionary force expected by 
Marx and Bakunin, and implemented by Lenin; this (Bolshevik) revolutionary 
force turned out to be just another variant of the old pattern of oppressive vio-
lence. The imagined dream comes true by peacefully eroding the legitimation 
of human hierarchies.
1.1 Paul’s Openness toward Roman Society
The kingdom of God is a multi-dimensional concept, the use of which in the 
Bible is impossible to systematize into one consistent whole. It is—like escha-
tological hopes in general—thought to be realized in the present age or in 
the future, in heaven or on earth, spiritually or materially, individually or 
collectively. Its conflicting visions of catastrophe and new hope have invited 
countless interpretations.9 While Paul seems to have a tendency of seeing 
eschatology as something that will be realized spiritually in heaven and indi-
vidually in the future, the other dimensions are still visible.10 Revolutionary 
or even anarchic dynamite can be felt, for example, in the claim that Christ 
will give the kingdom to God after destroying “every ruler and every authority 
and power” (1 Cor 15:24). What is worse, this conflict was even at the heart of 
Paul’s faith: he liked to know nothing except “Jesus Christ, him crucified,” and 
it was “the rulers of this age” who “crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Cor 2:2, 8).11 
There is no need to pursue a hidden criticism of Roman power, which is so 
popular in the anti-imperial reading but highly difficult to ascertain.12 Paul’s 
actual words are enough to prove his critical stance, like Anders Klostergaard 
9    For an overview, see Räisänen 2010, 79–113. Räisänen makes some references to the later 
adaptations.
10   Räisänen 2010, 98–102.
11   It is not absolutely clear that Paul is speaking here of mundane authorities; one can 
also see them as celestial angelic or demonic powers. Schrage (2001, 173–174; 2008, 253– 
254) sees a double meaning in these verses. Jewett (2007, 552) sees Rom 8:32 as a possible 
critical note on mundane authorities, but he admits that this reading is not very well 
grounded. I prefer to see only celestial powers in this context.
12   Heilig (2015) provides an illustrative reflection of the claims regarding the hidden 
criticism.
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Petersen states: “Definitely, any Roman ruler whom we imagine to have had 
access to the text would hardly have been satisfied with what he found.”13
These words of Paul are not what Bakunin might expect, however. For 
Bakunin, at the heart of all representatives of religion is “something cruel and 
sanguinary,” a hierarchy that sacrifices humanity.14 However, Bakunin might 
be defended by the fact that, as far as we know, the anarchic and revolutionary 
elements of early Christianity never led to real deeds of rebellion. There is no 
evidence of Christians participating in the Jewish revolutionary movements.15 
During the Jewish War (c. 60–70s CE), Christians fled from the war zone 
(Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 3.5.3; cf. Matt 24:15–16; Mark 13:14; Luke 21:20–21).16 Still, 
there really was a potential for conflict that was, from time to time, realized in 
persecutions. Possibly the most famous case is the description of the Beast 
in the Book of Revelation: “it was allowed to make war on the saints and to con-
quer them” (Rev. 13:7). Although the Beast is a shadowy figure, it was identified 
already in antiquity with the Roman Emperors who forced Christians to make 
offerings in the imperial cult.17 Another example is the (even contemporary) 
idiom of carrying one’s cross. The idiom is inherited from the idea of imitatio 
Christi, the central motif of Christian ethics, which emphasizes the readiness 
to suffer. In its scriptural roots (Matt 16:24; 10:38; Mark 8:34; Luke 9:23; 14:27), it 
was not merely an exaggerated figure of speech.
In the pagan sources, the historian Tacitus describes the early persecution in 
Rome during the 60s CE. Although he maintains that Emperor Nero falsely 
scapegoated Christians for the burning of the city, he adds that the Christians 
got what they deserved for their hatred for humankind (Tacitus, Ann. 15.44). 
Suetonius lists the persecution among Nero’s good deeds (Nero 16). As gover-
nor of Asia Minor, Pliny the Younger reports on his measures against the local 
Christians (Ep. 10.96). John Granger Cook takes these texts as evidence of the 
13   Klostergaard Petersen 2015, 117.
14   Bakunin 1907, 26.
15   Among Jesus’ disciples, Simon the Zealot (Luke 6:15) is possibly the closest candidate for a 
rebel, but we do not know if his nickname really refers to the rebellious Jewish movement 
or if he was rather just zealous in other meanings of the word. Note, for example, that Paul 
refers to his pre-Christian identity as “a Zealot of the traditions of my ancestors” (Gal 1:14; 
revised version of the NRSV), which meant persecuting the Christians, not fighting the 
Romans.
16   In addition to the Jewish War in Palestine, there was the so-called Bar Kokhba Revolt in 
the 130s CE. In diaspora, there was a vast Jewish uprising in 115–117 CE. See, e.g., Räisänen 
2010, 28.
17   Actually, there are two beasts in Rev. 13. The first one is an Emperor, probably Nero redivi-
vus (i.e., the arisen Nero; in depth on this, see Aune 1998, 713–780). On the interpretations 
of the Beast in the Early Church, see Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 196–203.
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Roman disgust and shock at the phenomenon of Christianity.18 Yet, one should 
not exaggerate the persecutions. Before the mid-third century CE they were 
just sporadic and local, incited by the neighborhood rather than by officials, 
who were often somewhat reluctant in their punitive measures after Christians 
were denounced to them. John the Seer, the author of the Book of Revelation, 
seems to exaggerate some real experiences in its apocalyptic worldview, which 
provided an expectation of the eschatological war against the saints (cf. Dan 
7:21).19 This expectation was rooted in a continuous feeling of threat. Christians 
bore a social stigma that increased the risk of negative encounters, although 
this stigma did not always lead to violent hostilities.20
The conflict between Christians and the society in which they lived was 
not the only truth. As I showed earlier, there were philosophers like Epictetus 
(a contemporary of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny), who highlighted the Chris-
tians as moral examples, despite his lack of any deeper interest in Christianity 
(Disc. 2.9.19–21; 4.7.6). At the same time, the evangelist Luke thought that a 
Roman soldier could be a Christian (Acts 10). Only a century later, a Christian 
soldier was no exception, despite objections made by early Christian intel-
lectuals like Tertullian (see, e.g., his treatise De corona).21 Actually, John the 
Seer was a Christian hardliner who drew an extremely clear line between “us” 
and “them,” and blamed his Christian companions for their readiness to adjust 
themselves to this world and society. The target of his criticism was, among 
other things, having too liberal of an attitude toward food sacrificed to idols 
(Rev 2:14, 20). The attitude under scrutiny was that of Paul, who counted “idol 
food” among the adiaphora, considering that one should merely give up eating 
“idol food” lest it insult persons like John, who still falsely held that such things 
make a difference (1 Cor 8; 10).22
Paul’s openness toward pagan society is also reflected in his attitude toward 
the Roman Empire. Heikki Räisänen states: “Unlike the seer of Revelation, 
18   Cook 2010, 2.
19   Räisänen 2010, 288–295.
20   For example, expulsion orders were often more symbolic than real acts. These orders, like 
other proclamations, confirmed social order (van der Lans 2015). This does not mean that 
proclamations were without effect. Paul Holloway (2009, 36) notes that “scholars of early 
Christianity make a serious mistake when they focus on the ‘local and sporadic’ nature of 
early Christian persecution—as if tallying actual deaths allows one to somehow quantify 
the lived experience of lethal prejudice—and ignore this much more fundamental and 
abiding problem.” Possibly Candida Moss goes too far in diminishing the extent of perse-
cutions in her The Myth of Persecution (2013).
21   See Chapter 4.
22   Paul’s thought is somewhat ambiguous in 1 Cor 8 and 10, but the main line is clearly liberal 
toward eating “idol food.” On this issue in early Christianity, see Räisänen 2010, 285–288.
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Paul, a middle-class cosmopolitan of sorts, apparently does not experience 
Roman rule as something from which he specifically needs to be redeemed.”23 
Thus, there was undeniably a clear potential for conflict with the Empire, but 
it did not necessarily need to be an actual one. Despite the occasional criti-
cal comments of earthly rulers, Paul was far from a political dissident. The 
only passage where he intentionally discusses the relationship with the state 
authority proves the opposite. In Romans 13:1–7, he explicates the relationship 
toward the Empire in a way that has steered attitudes since then in the Western 
world. Paul’s influence is visible already in the New Testament itself. Sayings in 
1 Timothy 2:1–2, Titus 3:1, and 1 Peter 2:13–14 are clearly dependent on Romans 
13:1–7. In later documents, Paul’s words repeated frequently until today.24 This 
fact supports Ranke claim that Paul’s Epistle to the Romans is “a monument 
of the most important class.” According to him, Paul made room for the state 
and the Emperor within the new faith. He ascribed the existence of all, even 
the Emperor, to the monotheistic God. “Everything is united in Paul’s thinking,” 
Ranke extols, adding: “This is the sum of his apostleship.”25
1.2 Avoiding Offense: Exegetical Attempts
Not everyone agrees with Ranke’s praise for Paul and Romans 13. Some readers 
of Paul are offended. Neil Elliott, one of the main representatives of the so-
called anti-imperial reading of Paul, feels uncomfortable.26 He makes a general 
claim that Paul’s thinking is “ideological intifada,” a “call for resistance,” and 
“revolutionary.” By contrast, the exhortation to subordinate all to the govern-
ing authorities “threatens to capsize every Christian liberative project,” which 
Elliott laments, referring to Romans 13:1–7 as a theological offense.27 In the 
modern Western world, Elliott’s lamentations have been more typical than 
Rankean praises. These lamentations vaguely reflect the 19th-century anarchist 
and revolutionary tradition. Yet, this stance regarding Paul has a point that is 
difficult to accept. Paul straightforward requires obedience to any authori-
ties that happen to be in power, because that authority is instituted by God to 
23   Räisänen 2010, 101.
24   1 Tim and Tit are usually seen as later productions of the “Pauline school” in a similar 
manner as some of Plato’s epistles. For the dependence between 1 Pet and Rom, see, e.g., 
Elliott 2000, 38. On the history of influence, see, e.g., Wilckens 2008, 44ff.
25   Ranke 1883, 182, 184; my translation.
26   In fact, Elliott has grown calmer and distanced himself from his earlier readings of Rom. 13 
(Elliott 2011, 48). For an overview on the anti-imperial reading of Rom. 13:1–7, see Krauter 
2009, 28–32.
27   Elliott 1995, 217, 230. Blumenfeld (2003, 396) thinks that Elliott’s work is provocative and 
“suited to a discourse on oppression and liberation, a modern political theme.”
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promote good and resist evil. Although the politics of recognizing earthly rul-
ers was not without predecessors in Judaism,28 there is one atypical element in 
Paul that threatens to ruin any critical attitude: unlimited theological justifica-
tion for the state. This point has always raised questions. The reading strategies 
among both biblical scholars and the more general audience demonstrate the 
attempts to avoid this offense.29
One of the most frequently proposed limitations is found in the fact that, 
according to Paul, the authorities promote good. This is thought to mean that 
only those authorities promoting good should be obeyed. But this is not what 
Paul says. He claims simply that the authorities promote good, without excep-
tion. A critical reader must surely marvel at this, but this is what Paul says—if 
he speaks of earthly authorities at all. In fact, this is another attempt to ease 
the offense. Irenaeus already knows the interpretation that the Greek words 
for authority (ἐξουσία, ἄρχοντες) do not denote civil authorities but angelic 
powers (Haer. 5.24.1). Thus, Paul would not be speaking of obedience to the 
state at all, or he is referring only to obedience to the angelic powers behind it. 
In modern times this interpretation is mainly associated with Oscar Cullmann, 
who promoted it in his Der Staat im Neuen Testament.30 Actually, the interpre-
tation had its lure already among early critics of the Nazis; for example, Karl 
Barth promoted it in the 1930s. Gerhard Kittel, a committed Nazi himself, grap-
pled with it, but for good philological reasons.31 As ἐξουσία and ἄρχοντες refer 
generally to power and authority, there should be some implication around 
the spiritual character of those powers. Paul does not give any hint of that. 
To the contrary, the context requires political character, as Irenaeus already 
noted, referring to Romans 13:6: “Now, that he spake these words, not in regard 
to angelical powers, nor of invisible rulers—as some venture to expound the 
passage—but of those of actual human authorities, [he shows when] he says, 
‘For this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God’s ministers, doing service for 
this very thing’ ” (Haer. 5.24.1; trans. ANF 1.552). In recent decades, the spiritual-
izing interpretation has been unanimously dismissed.32
Interpreters have also searched for the limiting principle in the textual 
context of the epistle. In the beginning of his paraenetic part, Paul admon-
ishes Christians not to “be conformed to this world” (Rom 12:2), which some 
28   Riekkinen 1980, 53–60.
29   Boer (2013, 182–183) seems to use quite similar examples to those I mention. See also 
Harrison 2011, 271–277.
30   Cullmann 1959.
31   Kittel 1939, 48–54. On Kittel’s Nazism, see, e.g., Ericksen 1977.
32   Krauter 2009, 11–12. This is true of another exceptional interpretation, namely, that the 
words refer to synagogue rulers (Harrison 2011, 270).
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scholars interpret as drawing a line vis-à-vis obedience.33 This is a very ambigu-
ous passage, however. One can easily reconcile it with the admonition to obey 
the authorities. Conforming to this world is against God’s will. If God’s will 
entails obedience toward authorities, conforming to this world is expressed 
in worldly resistance. The reference to “this world” is too hazy to provide an 
interpretative exit from the obedience. Another exit is sought in Paul’s escha-
tology. Shortly after his words on authorities, Paul reminds the readers of the 
imminent eschatological change (Rom 13:11–14). Can it relativize the state 
authorities and obedience to them? Is it more important to “put on the Lord 
Jesus Christ” than to obey the authorities? Possibly yes, but does this lead to 
any resistance? At least in 1 Corinthians, the imminent end seems to lead to a 
conservative stance: everyone should remain in his or her social position with-
out seeking to change it (1 Cor 7). It is meaningless to search for a change in 
a situation that is soon disappearing.34 In the textual context, there is noth-
ing mitigating the admonition to obey the authorities. Biblical scholars have 
also sought to contextualize Paul’s words in relation to the political situation 
of his time. Scholars have supposed that Paul recommended loyalty because of 
this or that political disturbance, be it tax uprisings, the problems between 
Jews and Romans (cf. Suetonius, Claudius 25.4; Acts 18:2), or strife between 
the Jews and the Christians. Thus, Paul’s admonition would be situational 
rather than general.35 The problem is that Paul hints at no situational factors.
Some scholars grant that the passage admonishes unlimited loyalty toward 
the state authorities—only to explain that Paul never could have said or meant 
it. Some claim that the passage is not originally a part of the epistle but an early 
33   See, e.g., Jewett 2007, 732.
34   Huttunen 2009, 26–36. It is also proposed that Paul stoically counted the authorities 
among the adiaphora (Engberg-Pedersen 2006). This, however, would not necessarily lead 
to resistance any more than the idea of an imminent end. Moreover, Paul speaks of fear 
(φόβος) as a motivation for obedience, while fear serves as a major category of vice for the 
Stoics. For the Stoic theory of emotions, see, e.g., Brennan 1998. For the contrast between 
Paul’s thought and that of the Stoic Epictetus, see Huttunen 2009, 96. Ironically, Epictetus 
praises Christians for their habit of not yielding to fear before tyrants (Discourses 4.7.6; see 
Chapter 2)!
35   See, e.g., Friedrich, Pöhlmann, and Stuhlmacher 1976; Harrington and Keenan 2010, 171. 
Krauter (2009, 12–15) and Harrison (2011, 271–272) have helpfully presented these situa-
tional explanations. Georgi (1991, 102) provides a variant of the situational interpretation. 
He points out that Paul never mentions the princeps and, thus, refers to the republican 
tradition urging decentralization and undermining the ideology that supports majesty. 
Paul did not mention the emperor, unlike 1 Peter, but his words are too general to promote 
republican ideas. It is more probable that Paul refers to the general hierarchy between the 
rulers and the ruled—be that hierarchy republican or imperial.
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addition to the text.36 No manuscript evidence backs up this claim, however, 
and the scholarly majority has rejected this theory.37 In the so-called anti-
imperial reading of Paul, it has been claimed that Paul’s words constitute such 
exaggerated praise for the authorities that a wise reader cannot miss the irony. 
Paul tried to undermine and subvert the social structures.38 Unfortunately, 
the reading is anything but obvious. I am not conscious of any ironic read-
ing of Romans 13 before the “anti-imperialists.” Robert Jewett explains that 
Paul ascribes the power behind the authorities to the God of Israel, not to the 
Roman gods. He claims that this is subversive in terms of political theology.39 
But this is hardly true. Actually, there was indeed a Jewish imperial theology. 
It is a standard view in the Hebrew Bible that power comes from God; for 
example, one reads: “He changes times and seasons, deposes kings and sets up 
kings” (Dan 2:21). Josephus allows King Agrippa to express the same idea con-
cerning the Roman Empire: “Without God’s aid, so vast an empire could never 
have been built up” (Josephus, Bell. 2.391; trans. Thackeray, LCL). The cultic 
expression of this imperial theology constituted the daily offerings on behalf 
of Romans and the Emperor (Josephus, Bell. 2.197). The end of these sacrifices 
erupted in revolt, as Josephus states:
Eleazar, son of Ananias the high-priest, a very daring youth, then holding 
the position of captain, persuaded those who officiated in the Temple 
services to accept no gift or sacrifice from a foreigner. This action laid 
the foundation of the war with the Romans; for the sacrifices offered on 
behalf of that nation and the emperor were in consequence rejected. The 
chief priests and the notables earnestly besought them not to abandon 
the customary offering for their rulers, but the priests remained obdurate. 
Josephus, Bell. 2.409–410; trans. Thackeray, LCL
Thus, there was not only a Roman theological legitimation of Empire but also a 
Jewish one, and it was recognized by Romans as an expression of loyalty. Paul’s 
Romans 13 stays in the tradition of the Jewish imperial theology, albeit not in 
its cultic form. Paul’s theology of political power does not question the rule of 
the Romans, as Jewett argues, but rather legitimizes it in a way that was accept-
able also to them. Paul’s words are therefore pro- rather than anti-imperial. 
36   See, e.g., Barnikol 1961.
37   Jewett 2007, 789–790.
38   See, e.g., Carter 2004. For an overview of this reading with critical remarks, see Krauter 
2009, 28–32. See also Harrison’s (2011, 308–323) reading, which is anti-imperial but finally 
comes quite close to my reading with its emphasis on Paul’s realism (see more below).
39   Jewett 2007, 789–790.
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I dare to claim that the modern scholarly pains to limit the power of authori-
ties fail. These failed attempts, however, touch on the sore spot felt from the 
earliest times onward.
1.3 The Unease of the Christian Tradition
The reception history of Paul’s words has always radiated a certain unease. 
1 Tim 2:1–2 is an admonition to pray for the authorities in order to maintain 
peace for the Christians (cf. 1 Clem 61). Are the authorities not always good, as 
Paul assumes, in the sense that Christians must pray for peace from the side 
of the authorities? Traditionally the authority ascribed to the state by Paul is 
limited by a reference to the clausula Petri: “We must obey God rather than 
any human authority” (Acts 5:29).40 Acts 5:29 is just one variant of Socrates’ 
famous saying, “I shall obey the god rather than you” (Plato, Apol. 29d; trans. 
Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL), which has a rich history of influence. For exam-
ple, Epictetus states: “When you come into a presence of some prominent man, 
remember that Another looks from above on what is taking place, and that 
you must please Him rather than this man” (Disc. 1.30.1; trans. Oldfather, LCL). 
Thus, the use of Acts 5:29 to limit the authority of earthly rulers merely contin-
ued the ancient tradition in Christian form. Tertullian requires that obedience 
be limited to the area outside of the spiritual sphere. If rulers demand author-
ity in divine issues, a Christian should be ready for martyrdom (Scorp. 14).41 
The same trend is visible in later times. Martin Luther, who also refers to Acts 
5:29 (among other biblical verses), limits state authority to earthly issues and 
requires freedom of religion, which can be manifest, for example, in the denial 
to hand over religious books.42 Actually, this is how Ranke understood Paul: a 
Christian should have freedom of religion, while it is the job of state to punish 
wrongdoers.43
In the Western sphere, law later became the main source for limits on the 
power of authorities, mainly monarchs. This also had an effect on the inter-
pretation of Romans 13, and therefore it is worth looking at the background 
of this legal thinking. Francis Fukuyama points out that the rule of law has 
religious origins and that this principle is known around the world: law is 
binding because it is higher than those holding political power. In Western 
40   The NRSV gives an alternative translation: “than men.” This is actually closer to the Greek 
(anthrōpois). The translation “authority” is in itself possible evidence for the fact that this 
verse is often read in parallel with the authorities in Romans 13. For the use of Acts 5:29 in 
the interpretation of Rom 13, see Wilckens 2008, 45.
41   See translation in Ante-Nicene Fathers 3.
42   Von weltlicher Oberkeit, 1523 = WA 11, 265–271.
43   Ranke 1883, 184.
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Europe, the rule of law developed further for institutional reasons; as a reli-
gious authority the Catholic Church became independent of the monarchs 
and was itself rooted in the idea of legal rule. According to Fukuyama, Western 
Europe clearly differs from other societies: “The result was that few European 
monarchs ever acquired the concentrated powers of the Chinese state, despite 
aspirations to do so. Only in Russia, where the Eastern Church was always sub-
ordinated to the state, did such a regime emerge.”44 In the Reformation, the 
nascent Lutheran churches became subordinated to the royalty, but the idea of 
legality seems to continue the earlier tradition and “resist” absolute monarchy. 
For example, Swedish bishop Olaus Petri’s (1493/1497–1552) rules for judges 
(still printed in the Swedish and the Finnish statute books) express this legal 
tradition: “Because a judge is commanded by God to judge right, he ought to 
labour with all his might and craft to know the law.” This divine law is not nec-
essarily identified with positive law. Rather, the positive law should be viewed 
in light of divine justice: “What is not just and fair cannot be law either.”45 
This legal tradition strengthened in Europe from the 18th century onward. 
I will discuss two important moderators and their effect on the interpretation 
of Romans 13.
First, Immanuel Kant’s political theories strongly promoted the idea of 
political authorities subordinated to the law. In his Science of Right (Metaphysik 
der Sitten, 1797), Kant emphasized the duty to obey the authorities, coined by 
the Lutheran neologism Obrigkeit for Romans 13 and certain other biblical 
passages.46 Romans 13 is explicitly paraphrased and called a categorical imper-
ative, while Kant admits its objectionable character:
Now, it is asserted that obedience must be given to whoever is in posses-
sion of the supreme authoritative and legislative power over a people; 
and this must be done so unconditionally by right, that it would even be 
penal to inquire publicly into the title of a power thus held, with the view 
of calling it in doubt, or opposing it in consequence of its being found 
defective. Accordingly it is maintained, that ‘Obey the authority which 
has power over you’ (in everything which is not opposed to morality), 
[Gehorchet der Obrigkeit (in allem, was nicht dem inneren Moralischen 
widerstreitet), die Gewalt über euch hat] is a Categorical Imperative. This 
44   Fukuyama 2014, 12.
45   An introduction and an English translation of Olaus Petri’s Rules for Judges, see Tontti 
2000.
46   For more on the neologism in the Lutheran tradition, see Huttunen 2019.
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is the objectionable proposition [der anstößige Satz] which is called 
into question.47
Kant straightforwardly nullifies the duty of obedience, if Obrigkeit opposes 
morality. This, however, is not his main point. Instead, he searches for a gen-
eral justification for obedience—and finds it in the idea of a legal constitution 
(Staatsverfassung). A people is “united by laws under a sovereign power (durch 
Gesetze unter einer Obrigkeit vereinigt).” Therefore, people cannot simultane-
ously be entitled to oppose “the Constitution, however defective it may be,” 
since it “would result in a supreme will that would destroy itself.” Any defects 
in the constitution should be gradually removed by reforms.48 Kant reduces 
Obrigkeit to laws and especially to the constitution. Instead of obedience 
toward certain persons (authorities), Kant sees Obrigkeit as a system of govern-
ment steered by a legal constitution, which can be reformed if needed.
Second, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) became another influ-
ential moderator. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, he (according 
to the editors of this posthumous publication) made a connection between 
religion and government in a way that Bakunin did later as well. Hegel, con-
trary to Bakunin however, held this connection as good: “A nation which has 
a false or bad conception of God, has also a bad State, bad government, bad 
laws.” Clearly referring to Romans 13, Hegel says that this connection finds its 
vernacular expression “in the tracing of laws, authority [Obrigkeit], and the 
constitution of the State to a divine origin.” Hegel clarifies: “It may be taken as 
meaning that man obeys God in the act of conforming to the laws, to the rul-
ing authority [indem man den Gesetzen und der Obrigkeit folgt], to the powers 
which hold the State together.”49 Hegel points out that the duty of obedience 
should not lead to the incorrect view that people are obliged “to obey the laws 
whatever they may happen to be. In this way the act of governing and the giv-
ing of laws are abandoned to the caprice of the governing power.” Hegel sees 
that the problem is most difficult in Protestant countries, where the “unity of 
religion and the State actually exists.” He explicitly refers to the system of state 
churches and gives special attention to England, where “the ruler was responsi-
ble for his actions to God only” during the last kings of the House of Stuart. This 
also assumes that the ruler knows what is good in the state so that he unites 
47   Metaphysik der Sitten Rechtslehre I, Beschluβ = Kant (1999, 371); trans. Hastie (p. 256).
48   Metaphysik der Sitten Rechtslehre I, Beschluβ = Kant (1999, 371–372); trans. Hastie 
(pp. 256–257).
49   Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I: 237–238; trans. Speirs and Burdon 
Sanderson (pp. 247–248).
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God’s will and the state laws. Hence, “he is an immediate revelation of God.” 
Hegel, however, claims that this runs against the Protestant conviction, which 
holds that there is no distinction between priests and laymen, as priests are 
not the sole possessors of divine truth. Hegel concludes: “But even supposing 
that the general principle at least has been established that laws exist through 
an act of the divine will, still there is another aspect of the matter which is just 
as important, namely, that we should have a rational knowledge of this divine 
will, and such knowledge is not anything particular or special, but belongs to 
all.”50 Thus, Hegel limits the duty of obedience—a feature so common in the 
reception history of Romans 13. Ultimately, he left it up to the individual to 
consider whom one obeys and whom one does not. This is something, at least 
in my own Finnish tradition, that is still visible in the idea of a specifically legal 
authority. It blocks out obedience to just any kind of authority.51
The reception history among both biblical scholars and other readers shows 
that the limiting principle—be it clausula Petri, law, or something else—has 
been brought outside of the passage itself. This betrays the fact that to find 
a limiting principle in the passage fails. Those rare persons who were happy 
with the idea of unlimited power could cite Paul’s words without further 
commentaries. Thomas Hobbes, who championed the unlimited power of 
the sovereign over society, cites Romans 13:1–6 in order to show that there 
is no excuse for disobedience to the “civill authority,” not even a faith-based 
one.52 Hobbes understood correctly, as Paul does not place any limits on 
the authorities in Romans 13. He thinks that their limitless power promotes the 
good, in any case. It is our task to make sense of this and ask, how could Paul 
claim such a thing? The answer comes less from theology than from ancient 
social practice. Scholars and other readers of Romans 13:1–7 have always noted 
the theological side: the authorities are instituted by God. But what makes 
God’s institution socially visible and what consequences does it have in the 
moral sphere?
50   Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I: 238–239; trans. Speirs and Burdon 
Sanderson (pp. 248–249).
51   Johann Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881), a very influential philosopher in Finland, main-
tained that obedience to authority should be developed with an understanding of the 
rationality of the national law. Pure obedience to authority would mean obedience to any 
kind of irrational statute or random ruler (Läran om staten 18 = Samlade arbeten III, 341). 
Thanks to general conscription, most Finnish men have given an oath where they have 
sworn loyalty to the legal authority (“laillinen esivalta”/ “laglig överhöghet”), the back-
ground of which is firmly rooted in the political situation at the beginning of the 20th 
century (Huttunen 2019).
52   Hobbes, Leviathan 3.42.
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2 Paul’s Realism and Imagination
2.1 Paul’s Political Realism and the Law of the Stronger
Paul’s famous words in Romans 13 are usually read as a moral exhortation to 
subordinate oneself to the civil authorities. True, this is their character. Paul 
warns the readers about any rebellion, as it will lead to disaster: those who 
resist authorities will incur judgment. However, the imperative of the third 
person (ὑποτασσέσθω) draws attention. Paul is not exhorting just his readers. 
Rather, he expresses a general rule concerning “every soul” (πᾶσα ψυχή).
Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτασσέσθω. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξουσία εἰ μὴ 
ὑπὸ θεοῦ, αἱ δὲ οὖσαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ τεταγμέναι εἰσίν.
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no 
authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been 
instituted by God. 
Rom. 13:1
Paul’s choice of words recalls the creation story where God creates human 
beings and lets them govern animals, which are also called “all soul/life of the 
living” (πᾶσα ψυχὴ ζῴων; Gen 1:20–26). Here the imperative in the third person 
(ἀρχέτωσαν) is used, just like in Paul. However, one should also note the dis-
similarity between Paul and Genesis 1. While the latter expresses a hierarchy 
between humankind and animals, Paul speaks of subjects under the rule of 
authorities. Only the hierarchical thought and the Hebraism (πᾶσα ψυχή) are 
similar. Paul’s words seem to have presented a stumbling block for some early 
copyists of his text, as if Paul was laying down rules for all life. No wonder 
that some manuscripts modestly read: “Be subject to all governing authorities” 
(πάσαις ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτάσσεσθε). This is a moral exhortation to the 
readers instead of a universal rule. Scholars, however, have nearly univocally 
rejected this reading as a secondary one.53 Paul may have expressed a univer-
sal rule, possessing a divine ring, but likely did not intend to set such a rule. 
The Septuagint is not the only context of Paul’s words on authorities, probably 
not even the primary one. Besides the biblical tone, Paul’s words could also 
resonate in the minds of his Greco-Roman audience. Outside of its Hebraic 
connotations, the expression πᾶσα ψυχή also occurs in non-biblical Greek,54 
53   Krauter 2009, 171.
54   See πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας (Epictetus, Disc. 1.28.4; cf. Plato, Soph. 
228c).
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and it was fully understandable to any Greek-speaking person. The impera-
tive of the third person occurs in an interesting passage by the Stoic Epictetus. 
According to Epictetus, God’s law, which is most powerful (κράτιστός) and 
most just, prescribes, “Let the stronger always prevail over the weaker” (τὸ 
κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος) (Epictetus, Disc. 1.29.13; trans. Oldfather, 
LCL, revised).55 The imperative of the third person describes the universality 
of the rule, as it does in Rom 13.1.56
The formal similarities between Paul and Epictetus, however, are less impor-
tant than the fact that Paul seems to communicate the idea of the law of the 
stronger. He assumes that one can do nothing but be subject to the authori-
ties, willingly or unwillingly. Paul summarizes the motives to obey in Rom 13:5: 
“one must be subject (ἀνάγκη ὑποτάσσεσθαι), not only because of wrath but 
also because of conscience” (Rom 13.5). Here ‘wrath’ clearly refers to the sword 
(μάχαιρα) the authorities bear, in order to “execute the wrath,” or literally as 
an “avenger due to wrath” (ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργήν);57 it worked through judicial pro-
cesses or through direct use of armed power, but Paul does not differentiate 
between these.58 It is all the same to him. One should avoid trying to resist 
authorities, as it will always lead to disaster. This is the law of the stronger in its 
rawest form. According to Paul, one is under duress (ἀνάγκη) caused by wrath 
and conscience. While wrath refers to violent means, it is more difficult to 
determine what the duress caused by conscience is. Because conscience refers 
one way or another to consideration, in this context Paul seemingly refers to 
an understanding of the divine institution and the rulers’ ability to crush the 
opposition: one should not obey purely out of blind fear, but also because one 
understands the situation. Paul is not putting forward any ideal of the ruler, 
unlike philosophers who discussed whether the king should be a living law 
unto himself in the state, or whether to honor the gods, etc.59 Neither is there 
any trace of the critical attitude toward rulers that is so prominent in the 
prophetic books of the Hebrew Bible or Deuteronomistic history.60 He is not 
55   Epictetus, Disc. 1.29.13; trans. Oldfather, slightly revised.
56   On Epictetus’ passage, see Huttunen 2009, 63–65.
57   Here ‘sword’ does not specifically refer to capital punishment (ius gladii), but to violent 
power in general (cf. Rom 8:35), which includes capital punishment. While the word ἔκδι-
κος (‘avenger’) can also be read in relation to a particular official, the idea of vengeance is 
present in Rom 12:19.
58   Some scholars of early Christianity are too eager to overemphasize the policing power of 
local magistrates. This is due to Theodor Mommsen’s legacy. Liebs (2005, 204–205) calls 
for a more precise consideration in readings of the martyr processes.
59   Scholars usually try to discover the background of these philosophical discussions; see, 
e.g., Bulmenfeld 2003 and Harrison 2011, 277–299.
60   On the philosophers’ discussions and the Jewish background, see, e.g., Harrison 2011, 
279–308.
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speaking about what the powers should be, but what the powers really are and 
what their ability to coerce actually constitutes. This is his political realism.
In the Roman sphere, it was the armed forces that pacified the world. In 
Res Gestae, Emperor Augustus proudly announces that he closed the temple of 
Janus “when peace had been achieved by victories on land and sea throughout 
the whole empire of the Roman people” (Res Gestae 13; trans. Cooley). What is 
romanticized as the Pax Romana indeed has the unacknowledged nature of a 
violent structure behind all its achievements, as Roland Boer puts it:
The famed Roman roads were not built for the sake of the postal ser-
vice or for wagons laden with trade; they were for rapid movement of 
armies, spatial control over the countryside and the movement of state-
sequestered goods. The infamous Pax Romana (analogous to the Pax 
Americana of our own day) was actually spattered with the blood of sys-
tematic violence, destruction, enforcement and enslavement in order to 
expand and maintain the Empire.61
The legions overpowering the provinces were seen as bringing peace and 
justice.62 The Roman army was not only for warfare. It also attended to the 
affairs of the internal peace. This police work was not so much aimed at pro-
tecting people, however, as attending to the interests of the Empire.63 In the 
case of unrest, “brute force was often expedient and effective, especially in 
dealing with ill-equipped townsfolk.”64 This is not far from Paul’s words con-
cerning the sword, where Roman forces act as “the servant of God to execute 
wrath on the wrongdoer” (Rom 13:4). One can now see what makes God’s insti-
tution socially visible. It is the execution of power, not least in its violent form. 
The public approval for good conduct (Rom 13:3) is just a single exception 
in the midst of a series of violent and fearful measures.
I claim that Paul’s statements are just one part of the Greco-Roman tradi-
tion of the law of the stronger, which was deeply rooted in Greek culture.65 In 
his fable of a hawk and a nightingale, Hesiod let the hawk say: “Stupid he who 
would wish to contend against those stronger (κρείσσονας) than he is: for he 
is deprived of the victory, and suffers pains in addition to his humiliations.” 
61   Boer 2013, 193–194.
62   On Pax Romana and its ties to such concepts as “freedom” and “safety,” see Dmitriev 2011, 
368–377.
63   Campbell 2002, 88; Fuhrmann 2012, 8, 91, 119.
64   Hubbard 2005, 423.
65   Pace Blumenfeld (2003, 390), for whom Paul’s concept of power differs from the classical 
Greek political thinking. In addition to examples of the law of the stronger that I present 
here, see Räisänen 1992, 81–82.
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Hesiod, however, warns of outrageousness or hubris: “The better (κρείσσων) 
road is the one towards what is just, passing her by on the other side. Justice 
wins out over Outrageousness (Δίκη δ᾿ ὑπὲρ Ὕβριος ἴσχει) when she arrives 
at the end.” Justice is Zeus’ law established for human beings, while there is 
no justice among animals (Op. 210–211, 216–218, 275–278; trans. Most, LCL). 
Hesiod’s warning implies that some people did not see anything wrong with 
the law of the stronger. Such people are vividly exemplified by Callicles and 
Thrasymachus, two characters in Plato’s dialogues.
Callicles proclaims “that it is right for the stronger to have advantage of the 
weaker, and the abler of the feebler” (δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον 
ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου). It is “so, not only in the animal 
world, but in the states and races, collectively, of men—that right has been 
decided to consist in the sway and advantage of the stronger over the weaker” 
(ὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν). According to 
Callicles, this is the law of nature in contrast to the law enacted by humans 
(Plato, Gorg. 483d–e; trans. Lamb, LCL, revised). Thrasymachus, a cruder vari-
ant of Callicles, states his thesis as follows, “I say that justice is nothing other 
than the advantage of the stronger” (τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος 
συμφέρον). Thrasymachus rebukes Socrates for naive illusions. Shepherds and 
herdsmen consider the good of the flocks because of their master’s good or 
their own.66 Nevertheless, Socrates imagines that “the attitude of those who 
govern our cities (those who really are rulers) toward those who are governed 
is somehow different from the way one might regard sheep, and that they think 
of anything else night and day but how to make a profit out of them” (Plato, 
Resp. 338c, 343b–c; trans. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL).
Callicles’ and Thrasymachus’ view of the law of the stronger was not pure 
speculation, as Plato’s contemporary Thucydides attests in the so-called Melian 
dialogue. The subject of the dialogue is the lot of the city of Melos in the hands 
of the Athenian army. The Athenians recommend capitulation with the follow-
ing rationalization: “the powerful (δυνατά) exact what they can, while the weak 
(οἱ ἀσθενεῖς) yield what they must.” In a good Hesiodian manner, the Melians 
put their trust in divinity. “We are god-fearing men standing our ground against 
men who are unjust (οὐ δικαίους).” The Athenians, however, believe that the law 
of the stronger is accepted by the gods: “For of the gods we hold the belief, 
and of men we know, that by a necessity of their nature wherever they have 
power they always rule (ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν). And so in 
our case since we neither enacted this law nor when it was enacted were the 
66   Cf. John 10:11–15, where the shepherd is even ready to die for the sheep.
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first to use it, but found it in existence and expect to leave it in existence for 
all time, so we make use of it …” (Thucydides 5.89, 104–105; trans. Smith, LCL).
These classical examples remained well known even in later times. Fol-
lowing the Stoic Posidonius, Seneca supposed that “nature has the habit 
of subjecting the weaker to the stronger” (potioribus deteriora summittere) 
( Seneca, Ep. 90.4; trans. Gummere). Josephus also applied the law of the 
stronger. He tells how he admonished Jews to surrender during the siege of 
Jerusalem.
Fortune, indeed, had from all quarters passed over to them, and God who 
went the round of the nations, bringing to each in turn the rod of empire, 
now rested over Italy. There was, in fact, an established law, as supreme 
among brutes as among men, ‘Yield to the stronger’ and ‘The mastery 
is for those pre-eminent in arms’ (νόμον γε μὴν ὡρίσθαι καὶ παρὰ θηρσὶν 
ἰσχυρότατον καὶ παρ᾿ ἀνθρώποις, εἴκειν τοῖς δυνατωτέροις καὶ τὸ κρατεῖν παρ᾿ 
οἷς ἀκμὴ τῶν ὅπλων εἶναι). That was why their forefathers, men who in soul 
and body, aye and in resources to boot, were by far their superiors, had 
yielded to the Romans—a thing intolerable to them, had they not known 
that God was on the Roman side. 
Josephus, Bell. 5.367–369; trans. Thackeray, LCL
Josephus follows the theological tradition—already visible in Thucydides’ 
dialogue as the Athenian standpoint—in which divinity is on the side of the 
stronger. To make his point even clearer Josephus adds, “listen, that you may 
learn that you are warring not against the Romans only, but also against God” 
(Bell. 5.378–379; trans. Thackeray). This is a very close parallel to Paul’s words: 
“whoever resists authority resists what God has appointed” (Rom 13:2). Here 
we see that both Josephus and Paul embraced the Greco-Roman political 
theology and adjusted it to their Jewish tradition. One can ask why Paul so 
strongly turned to the dominant imperial ideology. Would less glorification of 
the state have been enough? John S. Kloppenborg, referring to postcolonial 
studies, notes that subaltern groups often adopt a hegemonic discourse so that 
they can reduce their alterity. For him, Romans 13:1–7 is an example of that. 
As I have shown, Paul actually embraced a very common and deeply rooted 
ancient view of society. However, imitation of the hegemonic discourse is only 
a partial answer. Incomplete imitation presents one as compliant, but it also 
creates space for identity.67 Romans 13:1–7 can be seen as an example of that: 
at the top of society is the God of Israel, not the Roman gods. As I noted above, 
67   Kloppenborg 2014, 181.
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Robert Jewett sees this as subversive in terms of political theology,68 but his 
argument is unsuccessful. I pointed out that Josephus testifies to Jewish impe-
rial theology both on a cultic level (sacrifices in temple) and on a theoretical 
one. Thus, there was a Jewish tradition recognized by the Romans, and Paul 
joined in that. This nicely corroborates Kloppenborg’s observation of multiple 
hegemonic discourses.69 For Paul, Jewish imperial theology was a means to 
legitimately avoid the Roman gods. This theological option did not limit the 
duty of obedience in Romans 13:1–7. The theological differences between 
the official Roman religion and Jewish monotheism did not create any differ-
ences in daily life in the quotidian power structures.
The law of the stronger was well known in the Greco-Roman tradition, 
including the Jewish part of it. In many of the passages cited, the relation-
ship between power and justice is in focus. Hesiod preferred justice like Plato 
and Thucydides’ Melians; Callicles, Thrasymachus, and the Athenians in the 
Melian dialogue represent figures who prefer the unscrupulous use of power. 
Romans 13:1–7 clearly belongs to this discussion on the power play. Paul speaks 
about how “one must be subject” (ἀνάγκη ὑποτάσσεσθαι), like Athenians speak 
of “natural compulsion” (ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας) in Thucydides’ dialogue. 
James R. Harrison, who promotes the so-called anti-imperial reading, is ready 
to admit Paul’s realism. Harrison points out that “Paul’s heavy emphasis on 
judiciously ‘fearing’ the authorities is … far-sighted acknowledgement of 
first-century political realities.” Even in the end of his analysis on Romans 13, 
Harrison notes that Paul refused an open resistance as a “tragic miscalculation 
regarding Rome’s determination to suppress all rebellion.”70 Next I will show 
Paul’s compliance as one of the ancient strategies to cope with the stronger.
2.2 Coping Strategies and the Ethics of the Stronger
Epictetus seems to go in the opposite direction than Paul. He thinks that resis-
tance is both possible and morally acceptable. When speaking of the stronger 
and the weaker in Disc. 1.29 (cited above), Epictetus is seemingly commenting 
on Plato’s Gorgias. A. A. Long has noted, “Epictetus knew the Gorgias more or 
less by heart, and he probably included it as one of the main readings for his 
formal curriculum.”71 Although Callicles in Gorgias claims the superiority of 
the stronger, Epictetus answers by taking advantage of the binary meanings 
in the Greek words κρείσσων and χείρων, denoting ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ but 
68   Jewett 2007, 789–790.
69   Kloppenborg 2014, 180–181.
70   Harrison 2011, 313, 323.
71   Long 2002, 70.
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also ‘better’ and ‘worse,’ which contain moral connotations.72 Epictetus states 
that physical strength and moral strength (i.e., goodness) are two different 
things. The law of the stronger and the better leads to different conclusions 
when applied in physical and moral domains:
“Ten are better (κρείττονές) than one,” you say. For what? For putting in 
chains, for killing, for dragging away where they will, for taking away a 
man’s property. Ten overcome one, therefore, in the point in which they 
are better (κρείσσονες). In what, then, are they worse? If the one has cor-
rect judgements, and the ten have not. What then? Can they overcome in 
this point? How can they? But if we are weighed in the balance, must not 
the heavier draw down the scales? 
Epictetus, Disc. 1.29.14–15; trans. Oldfather, LCL
This differentiation between strength and morality makes it possible to criti-
cize authorities despite their physical supremacy. Socrates is the chief example 
of this attitude: “The paltry body of Socrates may be carried off and dragged to 
prison by those who were stronger (ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων) than he” (Epictetus, 
Disc. 1.29.16; trans. Oldfather, LCL). Now Epictetus changes the word κρείσσων 
to ἰσχυρότερος in order to make his point clear; he speaks of the physical supe-
riority. Yet, Socrates was also the prevailing one, as his moral judgements 
were superior:
But do you prove that one who holds inferior judgements prevails over 
the man who is superior in point of judgements (χείρονα ἔχων δόγματα 
κρατεῖ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐν δόγμασιν). You will not be able to prove this; no, 
nor even come near proving it. For this is a law of nature and of God: “Let 
the stronger always prevail over the weaker.” Prevail in what? In that in 
which it is stronger. 
Epictetus, Disc. 1.29.19–20; trans. Oldfather, revised73
In addition, the differentiation between the stronger and the better makes it 
possible to differentiate between physical and mental freedom. The person 
who is physically subjugated can prevail in a moral sense. This opens the pos-
sibility for a moral resistance, as, for example, the following passage proves:
72   See Liddell, Scott, and Jones 2011 on κρείσσων and χείρων.
73   For a further analysis of Epictetus’ text, see Huttunen 2009, 63–65.
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For when the tyrant says to a man, “I will chain your leg,” the man who has 
set a high value on his leg replies, “Nay, have mercy upon me,” while the 
man who has set a high value on his moral purpose replies, “If it seems 
more profitable to you to do so, chain it.” “Do you not care?” “No, I do not 
care.” “I will show you that I am master.” “How can you be my master? 
Zeus has set me free. Or do you really think that he was likely to let his 
own son be made a slave? You are, however, master of my dead body, take 
it.” “You mean, then, that when you approach me you will not pay atten-
tion to me?” “No, I pay attention only to myself. But if you wish me to say 
that I pay attention to you, too, I tell you that I do so, but only as I pay 
attention to my pot.” 
Epictetus, Disc. 1.19.8–10; trans. Oldfather, LCL
A non-Stoic would mistakenly identify his freedom with the freedom of the 
body. The Stoic, however, is interested in mental freedom.74 Epictetus does 
not hide his bold attitude toward tyrants, who are recurrent figures in his 
Discourses.75 He also expresses his resistant attitude in words that remind of 
Romans 13:
Is it for this that the tyrant inspires fear (φοβερός ἐστιν)? Is it because of 
this that his guards seem to have long and sharp swords (τὰς μαχαίρας)? 
Let others see to that; but I have considered all this, no one has authority 
(ἐξουσίαν) over me. I have been set free by God, I know his commands, no 
one has power any longer to make a slave of me, I have the right kind of 
advocate, and the right kind of judges. 
Epictetus, Disc. 4.7.16–17; trans. Oldfather, LCL, revised
God’s commands, which are equivalent to philosophy,76 make it possible 
to resist authorities. In contrast, Paul claims that those resisting authority 
(ἐξουσία) resist God’s ordinance (διαταγή). Moreover, the issue of fear is cen-
tral in Disc. 4.7, as its title “Of the freedom from fear” expresses. The whole 
discourse affirms that one should not fear authorities. Actually, Epictetus even 
takes fearless Christians an example of that (Disc. 4.7.6).77 They were surely 
not following what Paul states: “Do you wish to have no fear of the authority? 
Then do what is good, and you will receive its approval” (Rom 13:3). Paul unam-
biguously identifies obedience with what is good; accordingly, disobedience 
74   Long 2002, 198.
75   See, e.g., Starr 1949.
76   Huttunen 2009, 87–88.
77   On Epictetus’ sayings of Christians, see Chapter 2.
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toward the authorities is the same as distancing oneself from the good and 
living in fear. Yet, this was not the art of Epictetus and many other Stoics. 
Epictetus’ resistance was in line with that of the so-called Stoic opposition 
embodied by Helvidius Priscus, who was martyred by Vespasian.78 Epictetus 
presents Helvidius’ bold dialogue with the emperor as an example for future 
generations (Epictetus, Disc. 1.2.19–24). Helvidius and his father-in-law Thrasea 
Paetus, who was executed by Nero, became symbols for the philosophical and 
republican resistance in the early Empire. Even their memory was felt as a 
threat for the Empire, as Tacitus reports:
It is recorded that when Rusticus Arulenus extolled Thrasea Paetus, when 
Herennius Senecio extolled Helvidius Priscus, their praise became a capi-
tal offence, so that persecution fell not merely on the authors themselves 
but also on their books: the police, in fact, were given the task of burning 
in the courtyard of the Forum the memorials of our noblest characters. 
Tacitus, Agr. 2; trans. Hutton and Peterson, LCL
Without blaming Thrasea or Helvidius for their resistance, Tacitus presents an 
alternative way for Agricola, his own father-of-law: “He read aright the reign of 
Nero, wherein to be passive was to be wise” (Agr. 6; trans. Hutton and Peterson, 
LCL). The Stoic Seneca seems to follow along the lines of Agricola, although 
he did not escape death but committed suicide, per Nero’s order. Seneca dif-
ferentiates between three types of fear, of which the third is the most fearful: 
“we fear (timentur) the troubles which result from the violence of the stronger” 
(per vim potentioris) (Ep. 14.3; trans. Gummere, LCL). It becomes clear that the 
stronger ones are the authorities, who make a parade with several violent acts.
Surrounding it is a retinue of swords and fire and chains and a mob of 
beasts to be let loose upon the disemboweled entrails of men. Picture 
to yourself under this head the prison, the cross, the rack, the hook, and 
the stake which they drive straight through a man until it protrudes from 
his throat. Think of human limbs torn apart by chariots driven in oppo-
site directions, of the terrible shirt smeared and interwoven with inflam-
mable materials, and of all the other contrivances devised by cruelty, in 
addition to those which I have mentioned! It is not surprising, then, if our 
greatest terror (timor) is of such a fate; for it comes in many shapes and its 
paraphernalia are terrifying (terribilis). 
Seneca, Ep. 14.5–6; trans. Gummere, LCL
78   On Helvidius, see, e.g., Malitz 1985, 231–246.
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Keeping Paul in mind, it is worth noting that Seneca assumes fear to be an 
important issue in the relationship between subjects and authorities. This 
relates to a more general belief in the connection between power and fear. 
Shepherd of Hermas seems to reveal that ancient ethos:
ἐν ᾧ δὲ δύναμις οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ φόβος· ἐν ᾧ δὲ δύναμις ἡ ἔνδοξος, καὶ φόβος ἐν 
αὐτῷ. πᾶς γὰρ ὁ δύναμιν ἔχων φόβον ἔχει· ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔχων δύναμιν ὑπὸ πάντων 
καταφρονεῖται.
But in whom there is no power, neither is there fear. But in whom there 
is glorious power, there is also fear. For everyone who has power is feared; 
but the one who is powerless is despised by all. 
Herm. Mand. 7.2 [37.2]; trans. Ehrman, LCL
The passage presents as a piece of general wisdom the idea of power operating 
through fear. As shown above, this logic was also seen in the relationship to the 
state authorities: fear and power were interwoven, although some Stoics (like 
Epictetus) tried to disentangle them. Paul, in turn, accepted the connection 
between fear and power as an axiom. In Romans, one can see only the prac-
tical outcome of this conviction: Paul admonishes his audience to obey the 
authorities, in order to avoid fear (μὴ φοβεῖσθαι) of their wrath (ὀργή). Unlike 
many other Stoics, Seneca is in line with Paul. He admonishes his readers to 
avoid anger: “So the wise man will never provoke the anger (potentium iras 
provocabit) of those in power; nay, he will even turn his course, precisely as he 
would turn from a storm if he were steering a ship” (Ep. 14.7–8; trans. Gummere, 
LCL). Similarly, Josephus has King Agrippa advise the following: “The authori-
ties (τὰς ἐξουσίας) should be served, not irritated” (Bell. 2.351; my translation). 
Again, this sounds quite similar to Paul. Such logic leads Seneca to recommend 
a quiet life outside the political sphere:
I beg you to consider those Stoics who, shut out from public life, have 
withdrawn into privacy for the purpose of improving men’s existence 
and framing laws for the human race without incurring the displeasure of 
those in power (potentioris). The wise man will not upset the customs 
of the people, nor will he invite the attention of the populace by any 
novel ways of living. 
Seneca, Ep. 14.14; trans. Gummere, LCL
Seneca’s stance comes close to Epicurus’ famous maxim “Live unknown” 
(Plutarch, Mor. 1128C). This is probably not a surprise, as Seneca repeatedly 
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cites Epicurus in his Epistles. Epicurus’ own relationship toward society is as 
similarly quietist as Seneca’s in Ep. 14. In his Principal Doctrines 34–35, Epicurus’ 
motivation for quietism is a life without fear:
Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror 
(φόβῳ) which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish 
such offences will discover the injustice. It is impossible for the man who 
secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he 
will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand 
times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be 
detected. 
Diogenes Laërtius 10.151; trans. Hicks, LCL
Lucretius repeats these doctrines: a criminal can live undetected, but he can 
never be sure that his crimes will remain hidden: “Hence comes fear (metus) 
of punishment that taints the prizes of life” (Lucretius 5.1151–1160; trans. Rouse, 
LCL). Lucretius even ridicules how a fool not only fears the punishments in 
this life but also in the hereafter.
But in this life there is fear of punishment (metus in vita poenarum) for 
evil deeds, fear as notorious as the deeds are notorious, and atonement 
for crime—prison, and the horrible casting down from the Rock, stripes, 
executioners, condemned cell, pitch, red-hot plates, firebrands; and even 
if these are absent, yet the guilty conscience (mens sibi conscia factis), ter-
rified before anything (praemetuens) can come to pass, applies the goad 
and scorches itself with whips, and meanwhile does not see where can 
be the end to its miseries or the final limit to its punishment, and fears 
(metuit) that these same afflictions may become heavier after death. The 
fool’s life at length becomes a hell on earth. 
Lucretius 3.1014–1023; trans. Rouse, LCL
Epicurus and Lucretius put forth ideas that come quite close to what Paul pres-
ents in Romans 13. Both the Epicureans and Paul subscribe to the idea that 
one has to follow rules in order to avoid fear of punishment. Paul even seems 
to have noted the same thing as the Epicureans, namely, that authorities do 
not catch every wrongdoer. Paul asks and then answers, “Do you wish to have 
no fear of the authority? Then do what is good” (Rom. 13:3). He does not say 
that wrongdoers will be caught but only that they will live in fear. However, 
Paul takes seriously what Lucretius ridicules, that is, judgement in the hereaf-
ter: “those who resist will incur judgement” (κρίμα λήμψονται; Rom. 13:2). The 
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expression κρίμα λήμψονται is a hapax legomenon in Paul, but in the rest of 
the New Testament it refers to the Last Judgement (Matt. 23:14; Mark 12:40; 
Luke 20:47; Jas 3:1).79 Thus, Paul is aligned with Epicurus and Lucretius by 
claiming that criminals will always live in fear of punishment, but he differs 
from them by taking seriously the idea of divine punishment. There is also 
another aspect where Paul differs from the Epicureans. Epicurus claimed, 
“There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in recipro-
cal intercourse” (Diogenes Laërtius 10.150; trans. Hicks, LCL). In other words, 
justice and injustice are just human agreements. Therefore, the concrete con-
tent of justice differs according to time and place, as Epicurus states in the 
same context. There is no reason to think that ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ imply some 
totally different moral code in Romans 13:3–4 and its context, where Paul at 
least partly speaks of intra-Christian relationships (Rom 12:9, 17, 21; 13:10). Thus, 
the good required in intra-Christian relationships is the same good as that 
required by the authorities.80
In sum, Paul seems to differ from the Stoic opposition embodied by 
Helvidius Priscus and celebrated by, for example, Epictetus. Paul’s answer 
to the law of the stronger is more quietist, being closer to Seneca’s Epistle 14 
and the Epicureans. I generally agree with Runar Thorsteinsson’s conclusion 
that for Paul it was “important that the Christ-believers in Rome avoid unnec-
essary attention to themselves on behalf of the civic authorities.” In Paul’s 
words: “So far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all” (Rom 12:18).81 There 
is, however, one important difference between Paul and other quietists trying 
to cope with authorities. Paul assumed that the authorities really promoted 
the good and “therefore one must be subject, not only because of wrath but 
also because of conscience” (Rom 13:5). Why did Paul view the authorities so 
optimistically? The answer lies in the fact that the ancient ethics of the stron-
ger were not without obligations for the good of the weaker. This has not won 
enough attention, because many modern readers tend to sympathize with a 
Bakunin-like disgust of hierarchy and power as such. This tendency blinds one 
to the positive aspect that many ancient people found in social hierarchies.
Plato’s picture of Callicles and Thrasymachus cited above point out that the 
stronger make a profit from the weaker. Similarly, Paul admonishes his read-
ers to pay taxes and revenues to the authorities (Rom 13:7), but he also points 
out an important difference in these Platonic figures. Paul does not present 
relative morals, which qualify the profit of the stronger as the good. He does 
79   Huttunen 2009, 95.
80   Huttunen 2009, 97.
81   Thorsteinsson 2010, 99.
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not seek to justify the law of the stronger. In contrast, he optimistically claims 
that authorities operate “for your good” (Rom 13:4). The good the authori-
ties promote is the good he also recommends to Christian in-group relations 
(Rom 12:9–10; 13:8). There is no indication that the civil good would differ from 
the good of the Christian in-group.82 Thus, Paul claims that the authoritative 
power promotes justice in a genuine sense. This is quite an amazing claim. 
How could he think this? Is Paul proposing “a utopian vision of the state”?83 Or 
is there any other explanation? Yes, there is.
I take an example of the ethics binding the stronger. Thucydides’ report 
on the Athenians’ shameless invocation of the law of the stronger in the 
Melian dialogue and the subsequent destruction of the city of Melos is often 
presented as a classical example of immoral power politics.84 This is a mis-
conception, however. As I observed above, in ancient culture the stronger 
also had obligations toward the inferior. In the initial part of the dialogue, 
the Athenians openly state that they would like to have dominion over Melos 
“without trouble,” that is, without destroying the city. However, they claim 
that the capitulation of Melos would save the city, “to the advantage of both.” 
When the Melians ask what the advantage might be, the Athenians answer, “It 
would be to your advantage to submit before suffering the most horrible fate, 
and we should gain by not destroying you” (Thucydides 5.93; trans. Smith, LCL). 
This is surely a piece of war propaganda, but not altogether. The Athenians 
destroy Melos only as a fear-inspiring example to the other inferior cities in 
the Athenian dominion (Thucydides 5.99) how rebels are handled. As a gen-
eral procedure, the destruction of inferiors would disadvantage the Athenians 
themselves. The dominion needed its subjects.85 At the end of the dialogue, 
the Athenians counsel the Melians “to acknowledge yourselves inferior 
to the most powerful state when it offers you moderate terms.” The Athenians 
validate their counsel with a general wisdom: “Those who, while refusing to 
submit to their equals, yet comport themselves wisely towards their superi-
ors and are moderate towards their inferiors—these, we say, are most likely to 
prosper” (Thucydides 5.111; trans. Smith, LCL). The exercise of power lies not in 
destroying but in moderate subjugation.
This wisdom is the moral code of the hierarchically structured ancient soci-
eties. One can find it also in Roman times. Lucretius ascribes it to the dawn 
82   Wilckens 1982, 31; Huttunen 2009, 97–98. Thorsteinsson (2010, 98–99) makes the same 
point, but warrants that “it is hard to believe” that this would literally mean unlimited 
acceptance of the authorities.
83   Harrington and Keenan 2010, 170.
84   See, e.g., Crane 1998, 23 n3.
85   Crane 1998, 291–293.
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of the world, when the human race started to make covenants, “signifying by 
voice and gesture with stammering tongue that it was right for all to pity the 
weak” (Lucretius 5.1022–1023; trans. Rouse, LCL). Augustus boasts, “[A]s vic-
tor I was merciful to all citizens who asked for pardon. As for foreign peoples, 
those whom I could safely pardon, I preferred to preserve than to destroy” (Res 
Gestae 3; trans. Cooley). Virgil puts this thought into his verses: “Roman, be 
sure to rule the world (be these your arts), to crown peace with justice, to spare 
the vanquished and to crush the proud” (parcere subiectis et debellare super-
bos) (Virgil, Aen. 6.853; trans. Fairclough, LCL.). Josephus clearly recalls this 
morality after he has impressed the law of the stronger on besieged Jerusalem. 
He recounts what he told about the Romans to the Jews in the city:
The Romans would bear them no malice for the past, unless they per-
sisted in their contumacy to the end: they were naturally lenient in vic-
tory, and would put above vindictiveness considerations of expediency, 
which did not consist in having on their hands either a depopulated 
city or a devastated country. That was why, even at this late hour, Caesar 
desired to grant them terms; whereas, if he took the city by storm, he 
would not spare a man of them, especially after the rejection of offers 
made to them when in extremities. 
Josephus, Bell. 5.372–373; trans. Thackeray, LCL
This is a close variant of the story of Melos in The History of the Peloponnesian 
War. Both cities are advised to capitulate, such that the stronger would have 
the advantage of a living city, but both cities are destroyed after refusing sub-
jugation. In a way, this morality is also found in Thrasymachus’ crude words 
about rulers as shepherds who consider the good of the sheep in order to profit 
from the animals. The stronger takes care of the weaker for its own advantage. 
This is also the moral code which Teresa Morgan has detected in the popular 
morality of the early Roman Empire. Using as sources both fables and stories of 
exemplary figures, which predominantly deal with relations between the weak 
and the strong, she finds that hierarchy was seen as a natural phenomenon. 
The weak get advice to not put themselves in the way of the powerful, but 
instead try to show themselves as useful for the strong. Respectively, the strong 
should not destroy themselves by unwise treatment of their inferiors.86 The 
whole society is interconnected: everyone is bound to those above and below, 
and the exemplary figures Morgan discusses are loyal toward persons of higher 
rank. State institutions such as the army, censors, magistrates and law courts 
86   Morgan 2007, 63–67; See Reasoner 1999, 45–58.
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are regarded as moral authorities.87 Morgan shows that popular morality was 
connected with philosophy,88 as I presented above. Romans 13 is nothing but a 
Christian variation of this popular morality. Paul views the authorities optimis-
tically, because they need their obedient subjects.
2.3 The Imagination Made Real
I showed that Romans 13:1–7 is a Christianized version of common ancient 
ethics. Its starting point is the prevailing social hierarchy, including its violent 
basis. It also seems to be ruthlessly realistic in the sense that it discouraged 
all attempts to change the society. However, this is not all. As Ranke clearly 
saw, Paul’s teaching on authorities was a reaction to the social dynamite at 
the heart of the Christian beliefs which Paul himself shared. Paul was deeply 
convinced that the power structures were disappearing. His teaching on the 
authorities very smoothly transitions to that of Christian in-group ethics. After 
admonishing readers to give to the civil authorities what is due to them, he 
continues by advising Christians to owe nothing but mutual love. It is as if all 
other obligations could be fulfilled, but never the duty of love. The impend-
ing eschaton sharpens the ethical requirements. Troels Engberg-Pedersen has 
proposed that Paul is here depending on his Stoic ethics in 1 Cor. 7:31: those 
who deal with the world should deal “as if they had no dealings with it. For the 
present form of this world is passing away” (trans. slightly revised). According 
to Engberg-Pedersen, Paul similarly thinks here that the obligations to the 
authorities are secondary when compared to love:
Pay your taxes (fulfil your duties in that field) as something that can in 
fact be fulfilled. And then forget about it since the duty has, by now been 
fulfilled. In other words, do it “as if not”. Or: do it, but without paying 
any special attention to it. That is not what matters. By contrast, fulfil 
your obligation to love. Or rather: try to fulfil it, always, and everywhere. 
For that is what matters. And that kind of life precisely belongs with the 
eschaton.89
87   Morgan 2007, 136, 142. There were alternative discourses, as Kartzow has shown, for exam-
ple, in his study on the Pastoral Epistles. Kartzow (2009, 207) notes that the author of 
the Epistles rebukes women for gossiping, because “gossips” represent an alternative dis-
course. In this way women achieved power and influence. This single example shows that 
the hierarchical structure of society is not the whole truth of power in ancient society.
88   Morgan 2007, 274–299.
89   Engberg-Pedersen 2006, 170–171.
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The distinction between what matters and what does not matter is basic 
Stoic ethics, and 1 Corinthians 7 fits well into such a context.90 Even the idea 
of an impending eschaton is not strange in the Greco-Roman world. Lucretius 
reconstructs a theory of the growth and the fading of the world. He concludes, 
“now indeed the power of life is broken,” and the world goes “to the reef of 
destruction” (Lucretius 2.1150, 1173–1174; trans. Rouse, LCL).91 Stoics represented 
the cyclic view of the universe: everything will be destroyed in a conflagra-
tion and/or deluge so that a new cycle can begin. In his Naturales quaestiones, 
Seneca says that the destruction will be sudden, and “a single day will bury the 
human race” (Nat. 3.27.2, 3.29.9; trans. Corcoran, LCL). According to Seneca, 
the deluge and the conflagration “will occur when it seems best to god for the 
old things to be ended and better things to begin.” He estimates, “There will 
be no long delay in the destruction” (Nat. 3.28.7, 3.30.5; trans. Corcoran, LCL).92 
Paul’s vision is similar: “The night is far gone, the day is near” (Rom 13:12). The 
imminent end of this era emphasizes the right style of life (Rom 13:12–14), 
while Seneca emphasizes the vanity of all human achievements in the face of 
such cataclysms.93 For Paul, eschatology was a call for new values and new life; 
accordingly, he did not resist the state of the world being left behind.
Paul illustrates the requirement of a new life with the metaphor of “put-
ting on the Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom 13:14). This is a clear reference to baptism.94 
Robert Wilson estimates how baptism by immersion lent itself to the develop-
ment of an imagery of “garment symbolism”: “the candidate left his garments 
behind as he entered the water, and put on a fresh set of clothing when he 
emerged.”95 By means of this new “garment,” one should already imitate the 
coming world after the eschatological turn. This becomes clear in Romans 6, 
where Paul rebukes Christians for sinning. In baptism, Christians have mysti-
cally died to sin with Christ. This leads to the ethical conclusion: “For if we have 
been united with him in a death like his, we will certainly be united with him in 
a resurrection like his” (Rom. 6:5). Here is the future resurrection life projected 
onto the present as an ethical standard.96
As usual, the initiation revealed the central beliefs of the cult. What is of 
interest now in this chapter is the social dimension of the new faith. In the 
90   See Chapter 2.
91   Interestingly, in 5.330–331 Lucretius claims just the opposite: “But, as I think, the world is 
young and new, and it is not long since its beginning.”
92   See Heinonen 1990, 53–58; Downing 1995, 196–211.
93   Heinonen 1990, 57–58.
94   Jewett 2007, 827–828.
95   Wilson 2005, 250.
96   Huttunen 2009, 148–149.
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Epistle of Galatians, Paul declares: “As many of you as were baptized into 
Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, 
there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you 
are one in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:27–28). This maxim was seemingly a fixed part of 
the baptismal paraenesis. When it appears otherwise in the New Testament, it 
is always combined with baptism (1 Cor 12:13; Col 3:11).97 One can easily see that 
the indifference to ethnic status lies at the heart of Paul’s thinking, as he makes 
room for non-Jews among the Christians, but the baptismal paraenesis actu-
ally reveals that such indifference applies to other statuses within the baptized 
group as well. Male and female, slave and free are just examples of statuses 
which do not make any difference in the future life.
As the baptismal paraenesis shows, one of the cornerstones of this ethi-
cal standard is the lack of ethnic, status, gender, or—I suppose—any other 
characteristics. Of course, this does not mean that these characteristics some-
how disappear, but that they are just adiaphora. In this tendency, Paul comes 
close to the ethics of the Stoics, where the world is organized by the divine 
logos. According to the Stoics, even the social structure of the world is divinely 
instituted, and every person occupies a social position at God’s command. The 
social position itself does not matter. What counts is to fulfill one’s duties as 
an official or slave or in any other position that one happens to find oneself 
occupying. Every person is equal to others and the different ranks are just like 
roles composed by the divine playwright. Therefore, a Stoic slave-owner is not 
obliged to set his or her slaves free, but to treat them humanely:98 “Do you 
not remember what you are, and over whom you rule—that they are your 
kinsmen, that they are your brothers by nature?” (Epictetus, Disc. 1.13.4; trans. 
Oldfather, LCL, revised).
The analogy between the Stoic and the Pauline thinking is clear: social dif-
ferences are adiaphora, but in actual life they are not rejected. Interestingly, 
Paul admonishes everyone to remain in the social position he or she occupies. 
Not even slaves should try to find their freedom (1 Cor 7:17–24). The analo-
gies with Stoic ideas (and even technicalities) are so distinct in these verses 
that I have referred to them as a Christian version of Stoicism.99 As an inner 
97   Col 3:11 lacks a concrete reference to baptism, but the symbol of “clothing” in 3:9–10 is 
clearly a reference to baptism (Wilson 2005, 250).
98   Huttunen 2009, 24–26, 45. On the Stoic idea of equality, especially between genders, see 
Grahn’s profound study (2013).
99   See Chapter 2. Paul’s words on slaves can also be understood in the way that slaves should 
promote their emancipation when possible. If so, the parallel with Stoicism may be even 
clearer (Bonhöffer 1911, 171). However, I have philologically argued against the interpreta-
tion that Paul would admonish the promotion of emancipation (Huttunen 2009, 28–29).
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conviction, Paul’s Christianity makes no less an impact than does Stoicism. 
Paul’s short epistle to a certain Philemon stands as witness to this. The theme 
of this epistle is the slave Onesimus, who was probably a runaway. Paul returns 
Onesimus to his owner “no longer as a slave but as more than a slave, a beloved 
brother” (Philem. 16). The short personal letter should not be read as an overall 
statement on slavery or even on the treatment of runaways,100 but the human 
tone is distinctive and fits well with the baptismal paraenesis.
Among the statuses that become irrelevant through baptism are those of the 
stronger and the weaker. This is highly interesting after noting the law of 
the stronger in Paul’s teaching on civil authorities in Romans 13:1–7. Paul takes 
up the relationship between the strong (οἱ δυνατοί) and the weak (ὁ ἀσθενῶν, 
οἱ ἀδυνατοί) in the next chapters. In this case it is a question of weakness and 
strength in spiritual matters: the weak are scared by the “idol food,” while the 
strong—among whom Paul counts himself—know that “nothing is unclean 
in itself” (Rom 14:14). This spiritual strength is parallel to the moral strength 
shown by the physically conquered person in Epictetus’ example (see above). It 
is characteristic of an ancient mind that people are classified by their strength, 
even in intellectual, moral, and spiritual matters. Disputes between the strong 
and the weak are the subject of Paul’s pastoral guidance in Romans 14–15. He 
presents himself as though he were a sage from the Golden Age. Posidonius 
(cited by Seneca) says that in the Golden Age, “the government was under the 
jurisdiction of the wise. They kept their hands under control, and protected 
the weaker from the stronger (infirmiorem a validioribus)” (Seneca, Ep. 90.5; 
trans. Gummere, LCL).
Paul tries to smooth over the disagreements between the strong and the 
weak, although he identifies himself with the strong (Rom. 15:1) and gives phil-
osophical arguments for their views.101 Moreover, the apostle does not even try 
to get rid of the traditional vocabulary of the weak and the strong. He classifies 
believers as weak or strong in matters of faith. In this sense, he also accepts a 
social hierarchy within the Christian in-group. It is secondary, however, as both 
subgroups share the common interest of giving glory to God: “Those who eat, 
eat in honour of the Lord, since they give thanks to God; while those who 
abstain, abstain in honour of the Lord and give thanks to God” (Rom 14:6). They 
should thus recognize each other’s practices as differing outcomes of the same 
conviction. This illustrates the fact that though “the night is far gone,” there 
are still Jews and Greeks, slaves and freedmen, males and females—and also 
strong and weak. The dawn has not yet broken, and one can only get a dim idea 
100   See the discussion by Glancy (2002, 91–92).
101   Huttunen 2009, 71–74.
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(cf. 1 Cor. 13:12) of the future non-hierarchies. Paul ridicules the Corinthians 
who, according to him, already claim to have reached the eschatological full-
ness: “Already you have become rich! Quite apart from us you have become 
kings! Indeed, I wish that you had become kings, so that we might be kings 
with you!” (1 Cor. 4:8). This ideal, which Paul ascribes to the Corinthians, is a 
Stoic one. Diogenes Laërtius relates that Zeno and Chrysippus taught about 
the kingship of the wise.
According to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; king-
ship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so 
Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno’s use of terminology. For he 
holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler 
(ἐγνωκέναι γάρ φησι δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν), and that no 
bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good 
alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators (ἀρχικοὺς δικαστικούς τε 
καὶ ῥητορικοὺς), whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. 
Diogenes Laërtius 7.122; trans. Hicks, LCL
According to Paul, it is premature to claim that someone has already become 
a philosopher-king. Even Stoics would deny those claims, except in the case 
of few uncommon figures. For Epictetus, such figures were only Diogenes of 
Sinope, Socrates, or Heracles.102 For Paul, the Corinthian claim is also pre-
mature, because the eschatological kingdom has not yet come. Besides this 
prematureness, Paul sees nothing wrong with the Stoic ideal, which is noth-
ing but anarchical. In the future commonwealth (Phil. 3:20), there are only the 
saved, all of whom are wise. They all become kings, who hold knowledge of 
good and evil, the same knowledge and power authorities have in this world 
(Rom. 13:3–4). Therefore, the need for hierarchies will disappear. Actually, this 
is what Paul expects of Christ when that new day dawns: “He hands over the 
kingdom to God the Father, after he has annulled every ruler and every author-
ity and power” (καταργήσῃ πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν) (1 Cor. 
15:24; trans. revised).103 This is anarchy, but not in the sense of armed revolu-
tion or any other practical resistance. The opposition toward earthly empires 
is just on the ideological level, whereas on the social level Paul pursued peace 
with all (Rom 12:18).104
102   Downing 1998, 88–90; Huttunen 2009, 130–139.
103   Paul can also mean celestial angelic or demonic powers, or there can be a double meaning 
in these verses. See Schrage 2001, 173–174.
104   Klostergaard Petersen 2015, 123.
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However, Paul also expected something to happen on the concrete level. 
With a reference to Romans 14, French philosopher Alain Badiou claims: “Paul 
takes great pains to explain that what one eats, the behavior of a servant, astro-
logical hypotheses, and finally the fact of being Jewish, Greek, or anything 
else—all this can and must be envisaged as simultaneously extrinsic to the 
trajectory of truth and compatible with it.”105 This is certainly true in Romans 
14, but this is an overstatement if it is presented as Paul’s overall conviction, as 
Badiou does. Badiou wants to show that Paul was not promoting anti-Judaism or 
misogyny, but rather a genuine universalism that transcended all differences.106 
To just take the case of the Jews, one can read a lengthy discussion on them in 
Romans 9–11. It proves that Paul indeed had a serious intention to find a place 
for non-Christian Jews within salvation, but he fluctuated between different 
solutions and ended up leaving the matter to God.107 Ultimately, he could not 
find a universal solution. However, his intention toward one was undeniable. 
His intention was to eliminate any hierarchical differences.
The limitation of Paul’s universalism is clearly revealed when his thoughts 
are compared with those of the Stoics. Runar Thorsteinsson claims that 
“Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism are fundamentally similar in terms 
of morality or ethics,” but that only Stoics taught universal humanity. The 
Christian texts, in turn, “reserve the application of their primary virtue for 
fellow believers.”108 This is easily seen, for example, in Romans 13:8–10: here 
Paul exhorts the Christians to mutual love. While he surely does not leave non-
Christians out, or say they are not worthy of concern, the main line highlights 
in-group matters.109 This is due to the fact that the equality of all people is 
closely tied to faith and baptism in Christ. Transcending differences—say, 
between slaves and freedmen—is closely reminiscent to what the Stoics said. 
But whereas equality for the Stoics was based on common humanity, here it was 
based on Christ. This is clearly visible in 1 Corinthians 7:17–24.110 Nevertheless, 
105   Badiou 2003, 100.
106   Badiou 2003, 101–116. It is revealing that Badiou claims that Paul did not accuse the Jews 
of deicide. This is true, but deceiving. Although Paul does not speak of deicide, he ruth-
lessly blames Jews for being enemies of humankind and for murdering Christ (1 Thess 
2:15). This is so heightened a claim that one is tempted to see it as an interpolation. There 
is, however, no manuscript evidence for this proposition. In the case of women, Badiou is 
more sensitive. He admits that Paul sometimes utters things that are unacceptable today. 
However, “the only question worth asking is whether Paul, given the conditions of his 
time, is a progressive or a reactionary” (Badiou 2003, 104–116).
107   For an illustrative discussion on Rom 9–11, see Räisänen 2008.
108   Thorsteinsson 2010, 209. See also Engberg-Pedersen 2013.
109   Huttunen 2009, 71; Thorsteinsson 2010, 193–194.
110   See Chapter 2.
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there was really a universal mission in early Christianity: to make disciples of 
all nations (ἔθνη) (Matt 28:19). This was also Paul’s mission in the sense that 
he believed himself to be “the apostle to the nations (ἐθνῶν ἀπόστολος)” (Rom 
11:13; trans. revised). That there is no independent, humanistic interest toward 
outsiders is a completely understandable situation in a cult that projected all 
good onto Christ. In short, there was no freedom, equality, or brotherhood out-
side of Christ.
For some people, such a Christian outlook is regarded as too restrictive and 
vague, or even an illusion. They rationalized that because “there is so much 
hellish,” people take refuge in religion, “the creation of a world of fantasy.”111 
Instead of fantasy they would rather that such goals be realized in and for the 
whole of society. The Russian Revolution and subsequent communist revolu-
tions around the world were attempts at consummating the eschatological 
imagination. The Marxist philosophy of history can be seen in this light as a 
secular variant of Jewish-Christian apocalypticism:112 according to this view, 
global revolution will be the final conflict, Armageddon. Amid the battle, a 
devout revolutionary could have the premonition “that this will be the last 
one,”113 to be followed by everlasting human unity. Although apocalyptic 
Marxism has its prehistory from the late 16th century on,114 the Marxist union 
of the secular and the sacred is probably the strongest revolutionary power 
ever seen in history.115 Lenin put into practice the revolutionary spirit that he 
saw in the original Christianity, here apparently being under the influence of 
Friedrich Engels, who took the Book of Revelation as the original expression 
of Christianity.116
After few years after the Russian Revolution, enthusiasts claimed that 
the teachings of Jesus were “being realized in Russia.” But the disillusioned 
anarchist Emma Goldman was less keen in her comments: “A preposter-
ous falsehood.”117 Indeed, what actually followed the October Revolution of 
1917 was a realization of the bloody visions of John the Seer. The picture of 
blood rising to the bridles of horses (Rev 14:20) was not far away. The Black 
111   Dzerzhinsky 1959, 221 (March 9, 1914).
112   See, e.g., Zimdars-Schwartz and Zimdars-Schwartz 1998, 286–289; Baumgartner 1999, 
201–202.
113   Dzerzhinsky 1959, 291 (August 22, 1918). Dzerhinsky’s prison diary and letters document 
his constant faith in a kind of eschatological reality in the secular Marxist form. Lauchlan 
(2015, 101–104) also notes Dzerzhinsky’s Christian-like sentiment.
114   Räisänen 2017, 199. On the prehistory, see Funkenstein 1986, 202–289.
115   Altizer 1998, 341.
116   Engels 1894–1895.
117   Goldman 1924, 96–97.
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Book of Communism counted nearly 100 million deaths on the communist 
conscience.118 The exact number of victims is debated, but no one questions 
that the number was huge. The modern Bolshevist apocalypticists, however, 
saw spilling of blood with pleasure. For Lenin (citing Engels), revolutionary vio-
lence was good power in contrast to the “diabolical power” of the old society.119 
Along these lines, Lenin’s servants in the Cheka, the political police, were 
instructed to crush the old world in the apocalyptic turn toward the new eon:
Our morality is new, our humanity is absolute, for it rests on the bright 
ideal of destroying all oppression and coercion. To us all is permitted, 
for we are the first in the world to raise the sword not in the name of 
enslaving and oppressing anyone, but in the name of freeing all from 
bondage…. Blood? Let there be blood … for only the complete and final 
death of that [old] world will save us from the return of the old jackals.120
Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder and the first leader of Cheka, was at pains to 
explain to his sister why “there is no name more terrifying than mine,” while 
“love is everything for me.” He claimed to “banish injustice from the world.”121 
“My purpose compels me to be merciless,” he relates to his wife.122 This 
is how the Marxist eschatology took form in one individual who had spent 
years in the prison of the previous authorities. Violent rule was dethroned 
by even more intense violent rule. Is this exactly what happens in the Book 
of Revelation? The Lamb of Revelation begins to look here like a dragon or 
the Beast of the same book. The Lamb, who was earlier a slaughtered vic-
tim, destroys his enemies after all (Rev 19), just like the Beast who waged war 
against the followers of the Lamb (Rev 13:7). This is how David L. Barr puts 
the moral problem of the last book in the Bible.123 The Lamb becomes the 
new power. In a sense, John’s vision foreshadows the Christian empires, which 
eagerly utilized Paul’s legitimation for their dominance. Not even Lenin’s rule 
forgot such a useful biblical passage. Pyotr Krasikov, the deputy of the People’s 
Commissar of Justice, claimed in 1919 that Romans 13 belongs among the most 
important sayings of the apostle. Krasikov deplored that Tikhon, the Patriarch 
118   Courtois et al. 1999.
119   Lenin 1974, 404.
120   These words are from 1919 and the first issue of The Red Sword, a weekly periodical of the 
Ukrainian Cheka. Cited and translated by Leggett 1981, 203 (my clarification in brackets is 
based on the textual context).
121   Dzerzhinsky 1959, 293–294 (April 15, 1919).
122   Dzerzhinsky 1959, 290 (May 27, 1918).
123   Barr 2006, 218. Barr himself takes distance from this reading while aptly describing it.
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of Moscow and All Russia, did not use it to elucidate the relationship between 
the state and the church.124 Once they seized power, the Bolsheviks claimed 
to reign as those before—despite the fact that this was not their stated aim. 
Lenin wrote:
We do not after all differ with the anarchists on the question of the abo-
lition of the state as the aim. We maintain that, to achieve this aim, we 
must temporarily make use of the instruments, resources, and methods 
of state power against the exploiters, just as the temporary dictatorship of 
the oppressed class is necessary for the abolition of classes.125
The anarchists also preached social revolution.126 The temporary means that 
Lenin enumerated were just more longstanding than those held by the anar-
chists. Emma Goldman demanded that the means of revolution should be 
identical with the purposes to be achieved. In a weird way, she still suggested 
that violent revolution inspires “with a new concept of life and its manifesta-
tions in social relationships,”127 obviously expecting something else than the 
state and state-driven terror. While the anarchists believed in an immediate 
collapse of the state after revolution, Lenin ridiculed this idea by citing Engels:
Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly 
the most authoritarian thing there is; it is an act whereby one part of the 
population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayo-
nets and cannon, all of which are highly authoritarian means. And the 
victorious party must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its 
arms inspire in the reactionaries.128
The Marxists saw how contradictory the anarchists were when they promoted 
authoritarian methods to destroy the authorities. Oddly enough, the Marxists 
did not see a contradiction between their own lasting violence and the ulti-
mate abolition of authority. As a consequence, the state was never abolished 
but strengthened rather. This is the lesson that history provides: the revolu-
tionary heritage of the Christian tradition leads to disaster, turns the Lamb into 
124   Rössler 1969, 116.
125   Lenin 1974, 441.
126   Bakunin (1907, 16) thought that the oppressive structures can be circumvented in three 
ways: “two chimerical and a third real. The first two are the dram-shop and the church, 
debauchery of the body or debauchery of the mind; the third is social revolution.”
127   Goldman 1924, 175.
128   Engels 1913, 39 (translation in Lenin 1974, 442–443).
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the Beast, and makes the victim a victimizer. Is there a non-revolutionary alter-
native? The strong emphasis on obedience to authority has certainly played 
its part in oppressive societies. One routinely refers to Auschwitz as a horrible 
outcome of honoring the powers that be. This is not the whole truth, however. 
Northern European countries with Romans 13:1–7 as their underlying political 
ethos have never become totalitarian states. Instead, they have been receptive 
to ideas of a state-driven welfare system.129
Paradoxically, preserving eschatology as a vision for the future has at least 
led to some general changes in the society as a whole. How did this happen? 
Christianity was just another little cult in Paul’s time, and the apostle showed 
but a piece of realism when accepting the Empire as it was. What he could 
expect was a new order among those who found the source of all good. The 
eschatological imagination could be acted on, and so come true, insofar as this 
occurred in the attitudes of the Christian in-group. On the more general level, 
Paul could put trust only in Christ, who will destroy “every ruler and every 
authority and power” (1 Cor 15:24). While waiting for this divine revolution, 
it was better for Christians to realistically lead a quiet life in the Empire and 
“deal with the world as though they had no dealings with it. For the present 
form of this world is passing away” (1 Cor. 7:31). More important for Paul is the 
new order among those in Christ. This is how Jacob Taubes understood Paul—
and rightly so:130 “Paul’s genius was to create of a parallel state that posed no 
immediate threat to the existing political structure, the Roman state.”131 But 
the story did not end when Paul passed away. What he could not expect or 
even imagine is that such a vision would come true, also at the practical level of 
social structures, already before the form of this world passed away. At least in 
the case of slavery, Christian attitudes gradually influenced society. Clement of 
Alexandria, an early Christian theologian (ca. 200 CE), required a decrease in 
work by slaves. Although the theologians usually admitted slavery as a matter 
of fact, it became more and more restricted. In a sense, the anti-hierarchical 
spirit corrupted the system of slavery from the inside. Certainly, the devel-
opment toward the end of slavery was not without some backtracking; in 
129   Nelson 2017, 104. Karimäki (2019, 52) aptly describes the mentality that resisted the 
right-wing takeover in the 1930s: “Finnish liberal anti-fascism and the policy of national 
unification were anti-communist, democratic, parliamentarian, legalistic and national-
istic in nature. This combination of liberal yet nationalistic values aspired to achieve a 
united nation in spirit and mentality, but never a coerced acceptance of a single political 
ideology.”
130   Taubes 2004, 52–54.
131   Blumenfeld 2003, 389. Similarly, see Klostergaard Petersen 2015, 116.
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addition, the general prohibition of slavery was not only due to Christianity.132 
However, Christianity did play a significant role in that process.133 In other 
words, what Marx rejected as a fantasy has had a more powerful effect than 
violent revolution.
Today, it is difficult to imagine any serious Christian leader who would share 
Paul’s opinion that slaves should not pursue their freedom. At the level of the 
letter, these modern Christians have put aside “what the Bible says.” There is no 
general prohibition of slavery in the Bible, and even Paul accepted it. However, 
Paul also says that “we are slaves not under the old written code but in the 
new life of the Spirit” (Rom. 7:6; cf. 2 Cor 3:6). He preached spiritual change, 
and therefore we can legitimately ask if the one who follows his spirit is more 
his disciple than the one who follows his letters. From this spiritual point of 
view, the limitations placed on Romans 13 can be justified, although they go 
against the letters that Paul wrote. Do such limitations not actually enhance 
Paul’s vision that there will be an end of “every ruler and every authority and 
power” (1 Cor 15:24)?
132   That Paul’s ideal of equality among Christians was easily changed back to the ethics of the 
law of the stronger is illustrated by Clement of Rome, who wrote only a few decades after 
Paul: “Let the one who is strong (ὁ ἰσχυρὸς) take care of the weak (τὸν ἀσθενῆ); and let the 
weak show due respect to the strong. Let the wealthy provide what is needed to the poor, 
and let the poor offer thanks to God, since he has given him someone to supply his need” 
(1. Clem. 38.2; trans. Ehrman, LCL).
133   Klein 2000; Turley 2000; Ramelli 2016.
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chapter 4
Brothers in Arms: Soldiers in Early Christianity
So far as our sources permit us to judge, this kind of career has little or 
no relevance for the first generations of Christians, although later on 
Christians in the army would constitute a problem both for the empire 
and for the church’s leaders.1
This is what Wayne A. Meeks has to say about Christian soldiers in his ground-
breaking study First Urban Christians (1983), which mapped the social world 
of the Pauline churches (for example, pointing out that Philippi was a Roman 
colony consisting of veterans). A quarter of a century later, Meeks’ book has 
been critically revisited in After the First Urban Christians (2009), but a gap 
remains unfilled. Raymond Hobbs is right when he says: “Many studies of the 
Roman-Hellenistic social world of the New Testament offer a strange silence 
on things military.”2
Why are soldiers passed over? The answer flickers brightly through Meeks’ 
comment that soldiers are a problem, especially a moral one. This is the way 
in which scholars usually discuss the military. Nearly all scholars focusing on 
soldiers in early Christianity basically consider them in a modern sense, not 
a historical one. More precisely, this motivation springs from the needs of 
modern Christian ethics, in which soldiers, wars and armies represent noth-
ing but a problem.3 Such a viewpoint surely makes soldiers a less attractive 
theme for the more historically oriented scholar. The present situation of 
scholarly discussion makes me treat earlier studies with caution. In the words 
of David G. Hunter, soldiers and early Christianity are “a field where ideological 
bias seems so often to affect one’s interpretation of the evidence.”4 However, 
these studies are not worthless. As Roland Bainton puts it, the “various conten-
tions are not to be dismissed simply because they support the views of those 
who propose them. Some may be right.”5
1   Meeks 1983, 20.
2   Hobbs 2001, 334; see also Zeichmann 2019, 42.
3   Helgeland (1974, 149; 1979, 725) puts the scholars discussing soldiers into three categories: 
Roman Catholics, Protestant pacifists, and “establishment” Protestants, mainly Lutherans. 
The fact that the categorization is based on religious confessions illustrates the modern point 
of view.
4   Hunter 1992, 92.
5   Bainton 1986, 67.
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To give an example, C. John Cadoux’s The Early Christian Attitude to War: A 
Contribution to the History of Christian Ethics (first published in 1919) is a classic 
in its area, which contains rich source material of great value for anyone inter-
ested in the topic. The book surveys biblical and other early Christian texts, 
both pro- and antimilitary, and yet it has Christian pacifism as its underlying 
mission.6 Cadoux criticizes non-pacifistic readings of the sources, among oth-
ers Adolf Harnack’s Militia Christi: The Christian Religion and the Military in 
the First Three Centuries (German orig. 1905; English trans. 1981), which is also 
a classic. Cadoux thought that there was an original antimilitary ethos in early 
Christianity, which he traced back to Jesus. Interestingly, Harnack shared this 
view.7 Both scholars were unanimous that this original ethos was then gradu-
ally changed to a more positive attitude toward Christian participation in 
the army. Both avoid falling prey to the popular misconception that the exis-
tence of a Christian soldier would be a possibility only after the Constantinian 
turn in the fourth century. Unlike Harnack, Cadoux thought that the positive 
attitude was a minor trend even after the Constantinian turn. He criticized 
Harnack and other scholars for overestimating the approval given to Christian 
soldiers in the early Church.8
In the early Church Cadoux found what he needed to provide an arguable 
ethical judgment against any participation in bloodshed.9 However, he was no 
blinkered pacifist. He was also sensitive to the fact that there were Christian 
soldiers in the early Church and that they were more or less tolerated.10 This 
fact does not destroy his pacifist argumentation, however, as he traces paci-
fism back to Jesus and shows witnesses from the early Church who understood 
Jesus’ words in an antimilitaristic sense. Cadoux explains the participation of 
early Christians in the army as the result of a certain immaturity of reflection, 
noting that there was no exigent reason for such reflection: Christians could 
easily avoid enlistment in the army, if they liked. But the lack of reflection also 
made room for various compromises. Cadoux explains, “This, of itself, meant 
6    Hunter 1992, 92. Gero (1970, 285 n. 1) speaks of Cadoux’s “doctrinaire pacifism.”
7    Harnack 1981, 65.
8    Cadoux 1919, 254; McInnes Gracie 1981, 9–10. Recently, Despina Iosif (2013) has strongly 
questioned the pacifistic readings. She tends to read sources as approving of military 
service.
9    McInnes Gracie 1981, 9.
10   Shean (2010, 76) goes too far when claiming that “Cadoux refused to acknowledge any 
Christian participation in the military” and that “Cadoux’s arguments represent the most 
extreme pacifist position and are the least convincing historically.”
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that at any time after the inception of Christianity, the existence of Christian 
soldiers was at least a possibility.”11
This seems to be a historical result as long as a reader forgets Cadoux’s 
interest in the search for a norm for modern Christian ethics. He can admit 
early Christian participation in the army as long as he can find an authori-
tative pacifistic tradition originating in Jesus and looming large enough in 
the early Church. After the horrors of World War I, Cadoux found a modern 
function for the tradition he constructed. This, however, is not my interest. 
Reading his book, I prefer to place more emphasis on the historical side, asking 
a further question: if Christian soldiers possibly existed since “the inception of 
Christianity,” as Cadoux admits, did any really exist? What can we say about 
them in historical terms? My aim is to make a shift from applied exegesis to a 
more historically oriented one.
The earliest indisputably documented Christian soldiers served in the 
late second century.12 The scholarly discussion on the participation of early 
Christians in the army deals mainly with sources from that time or later. This 
is mostly the case with the recent study Soldiering for God by John F. Shean, 
whose viewpoint is largely historical without any overt theological or ethical 
program. He engages in groundbreaking work at the crossroads of Christianity 
and the Roman army. However, the time before Marcus Aurelius’ reign (late sec-
ond century) only occupies a minor place in his learned study. Unfortunately, 
historically oriented research mainly moves from covering soldiers from ear-
lier times to instead discuss what Jesus’ words on love, nonresistance, and so 
on mean for Christian ethics today. Yet, even the earlier documents should 
undergo scrutiny from a historical standpoint.
In the historical approach, one should be open to differing views instead of 
searching for one, in particular only one, authoritative Christian stance; it is 
typical for many studies to pursue the Christian view on war and soldiers. As 
Shean rightly notes, early Christianity was not a unanimous movement. He 
continues:
This also means that there was no effective control over who could be a 
member of these different groups and that it is not possible to say with 
any assurance that soldiers could not be found among those calling 
11   Cadoux 1919, 244–249. Similarly, Hays acknowledges that military figures were presented 
in a favorable light in the New Testament, but thinks it inconsistent with the overall mes-
sage of the New Testament: “The place of the soldiers within the church can only be seen 
as anomalous” (Hays 2004, 335–337). Hays treats the subject openly from a modern ethi-
cal point of view.
12   Harnack 1981, 71.
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
141Brothers in Arms: Soldiers in Early Christianity
themselves Christians. Nor can it be said that all Christian groups would 
have had the same attitude towards the use of violence.13
The core of my interest does not lie in the general ethics of love and nonviolence, 
although I will take a short look at these in the Sermon on the Mount. There 
is a more direct road in our quest to discover early Christian soldiers: those 
passages where soldiers are mentioned. How true these passages are in terms 
of the historical record is another matter, however. Fortunately, the question of 
the historicity of the descriptions is not of primary importance. What is impor-
tant is the fact that the descriptions surely bear the values of their Christian 
authors.14 If a soldier is described positively, or described even as a Christian, it 
certainly betrays something of the actual practice or at least the values of the 
author. One must be careful not to conclude too much based on scanty evi-
dence, for the values that the portrayals express are not straightforward. In this 
sense there is a danger of interpreting the values anachronistically, if one does 
not realize that value judgments always represent opinions within a certain 
social situation. Focusing on the social situation brings us out of the abstract 
domain of values and grounds us in a more historically reliable context. Such 
a position helps to anticipate with greater accuracy the actual practices within 
early Christianity.
In 2014, two studies were published that have contributed to a greater 
understanding of the picture of soldiers in the New Testament: Laurie Brink’s 
Soldiers in Luke-Acts: Engaging, Contradicting, and Transcending the Stereo-
types and Alexander Kyrychenko’s The Roman Army and the Expansion of 
the Gospel: The Role of the Centurion in Luke-Acts. Brink’s and Kyrychenko’s 
approaches are close to mine. They do not concentrate on what modern 
Christians should think about war and soldiers, but how Luke’s description 
can be understood in its historical context. Brink and Kyrychenko scrutinize 
the picture of soldiers and the Roman army in the ancient sources so that the 
cultural background of Luke’s portrayal becomes more apparent. Brink con-
cludes that Luke piggybacks on the negative picture of soldiers in order to let 
Jesus exonerate them, like tax collectors and sinners. The soldier functions 
in Luke’s treatment “as a parabolic exemplum of a good disciple, and as the 
author’s optimistic expectation of imperial benevolence.”15 Kyrychenko also 
sees that Luke-Acts gives a favorable portrayal of the Roman military, especially 
13   Shean 2010, 9.
14   See Zeichmann 2019, 45: “Though some of these depictions are fantastical, they neverthe-
less elucidate how many civilians perceived soldiers of the Roman East.”
15   See especially Brink 2014, 175.
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centurions. Kyrychenko thinks that centurions represent the Empire in the 
narrative and that the positive picture of them proves that the Empire was 
a receptive mission field.16 Despite some differences between Brink’s and 
Kyrychenko’s analyses,17 their main conclusions amount to the same thing: 
Luke’s soldiers exemplify the opportunity for a good relationship between 
Christians and the Empire.
Unfortunately, both studies focus only on Luke-Acts, which is just one 
among many early Christian sources. Moreover, I would question whether 
there is merely one portrayal of soldiers, even in a single ancient author’s text. 
As I will argue, there are commonly two stereotypes in the ancient sources. 
The usual picture of centurions as different from the rank-and-file men is due 
to certain social factors. Thus, it is not enough to read just early Christian texts 
in the frames of the ancient stereotypes; it is also important to read behind 
the stereotypical representations and ask, what was the place of soldiers 
in the social reality of the Empire. This makes us conscious of why the stereo-
types are what they are. Social reality also makes us see where and how early 
Christians factually encountered soldiers. In this way, we can take a step closer 
toward historical reality.
My thesis is that there were Christian soldiers from the very beginning 
of Christianity. This does not mean that all Christians accepted the military 
vocation. Some did, some did not, and some did not even consider the matter. 
There are three large aspects regarding this matter: (1) the dual view of sol-
diers in the gospels, (2) the use of military metaphors, and (3) the difference 
between the non-military views of the early Christian theologians and the 
actual reality in the ranks of Christians, which included soldiers.
First, I treat the dual view of soldiers in the gospels: centurions seem to 
be positive characters, while the rank-and-file soldiers are more ambiguous 
figures, mostly negative ones. The modern phrasing of the question on early 
Christianity and the military has left scholars to emphasize either the positive 
or the negative side, depending on their interests in either defending or resist-
ing Christian participation in the military. However, because the duality of 
soldier characters in the gospels is actually there, the task is to explain it. I will 
put the gospels into their ancient social context, which shows that the duality 
was a common view among the ancient population. In order to properly frame 
the gospel material, I take a view on the presence of the military in the Eastern 
Mediterranean area in the first two centuries. Where did people encounter sol-
diers? How were the army and the rest of society interconnected? The answers 
16   See especially Kyrychenko 2014, 189.
17   Kyrychenko (2014, 6) criticizes Brink for arguing that there was only one common set of 
stereotypes of soldiers “known and accepted by Luke and his intended audience.”
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
143Brothers in Arms: Soldiers in Early Christianity
to these questions introduce us to the social context of the scattered sayings in 
the gospels and make visible the pattern of connections between soldiers and 
Christianity.
After looking at the gospels, I look at the military metaphors in the early 
Christian literature. Scholars have discussed whether these betray the exis-
tence of soldiers among the early Christians or not. I show that the use of 
military metaphors belongs to the longer philosophical tradition, which can 
be traced back at least to Plato. An analysis of Christian texts and how they 
compare with philosophical analogies leads mostly to negative results. Only in 
1. Clement does the wording betray a positive identification with the Roman sol-
diers as “our soldiers.” On the other hand, the vocabulary of Latin Christianity 
betrays a strong connection with the army. This is a question which I deal with 
on a deeper level when discussing Tertullian.
Turning from military metaphors to the theologians of the early Church, I 
compare their views to the other data we have on early Christians. I claim that 
most theologians, such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Clement of Alexandria, 
belonged to the philosophically minded intellectual class of the society. The 
intellectuals of the early Empire had rather reserved or even overtly negative 
attitudes toward the military. They could use military metaphors but usually 
without indicating any positive stance regarding the army or soldiers. The com-
mon Christians, however, lived their life in the larger social context, including 
the army. According to archeological evidence, the Christian soldiers seem to 
have had public piety as early as the beginning of the third century. This is in 
conflict with the reserved attitude of the Christian intellectual elite.
Interestingly, Tertullian brought the two strands together in the beginning 
of the third century. At the end of this chapter, I concentrate on him. Tertullian 
was passionately against Christian participation in the military, but when pro-
moting his view he also openly states that there were many Christians in the 
Roman legions. The military influence on the North African Church seemed 
to have been strong, and it is indeed felt in the vocabulary of the Latin Bible 
translations and in Tertullian’s own language. Tertullian’s words prove the dual 
relationship to the military among the early Christians.
1 Soldiers in the Gospels Contextualized
1.1 The Army in Roman Society
1.1.1 Police Work
Cadoux wrote his book in a time when the trenches and bloody massacres of 
World War I were still fresh in memory. “The most crying and scandalous evil 
of our time,” as he notes in the closing pages, aimed at large-scale warfare with 
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
144 chapter 4
mass destruction. When we turn that view toward ancient Rome, however, one 
sees that the imperial army had far more tasks than large-scale campaigns.18 
The disasters of the Jewish War and the Bar Kokhba revolt do not tell the whole 
truth of the Roman army, its tasks, and its presence in the East. Actually, cam-
paigning seems to be the exception. Roy W. Davies explains, “Many soldiers 
would have spent only a small part of their quarter of a century’s service taking 
part in campaigns; there must have been quite a few who rarely, if ever, saw 
active service, as several writers noted about the troops in Syria and the East.”19 
This does not mean that soldiers spent their time peacefully. After an area was 
occupied, the army started to consolidate Roman control, which was often a 
violent process taking many years.20
In Judaea—unlike in Galilee—the local unrest was continuous.21 While it 
is a matter of definition how long the process of consolidation took there, it is 
clear that the army continued to be present even afterwards. The troops had 
a role in maintaining Roman control, overcoming local unrest, cooperating in 
judicial processes, executing punishments, and safeguarding tax collection or 
exacting taxes themselves.22 Davies notes that the New Testament provides a 
catalog of the various police jobs routinely performed by soldiers:
They arrested and flogged Christ; an execution squad of a centurion and 
four armed soldiers crucified Him and two brigands, detained earlier in 
a security operation, but not Barabbas, in custody for insurrection and 
murder; a small picket guarded the tomb; the rest of the cohort was drawn 
up in full battle kit in the governor’s residence, ready to suppress any 
outbreaks of rioting. In Jerusalem the men of the cohors equitata com-
manded by Claudius Lysias had to rescue Paul from a lynch mob three 
times in twenty-four hours; he was arrested, almost flogged, released, 
taken into protective custody, and then sent under heavy armed escort 
to Caesarea for trial. The tribune wrote an official report and came to 
give evidence. In the capital he was first held in custody in the governor’s 
residence, but was then put under open arrest under the surveillance 
of a centurion for two years. When the governor left, Paul was put back 
into protective custody, appealed to his successor, and was remanded in 
custody pending transport. On the sea voyage he was under open arrest, 
18   Isaac 2000, 54.
19   Davies 1989, 33.
20   Isaac 2000, 54–67; Campbell 2002, 90.
21   Isaac 2000, 77–89. On Galilee, see Freyne 1998, 245–246.
22   Davies 1989, 56–57; Isaac 2000, 113; Campbell 2002, 90; Kyrychenko 2014, 29–32.
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but the non-Roman prisoners were kept under close arrest by the cen-
turion and escorts of cohors I Augusta; in Rome the latter were confined 
in the camp of the Praetorians by the princeps peregrinorum [the head 
of the castra peregrina, the headquarters of the secret police in Rome; 
peregrini were people without Roman citizenship], while Paul was kept 
under house arrest with one soldier for two years.23
Davies mentions in passing that secret police also appear to have been present 
in Rome, as Epictetus describes:
In this fashion the rash are ensnared by the soldiers in Rome. A soldier, 
dressed like a civilian, sits down by your side, and begins to speak ill of 
Caesar, and then you too, just as though you had received from him some 
guarantee of good faith in the fact that he began the abuse, tell likewise 
everything you think, and the next thing is—you are led off to prison in 
chains. 
Epictetus, Disc. 4.13.5; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Epictetus is obviously describing the politically heated atmosphere of the capi-
tal city, not his immediate environment in Nicopolis in Greece.24 However, it 
tells how far soldiers’ tasks could be from battlefield operations. It is also worth 
noting that soldiers are described as informers in the Gospel of Luke, where 
John the Baptist warns against corruption in denunciations (συκοφαντέω) (Luke 
3:14). This warning fits well with the general picture of soldiers as policemen.
On the other hand, the army was not alone in policing. Christopher J. 
Fuhrmann points out in his Policing the Roman Empire that there were also 
other organizations safeguarding the order. The civil policing institutions were 
most developed in Egypt and in Asia Minor. In the Martyrium of Polycarp, 
the bishop Polycarp was captured by a troop of “pursuers” (διωγμῖται) and 
horsemen (Mart. Pol. 6.2–7.1), whose leader is called an “officer of the peace” 
(εἰρήναρχος). These Greek words denoted particular city officials.25 Yet, 
Fuhrmann also shows how the army took an increasing role in policing during 
the first three centuries CE.26 He even sees this trend in the gospels: in the ear-
liest ones, Jesus is arrested by armed rabble, but John writes of a military unit. 
23   Davies 1989, 57.
24   Fuhrmann (2012, 143) notes that this is the only case when soldiers were used as agents 
provocateurs. Yet, the civil disguise is attested to by other sources (Fuhrmann 2012, 115).
25   Fuhrmann 2012, 66–69.
26   Fuhrmann 2012, 6–12, 93, 202.
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Fuhrmann points out that when Origen was commenting on Matthew, he did 
not understand the scene without soldiers and referred to John.27 By the third 
century, a reader of the gospel could not imagine an arrest without soldiers.
Police work, or any other paramilitary or nonmilitary tasks28 carried out by 
the army, did not change the fact that soldiers were, first and foremost, fight-
ers. They regularly conducted exercises for warfare,29 but their daily drills are 
not described in the earliest Christian sources. There are references to military 
campaigns in the Jewish War (e.g., Luke 19:43–44), but Davies’ words above are 
revealing: the New Testament primarily describes their police work, although 
that differs from the modern understanding. Another difference is the decen-
tralized form of military command. In modern Western societies, usually the 
army is strictly under the command of the government. This was not the case 
in the Roman Empire. The vassal rulers had their own armies. Thus, for exam-
ple, Herodian client rulers had their own military forces, as Josephus informs 
us. It was exceptional for Roman troops to be present in the areas of the vassal 
rulers.30 Moreover, the Roman army did not only consist of regular troops, but 
also auxiliary units, mostly made up of locally recruited manpower and pos-
sibly even Italian citizens, like Acts 10 reports.31
It is clear that soldiers and Christians did not encounter one another only in 
times of war, but in many other ways in everyday society. In his study Soldiers, 
Cities, and Civilians in Roman Syria, Nigel Pollard uses two scholarly models 
to show the relationship between the Roman army and the local population. 
The older model emphasizes the integration of the army and the rest of soci-
ety, while the more recent one reconstructs their relative separation.32 Pollard 
himself remains halfway between these, arguing that there were elements of 
both separation and integration. The Romanization of soldiers—without any 
word of the surrounding society—was superficial. However, the army as an 
institution created a separate social identity.33 I will first look at the separation, 
which was manifested in the tensions between the army and the local people. 
After that I will address the integrative element visible in the positive relation-
ships between the army and the civilians.
27   Fuhrmann 2012, 240.
28   “Soldiers were dispatched as surveyors, engineers, even judges. They built roads, super-
vised mines, and collected supplies” (Fuhrmann 2012, 105).
29   Davies 1989, 41–43.
30   Chancey 2007, 54. Kyrychenko (2014, 35 n. 141) lists some exceptional cases.
31   Chancey 2007, 49. I will later note that despite the name of the unit, manpower could also 
be recruited in the provinces.
32   Pollard 2000, 5–7.
33   Pollard 2000, 7–8.
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1.1.2 Tensions between the Army and the Local People
Roman police work was not so much aimed at protecting people than at 
attending to the interests of the Empire.34 The bigger detachments were usu-
ally concentrated in camps in the countryside, except in the East. There were 
big garrisons in Antioch, Caesarea, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. Benjamin Isaac 
assumes that the reason for the exceptional practice in the East was the need 
for tighter control over the local centers.35 From the beginning of the second 
century, there is increasing evidence of soldiers being widespread in outposts 
in both small towns and the countryside.36 One of the main purposes of these 
outposts was maintenance of Roman order.37 All this suggests some kind of 
tension between the army and the local people. This tension is clearly felt in 
Paul’s words on earthly authorities in Romans 13. He is uncompromisingly loyal 
to the authorities, but his line of thought is interesting. Besides the theologi-
cal reasoning—which scholars have always noted—he also provides a more 
“secular” interpretation: you must (ἀνάγκη) obey in order to avoid wrath (Rom. 
13:5). He speaks of the fear before authority, which bears a sword and executes 
wrath (Rom. 13:3–4). The fear that Paul describes is an emotional echo for a 
population that understands how the troops will overpower any resistance 
or unrest.38
One source of tension between soldiers and the local population was the 
practice of requisition. Its technical term in Greek was angareia (ἀγγαρεία, 
ἀγγαρεύω). In principle, it meant local help with transportation, as the Latin 
cognate vehiculatio expresses. Jonathan P. Roth explains, “Both animals and 
drivers, including slaves, freedmen and free persons were requisitioned for 
such duty. The Roman army also routinely requisitioned civilians to carry 
supplies.”39 Demanding angareia was allowed for state officials. Soldiers could 
practice it only with an official permit, but in reality this limitation was just 
theoretical. Soldiers often exercised requisition without any permit. They 
could confiscate clothes, foodstuff for men and animals, firewood—practically 
anything. Angareia also made it possible to commission local people or their 
animals. The latter could be returned or not.40 Fuhrmann notes that “the very 
34   Campbell 2002, 88; Fuhrmann 2012, 8, 91, 119.
35   Isaac 2000, 269–282.
36   Fuhrmann 2012, 10.
37   Davies 1989, 56–57.
38   Hobbs 2001, 334–335.
39   Roth 1999, 110.
40   Rostovtzeff 1971, 381–388; Wink 1988, 215–218; Davies 1989, 51; Isaac 2000, 282–297. A pic-
ture of angareia is presented in a funeral stele (Rostovtzeff, plate LXXIV). Angareia or 
vehiculatio was officially different from annona (grain provisions) and taxation.
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expansion of military policing increased soldiers’ abuse of civilians, evident in 
several sources.” Emperors tried to limit the malpractice in vain.41
The work compelled of the people is exemplified by Simon of Cyrene, 
whom the soldiers forced (ἀγγαρεύουσιν) to carry Jesus’ cross (Mark 15:21; cf. 
Matt. 27:32). In the Sermon on the Mount, not only did Jesus exhort his followers 
not to resist angareia, but to do even more than was required (Matt. 5:41). The 
alternative that Jesus rejects is a scuffle (i.e., “if anyone strikes you …” in Matt. 
5:39). Angareia is described in a lively manner by Apuleius in Metamorphoses. 
The main character of this comic novel is Lucius, who is transformed from 
a man into a donkey and tells about his adventures. Once, being in the pos-
session of a gardener, he met with a soldier who was clearly doing what I call 
angareia.42 The soldier says to the gardener that he needed the donkey. He took 
it by the halter and would have taken it away if the gardener had not started to 
beg and finally fight. The soldier was overcome, and to avoid further battery he 
feigned death. The gardener fled and hid himself with the donkey (Apuleius, 
Metam. 9.39–40). Overcoming a soldier may have been an exceptional case, of 
course. Juvenal reports the advantages of being a soldier as follows.
First, let’s deal with the advantages shared by all soldiers. Not the least of 
these is that no civilian will have the nerve to beat you up. Instead, if he 
gets beaten up himself, he’ll pretend he wasn’t, and he won’t be eager to 
show the praetor his teeth that have been knocked out, or the black lump 
on his face with the swollen bruises, or the eye he still has, though the 
doctor isn’t making any promises. 
Juvenal, Sat. 16.7–12; trans. Bround, LCL
Epictetus shares general wisdom about the right attitude to express when a 
soldier might require a donkey: “If it be commandeered (ἂν δ’ ἀγγαρεία ᾖ) and 
a soldier lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist nor grumble. If you do, you will 
get a beating and lose your little donkey just the same” (Disc. 4.1.79; trans. 
Oldfather, LCL). Roth claims that Epictetus’ advice “was sound common sense 
for provincials wishing to avoid bodily injury.”43 Interestingly, Didache 1.4 
seems to share Epictetus’ pessimism. The passage roughly follows Matthew 
5:38–41 with its reference to angareia. There are small differences, however; of 
41   Fuhrmann 2012, 11, 159–161. See Pollard 2000, 85; Fuhrmann 2012, 133–134, 232–237.
42   There is no technical term for angareia in the story, either in the Latin or in the Greek ver-
sion of it (Ps.-Lucian, Asin. 44–45). One may also note that before entering Jerusalem in a 
kingly fashion, even Jesus seems to have practiced something like angareia, commanding 
disciples to take a donkey and a colt with a promise of their return (Matt. 21:2–3) (see 
Derrett 1971, 243–249).
43   Roth 1999, 145.
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these, the concluding words catch the eye: “If anyone seizes what is yours, do 
not ask for it back, for you will not be able to get it (οὐδὲ γὰρ δύνασαι)” (Did. 1.4; 
Trans. Ehrman, LCL). The author seemingly thinks it an impossibility to resist 
angareia.44 Even in Apuleius’ story the soldier finally gets the donkey after a 
home search, which is based on a false denunciation by the soldier and his 
comrades. Later the soldier sells the donkey for eleven denarii (Metam. 9.41–
42; 10.1, 13). In Apuleius’ story, angareia became robbery. Similar malpractices 
are reported frequently in the Roman sources.45
The reason for such robbery was not always pure greed. A soldier’s pay was 
not generous, being little more than the wages of a laborer. We have information 
of corrupt officers who kept the pay of their men,46 while pay was deducted for 
necessities organized by the troops. Furthermore, the pay of auxiliary troops 
was less than that of the regular army.47 So, what Sirach complained about 
some centuries earlier could indeed have been true: “a warrior in want through 
poverty.” Interestingly enough, Sirach did not view soldiers with contempt, 
comparing the poor soldier with “intelligent men who are treated contemptu-
ously” (Sir 26:28). Percennius, a rebellious soldier under Emperor Tiberius, also 
provides an impression of the difficulties a soldier could encounter. According 
to Tacitus, he lamented the following iniquities:
In fact, the whole trade of war was comfortless and profitless: ten asses 
a day was the assessment of body and soul: with that they had to buy 
clothes, weapons and tents, bribe the bullying centurion and purchase a 
respite from the duty. 
Tacitus, Ann. 1.17; trans. Jackson, LCL48
44   The meaning of the words οὐδὲ γὰρ δύνασαι have been under discussion and some schol-
ars prefer textual emendation. Niederwimmer (1998, 79), however, considers the meaning 
to be obvious: “Let yourself be robbed, because you cannot really defend yourself, no mat-
ter what!” I would like to add that the robbery may be angareia—at least if we look at the 
textual context, which explicitly speaks of angareia.
45   Campbell 2002, 91–92. Zeichmann (2019, 47) also notes these practices, although he 
strangely misunderstands what Paul says in 1 Cor. 9:7: “Who at any time pays the expenses 
for doing military service (τίς στρατεύεται ἰδίοις ὀψωνίοις ποτέ)?” According to Zeichmann, 
Paul suggests that soldiers do not spend money earned in their service (ὀψώνια). Yet, as 
the parallel examples in the same verse (planting a vineyard and tending a flock) show, 
Paul must have thought that soldiers used the money earned in their service for their 
subsistence. Indeed, this was the normal practice in the army. What Paul denies is that 
the soldiers should cover their subsistence by any “own money” received outside of their 
service.
46   Isaac 2000, 273; Williams 1999, 244 n. 156.
47   Pollard 2000, 179–182.
48   The rates of the payment varied considerably during the course of the empire, depending 
on costs and circumstances. See, e.g., MacMullen 1963, 155–156; Campbell 2002, 83–89.
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Tacitus describes how respite from duty laid an economic burden on the 
shoulders of the rank and file. No one cared how the soldiers got their money. 
Tacitus continues: “In reality, it was through highway robbery, petty thieving, 
and by menial occupations that the soldiers purchased rest from military ser-
vice” (Tacitus, Hist. 1.46; trans. Moore, LCL).49
These miseries were just one side of the coin. There were also advantages to 
be had in the Roman army, which drew one to enlist. No laborer could dream 
of a contract for 25 years, complete with medical care, a pension, and Roman 
citizenship.50 The prevalence of voluntary recruitment surely attests to the fact 
that the average soldier was content with his occupation,51 and the opportu-
nities for some extra income via private angareia probably helped with this 
contentment. But it was for this very reason that a soldier encountered ten-
sions with the local population of the area.
1.1.3 Positive Relationships between Soldiers and Civilians
The tension between soldiers and local people is only one part of the picture. 
At the same time, one has to recognize that the army recruited soldiers from 
around a vast empire, and these recruits were not necessarily brought 
from their original home area.52 In such cases, the tensions with local peo-
ple were lighter. Another factor that lessened tension was marriages made 
with local women (see, e.g., Tacitus, Hist. 2.80). Until Septimius Severus, who 
reigned in 193–211, Roman soldiers were forbidden by law from contracting a 
marriage; in practice, however, concubinage was common and widely toler-
ated. The ban on marriage caused perpetual problems, since the status of a 
soldier’s child was that of a bastard, making it impossible to be an heir of the 
father. For soldiers, the unofficial status of family ties was hard to accept and 
there were attempts to reduce the obstacles caused by the ban on marriage. 
For instance, families settled close to the garrisons.53
Among the auxiliary troops, marital unions were acknowledged. After 
twenty-five years of service, an auxiliary and his family received Roman 
citizenship,54 and centurions of the auxiliary troops were often citizens already 
during their service. The soldiers of vassal rulers were also free from the mar-
riage ban. For example, Herod’s soldiers could have families. I will later discuss 
49   Sometimes soldiers simply changed career from the military to robbery (Kloppenborg 
2009, 469–471).
50   Campbell 2002, 34.
51   Davies 1989, 68.
52   Pollard 2000, 115, 132, 133; Campbell 2002, 25–32.
53   Campbell 1978, 153–159; Campbell 2002, 96–97; Kyrychenko 2014, 168–170.
54   Saddington 1996, 2411.
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the case of the centurion in Capernaum, which was under Herod’s rule, but I 
note here that according to Matthew (8:6) he had a son (as we should trans-
late the word παῖς).55 Moreover, Fuhrmann supposes that soldiers who were 
detached from their legions and given posts among civilians created more or 
less lasting relationships with local women. This is the social background of 
Celsus’ claim that Jesus was a son of a soldier called Panthera.56
Though one should not exaggerate the economic effects of the army, its 
presence surely stimulated trade.57 Supplying the army did not happen only 
through requisition, but also via the open market. If soldiers had wealth, they 
could take part in business, contract debts, or lend money. A document from 
the Judean desert dated 124 CE reveals that a centurion in the camp of En Gedi 
lent money to a Jewish owner of a local palm grove,58 thus showing the eco-
nomic resources of centurions. In the early first century CE, centurions earned 
about fifteen times the salary of a legionary. This does not mean, however, that 
centurions were from wealthy families. While the rank and file came from low 
social backgrounds, the centurionate was socially heterogeneous. Centurions 
were in the main the most experienced soldiers in the army, and they were often 
destined to rise to more senior posts and then into the civil administration.59 
Service in the army was a way of climbing the social ladder.
Local communities could honor centurions as benefactors in inscriptions. 
For example, the people in the Syrian village of Phaena thus distinguished a 
centurion as “friend and benefactor.”60 Sometimes centurions acted as judges.61 
Centurions were often asked for help in situations that were officially not their 
tasks,62 and Richard Alston has illustratively described the confidence which 
local people could feel toward them. Soldiers could act on behalf of locals in 
legal cases or present petitions to the emperor, representing the population. 
In addition to the official cult, they could also worship diverse deities, includ-
ing local ones.63 John F. Shean writes on the cult of local deities:
55   Luz 2001, 10 n. 17; cf. John 4:46. Saddington (2006) shows that the meaning of “boy love” is 
anything but evident. Later I will address the historicity of the story.
56   Fuhrmann 2012, 229–230.
57   MacMullen 1963, 90–95; Pollard 2000, 182–191; Campbell 2002, 92–96.
58   Campbell 2002, 100. For a close reading of the document, see Oudshoorn 2007, 156–168.
59   Wegner 1985, 61–63; Campbell 2002, 32–33, 41, 103; Fuhrmann 2012, 242.
60   Pollard 2000, 88.
61   Pollard 2000, 94.
62   Alston 1995, 86–96. The evidence is from Egypt. See also Kyrychenko 2014, 86–89.
63   Helgeland, Daly, and Burns 1981, 48; Campbell 2002, 100.
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In the course of moving from one area of the empire to another, a soldier 
was conscious of the fact that he could encounter and unwittingly offend 
various local spirits who were unknown to him but, nevertheless, could 
potentially harm him out of pique. To ensure peace-of-mind, soldiers 
recently arrived at a new, alien post would set-up altars to the genius loci 
(‘spirit of the locality’), a generic term used by Romans for any unknown 
spirits in a given area, however, those spirits already known by name 
would be directly addressed.64
One should not overestimate, however, the attraction of the local deities 
among the soldiers. Pollard’s analysis of the archeological evidence shows only 
limited partaking by soldiers in the local cults.65 Of these, there are some dedi-
cations to local deities. For example, a former centurion of Moesian extraction 
offered to the Phoenician god Baetocaece.66 Shean points out that centurions 
belonged to the itinerant officer corps; often changing posts actively, they 
became acquainted with numerous deities and were the most open to new 
ones.67 In this context, the picture of the centurion who had funded a syna-
gogue in Capernaum is credible (Luke 7:4), as is Cornelius the centurion, called 
a God-fearer (Acts 10:2); of course, this does not prove the historicity of these 
accounts.68 There were also Jewish soldiers in the imperial army.69 From this 
economic and religious background, Shean concludes:
From the point of view of the church soldiers, especially officers, would 
have been too attractive from a sociological perspective to reject out of 
hand considering the important role of the Roman military in imperial 
society. Roman army officers were a positive asset due to their leadership 
skills and their financial resources. They also would have been amenable 
to taking up the faith given their proclivity to be religious innovators.70
In sum, soldiers in the world of the early Christians were doing something 
that today is called police work. Because the army attended more to the inter-
ests of the Empire than to the population, the latter could feel the army as a 
64   Shean 2010, 39.
65   Pollard (2000, 142–149) points out that there were three dimensions in the religiosity of 
the soldiers: state cults, unofficial military cults (like that of Mithra), and local cults.
66   Pollard 2000, 148.
67   Shean 2010, 41.
68   See Shean 2010, 139–140.
69   Schoenfeld 2006.
70   Shean 2010, 141.
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threat. At the same time, there were also traces of more positive interaction. 
This twofold experience of soldiers comprises the context of that described by 
the early Christian sources (all early Christian authors seem to have been civil-
ians). These give voice to encounters with soldiers which were both positive 
and negative. The accounts do not necessarily include any principled com-
ments on pacifism, conscientious objection, military service, just war, or other 
moral matters that interest many modern scholars. The accounts mirror more 
the civil experience of soldiers in their everyday life. The image of centurions 
presented in the ancient sources is quite often better than that of the rank-
and-file men. Although there are exceptions to this general rule, I claim that 
this division is decisive for our understanding of the attitudes toward soldiers 
in the gospels.71
While I do not mean to deny that the sources can also include more princi-
pled views, one should be careful not to search too hard for a moral statement 
in any verse referring to soldiers. The sources are primarily an echo of the 
diverse social experience. What Mark says about soldiers is partly colorless, 
partly negative, and partly positive. One cannot find traces of any principled 
view, for instance. Matthew strengthens the ambiguity between good and bad 
soldiers, but the value judgments do not seem to mirror any judgment on hav-
ing a military calling as such, though scholars usually tend to think so. Luke 
whitewashes the dark side of the soldiers. Compared with Matthew, Luke has 
a more positive picture, which becomes even clearer in Acts. Regarding John, 
his comments on soldiers are limited to the Passion narrative, not appearing 
elsewhere. Among the gospels, John seems to have the most negative atti-
tude toward soldiers. The Gospel of Peter offers an interesting development of 
the gospel tradition; in a story that is parallel to that in Matthew, soldiers are 
mentioned at the tomb. It is noteworthy that Matthew paints a very negative 
71   See Fuhrmann 2012, 231. Brink (2014, 139) claims that the picture of centurions was less 
favorable than I claim. First, her examples from Tacitus speak of the relationship between 
centurions and the rank and files. I have cited a similar example above. My aim is to speak 
of the relationship between centurions and civilians. Second, Brink refers to Juvenal’s 
Satires 16, which I also cited above. This text speaks of the bullying rank and file defended 
by a centurion judge. The centurion is just a side figure, but he admittedly acts against 
the civilian. Certainly centurions also acted negatively, but it is less frequently noted than 
Brink claims. Actually, Brink (2014, 74–77) herself notes that centurions also had quite a 
good reputation and refers, for example, to Alston’s study, which I have also cited. Third, 
a negative picture of centurions reflects an upper-class and intellectual view, because the 
literary sources come mostly from that background (see Zeichmann 2019, 44). I will show 
later that early Christian theologians belonged to that social group, for whom military 
issues were quite unattractive.
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picture of the soldiers in this story, but the Gospel of Peter changes them into 
positive figures.
1.2 Soldiers in the Gospels
1.2.1 Military Characters in Mark
Mark mentions soldiers in four passages. Two of them are unique, as sol-
diers are not mentioned in the parallel stories of the other gospels. The first 
is the story of the death of John the Baptist (Mark 6:21–29), which is retold by 
Matthew (14:6–12) and briefly noted by Luke (9:9) without mentioning soldiers. 
Mark mentions soldiers twice, initially the ranking officers (χιλίαρχοι) among 
the guests and then the speculator (σπεκουλάτωρ), who beheads John in the 
prison. The latter term is a Latin loanword in Mark, which can mean a scout, 
bodyguard (δορύφορος) or legionary in the staff corps who was also responsible 
for executions.72 These soldiers in Mark’s story are just extra characters. The 
officers included among the other exalted guests in Herod’s banquet are just 
there to add color to the high society around the tetrarch.73 The speculator car-
ries out Herod’s command. Neither Matthew nor Luke mentions these extra 
characters, about whom Mark has nothing more to say. Yet, we must note that 
although these soldiers are quite colorless, from the evangelist’s point of view 
they belong to a remote environment, that is, to Herod’s court. Mark seems to 
have no closer relationship with the soldiers.
This is also the impression given by the synoptic apocalypse. It does not 
even mention soldiers, though it speaks of wars. Wars are the basic elements 
of an apocalyptic vision of the future: “When you hear of wars and rumours of 
wars, do not be alarmed; this must take place, but the end is still to come. For 
nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom” (Mark 13:7–8). 
Nevertheless, the outbreak of wars is far beyond the power of Christians, 
and the wars are encountered with simple perseverance as are all the other 
eschatological sufferings: “But the one who endures to the end will be saved” 
(Mark 13:13). In this vast apocalyptic vision, soldiers as persons disappear from 
sight: wars like earthquakes and famines are powers independent of human 
agency. In the story of the death of John the Baptist, soldiers are just tools in 
Herod’s hand. It is a question of Herod’s and his wife’s agency, not that of the 
soldiers. Therefore, Matthew could easily leave soldiers out of his version.
72   Liddell, Scott, and Jones 2011, σπεκουλάτωρ; Lewis and Short 1969, speculator; Saddington 
1996, 2413; Fuhrmann 2012, 193; Kyrychenko 2014, 32.
73   Verbally χιλίαρχοι are leaders of 1000 men. “It may not mean more than ‘senior officer’ in 
this context” (Saddington 1996, 2413).
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Raymond Hobbs, who has studied the soldiers in the gospels from a social-
scientific point of view, thinks that Mark mirrors the threat felt by the rural 
people vis-à-vis the urban environment and its soldiers. Hobbs adds that 
the strategies for dealing with this threat vary from outright rebellion to 
apathetic non-involvement.74 If one follows Hobbs’ distinction of the strate-
gies, one must conclude that a colorless or non-existent depiction of soldiers 
expresses the apathetic strategy. However, the gospel does not primarily mir-
ror the Palestinian rural viewpoint—as Hobbs seems to think—but Mark’s 
own (urban?) environment.75 The story of John the Baptist’s death presents 
Herod as a slightly sympathetic figure, who vaguely believes in John’s message 
but is compelled to follow the will of his capricious wife. Thus, one cannot 
depict Mark’s story as a black-and-white opposition between urban nobility 
and rural peasants. The story of John’s death is more of a glance into the exotic 
but somewhat dangerous feasts of high society. Ranking officers and body-
guards belonged to this environment, which was remote from the author and 
his readers.
Besides the soldiers at Herod’s feast, there are two other soldiers mentioned 
in Mark. In the Passion narrative, he depicts soldiers twice. First, there are the 
soldiers who mock Jesus (Mark 15:16–20), take him to Golgotha (15:20–22), and 
then crucify him and two robbers (15:23–27). Mark clearly describes the soldiers 
in a brutal light. After Jesus’ death, a centurion makes a Christian-sounding 
confession: “Truly this man was God’s Son!” (15:39.) A little later, the centurion 
corroborates to Pilate that Jesus is really dead (15:44–45). The reader may see 
an inconsistency between the behavior of the rank-and-file men and the con-
fessing centurion. How could Mark describe soldiers in such a different light so 
close to each other? Or to ancient eyes was there any clear difference between 
them? Hobbs reminds us not to read our modern values into the story and 
criticizes the imposition of hasty moral judgments on the mocking soldiers:
They were, states Hagner, “rough men” and “immature” (Hagner 2.829–
832). Similarly Lane (Lane 559) characterizes this whole episode as an 
“impious masquerade,” reflecting a “perverted sense of humor” on the part 
of the soldiers. The presuppositions of these judgments are, of course, 
modern and western. Such roughness and “immaturity” is expected of 
soldiers, and quite common in their acknowledged roles in first century 
politics (see Tacitus, Histories). Soldiers in all societies are trained to do 
74   Hobbs 2001, 346.
75   Brown (1997, 161–163) discusses the place where the gospel is written. Although he leaves 
the location open, he is quite sure that it is not Galilee.
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harm to others, and nowhere was this clearer than in the Roman army 
(Watson 1969). It should come as no surprise then that soldiers inflict 
harm in the story of the crucifixion.76
Hobbs’ evaluation bears some truth: one should expect nothing but this pro-
cedure from soldiers. They behaved just as soldiers are supposed to behave. 
Mark describes soldiers in a way that is familiar from other ancient sources: 
rank-and-file men are brutal. Thus, a modern evaluation of the mocking sol-
diers is not as wrong as Hobbs maintains. Though the ancient people expected 
brutality, it is not to say that this brutality was seen as being morally neutral. 
The Passion narrative surely expresses that Jesus experienced something nega-
tive. Robert M. Fowler claims that the vivid portrayal of their ironic mockery 
of Jesus is important for our understanding of the confession of the centurion. 
Fowler concludes that in light of the soldiers’ irony, the confession is also easy 
to see as an ironic one: “the centurion utters the last of all the mockery com-
mitted by the soldiers and the passersby.” Noting that the centurion sees the 
death of Jesus and the curtain of the temple being torn in two, Fowler asks 
rhetorically: “Why should we be surprised if he mocks the demise of both with 
cruel, insincere flattery?”77
Fowler’s conclusion rests on the supposition that the centurion shares the 
brutality of the rank-and-file men. This presupposition can be questioned on 
the basis of the ancient point of view, however. As the picture of centurions 
was much more positive than that of the rank-and-file men, one should not be 
surprised by the different attitudes. Actually, it is noteworthy that Mark seems 
to differentiate the centurion from the rank-and-file men in his narrative. As 
Fowler says, the centurion is probably thought to be in charge of the execution 
squad,78 but he is not visible when the rank-and-file men mock Jesus, bring 
him to Golgotha, and put him on the cross. It is as if the rank-and-file men 
execute Jesus without supervision. They do the dirty work, while the centu-
rion enters into the story to utter the Christological confession. Contrary to 
Fowler’s supposition that the centurion is as brutal as the rank-and-file men, 
the ancient reader would have expected more civilized behavior from the offi-
cer. This is also what Mark seems to tell us. Fowler points out that the readers 
have “almost universally” understood the confession of the centurion as “the 
grand denouement in the Gospel.”79
76   Hobbs 2001, 333.
77   Fowler 1991, 207.
78   Fowler 1991, 203.
79   Fowler 1991, 204.
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I have here described what kind of characters the soldiers are in the Gospel 
of Mark. It does not, however, directly inform about any Christian soldiers in 
Mark’s Christian community. What Mark tells of the rank-and-file men makes 
it improbable that there were any such soldiers in his Christian circle. If there 
were, they surely were centurions. At least Mark regarded it as credible that a 
centurion might confess Christ as the Son of God.
1.2.2 Ambiguous Matthew
Many readers of the Bible have seen a kernel of early Christian pacifism in the 
Sermon on the Mount. Even the word ‘pacifist’ is derived from the Latin trans-
lation of beati pacifici (Matt 5:9). If Matthew actually means an adherent of 
pacifism, it would be a strong value judgment, making it improbable that there 
were soldiers among the Matthean Christians. However, the beatitude on so-
called pacifists does not make explicit what kind of peacemaking was at stake. 
The Greek εἰρηνοποιός is a hapax legomenon in the New Testament, but in prin-
ciple it can bear overtones of making peace during war or maintaining peace 
in contrast to war (Xenophon, Hell. 6.3.4; Plutarch, Nic. 11.3), though not neces-
sarily (Prov 10:10 LXX). The title was sometimes used of emperors. Cassius Dio 
claims that among the several superb titles that Commodus assumed, one was 
Εἰρηνοποιὸς τῆς οἰκουμένης (Cassius Dio 73.15.5; cf. 44.49.2). In this imperial use, 
εἰρηνοποιός shows the ideology of the Pax Romana, with the idea that peace 
was brought by the Roman army.80 The character of this kind of peacemaking 
is famously described by the British Calgacus, who criticized Roman peace by 
means of the sword: “they make a desolation and they call it peace” (Tacitus, 
Agricola 30.5; trans. Hutton and Peterson, LCL). In the Jewish-Christian usage, 
the word ‘peace’ had a far broader meaning than the mere absence of war.81 
This also makes peacemaking a broader concept. In Colossians and Ephesians 
peacemaking refers to Christ unifying Jews and gentiles (Col 1:20; Eph 2:15). 
For James, peacemaking means shunning quarrels in social relationships, but 
there is also the certain metaphorical weight of warfare.
A harvest of righteousness is sown in peace for those who make peace 
(τοῖς ποιοῦσιν εἰρήνην). Those wars (πόλεμοι) and conflicts (μάχαι) among 
80   Swartley 1996, 2311–2314.
81   Swartley (1996) shows this in his article. He also demonstrates that similar ideas were 
present in the ideology of the Pax Romana: “Clearly the Pax Romana was celebrated as an 
ideal state of affairs, a time of one worldwide Greco-Roman language and culture, a time 
of prosperity and order. These latter features accord with the Hebrew notion of shalom.” 
Swartley continues that the situations where the subjugated peoples suffered oppression 
“oppose and mock shalom” (Swartley 1996, 2312).
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you, where do they come from? Do they not come from your cravings that 
are at war (τῶν στρατευομένων) within your members? You want some-
thing and do not have it; so you commit murder. And you covet something 
and cannot obtain it; so you engage in conflicts and wars (μάχεσθε 
καὶ πολεμεῖτε). 
Jas 3:18–4:2
James, Plutarch, and Xenophon attest that the wording of Matt 5:4 may refer 
to the idea of making peace during war. Conversely, Prov 10:10, Colossians, 
and Ephesians attest to such an idea being anything but tenable. Everything 
depends on the textual context, where many have found a clear reference to 
pacifism, namely in the fifth and the sixth antitheses:
You have heard that it was said, “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” 
But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the 
right cheek, turn the other also; and if anyone wants to sue you and take 
your coat, give your cloak as well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, 
go also the second mile. Give to everyone who begs from you, and do not 
refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you.
You have heard that it was said, “You shall love your neighbour and 
hate your enemy.” But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those 
who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; 
for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on 
the righteous and on the unrighteous. For if you love those who love you, 
what reward do you have? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? 
And if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more are you doing 
than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? Be perfect, therefore, 
as your heavenly Father is perfect. 
Matt 5:38–48
On such words, Michel Desjardins comments: “The message found in these 
antitheses, if carried out, would make it virtually impossible for Christians 
to support war or to participate in most forms of violence, however broadly 
defined. This cannot be said strongly enough.”82 Desjardins is not alone in this 
opinion,83 and this is obviously why he dares to state his view without any fur-
ther grounds. Gerd Theissen is more sensitive to the social context presented 
82   Desjardins 1997, 42.
83   See, e.g., Cadbury 1918, 86–88; Cadoux 1919, 22–25; Harnack 1981, 66; Luz 1989 with further 
references.
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here, which he traces back to the historical Jesus. According to him, the enemy 
that Matthew speaks of is a national enemy. Matthew perceived in Jesus’ 
words an injunction against resistance in the manner of King Agrippa’s speech 
in Josephus (Bell. 2.350–352). The words expressed a means to get through the 
bitter time after the defeated Jewish uprising.84
Theissen is right in claiming that Matthew understood Jesus’ words as a way 
to get by. However, I would like to question his claim that they are closely con-
nected to the post-war era. The references to a lawsuit and to lending imply 
that Matthew is speaking of normal peace-time activities. The reference to 
angareia presumes an encounter with a soldier, but even this does not indi-
cate warfare; instead it deals with advice on how to get through an unpleasant 
situation in normal everyday life.85 As I have shown, the (mal)practice of 
angareia was a well-known burden at any time and in any place in the Empire. 
Matthew’s negative tone—he speaks of an evildoer86—merely presumes an 
encounter with any soldier compelling a civilian to his service.87 The forbidden 
resistance could mean the kind of physical coercion which Apuleius describes, 
probably without any positive results, as Didache and Epictetus point out. Even 
the word ἐχθρός in the sixth antithesis fails to refer to warfare. It does not pri-
marily mean a foe in war, which has a word of its own (πολέμιος), but rather 
a personal enemy.88 While this differentiation is not a strict one and there are 
examples of ἐχθρός being used for a foe in war (e.g., Luke 19:43),89 the context 
here, lacking any reference to war, speaks for the basic meaning.
One further point in the Sermon on the Mount should be treated: the ban on 
killing in the first antithesis (Matt 5:21–26). Eager to promote pacifism, Cadoux 
cannot but admit that in the Hebrew Bible the commandment does not cover 
84   Theissen 1979, 176–180, 182.
85   Roth (1999, 110–111) notes not only the word ἀγγαρεύω, but also the Latin loanword μίλιον 
(Lat. mille). He continues by saying: “In first-century Palestine, a Latin loan-word in such 
a context strongly suggests the ‘whoever’ in this case represents a military officer. The 
army was practically the only Latin-speaking Roman institution encountered by common 
people in Palestine at that time.” Roth speaks as if the Greek text would transmit Jesus’ 
actual words, although the gospel is written later and possibly not in Palestine.
86   See Weaver 2005, 111. It does not matter here if the Greek τῷ πονηρῷ actually is masculine 
(as the NRSV understands) or neuter (when it should be understood as evil in an abstract 
and general sense). In both cases, Matthew is describing negative encounters.
87   Brink (2014a, 117) rightly notes that even some civilians could practice angareia. This leads 
her to an unusual interpretation. According to Brink (2014a, 124–126), the text should be 
understood metaphorically, referring to the load the scribes and the Pharisees put on oth-
ers. In reality, angareia was usually associated with soldiers. Because nothing indicates 
civilians practicing angareia, one should read the common association.
88   This is attested to by Ammonius in his dictionary (Diff. 208) from the 1st or 2nd century.
89   Cadoux 1919, 23 n. 1.
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war, as the word חצר never means killing in the context of military engage-
ments. However, he hastens to add that the Greek φονεύω does mean any type 
of killing, including killing in war, and that Jesus extended the meaning of 
the commandments of the Torah.90 While this is true, Jesus (as presented by 
Matthew) extends the meaning of the commandment only in personal rela-
tionships: even anger and verbal insults should be counted as killing. There is 
no hint of war in the antithesis, and I cannot see any intimations in this direc-
tion. I thus conclude that the Sermon on the Mount does not bear pacifistic 
overtones. In this sense it does not speak against the possibility that soldiers 
belonged to the Matthean community. On the other hand, the implied audi-
ence of the Sermon on the Mount consisted of civilians who had to cope with 
the (mal)practice of angareia. The evangelist gives no advice to soldiers, who 
are counted as evildoers. Soldiers are evil others for Matthew, though for dif-
ferent reasons than the pacifistic reading suggests. Does this negative picture 
make it probable that there were no soldiers among the Matthean Christians?
One should not hasten to any such conclusions. An unambiguously positive 
military figure can be found just after the Sermon on the Mount: the centurion 
of Capernaum (Matt 8:5–13). Jesus appreciates his faith, which is above all faith 
in Israel. The centurion is clearly prefiguring gentiles who “will come from east 
and west and will eat with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of 
heaven, while the heirs of the kingdom will be thrown into the outer dark-
ness” (Matt 8:11–12). Who is this centurion? We have to differentiate between 
the centurion as a possible historical person in Capernaum in Jesus’ time 
and the centurion as a literary figure in the Gospel of Matthew. When speak-
ing of a historical person, we have to be aware that the Roman army was not 
present in Galilee in Jesus’ time when the area was under the rule of Herod 
Antipas. This is due to the fact that Rome did not station its own army in the 
client kingdoms. There is no evidence of either Roman troops or coloniae of 
veterans in this area during Jesus’ time.91 If the centurion is a historical figure, 
he cannot be a Roman. Actually, both Matthew and Luke (the other evangelist 
reporting on the centurion) only assume that the centurion is a gentile.92 They 
do not claim that he is a Roman soldier.
Mark A. Chancey has helpfully analyzed the passage on the centurion in 
Capernaum. He notes that the Greek word behind the English ‘centurion’ is 
not the Latin loanword κεντυρίων (cf. Mark 15:39, 44–45), but dependent on 
reading ἑκατοντάρχης or ἑκατόνταρχος. Though all these words can be used as 
90   Cadoux 1919, 21–22.
91   Chancey 2002, 53–54; 2005, 47–50, 53; Sanders 2002, 9–13.
92   Saddington 1996, 2413.
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equivalents, there are also differences in their usage. The words ἑκατοντάρχης 
and ἑκατόνταρχος are also used for non-Roman commanders in Josephus and 
the Septuagint (e.g., Exod 18:21; Num 31:14).93 Chancey concludes: “In short, the 
gospels themselves do not present the centurion at Capernaum as the com-
mander of Roman forces, and it is far more likely that he was a Herodian 
officer.”94 It is no surprise that the centurion is a gentile. Antipas’ father, Herod 
the Great, recruited troops from the gentile areas of his kingdom; his body-
guards consisted of Gauls, Thracians, and Germans. It is probable that Antipas 
also had foreign forces.95 What, then, might have been the tasks of a centurion 
in a fishing village like Capernaum? The presence of a centurion does not indi-
cate any large-scale military troops. The number of soldiers in the command of 
a centurion could be more or—probable in this case—less than one hundred. 
As we have seen, centurions had tasks in the local administration. Possibly the 
centurion in Capernaum was coordinating or safeguarding the toll collection 
in the nearby border region between Antipas’ and Philip’s territories.96
So much for the possible historical person. Primarily here we can discuss 
a literary person presented in the gospels. Matthew (or Luke) was conscious 
of the fact that Galilee was under Antipas’ vassal rule during Jesus’ lifetime. 
The changes in the government were rapid after Antipas’ reign. Galilee contin-
ued to remain under the Herodian dynasty for a couple of years, but then fell 
to the governance of the Roman procurator (Josephus, Bell. 2.183, 247). These 
later circumstances may be reflected in the story which Matthew found in 
the Q document. Matthew may or may not be thinking of a Roman soldier. 
In the last analysis, the answer is quite unimportant. Concretely belonging to 
the Herodian or Roman army seems to make no difference to Matthew.97 For 
him, the centurion is just one person whom Jesus encounters. He lives among 
civilians like the centuriones regionarii (ὁ ἑκατόνταρχος ἐπὶ τῶν τόπων) did. From 
circa 100 CE we have information of this kind of centurionate, whose task was 
mostly policing. At least in one case a centurio regionarius received praise 
from the local authorities of the community.98 It is possible that Matthew 
(and Luke) thought of the centurion in Capernaum as a centurio regionarius. 
Thinking about this happening at the time of the writing of the gospel, this is 
certainly within the limits of possibility.
93   Chancey 2007, 52.
94   Chancey 2007, 55.
95   Chancey 2007, 51–52.
96   Chancey 2007, 54–55.
97   See Fuhrmann 2012, 232; Brink 2014, 137.
98   On the centuriones regionarii, see Fuhrmann 2012, 222–224.
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From Matthew’s point of view, the centurion’s profession does not seem to 
pose a problem. Cadoux is not convinced, however. He points out that it is an 
argument from silence to claim that a military profession is acceptable.99 True, 
there is no explicit approval of a centurion’s profession. However, in this case, 
the argument from silence has a certain weight. The centurion is clearly an 
exemplary figure. Could he still be exemplary if his profession were dubious? 
The calling of Matthew the tax collector makes for a good point of comparison 
(Matt 9:9–13). Tax collecting was viewed as a dubious profession, coupled with 
sinning (cf. Matt 11:19), and yet Matthew followed Jesus in an exemplary way. 
There is, however, a difference between the centurion and Matthew the tax 
collector: only tax collectors are paralleled with sinners. On the other hand, 
nothing indicates that the centurion left his post and followed Jesus, while 
Matthew the tax collector does. Is this an indication that the centurion was 
left out of the Jesus movement? Probably not. He represents the pagans eating 
with Abraham and the other patriarchs in the kingdom of heaven.
The centurion is presented as a good guy, while soldiers are hinted at as evil 
just before in the Sermon on the Mount. This ambiguity is characteristic of the 
gospel. The reader encounters a similar ambiguity in Matthew’s Passion narra-
tive. A whole cohort of soldiers—between 500 and 600 men!100—mocks Jesus 
in the most brutal way (Matt 27:27–30). Soldiers mock Jesus as a pretender, 
however, not as a Son of God. Their ridicule lacks all the religious overtones 
which are so clear in the comments of the Jewish leaders (Matt 26:59–68). This 
by no means mitigates the brutality of the soldiers, but it shows up as a mean-
ingful detail when one reads the narrative that follows. After mocking Jesus, 
the soldiers lead him to Golgotha and crucify him (Matt 27:31–37). Bypassers 
deride him. The chief priests, scribes, and elders mock him. Even the two cruci-
fied bandits taunt him. There are clear religious overtones—even satanic: the 
phrase “if you are the Son of God” (Matt 27:40) is word-for-word the same as 
Satan stated earlier (Matt 4:3, 6).101 Yet, the soldiers are quiet until the miracles 
after Jesus’ death.
Suddenly the reader encounters a centurion (Matt 27:54). Before that the 
evangelist has told only of “soldiers” (οἱ στρατιῶται) in the Passion narrative. 
Like the centurion of Capernaum, this centurion at the cross represents an 
exemplary gentile, in opposition to the Jews who abandon Jesus. He and “those 
with him”—seemingly the rank-and-file men under his command—utter the 
99   Cadoux 1919, 33–34.
100   Luz (2005, 513) understands this as an exaggeration.
101   Luz 2005, 538. This is part of Matthew’s theological anti-Judaism. See further in Räisänen 
2010, 268.
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Christological confession that is reminiscent of the confessions of the disciples 
(cf. Matt 14:33; 16:16).102 The narrative points toward the idea that soldiers can 
be Christians. They represent gentiles, who can be accepted into the Christian 
community. In this theological structure their profession is a secondary issue. 
There is no particular statement on the military profession. Yet, we can again 
point to what Cadoux falsely discounted as the argument from silence: if these 
gentiles can prefigure gentile Christianity, then their profession is no stum-
bling block.
Matthew found the mocking soldiers and the centurion at the cross in 
Mark. Matthew gave to these figures a distinctive theological role, making 
two small changes to Mark’s story. First, he adds that even the rank-and-file 
men uttered the Christological confession, while in Mark this was done only 
by the centurion. Second, Matthew leaves out of his story Mark’s account of 
a centurion who ex officio confirms Jesus’ death (Mark 15:44–45). The latter 
change has no theological weight; it makes the narrative sleeker, as the centu-
rion plays just a technical role in Mark’s story, for the agency is in Pilate’s hands. 
The former change, however, cannot be explained as a streamlining of the nar-
rative. The centurion says the essential thing. Why did Matthew make “those 
with him” join in the Christological confession? The most natural explanation 
is Matthew’s theological agenda regarding Jews and gentiles, which becomes 
visible when this account is compared to the account of the centurion in 
Capernaum. When presenting the centurion in Capernaum as an example, 
Matthew gives a lesson on two groups: “many will come from east and west” 
(i.e., many gentiles), but “the heirs of the kingdom” (i.e., Jews) are thrown out 
(Matt 8:11–12). In the Passion narrative, he again presents two groups, Jews and 
gentiles, with their different relationships to Jesus. The centurion at the cross 
is not the sole gentile to confess Jesus as the Son of God.
If this was all that Matthew said of soldiers, it would be quite probable that 
soldiers were welcome to join the Matthean community. The picture, how-
ever, becomes more ambiguous because of the epilogue of the resurrection 
story, which is probably Matthew’s own invention.103 Here soldiers remind 
of dark figures in the gospel. First, the soldiers are like the false witnesses 
whom the Jewish leaders presented in the trial scene (cf. Matt 26:59–61). In 
102   Luz 2005, 569–570.
103   Luz 2005, 585–587. Luz discusses Crossan’s and Koester’s hypothesis of the “Cross gospel,” 
which Matthew and the author of the gospel of Peter have used. Luz regards the hypoth-
esis as implausible and thinks that, despite some possible earlier traditions, the pericope 
is essentially Matthew’s creation.
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the epilogue, the leaders pay off the guards104 of Jesus’ tomb to give false testi-
mony (Matt 28:11–15). Second, soldiers are like Judas. They take a large sum of 
money (ἀργύρια), like Judas taking 30 pieces of silver (ἀργύρια) (Matt 26:14–16). 
Third, they are counterimages of disciples. The soldiers follow the teaching 
of the Jewish leaders: “they took the money and did as they were directed 
(διδάχθησαν). And this story is still told among the Jews to this day” (Matt 28:15). 
Matthew’s wording bears the clear weight of biblical language, which he other-
wise uses in a positive sense (Matt 1:24; 21:6; 26:19); soldiers are counterimages 
for the right attitude.105
The word διδάσκω is usually translated in biblical texts by the word ‘teach.’ 
As the translation of the New Revised Standard Version (the verb ‘direct’) indi-
cates, this is not the only possibility. Even a less directing tone is possible (e.g., 
‘advise,’ ‘inform’).106 This makes understandable the use of the verb διδάσκω 
here. Yet, the choice of the word becomes striking if the reader remembers 
that it denotes spiritual teaching earlier in the gospel (e.g., Matt 4:23; 5:2, 19; 
7:29; 9:35; 13:54; 21:23). The word is even more poignant after one has read the 
theologically significant ending of the gospel, which follows immediately after 
the pericope on the bribed soldiers.
Now the eleven disciples went to Galilee, to the mountain to which Jesus 
had directed (ἐτάξατο) them. When they saw him, they worshipped him; 
but some doubted. And Jesus came and said to them, “All authority in 
heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make dis-
ciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of 
the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching (διδάσκοντες) them to obey 
everything that I have commanded you. And remember, I am with you 
always, to the end of the age.” 
Matt 28:16–20
104   In Greek κουστωδία, a loan from Latin custodia. Matthew’s word choice reflects the Latin 
spread by the Roman army.
105   Luz 2005, 611.
106   “At first the soldier resisted and threatened to kill him with his sword, if ever he got to his 
feet again. As though warned by the soldier’s own words (ὥσπερ ὑπ· αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου διδα-
χθείς), my master chose the safest course, drew the soldier’s sword and threw it a long 
way off, before …” (Ps.-Lucian, Asin. 44; trans. MacLeod, LCL). “It was the people itself, as 
everybody knows, which voted for the government of the Four Hundred, being advised 
(διδασκόμενος) that the Lacedaemonians would trust any form of government sooner 
than a democracy” (Xenophon, Hell. 2.3.45; trans. Brownson, LCL). Cf. Liddell, Scott and 
Jones, διδάσκω (esp. meaning II).
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Soldiers are counterimages of Jesus’ disciples. Matthew’s use of the word 
διδάσκω sketches a hazy picture of soldiers sitting at the feet of the Jewish lead-
ers. Soldiers obey the false “mission commandment” of the Jewish leaders—and 
this is a conscious betrayal, as they saw the miracle at Jesus’ tomb (Matt 28:4). 
There is no trace of the pious confession at the cross. Of course, Matthew could 
think that the soldiers at the cross were different persons than the guards at 
the tomb.107 But Matthew does not indicate this. Probably he did not bother 
with a closer identification. However, it seems to be an intentional choice to 
specify the guards as soldiers. He could have presented Jewish leaders sending 
their own armed mob, similar to the throng arresting Jesus in Gethsemane: 
“a large crowd with swords and clubs, from the chief priests and the elders 
of the people” (Matt 26:47). Remembering Matthew’s theological agenda, 
it would have been logical to assign a Jewish guard to watch over the tomb. 
A Roman guard made up of soldiers destroys the contradiction between the 
Jewish and the gentile attitudes toward Jesus. Now they are both against him.
I suggest that there is no longer a need to knit into the figures of soldiers a 
contrast between Jews and gentiles. The theological agenda is stated openly in 
the mission commandment: one should make disciples of all nations (τὰ ἔθνη).108 
Matthew does not need believing gentiles, as it is now the future task to make 
disciples of them. This theological composition does not explain, however, why 
gentile soldiers are pictured as open allies of the Jewish leaders and spread-
ers of the anti-Christian lie. Had Matthew wanted to narratively emphasize 
the future task, he would have presented the soldiers as being more open to the 
Christian message. Now they are actively resisting it. There must be a reason 
that explains the negative characterization of soldiers. The answer may partly 
lie in the political situation. Matthew was writing in the aftermath of the Jewish 
war.109 The Jewish nobility, including high priests and the leading Pharisees, 
had resisted the war and even asked King Agrippa and the Roman procurator 
Florus to send troops to smother the rebellion in Jerusalem (Josephus, Bell. 
2.411–421). The uprising did not lack elements of class war between the popula-
tion and the local aristocracy.110 From this point of view, the high priests and 
Pharisees asking Pilate’s assistance (Matt 27:62–66) represent nothing but the 
hated aristocracy allied with the Romans. If this is also Matthew’s viewpoint, 
107   According to Luz (2005, 570), who presents this assumption as an explanation for the 
ambiguity.
108   Discussing whether Jews can be considered part of the nations, Luz (2005, 628–631) 
inclines toward the positive. In any case, pagans belong among those who should be 
made disciples.
109   On the date of writing, see, e.g., Brown 1997, 216–217.
110   Brunt 1990, 272, 282–287.
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he exploits the social antipathy to present all claims against Jesus’ resurrection 
in a dubious light.
Yet, we can ask how central a factor were the social antipathies present in 
Palestine during the Jewish War? Matthew wrote in a post-war situation, prob-
ably outside of Palestine.111 The political aspect was probably not so intense in 
Matthew’s own social context. Another factor has a much greater explanatory 
force: the evil reputation of the rank-and-file men (mal)practicing angareia, 
etc. As soon as Matthew stops needing soldiers to represent the collective of 
gentiles, this general view becomes visible. Now they serve to cast dubious 
light on the Jewish leaders. One of the odd sides of the story is the fact that no 
leader of the custodia is mentioned. The soldiers at the tomb are just “guards” 
(οἱ τηροῦντες), like those who guarded Jesus at the cross and were led by the 
centurion (Matt. 27:54; 28:4). They are also called “soldiers” (οἱ στρατιώται), like 
those who mocked Jesus (Matt. 27:27–31; 28:12). Brutal and corrupt soldiers are 
ready to promote a serious lie for a bribe. No superior is mentioned, which fits 
well with the ancient stereotypes. The Jewish leaders thus operate with corrupt 
rank-and-file men; this reveals a great deal about the leaders, reflecting poorly 
on them.
The distinction between rank-and-file men and their superiors is seen 
nearly throughout the Gospel of Matthew.112 Matthew follows Mark, who 
already made this distinction and told how the rank and file mocked Jesus, 
while the centurion confessed his faith at the cross. In Matthew, the exemplary 
centurions include the one in Capernaum and the one at the cross. No nega-
tive superiors are presented, while the rank and file perpetrate angareia, mock 
Jesus, and promote the anti-Christian lie. The only exception is the guard at the 
cross, but the positive representation is due to Matthew’s theological contrast 
between Jews and gentiles, and it is not due to any overall positive attitude 
toward soldiers. At the end of the narrative, the rank-and-file men turn out to 
be what they were commonly thought to be: greedy, corrupt, untrustworthy, 
and, in a word, immoral.
So, were there soldiers in Matthew’s community? First, contrary to the paci-
fistic readings, Matthew does not present any principled reason to preclude 
soldiers from the Christian community. The door was in principle open for 
soldiers, but it is another question whether any entered. As Matthew’s view 
111   Brown 1997, 212–213.
112   Weaver (2005, 111, 114–116, 121–122) claims that in Matthew’s mind, the centurions would 
generally “appear to be people who inspire the same fear and hatred as their soldiers.” As 
both of the centurions in the gospel are positive characters, I find it difficult to agree with 
Weaver’s view of the general picture.
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of rank-and-file men follows the general stereotype, this does not speak for a 
personal knowledge of soldiers joining the faith. In turn, the images of centuri-
ons are highly positive: they believe in Jesus. Remembering that these men just 
represent gentiles in Matthew’s narrative, we should not read too much into 
their military profession. However, the profession of exemplary gentiles can-
not be entirely without relevance. Matthew gets these figures or at least part of 
them from his sources, but they would have been more strongly rewritten had 
they not been acceptable. This fits well with the information of positive inter-
actions between centurions and the local people. In sum, Matthew held the 
door open for soldiers, but anticipated them with an ambiguous mind. He did 
not foresee that brutal rank-and-file men would enter the community, and he 
expected more of centurions. In the narrative world, two centurions entered. 
This reflects Matthew’s expectations of his social context, if not beyond. Most 
scholars assume that Matthew wrote in Antioch.113 A big garrison was located 
there and, thus, Matthew surely had lived experiences of soldiers.
1.2.3 Luke’s Exemplary Soldiers
In the Gospel of Luke, the reader encounters several military figures known 
from Matthew. However, the story is not the same. Luke does not just repeat the 
same stories but presents his own versions, leaving some figures unmentioned 
and adding a group of soldiers to the opening of his Gospel. After the infancy 
stories, where a heavenly army has praised God (Luke 2:13), Luke recounts the 
preaching of John the Baptist and tells of the reaction of the listeners, among 
whom one encounters soldiers present in neither Mark nor Matthew.
And the crowds (οἱ ὄχλοι) asked him, “What then should we do?” In reply 
he said to them, “Whoever has two coats must share with anyone who 
has none; and whoever has food must do likewise.” Even tax-collectors 
came to be baptized, and they asked him, “Teacher, what should we do?” 
He said to them, “Collect no more than the amount prescribed for you.” 
Soldiers (στρατευόμενοι) also asked him, “And we, what should we do?” 
He said to them, “Do not extort money from anyone by threats or false 
accusation, and be satisfied with your wages (μηδένα διασείσητε μηδὲ 
συκοφαντήσετε καὶ ἀρκεῖσθε τοῖς ὀψωνίοις ὑμῶν).” 
Luke 3:10–14
There are three groups here: crowds, tax-collectors, and soldiers. I suppose 
that this indicates everyday life; the crowds can be interpreted as the common 
113   Brown 1997, 212.
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people with matters of adequate livelihood and clothing, and tax collectors 
and soldiers were officials met in everyday life. It is not problematic that these 
officials are mentioned together, because soldiers could safeguard taxation.114 
MacMullen vividly describes gross abuse on the part of soldiers and tax 
collectors.
At Mendechora, stationarii and kolletiones, threatening reports to their 
superiors or imprisonment, practiced a diaseismon, a “shakedown,” 
upon the whole village; nearby, nine men were imprisoned and only one 
released, for a thousand drachmas; a third neighboring village was loaded 
“with insupportable burdens, exhausted by unlimited expenses of these 
sojourners and for the hordes of kolletiones is deprived also of its baths 
due to its depleted condition, and deprived too of the necessities of life.”115
Stationarii were soldiers scattered around in minor posts, stationes. MacMullen 
describes their ill repute: “It is natural that they should have made themselves 
unpopular, taking the oxen from the fields, and so forth.”116 In other words: 
they perpetrated angareia. The other group mentioned, kolletiones, were tax 
collectors or their helpers.117 Interestingly, MacMullen describes soldiers and 
tax collectors in cooperation, just as Luke seems to presume. This coopera-
tion is even philologically visible in the words συκοφαντέω and διασείω, which 
John the Baptist uses to refer to soldiers’ questionable activities, as such terms 
not only apply to soldiers but also tax collectors. Zacchaeus the tax collector 
uses συκοφαντέω to admit that he has “defrauded” people (Luke 19:8). The other 
verb, διασείω, is the semiofficial term for extortion.118 Its cognate, διασεισμός, 
appears in MacMullen’s description, denoting the joint activities of soldiers 
and tax collectors. Luke parallels συκοφαντέω with διασείω, which is somewhat 
pleonastic but not unique in the ancient literature.119 The verbs as such do 
not necessarily refer to the extortion of money or goods but the end of the 
114   Nolland 1989, 150; Pollard 2000, 101.
115   MacMullen 1963, 87. The text is from the third century. The serious illegality it recounts 
may mirror the increasing disorder in the Empire (Fuhrmann 2012, 220).
116   MacMullen 1963, 55–56. See also Brink 2014, 169.
117   MacMullen 1963, 87 n. 38; Fuhrmann 2012, 218–220.
118   MacMullen 1963, 87 n. 38; Brink 2014, 76.
119   Brink 2014, 101. Cf. Antiphon, De Choreuta 43, where σείω and συκοφαντω are used in par-
allel with a similar meaning, and Liddell, Scott, and Jones 2011 on διασεισμός. Zeichmann 
(2019, 46) claims that συκοφαντέω “denoted false charges against the wealthy, evident in 
perusing use of the term in documentary papyri and literary texts of the period.” This is 
incorrect, as Prov 14:31, 22:16, and 28:3 (LXX) put “a poor one” as object of the verb.
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
169Brothers in Arms: Soldiers in Early Christianity
sentence makes this meaning incontrovertible.120 The verb διασείω refers to 
violent means of extortion, while συκοφαντέω alludes to false accusations. As 
we saw earlier, extortion and other injustices were a real threat in the Roman 
East. Thus, Luke 3:14—like Matthew 5:41—refers to common problematic 
encounters between soldiers and local people.
However, there are three noteworthy differences when Matthew 5:41 and 
Luke 3:14 are compared. First, Matthew speaks of angareia, while Luke refers 
most probably to soldiers’ activities in taxation. This is not a large difference, as 
people surely felt angareia and taxation to be two aspects of the same burden. 
Second, Matthew does not make a distinction between lawful and unlaw-
ful angareia, both being bad without qualification. Luke refers only to clear 
crimes, hinting that soldiers can blamelessly fulfill their tasks. Third, Matthew 
sees soldiers practicing angareia as people one simply has to cope with, not 
expecting any change in them. Luke is not so pessimistic. He describes sol-
diers as asking guidance from John the Baptist—possibly with the intention 
to become baptized. Luke paints a picture of soldiers who may become good. 
This is in line with his emphasis in the gospel as whole, where repenting sin-
ners, like Zachaeus the tax collector, are recurring figures and paradigms of 
real followers of Christ.121 Luke’s positive view of soldiers is here in nuce. One 
will encounter this positive trait also later in the gospel and in Acts.
The positive trait becomes clearly visible in the next Lukan passage on a 
soldier, the centurion of Capernaum (Luke 7:1–10). This is no surprise after 
one has noted the general tendency in ancient texts to depict centurions 
positively. As we have seen above, the common people could feel some kind 
of trust toward centurions, who often had economic resources. While in the 
Matthean parallel the centurion of Capernaum is exemplary, Luke’s centu-
rion is even more so. Laurie Brink says that the evangelist characterizes him in 
encomiastic terms.122 In Luke’s version, the centurion never meets Jesus but 
communicates with him via Jewish elders and friends. The elders praise the 
centurion as a wealthy benefactor in the local community.123 He is clearly not a 
Jew (7:9), but he “loves our people, and it is he who built our synagogue for us.” 
120   The NRSV speaks only of extorting money. This is possibly due to translating ὀψώνιον as 
‘wages.’ Yet, ὀψώνιον probably means provisions in a more general sense. For the mean-
ing of ὀψώνιον, see Caragounis’ (1974) careful examination. He proposes the following 
translation for the Lukan sentence “Do not by applying violence rob anyone, nor slander 
anyone with a view to possible gain, and be content with your own provisions/shoppings” 
(Caragounis 1974, 51).
121   On Luke’s interest in sinners and their repentance, see Pesonen 2009.
122   Brink 2014, 163.
123   There are examples of gentiles founding a synagogue. See Nolland 1989, 317.
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The words may support the idea that the centurion is a God-fearer—whatever 
this means in practice. As I noted earlier, soldiers could honor local deities 
alongside state and military deities. Loving Israel and building a synagogue can 
also imply good relations with the local people.
One can question Luke’s picture from a historical point of view. Can a cen-
turion afford to build a synagogue?124 Is it credible that a centurion in pre-war 
Galilee had such a good relationship with the local Jews? Before 44 CE, the 
soldiers in Galilee were Herod Antipas’ men, who were known for their anti-
Jewish attitudes (cf. Josephus, Ant. 19.356–359). Could there be an exception? 
These questions are secondary, as I try to understand Luke’s message rather 
than the historicity of his account. Because Luke wrote outside of Galilee 
after the Jewish war,125 for him the centurion primarily served as a religious 
example for the audience of the Eastern Mediterranean area; he may have 
thought about a Roman soldier, which suited his political purposes.126 There 
are examples of wealthy centurions serving as benefactors and funding local 
sanctuaries.127 Thus, the prestigious status of the centurion in the local com-
munity is credible in light of what we know about Roman centurions. Martin 
Goodman notes that Jews even tried to find sympathizers of their religion in 
order to build useful social links.128 Early Christians surely had similar goals.
In the narrative, the centurion’s office and economic resources secure him 
a powerful status in Capernaum. He can send a Jewish delegation to repre-
sent himself, which proves his authority among the local people. Seemingly 
the centurion is a patron to them.129 In this context the word “friends” (φίλοι) 
probably does not indicate equality between the friends and the centurion, 
but loyal relationship between patrons and clients.130 What makes the centu-
rion so exemplary is his humble attitude toward Jesus. His socially high status 
emphasizes the humility. While the Jewish delegation describes him as worthy 
(ἀξιός) of Jesus’ help, the centurion claims to be unworthy: “I am not worthy (οὐ 
γὰρ ἱκανός εἰμι) to have you come under my roof; therefore I did not presume 
(οὐδὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἠξίωσα) to come to you” (Luke 7:6–7). The centurion is humble 
like the tax collector praying in the temple (Luke 18:9–14), but they are not 
comparable in every respect. In the story of the praying tax collector, a Pharisee 
124   Wegner 1985, 257–259.
125   Brown 1996, 269–271, 273–274.
126   Kyrychenko 2014, 154–155.
127   Kyrychenko 2014, 156.
128   Goodman 1994, 87–88.
129   Moxnes 1991, 65; Hobbs 2001, 333.
130   Stählin 1974, 147, 159. Aristotle explains the several types of friendship. Among others he 
mentions the one between unequal persons (Eth. Nic. 1158b–1159a).
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pairs tax collectors with thieves, rogues, and adulterers (Luke 18:11; cf. 15:1). 
Similarly in the story of Zaccheus the tax collector, he confesses fraud (Luke 
19:8). The centurion, in comparison, bears no trace of immoral behavior. There 
does not seem to be anything dubious in his past or present. He is exemplary 
in a different way than the repenting sinners.131 Therefore, even his military 
profession cannot be brought into question. If it was, the centurion could not 
be the exemplary believer, if he did not repent. Luke probably did not see any 
obstacles for a centurion to be a member of the Christian community.
The following soldiers in the gospel are not positive, however. In the story of 
Judas’ betrayal, Luke adds military figures that are absent from the other gos-
pels. These figures are officers (στρατηγοί) who appear on the side of the chief 
priests and the elders (Luke 22:4, 52). As the latter occurrence clearly indi-
cates, Luke means the officers of the temple police.132 One can only speculate 
why Luke added the officers. Possibly it has something to do with the fact that 
Roman soldiers are reduced in the Lukan passion story. The soldiers mocking 
Jesus are not Roman soldiers but belong rather to Herod’s men (Luke 23:11).133 
The odd absence of Roman soldiers continues when Pilate reluctantly hands 
Jesus over—to translate it literally—“to their will” (τῷ θελήματι αὐτῶν) (Luke 
23:25). Luke continues that “they” (using only verbs in the third-person plural) 
led him away. “They” also put the cross on Simon of Cyrene, but—and this 
catches the eye of the reader—Luke (23:26), unlike Mark (15:21) and Matthew 
(27:32), avoids the verb ἀγγαρεύω and the impression of an official procedure 
which that verb would give. As Jesus is brought to Golgotha, “they” even put 
Jesus and the two criminals on the cross. The people see what is happening and 
the leaders scoff at Jesus. Only after he has been crucified do the soldiers sud-
denly appear to mock (ἐνέπαιξαν) him (23:36).134 The reader’s first association 
131   Pace Brink (2014, 175), who sees soldiers and tax collectors in a similar category of sinners 
to be exonerated by Jesus.
132   Scholars have identified them as officials in the temple (Wolter 2008, 693–694), but the 
textual context clearly refers to temple police. As Nolland (1993, 1030) says, “their impor-
tance is surely related to their ability to set in motion the arrest of Jesus.”
133   Luke uses the word στράτευμα, which does not denote a soldier explicitly but rather 
a group of soldiers, a military unit (cf. Acts 23:10, 27), without defining its strength 
(Bauernfeind 1971, 702, 709 n. 34). The plural form indicates several units, in this case 
surely the detachments in Herod’s bodyguard.
134   The mocking soldiers offer coarse (poor quality) wine (ὄξος), which was usual among the 
military (Nolland 1993, 1147). It might be a merciful act, but Luke possibly had in mind 
Ps 68:22 (LXX), where inferior wine is offered as part of a mocking performance.
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is with the previously mentioned soldiers, namely Herod’s contingent, who 
mocked (ἐμπαίξας) Jesus.135
Who actually are the nameless “they” to whose will Pilate hands Jesus over? 
In the textual context they are the chief priests, leaders, and the people (Luke 
23:13), who all (παμπληθεί) required Jesus’ death (Luke 23:18). Thus, it seems as 
if Jesus was crucified by the chief priests, leaders, and the people (cf. Acts 5:30). 
This is anything but clear, however. In the Gospel of Peter, Herod (not Pilate!) 
commands people to execute Jesus, but there is no similar authorization in 
Luke’s account. The handing over of Jesus “to their will” can actually mean that 
Pilate did “as they wished.”136 Ancient people might have thought that only 
Roman officials had the right to execute Jesus (cf. John 18:31). In fact, “they” 
indicate that the decision of execution was Pilate’s responsibility, as “they” 
shout: “Crucify, crucify him!” (Luke 23:21; cf. 23:18). It is also quite odd that the 
subject of the verbs in the third-person plural is never mentioned again after 
Luke 23:13. It is possible that the third-person plural is used to express a more 
general agency. In other words, one could translate the active voice with the 
passive one without violating Luke’s idea.137 It is as though Luke does not wish 
to pinpoint those very persons who are responsible for executing Jesus’ death 
sentence. There are reasons to believe that they were not what a mechanical 
reading of the third-person plural presumes. One could naturally accept that 
the executioners were the soldiers of the local prefect, but Luke carefully avoids 
saying this in explicit terms. When the soldiers suddenly appear to mock Jesus, 
their actual task there is left in obscurity. The reader easily associates them 
with the soldiers of the tetrarch. With regard to Jesus’ death, therefore, Luke 
tries to obscure the role of the Romans in the shadows.
After Jesus’ death, there is another military figure at the cross, a centurion 
who immediately praises God and confesses: “Certainly this man was innocent 
(δίκαιος)” (Luke 23:47). One can speculate why Luke made the centurion speak 
of an innocent (or righteous) man—not the Son of God, as seen in Mark and 
Matthew. Probably it has something to do with what Pilate said earlier: Jesus 
is not guilty (Luke 23:4,14,22). Similarly, the repenting criminal attests that 
135   Brink (2014, 104–105) and Kyrychenko (2014, 148–149) assume that the soldiers at the cross 
are Romans. Both are aware of the problematic identification and mention it in footnotes. 
Only Kyrychenko gives reasons for his interpretation, saying that the parallel accounts 
and the presence of a centurion make it impossible to speak of Herod’s soldiers or the 
temple police. I do not see why parallel accounts (in other gospels?) should rule out what 
Luke says or why a centurion could not serve in other than Roman troops.
136   Wolter 2008, 751.
137   Nolland (1993, 1136) speaks of Luke’s grammatical carelessness. See also Smyth 1984, 259 
(§ 931d).
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Jesus has been unjustly condemned. Pilate, the centurion, and the repenting 
criminal make the same claim regarding Jesus’ blamelessness.138 As the repent-
ing criminal is clearly a paradigmatic figure for Christians,139 one can assume 
that the centurion is of the same type. At the cross, the reader of Luke’s gospel 
encounters again the ancient dualism commonly seen between rank-and-file 
men and centurions. The former mock Jesus, while the latter is a more posi-
tive figure. Earlier in the passion narrative the officers of the temple police are 
negative figures, but this is because they assist Jesus’ opponents. The different 
evaluations of military persons depend on their status or their task, not on 
their profession as soldiers per se. Here the modern scholarship usually strays, 
arguing for acceptance or rejection of the military profession. For Luke the 
problem seems not to be soldiers as such, but unjust soldiers. As an ancient 
person, he tended to think of rank-and-file men in those terms, but believed 
that even they could become just (Luke 3:14).
It will suffice to make a few short comments on soldiers in Acts, which 
support my observations on the gospel. First, the temple police are hostile 
to Christians (Acts 5:23–26), as in the gospel. Second, there are soldiers who 
are just doing their work and are mainly extra figures (24:22–23; 27:1, 11, 31–32; 
28:16). For example, Herod’s soldiers guarding Peter in prison emphasize the 
miracle.140 Peter succeeds in escaping while the guards are sleeping, which 
leads to their execution for lack of vigilance (Acts 12:6–19).141 Third, in Acts, 
Roman soldiers are mainly described in a positive light. One may surmise that 
Luke’s positive attitude toward Roman soldiers can already be seen from their 
absence in the passion story in the gospel. The third point deserves more atten-
tion. Roman soldiers protect Paul against the Jews (Acts 21:31–40; 22:24–29, 30; 
23:10, 15, 17–35), and Luke finds only minor faults in them. Julius the centurion 
“treated Paul kindly,” but makes the mistake of not believing Paul’s weather 
report (Acts 27:3, 11). Later he protects Paul and other prisoners against guards 
who wanted to kill them, fearing their escape (Acts 27:42–43)—a very under-
standable reaction on the part of the soldiers (cf. Acts 12:19). Otherwise, Paul 
almost always engaged with members of high society (e.g., Felix, Festus, 
Agrippa) and the tribunus cohortis (ὁ χιλίαρχος τῆς σπείρης) (cf. Acts 21:31), 
the leader of the Roman troops in Jerusalem.142 Paul is brought to Ceasarea 
in the custody of a mixed unit of infantry and cavalry. Luke even states the 
138   Brink (2014, 171) notes only Pilate and the centurion.
139   Syreeni 1991, 47–49; Pesonen 2009, 215–216.
140   Barrett 2004, 579.
141   It is uncertain if Luke really means execution with the verb ἀπαχθῆναι, but it is probable 
in this context (Barrett 2004, 588).
142   On the tribunus, see Tajra 1989, 67.
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strength of the force (470 men). The level of security employed to protect Paul 
against the Jewish conspirators clearly emphasizes his importance.
While the overall picture of Roman soldiers in Acts is positive, the value 
placed on Cornelius the centurion (Acts 10) is the greatest. He is probably pre-
sented as serving in the Cohors II Italica voluntariorum civium Romanorum, an 
auxiliary troop. The name of this unit indicates that it recruited Roman citi-
zens, placing it in the superior category of auxiliary regiments. On the other 
hand, the name could have been an honorary title, with soldiers who were 
non-citizens recruited locally in the East.143 These historical details have minor 
importance for Luke, however. Key here is that Cornelius was a Roman soldier 
and the first gentile Christian.144 He was “a devout man who feared God” (Acts 
10:2) already before his conversion. The stumbling block which Luke pushes 
aside in the account of Cornelius’ conversion is not his military profession, but 
the fact that he is not a Jew. The whole account tries to argue that a non-Jew 
can be a Christian. The military profession is quite inessential in the conver-
sion story of Cornelius, as no questions are raised in terms of this.
When commenting on the stories of Cornelius and other military figures 
in the New Testament, Harnack claims that they “are not told in order to praise 
the military profession or even to suggest toleration. That they were soldiers in 
all these cases was of minor importance for the teller of the story.”145 The last 
statement makes clear why Luke welcomed soldiers into the Christian com-
munity. Cornelius’ profession is of no consequence for the evangelist, who 
indicates toleration.146 The case is so clear that even a pacifist, like Cadoux, 
can see it. He writes on Cornelius and the jailer (δεσμοφύλαξ)147 in Philippi 
(Acts 16:23–34), connecting them with the soldiers who posed a question to 
John the Baptist (Luke 3:14):
The New Testament itself and the earliest Christian literature nowhere 
express disapproval of the continuance of these men—assuming they 
143   Saddington 1996, 2415–2416; Kyrychenko 2014, 39–40. Brink (2014, 151–152) assumes that 
Cornelius was a veteran.
144   See Brink 2014, 154. Kyrychenko (2014, 164) notes that the place, Caesarea, is hardly coin-
cidental. The city was the Roman capital in Judea.
145   Harnack 1981, 70.
146   Later Harnack (1924, 578; the previous citation is from Militia Christi, which was originally 
published in 1905) relayed that there was no problem of Christian soldiers (“eine christli-
che ‘Soldatenfrage’ ”) before Caesar Marcus Aurelius.
147   Some jailers were soldiers, but slaves and civilians were also employed to this end. The 
jailer in Philippi, under the duoviri (στρατηγοί) city authorities, heeds the commands of 
their lictores (ραβδοῦχοι). It seems that this jailer is a civilian. Later (from ca. 150 onwards), 
the city prison came more strongly under military command. For more on prison guards, 
see Krause 1996, 252–264.
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did continue—in their calling, or of the military calling in general. It 
is even possible that Luke, who records these cases, as well as the con-
versation between John the Baptist and the soldiers, may have meant to 
intimate thereby his view as to the propriety of admitting soldiers to the 
Church without requiring them to abandon the profession of arms: and 
the existence even of these few cases makes it possible that from the ear-
liest times there may have been soldier-converts in the Church.148
Cadoux’s reserved attitude—“there may have been soldier-converts”—is well-
grounded, as we should be cautious with the historical reliability of all the 
details in Acts. Scholars have justly asked whether Cornelius and the jailer in 
Philippi are historical figures.149 But if they are not historical, the author has 
intentionally created them. If this is the case, their profession may not be so 
inconsequential, as Harnack claimed. If Cornelius is Luke’s innovation, why 
did he choose a soldier to be the first non-Jewish Christian? Why not another 
gentile in Caesarea? If Cornelius is an imaginary figure, Luke’s choice could 
attest to the fact that he at least hoped there would be soldier converts.
In sum, it is characteristic for Luke to maintain the reputation of the Roman 
soldiers. Herod’s soldiers or the temple police are presented in a less favor-
able light. This distinction is seemingly based on political needs. Alexander 
Kyrychenko puts it as follows: “The Roman Empire in Luke’s narrative is a 
receptive mission field, and the Roman centurion, the principal representative 
of the Empire, exemplifies the desired response.”150 Otherwise Luke pres-
ents the standard distinction between rank-and-file men and their superiors. 
At the very least centurions were clearly welcomed into the Christian commu-
nity. This is commensurate with Mark and Matthew. While Matthew seems to 
have reservations regarding rank-and-file men, Luke hopes that even they can 
be converted, as the admonition addressed to them assumes (Luke 3:14).151 In 
Acts, Luke also reports on a baptized soldier. Why, then, would there not have 
been any in his own day? Luke would have accepted them if there had been 
any. However, it is noteworthy that he assumes his readers to be civilians. In the 
synoptic apocalypse, Luke presents Christians in the midst of a war. There is no 
hint of Christian soldiers, but rather refugees of war: “When you see Jerusalem 
148   Cadoux 1919, 228–229.
149   On Cornelius, see, e.g., Haenchen 1982, 355–362, and Barrett 2004, 491–497. One can 
question if Cornelius’ troop was really stationed in Caesarea at that time: “It may be that 
circumstances prevailing at a later period were assumed to have existed at an earlier one” 
(Schürer 1973, 364–365). On the jailer, see, e.g., Haenchen 1982, 355–362.
150   Kyrychenko 2014, 189.
151   See Brink 2014, 175. Zeichmann (2019, 46) argues that Luke tries to put the rank and file in 
their place with the poor while presenting the values of the wealthy elite.
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surrounded by armies, then know that its desolation has come near. Then 
those in Judea must flee to the mountains, and those inside the city must leave 
it, and those out in the country must not enter it” (Luke 21:20–21). If there were 
Christian soldiers in Luke’s community, they must have been exceptions.
1.2.4 John’s Soldiers Fulfill Prophecies
In the Gospel of John, soldiers are like puppets on a string. They behave as God 
has planned, acting in a deterministic drama where Christ is to be crucified and 
then lifted to heaven. Soldiers appear only in the passion story. Their march to 
the stage is massive: a cohort (σπεῖρα) led by a tribunus cohortis (ὁ χιλίαρχος), 
come to arrest Jesus along with servants (ὑπηρέτας)152 of the Pharisees and 
high priests (John 18:3, 12). Thus, Jews and Romans cooperate in the arrest.153 
The Jewish-Roman cooperation is surprising. In the story of the arrest, John 
refers to a Jewish plan to seek Jesus’ death: Jews were afraid of the Romans 
and they planned Jesus’ death to avoid national destruction (John 11:47–50; 
18:14). Thus, the cooperation does not reflect a good or confidential relation-
ship between Jewish leaders and Romans. Pilate will be won over to the side 
of the Jews only later (John 18:28–19:18). Nonetheless, a whole cohort assists in 
the arrest of Jesus. How can a cohort be united with Jews in this situation? The 
answer involves Judas: he—and no one else—“took” (λαβών) the cohort and 
the servants as though he were the real leader. This might be an overinterpreta-
tion of a single verb,154 if one were to forget that Judas plays the part of Satan 
(John 13:27). Being that Satan is the ruler of this world (John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11), 
he can recruit these massive forces against Jesus.155 Still, in the last analysis, 
God pulls all the strings: everything happens as he has planned.156
152   Not ‘police,’ as the NRSV translates. It is surely possible that John is thinking about the 
temple police, but this is anything but clear. The basic meaning of ὑπηρέτης is a free 
servant as distinct from a slave servant (δοῦλος) (Rengstorf 1974, 532–533). See Brown 
1970, 314.
153   Quite similarly, see Beasley-Murray 1999, 322.
154   This kind of criticism of my interpretation is quite common. For most interpreters, the 
verb indicates that Judas showed the way (see, e.g., Carson 1991, 577; Beasley-Murray 1999, 
322). The meaning of the verb, however, requires more (see Brown 1970, 807).
155   Lindars (1972, 539–540) sees here a symbolic dimension: both religious and secular pow-
ers stand against Jesus. Theissen (1999, 203) claims that “a cohort can be commanded only 
by someone who has a Roman mandate” and, thus, Judas’ satanic power is also the Roman 
power, haunted by the words “the ruler of this world.” On the other hand, Hakola (2005, 
205 n. 15) comments that neither John nor the other references to the devil in the Jewish 
or Christian sources support Theissen’s interpretation.
156   On John’s dualism and its relationship to his idea of God’s governance, see, e.g., Hakola 
2005, 197–210.
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Soldiers appear again on the scene when Jews try to induce Pilate to pass a 
death sentence on Jesus. Pilate is reluctant and flogs Jesus; this surely means 
that he ordered soldiers to do the flogging (John 19:1). The flogging is an odd 
turn, as Pilate saw no case against Jesus (John 18:38; 19:4). Did he hope that 
the Jews would be satisfied with flogging only?157 Be that as it may, soldiers 
properly humiliate Jesus: they not only flog but also mock him.158 The mock-
ing itself resembles the descriptions in Mark and Matthew and their view on 
soldiers. When analyzing Mark’s story, I showed that the description corre-
sponds to the normal ancient view of rough rank-and-file men. As Pilate finally 
assents to execute Jesus, John’s story continues as if the Jews crucified Jesus. 
After stating that Pilate discusses with the Jews and the chief priests, John 
continues by saying that Pilate handed Jesus over “to them to be crucified. So 
they took Jesus” (John 19:16). The reader gets the impression that the Jews took 
Jesus. This is the impression even at Golgotha, where “they” crucify Jesus and 
two other men (John 19:18). I showed above that Luke possibly tried to blot out 
the role of soldiers. There is seemingly no similar motive behind John’s story, 
as he later openly states that soldiers crucified him (John 19:23).159 The appear-
ance of the third-person plural in John 19:16 and 19:18 is imprecise usage and 
actually refers to soldiers.
After the crucifixion, soldiers appear twice to assure the reader that it is God 
who pulls the strings. Soldiers fulfill prophecies:160
When the soldiers had crucified Jesus, they took his clothes and divided 
them into four parts, one for each soldier. They also took his tunic; now 
the tunic was seamless, woven in one piece from the top. So they said 
to one another, “Let us not tear it, but cast lots for it to see who will get 
it.” This was to fulfil what the scripture says, “They divided my clothes 
among themselves, and for my clothing they cast lots.” And that is what 
the soldiers did. 
John 19:23–24
157   Thus see, e.g., Brown (1970, 886) and Beasley-Murray (1999, 334).
158   Beasley-Murray (1999, 336) regards the mockery as “motivated by a spontaneous desire for 
some crude and cruel horseplay.”
159   In principle, it is syntactically possible to read John 19:23 in a way that soldiers did not 
crucify Jesus: Οἱ οὖν στρατιῶται ὅτε ἐσταύρωσαν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἔλαβον τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτοῦ … (“The 
soldiers, when they (i.e. the Jews) had crucified Jesus, took his clothes …”) This transla-
tion, however, is against all probability and would be forced.
160   Brown 1970, 913.
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Then the soldiers came and broke the legs of the first and of the other 
who had been crucified with him. But when they came to Jesus and saw 
that he was already dead, they did not break his legs. Instead, one of the 
soldiers pierced his side with a spear, and at once blood and water came 
out. (He who saw this has testified so that you also may believe. His testi-
mony is true, and he knows that he tells the truth.) These things occurred 
so that the scripture might be fulfilled, “None of his bones shall be bro-
ken.” And again another passage of scripture says, “They will look on the 
one whom they have pierced.” 
John 19:32–37
Everything happens according to the divine plan, and soldiers play their role, 
as it is written. This, however, is no positive statement regarding soldiers. All 
the protagonists, even the Jews striving for Jesus’ death, are part of this plan 
(John 11:51–52), but this does not mean that every character in the gospel is 
a good one. The reader cannot miss the fact that the Jews are dark charac-
ters with nefarious motives.161 This is clear throughout the gospel, hitting an 
apex when Jesus says to the Jews: “You are from your father the devil, and you 
choose to do your father’s desires” (John 8:44). Does the statement about the 
Jews apply also to the soldiers? Yes and no. On the one hand, in John’s dualism 
the soldiers fall on the side opposing Jesus, as the story of Jesus’ arrest clearly 
presupposes. On the other hand, one can see that soldiers are like extra fig-
ures. One can also perceive that the evangelist’s attitude toward Pilate is more 
lenient than toward the Jews. John lets Jesus say to Pilate: “the one who handed 
me over to you is guilty of a greater sin” (John 19:11).162 If one were to extend 
any conclusion to the soldiers, it would mean that John’s attitude was similarly 
lenient to them.
Despite these mitigating circumstances, one must conclude that in John’s 
dualism, soldiers were against Jesus. Moreover, fighting is not found among 
Jesus’ followers: “If my kingdom were from this world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου), 
my followers would be fighting (ἠγωνίζοντο)163 to keep me from being handed 
over to the Jews. But as it is, my kingdom is not from here” (John 18:36). Is it 
possible to soften this statement by claiming that fighting is out of place in 
161   On the Jews in John, see Hakola 2005.
162   “The one who handed me over to you (Pilate)” cannot refer to Judas, as he did not hand 
Jesus over to Pilate but to the Jews (Morris 1995, 705). The reference is possibly to Caiphas 
or to the leading Jews as a collective (Brown 1970, 878–879; Beasley-Murray 1999, 340).
163   ‘To fight’ is the only possible meaning of the verb in this context. The basic meaning of 
ἀγωνίζομαι is ‘to contend,’ especially in games. Yet, the meaning ‘to fight’ is well known, 
even in early documents (e.g., Herodotus). See Liddell, Scott, and Jones 2011, ἀγωνίζομαι.
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this situation? In other words, one would see Jesus’ crucifixion as a part of the 
divine plan, which Jesus’ followers accept without resistance, while fighting 
would be allowed in other situations. This is not a possible reading, however. 
After reading the Gospel of John to this point, one cannot miss that the “world” 
(κόσμος) has become an increasingly negative concept.164
In the opening hymn, the world is made by God through the logos (John 1:10). 
A little later, it is said that the world is the object of God’s love. Jesus came to 
bear the sins of the world and save it (John 1:29; 3:17). Despite this basically pos-
itive aspect, one cannot miss the fact that there is something seriously wrong 
in the world. The negative trait becomes clearer as the story proceeds toward 
Jesus’ death. It is illustrative that Jesus proclaims his victory over the world 
(John 16:33) as though it were his enemy (though he earlier was meant to save 
it!). A similarly oppositional situation is encountered when Jesus says that he 
does not pray for the world (John 17:9). Now it is no more the world which will 
be rescued, but the believers who are rescued from the world. In this context, it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that fighting is something entirely negative, 
as it belongs to the world. Moreover, Jesus speaks of his non-fighting follow-
ers as his servants (ὑπηρέται), although the NRSV translates them as ‘followers’ 
(John 18:36). The use of the word ‘servant’ possibly equates Jesus’ followers 
with those servants who came to violently arrest Jesus (John 18:3, 12).165 In this 
light, it is difficult to imagine a soldier in a Johannine community.
This Johannine background also sheds light on the story of the royal official 
(John 4:46–54). This story is dependent on the same tradition as the synoptic 
parallels,166 but John either changed the centurion into the official or he was 
influenced by a variant of the tradition where there was no centurion.167 The 
choice between the two alternatives is highly speculative. However, it is worth 
noting that the other believing centurion of the synoptic tradition is missing 
from John, namely, the centurion at the cross.168 One can sense the reason after 
reading the Johannine passion story where the soldiers belong to the world. 
Believing soldiers simply do not fit with John’s dualistic drama. This makes it 
improbable that the official is a soldier; although the Greek word βασιλικός 
can mean a wide range of professions in royal service, including the military 
164   Schnackenburg (1986, 285) sees the world in John in a more positive light than I do.
165   Morris 1995, 680 n. 85.
166   Dunderberg (1994, 74–97) supposes that John probably knew the parallel stories.
167   The centurion seemingly was present in Q (see Robinson, Hoffmann, and Kloppenborg 
2000, 102–117).
168   Walle (2010, 62–63) takes note of this fact, although his explanation is not very convinc-
ing. Walle thinks that soldiers represent Mithraism and, therefore, a believing centurion 
does not fit in the story.
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ones, it is also a royally virtuous mindset.169 The word βασιλικός does not make 
it clear that the believing person is a soldier. The official does not metaphori-
cally refer to his power to command minions like the centurion does in the 
synoptic parallels. All in all, there are no positive military figures in the Gospel 
of John. As Jesus quite programmatically says, in contrast to the servants of 
the earthy kingdoms, his followers do not fight. In this, then, there is some-
thing akin to modern pacifism.170 It is thus difficult to imagine a soldier in a 
Johannine community.
1.2.5 The Gospel of Peter
The Gospel of Peter reflects an interesting development from the canonical gos-
pel tradition.171 While Luke is somewhat obscure about whether soldiers or 
the crowd crucified Jesus, the Gospel of Peter is clear: the crowd did it. Soldiers 
are not even mentioned in the crucifixion scene, nor before that. For example, 
the crowd mocks Jesus. The author’s tendency is to put the blame on the Jews, 
while Pilate’s role is diminished.172 This general tendency is mirrored in the 
representation of soldiers, who appear only after Jesus is brought to the tomb; 
the Jewish elders ask soldiers to guard the grave so that the disciples will not 
steal his body and present a claim of resurrection (Gos. Pet. 8.30). The story is a 
variant of Matthew’s version, but the role of the military is quite different here 
than in the Matthean version, where soldiers are bribed and liars. Paul Foster 
claims rightly:
While a Roman presence has been removed from the previous scenes 
involving the torture and execution of Jesus, it is now required as a reli-
able witness to the veracity of the resurrection. For this reason the author 
has the Jewish leaders beseech the impartial Pilate to provide the sol-
diers, who in narratival terms will perform the more significant role of 
reliable witnesses.173
169   Wegner 1985, 57–60; Dunderberg 2014, 281, 289–292.
170   “Pacifism” is surely a somewhat anachronistic expression, as John’s view does not neces-
sarily presuppose nonviolence, as modern pacifism usually does. Jesus violently expels 
people from the temple (John 2:13–15).
171   Some, like Crossan (1988), have claimed that the Gospel of Peter transmits an early tradi-
tion which is independent of the canonical gospels. Foster (2010, 119–147; see Augustin 
2015, 57–109) argues convincingly that the Gospel of Peter is dependent on the synoptic 
gospels (possibly also on the Gospel of John) and that the unparalleled sections in the 
Gospel of Peter are due to the author’s own creativity. The gospel has been preserved only 
as a fragment containing the trial, execution, and resurrection of Jesus.
172   Räisänen 2010, 272.
173   Foster 2010, 374.
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This favorable view of soldiers is probably the reason why the Gospel of Peter 
tells not only of rank-and-file soldiers at the tomb, but also their leader, a centu-
rion called Petronius (Gos. Pet. 8.31).174 As I have repeatedly noted, centurions 
had quite a good reputation. A centurion at the tomb gives reliability to the 
witness of the soldiers. Against the canonical versions, soldiers are active in 
rolling the stone into its place at the mouth of the tomb (Gos. Pet. 8.32). Foster 
sees in this detail “the author’s validation of the placement of the body in 
the tomb prior to the miraculous resurrection.”175 The author informs that the 
soldiers guarded it in an orderly manner in pairs, thereby proving the impos-
sibility of a theft.176 During the night, the miracle takes place. The guards see 
(εἶδον) two men descend from heaven and go to the reopened tomb. After see-
ing (ἰδόντες) this they wake up the centurion and the elders and tell what they 
saw (εἶδον). (Gos. Pet. 9.36–39). The repeated references to seeing stress the fact 
that the soldiers on guard duty really witnessed this miraculous event.
The author’s claim that Jewish elders were also guarding the tomb is idiosyn-
cratic. Foster proposes three reasons, asking, “was there a perception that the 
Romans could be bribed to allow the theft of the body, or that they might be 
derelict in their duties, or perhaps the narrator simply wanted the Jewish elders 
present at the resurrection to illustrate how recalcitrant they had become in 
refusing to accept divine revelation and affirmation of Jesus as God’s messiah 
and son?”177 The first two reasons, bribery and negligence of duties, would be 
credible when thinking of the general ancient view of rank-and-file soldiers. 
On the other hand, the narrator likes to present the soldiers as trustworthy 
witnesses. This is probably why there is also the centurion Petronius, unknown 
in the canonical tradition, at the tomb. A centurion diminishes doubts about 
the soldiers. The third reason Foster gives fits well with the author’s general 
tendency to slander the Jewish leaders. Later in the narrative, they prefer to 
commit a great sin before God over falling into the hands of the people (Gos. 
Pet. 11.48). The elders did this even though they saw (ὁρῶσιν) how Christ came 
out of the tomb (Gos. Pet. 10.39).
After seeing the miracle, the soldiers, the centurion, and the elders deter-
mined to report everything to Pilate. While still thinking to do this they saw an 
additional miracle, which made the soldiers depart quickly and tell what they 
had seen (εἶδον). Interestingly, the centurion seems to have stayed at the tomb. 
174   Augustin (2015, 138) claims that a centurion commanding this small size of a guard is 
historically suspect.
175   Foster 2010, 382.
176   Foster 2010, 398.
177   Foster 2010, 415.
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The author says that “those around the centurion” (οἱ περὶ τὸν κεντυρίωνα) 
rushed to Pilate and reported what had happened and concluded that “truly 
this was God’s son” (Gos. Pet. 11.43–45). The elders also stayed at the tomb, but 
later “they all came” to visit Pilate. In the text, “all” refers only to the elders, 
who prefer sin over being delivered into the hands of the people (Gos. Pet. 
11.47–48).178 Is the centurion alone at the tomb then? His return is not men-
tioned. Surely he is assumed to be present when Pilate later commands him 
and the soldiers. Is he the last one at the tomb, calming remaining after the 
“distressed” (ἀγωνιῶντες) soldiers have rushed to Pilate and the elders have also 
arrived there? In this case, he would be the most trustworthy witness of Christ. 
This is not the only solution. It is possible that Petronius is included in “those 
around the centurion” and thus he has returned with his soldiers. The Jews 
ask Pilate to command the centurion and the soldiers not to tell anyone about 
what happened. Pilate does as the Jews ask and commands the centurion and 
the soldiers to keep silent (Gos. Pet. 11.49). This is an odd turn of events, as 
Foster remarks:
With this complete media black-out on reporting the events that 
occurred, the author does not explain to his audience how he is able 
to relate this version of events. Is this simply the prerogative of an 
omniscient narrator, the product of divine revelation, the result of a 
breaking of silence by one of the observers, or do such questions rob this 
narrative of the impact it was intended to create for its audience?179
Foster leaves the matter open, but I am inclined to see here an intention to 
say that the soldiers broke the silence. Had this been otherwise, why would 
the author have placed so much stress on the trustworthiness of the sol-
diers? The author does not say that the soldiers kept the silence, which is a 
remarkable difference from Matthew’s version. Matthew pointedly says 
that the soldiers kept silent (Matt 28:15). As the author of the Gospel of Peter 
probably knew of Matthew’s version, it must have been his intentional choice 
not to follow it here. The figures of the soldiers and the centurion are clearly 
positive. There is no trace of Matthew’s ambiguity around the soldiers, and 
the positive image of the centurion is similar to the Gospel of Matthew. 
Petronius’ name is surely “due to a fascination for detail in the development of 
178   Foster (2010, 448–449) supposes that the soldiers are included.
179   Foster 2010, 455.
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the tradition, rather than the preservation of a historical detail.”180 But nam-
ing gives more personal color and makes the figure even more positive in the 
readers’ eyes. The name is a reliably Roman name, which possibly hints that 
he is a citizen.181 A centurion is again the most positive military figure—and 
surely not by accident. The Gospel of Peter just follows the standard imagery 
of centurions.
1.3 Conclusions
The scholarly discussion on soldiers and early Christianity is characterized 
in the light of modern moral discussions. The sources are often used to defend 
or oppose Christian participation in the military, as though there were a 
Christian stance on the issue. In fact, these discussions dismiss the fact that 
views and practices were diverse among the early Christians. Moreover, all 
descriptions of soldiers are not meant to be a moral judgement on the ques-
tion of whether a Christian can serve as a soldier.
I showed that in the gospel material there is an important division between 
centurions and rank-and-file men. While this division has moral overtones, 
too, they are not the ones of the modern discussion on Christian ethics. Instead, 
they reflect the ancient stereotypes of civilized centurions and the brutality of 
the rank and file. One can only indirectly assume a moral stance on Christian 
participation in the army. If centurions are acceptable, then the military call-
ing is not questionable in and of itself. This is what one can assume in the case 
of Mark, Matthew, and—most clearly—Luke. Luke openly states that soldiers 
must fulfill moral standards: “Do not extort money from anyone by threats or 
false accusation, and be satisfied with your wages” (Luke 3:14). What comes 
to the fore here is that soldiers were morally criticized for their violent cor-
ruption, not for killing at war, as in the modern debates. Moreover, centurions 
may have had considerable economic resources, and Christians perhaps used 
their services. Especially Luke’s version of the centurion in Capernaum pres-
ents a picture of a wealthy benefactor—surely a proper convert. In general, the 
gospels speak of soldiers engaged in police work, not at war. The representa-
tion of soldiers reflects the views of civilians who encountered soldiers in their 
everyday life. The soldiers in the synoptic gospels are thus understandable as a 
part of the social setting. Only Luke seems to have clearer ideological tenden-
cies, as the Roman soldiers contribute to his pro-Roman message, especially 
in Acts.
180   Foster 2010, 378.
181   Saddington 1996, 2414, 2414 n. 12.
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As is generally known, the Gospel of John differs from the synoptics in 
many respects; this is also the case in respect to the soldiers represented 
in it. First, centurions are missing. While Matthew and Luke speak of a centu-
rion in Capernaum, John speaks of a βασιλικός, which may or may not mean 
a soldier. John seems to intentionally disregard the military character as sol-
diers belong to the dark side in his dualism. In the Passion narrative, John even 
states that earthly rulers use men to fight, but Jesus does not (John 18:36). John 
proves that there are indeed some antimilitaristic tendencies among the early 
Christians.
2 Metaphors, Antimilitarism, and Christian Soldiers
In this section, I show that the antimilitaristic tendencies pronounced, espe-
cially within the literate class. I first look at the military metaphors. Then, I 
proceed to examine what Christian apologetes and other early Christian 
theologians have said about soldiers. Their views are well represented in the 
surviving literature. The views of other Christians must be read through them 
or on the basis of archaeological evidence. I will show that there were Christian 
soldiers, despite the antimilitaristic tendency among the theologians.
2.1 Military Metaphors
One encounters military issues not only in the literary persons of the gospels. 
What do military metaphors imply about attitudes toward the military and 
indirectly about soldiers in Christian communities? John F. Shean refers to 
the centurion of Capernaum, who presents a military analogy for his author-
ity over those under him and Jesus’ authority (Matt 8:8–9; Luke 7:7–8), Paul’s 
military metaphors, and the patristic usage. This leads him to ask what the 
parlance betrays of the audience:
One can only speculate on the intended audience for such comparisons, 
but they may reflect the active participation of military personnel in 
Christian communities for whom such analogies would have had a par-
ticular resonance.182
182   Shean 2010, 145. Helgeland, Daly, and Burns (1987) claim that there are no military meta-
phors in the gospels. This is apparently wrong unless we draw a straight line between 
metaphors and parables and count the centurion’s words among the latter. Moreover, 
there is the parable of a king who wonders if he may engage an enemy in battle (Luke 
14:31–32).
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Shean acknowledges that he is only speculating. The key of his assumption 
is that the analogies of military life “would have had a particular resonance” 
among soldiers. This sounds intuitively true, but before rushing to conclusions 
I would like to ask whether the frequency of military metaphors makes sense 
in the absence of real soldiers among Christians. I will take a look at the use 
of the metaphors in early Christian writings and then in antiquity in general. 
After that I will discuss what military metaphors betray about the potential 
presence of soldiers among the early Christians.
2.1.1 Military Metaphors in Early Christian Writings
David J. Williams has helpfully collected military metaphors in the Pauline 
epistles.183 I will neither repeat all these metaphors nor limit my survey to 
the Pauline material. Instead, I will present examples from this material, add 
examples outside of the Pauline texts and group the material into three main 
types. First, there are single military words or expressions used without further 
elaboration. Second, there are military metaphors for the inner conflict within 
an individual person. Third, Christian conduct is sometimes presented as mili-
tary service.
Some single words in early Christian texts originally belong to the military.184 
For example, in the passage on the wages of sin (Rom 6:23), the word ‘wages’ 
(ὀψώνια) actually means payment or provisions for soldiers.185 In Hebrews, 
there is a two-edged sword (μάχαιρα δίστομος) (Heb 4:12),186 and Ignatius 
of Antioch says that Christ lifted up a “standard” or a “flag” (σύσσημον) (Ign. 
Smyrn. 1.2). Ignatius’ own zeal wages war (πολεμεῖ) against him (Ign. Trall. 
4.2). These are a few examples of single words bearing a military ring. The 
last example leads to the second type of military metaphors, the description 
of inner conflict within an individual person. This is quite common in early 
Christian writings. Ignatius makes his point with one word, but there is a more 
extended version, for example, in Rom 7:23: “I see in my members another 
law at war (ἀντιστρατευόμενον) with the law of my mind, making me captive 
(αἰχμαλωτίζοντα) to the law of sin.” Polycarp claims that “every passion wages 
war (στρατεύεται) against the spirit” (Pol. Phil. 5.3; trans. Ehrman, LCL; cf. also 
1 Pet 2:11). The Letter of Peter to Philip, which belongs to the Nag Hammadi 
183   Williams 1999, 211–244.
184   Of course, it is not always clear which terms can be counted among military metaphors. 
For example, Gupta (2017, 27–30) discusses πίστις. I provide only clear cases.
185   Williams 1999, 224.
186   The word μάχαιρα can also mean a sacrificial knife (Liddell, Scott, and Jones 2011, μάχαιρα). 
Yet, μάχαιρα δίστομος is a weapon in LXX (Judg 3:16; Prov 5:4).
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library, also uses a military metaphor for the inner fight. Christian teaching is a 
way to fight the enemy attacks:
Concerning the fact that you are being detained, it is because you are 
mine. When you strip yourselves of what is corruptible, you will become 
luminaries in the midst of mortal people. Concerning the fact that you 
are to fight the powers, it is because they do not have rest like you, since 
they do not want you to be saved. The apostles worshiped again and said, 
“Lord, tell us, how shall we fight against the rulers, since the rulers are over 
us.” A voice called out to them from the appearance and said: “You must 
fight against them like this, for the rulers fight against the inner person. 
You must fight against them like this: come together and teach salva-
tion in the world with a promise. And arm yourselves with my Father’s 
power, and express your prayer, and surely the Father will help you by 
sending me.” 
NHC VIII,2 137; trans. Meyer
James concludes that the war within the individual Christian is the reason for 
Christian in-group disputes. He also calls these disputes wars and conflicts. 
Thus, James develops a two-sided metaphor where the in-personal conflict 
is the starting point: “Those wars (πόλεμοι) and conflicts (μάχαι) among you, 
where do they come from? Do they not come from your cravings that are at 
war (στρατευομένων) within your members? You want something and do not 
have it, so you commit murder. And you covet something and cannot obtain 
it, so you engage in conflicts and wars (μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε) (Jas 4:1–2; 
trans. slightly revised).” For James, warfare in Christian daily life is a negative 
metaphor. Usually it is something positive, as is the case in the Letter of Peter 
to Philip, cited above.
The positive usage is the third type of military metaphors. The author of 
2 Timothy puts it in a way which later became classic:187 “Share in suffering like 
a good soldier of Christ Jesus” (συγκακοπάθησον ὡς καλὸς στρατιώτης Χριστοῦ 
Ἰησοῦ) (2 Tim 2:3). This is actually not meant to describe just any Christian, 
only preachers. The limited usage is already present in the undisputed Pauline 
epistles where Paul calls his co-workers comrades in arms (συστρατιώτης) 
(Phlm 2; Phil 2:25). Early Christian literature also affords examples of all 
Christians as soldiers. This is openly stated by Clement of Rome when he is 
discussing the right attitude toward Jesus Christ: “Who then are the enemies 
(οἱ ἐχθροί)? Those who are evil and oppose (ἀντιτασσόμενοι) his will. And so, 
187   See Harnack 1981, 38.
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brothers, with all eagerness let us do battle as soldiers (στρατευσώμεθα) under 
his blameless commands (προστάγμασιν)” (1 Clem. 36.6–37.1; trans. Ehrman, 
LCL). Clement continues by presenting imperial soldiers as a good example 
of Christian conduct. The metaphorical Christian army is led by Jesus as the 
commander-in-chief, Clement says.
In the Gospel of John, Jesus is not the commander but a soldier whose 
willingness to sacrifice himself is exemplary. Jerome H. Neyrey has presented 
an illustrative array of classical texts in which the good shepherd repeats the 
ancient values of a noble warrior who gives his life for others (John 10:11–18) 
and leaves an example of right conduct.188 Jesus also provides an example of 
heroism with his words: “This is my commandment, that you love one another 
as I have loved you. No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for 
one’s friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you” (John 15:12–
14). Lengthy military metaphors are found in 2 Corinthians, Ephesians, and 
Ignatius’ epistle to Polycarp. In 2 Corinthians, Paul presents the picture of a 
victorious battle:
Indeed, we live in the flesh, but we do not wage war according to the 
flesh, for the weapons of our warfare are not in the flesh, but they have 
divine power to destroy strongholds. We destroy arguments and every 
proud obstacle raised up against the knowledge of God, and we take 
every thought captive to obey Christ. We are ready to punish every dis-
obedience when your obedience is complete. 
2 Cor. 10:3–6; trans. revised
Paul presents Christians as an assaulting army that destroys the enemy base 
and after the battle pacifies the area by punishing every remaining foe.189 The 
aggressive and belligerent tone is quite striking from Paul, who just previously 
appealed to the recipients of the epistle “by the meekness and gentleness of 
Christ” (1 Cor 10:1). A similar oddity occurs in Ephesians, where the readiness to 
proclaim the gospel of peace is joined with a lengthy military metaphor:
Finally, be strong in the Lord and in the strength of his power. Put on 
the whole armour of God, so that you may be able to stand against the 
wiles of the devil. For our struggle is not against enemies of blood and 
flesh, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic 
powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the 
188   Neyrey 2001.
189   Williams 1999, 215–217.
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heavenly places. Therefore, take up the whole armour of God, so that you 
may be able to withstand on that evil day, and having done everything, 
to stand firm. Stand, therefore, and fasten the belt of truth around your 
waist, and put on the breastplate of righteousness. As shoes for your feet 
put on whatever will make you ready to proclaim the gospel of peace. 
With all of these, take the shield of faith, with which you will be able to 
quench all the flaming arrows of the evil one. Take the helmet of salva-
tion, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God. 
Eph. 6:10–17
The background of this metaphor is quite surely found in 1 Thessalonians, 
which is undoubtedly an authentic epistle of Paul, even the oldest one. 
There Paul exhorts, “But since we belong to the day, let us be sober, and put 
on the breastplate of faith and love, and for a helmet the hope of salvation” 
(1 Thess. 5:8). One may note that the pattern illustrates the well-known Pauline 
triad of faith-hope-love.190 Ignatius of Antioch is possibly dependent on the 
Pauline tradition, but he extends the tradition with concrete Latin words from 
the Roman military usage of his day:191
Be pleasing to the one in whose army you serve, from whom also you 
receive your wages. Let none of you be found deserter (δεσέρτωρ). Let 
your baptism remain as your weaponry, your faith as a helmet, your love 
as a spear, your endurance as a full set of armor. Let your works be a down 
payment on your wages (δεπόσιτα), that you may receive the back pay 
(ἄκκεπτα) you deserve. 
Ign. Pol. 6.2; trans. Ehrman, LCL
Cadoux notes that it was “apparently Paul who introduced this custom of 
drawing from the military world metaphors and similes illustrative of differ-
ent aspects of Christian, particularly apostolic, life.”192 This is surely right if 
the criterion is based on the earliest Christian documents on this practice. 
However, it is up to the reconstruction of the gospel material to determine 
if this usage goes back to the centurion of Capernaum or to the historical 
Jesus himself (Luke 14:31–32).193 Military metaphors later became increasingly 
190   Lohse 1990, 8.
191   For the Latin words and their meaning in the army, see Schoedel 1985, 276. Harnack (1981, 
41) explains the presence of these technical terms with the fact that Ignatius wrote his 
letter during his transportation to Rome under the auspices of soldiers.
192   Cadoux 1919, 161. Cadoux seems to think that Paul is the author of Ephesians.
193   See Hobbs 1995, 271.
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popular among Christians, especially in the West.194 Two illustrative examples 
are the words paganus and sacramentum. The latter originally meant the mili-
tary oath.195 The former could mean a person who lives in the countryside, but 
it also denoted a civilian in contrast to a soldier. The military meaning seems to 
be the origin of the term in Christian usage.196 Does this fact reflect the active 
participation of soldiers in the Christian communities, as Shean cautiously 
assumes? I do not want to hasten to conclusions. The view remains unbal-
anced as long as the Christian usage is deprived of its ancient context.
2.1.2 The General Background of Military Metaphors
Ramsay MacMullen has pointed out that certain military concepts and even 
slang spread from the army into common usage.197 The Latin-based words 
δεσέρτωρ and ἄκκεπτα in Ignatius’ text (Pol. 6.2) clearly belong to this cate-
gory. However, military metaphors occur already in the pre-Roman Greek. In 
his article on spiritual warfare, Emonds argues that Plato is the oldest source 
where a military metaphor is related to human life.198 Emonds notes that the 
metaphor in Apologia became very popular.199
This is in truth how it is, fellow Athenians. Wherever someone takes his 
stand thinking it’s the best thing to do, or is posted by his commander, he 
must remain there, in my opinion, and face the danger without taking 
into account either death or anything else rather than the prospect of dis-
grace. So I would have done a dreadful thing, fellow Athenians, if, when 
the commanders whom you had chosen to lead me gave me orders both in 
Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, on that occasion I remained where 
they had posted me like anyone else and risked being killed, but when the 
god commanded, as I thought and assumed, that I must spend my life 
in philosophy and examining myself and others, I then abandoned my 
post because I was afraid of dying or some other difficulty. That would 
have been dreadful and in truth then someone would have justly taken 
194   Harnack 1981, 52–61.
195   Harnack 1981, 53–55.
196   Harnack 1981, 84,105. Harnack refers to examples in Christian and non-Christian texts, 
among others Tertullian’s De Corona 11.
197   MacMullen 1963, 165–169.
198   Emonds’ article was originally published in Heilige Überlieferung. Ausschnitte aus 
der Geschichte des Mönchtums und des heiligen Kultes. Eine Festgabe zum silbernen 
Abtsjubiläum des hochwürdigen Herrn Abtes von Maria Laach Dr. theol. et iur. h.c. Ildefonds 
Herwegen (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung: 1938), pages 21–50. I refer to 
the pages of the 1963 reprint, which appears as an appendix of Harnack’s Militia Christi.
199   Emonds 1963, 135.
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me to court because I don’t believe gods exist, disobeying the oracle and 
fearing death and thinking I’m wise, though I’m not. 
Plato, Apol. 28D–29A; trans. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL
Plato is not the first to use this type of metaphor, however. Referring to Cicero 
(Sen. 73), Emonds states that these kinds of metaphors must have been pres-
ent in the Pythagorean sources before Plato.200 Yet, Plato’s words became very 
influential, as Epictetus shows, for example, in a context where he explicitly 
refers to Socrates:
You make yourselves ridiculous by thinking that, if your general had sta-
tioned me at any post, I ought to hold and maintain it and choose rather 
to die ten thousand times than to desert it, but if God has stationed us in 
some place and in some manner of life we ought to desert that. 
Epictetus, Disc. 1.9.24; trans. Oldfather, LCL201
Emonds shows that the topos appears not only in Epictetus but also in Seneca, 
Marcus Aurelius, and the writing of De Mundo by an unknown author (usually 
called Ps.-Aristotle).202 The concise form is found in Seneca (Ep. 96.5): “Life is 
warfare.” Marcus Aurelius follows suit (Med. 2.17). What comes to the versions 
of the military metaphors, Emonds distinguishes two types, the metaphysical 
or mystical metaphor and the ethical metaphor. In Plato’s metaphors he sees 
the metaphysical version, where Socrates understands himself in a certain 
relationship with God. In Seneca’s texts he sees a more ethical aspect, following 
Stoic lines.203 I am not sure that Stoicism put less weight on the relationship 
with God. At least Epictetus and Cleanthes prove the opposite.204 This also 
goes for the military metaphor, as proved by Epictetus’ passage cited above.
200   Emonds 1963, 138. Moreover, one should bear in mind that Heraclitus spoke of natural 
phenomena in terms of war. See fragment 80, and possibly also 53, as explained by Kirk 
(1962, 238–249).
201   For similar references to this section of Plato’s Apologia, see Epictetus, Disc. 3.1.19–20; 
3.24.99.
202   Emonds 1963, 142–162. Emonds fails to show that the military metaphor was present in 
early Stoicism, though he thinks that it must have been there. The only reference he 
gives is Cleanthes’ prayer transmitted by Epictetus (Ench. 53), but it is hardly clear that a 
military metaphor was really intended. Yet, it is without question that in New Testament 
times there were military metaphors in non-Christian sources.
203   Emonds 1963, 136–137, 148–149.
204   On Stoic theology in general, see Algra 2003; for Cleanthes’ religion, see Thom 2005; for 
Epictetus’ religion, see Long 2002, 142–179.
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One can say fairly that as concerns the religious dimension in general, there 
is no lack of ancient military metaphors. In this sense, the early Christian 
usage is similar. There are analogies for all three types of military metaphors 
in Christian texts. First, there are single military words with a metaphorical 
meaning (e.g., Epictetus, Disc. 3.22.18). Regarding the second type of military 
metaphors, the conflict within an individual, Aristotle speaks of it with expres-
sions closely reminiscent of Rom. 7:23. According to Aristotle, the human soul 
seems “to contain another element beside that of rational principle, which 
combats and resists (μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει) that principle” (Eth. Nic. 1102b; 
trans. Rackham, LCL; cf. Plato, Leg. 626e). James claimed that the inner con-
flict in individual Christians also causes “wars” and “conflicts” (πόλεμοι, μάχαι) 
between Christians who covet something and do not get it without violence. 
This is an old theme. Plato writes: “For nothing causes us wars, revolts and 
battles (πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας) other than the body and its appetites” 
(Phaed. 66c; trans. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, LCL). This is echoed by Epictetus:
For it is my nature to look out for my own interests. If it is in my interest 
to have a farm, it is in my interest to take it away from my neighbour; if it 
is in my interest to have a cloak, it is in my interest also to steal it from a 
bath. This is the source of wars, uprisings, tyrannies, and plots (πόλεμοι, 
στάσεις, τυραννίδες, ἐπιβουλαί). 
Epictetus, Disc. 1.22.14; trans. Oldfather, LCL revised
Plato and Epictetus speak of wars and uprisings in relation to literary mean-
ing. However, their reasoning is close to that which James metaphorizes when 
speaking of Christian in-group disputes as wars.
The third type of military metaphors comprises the one where Christian con-
duct is described as warfare. A good parallel is in Plato’s Apologia cited above. 
Clement (1 Clem. 36.6–37.1) emphasizes the orderly conduct of Christian life 
with a comparison to order in the army. Clement’s words have a parallel in 
De Mundo, whose unknown author (called Ps.-Aristotle) compares the orderly 
processes of the universe (cf. 1. Clem. 20) to those of an army.
The process is very like what happens, particularly at moments in a 
war, when the trumpet gives a signal in a military camp; then each man 
hears the sound, and one picks up his shield, another puts on his breast-
plate, and a third his greaves, helmet or belt; one harnesses his horse, 
one mounts his chariot, one passes on the watchword; the company-
commander goes at once to his company, the brigadier to his brigade, the 
cavalryman to his squadron, and the infantryman runs to his own station; 
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all is stirred by a single trumpeter to a flurry of motion according to the 
orders of the supreme commander. 
Ps.-Aristotle, Mund. 399B; trans. Furley, LCL
De Mundo lacks the ethical intention so clear in 1 Clement, but as we have seen 
in the texts of other ancient authors, the military metaphor is easily extended in 
this direction. The form of catalog also reminds one of the metaphor in Paul’s 
epistle to the Ephesians though there is no detailed metaphorical breakdown 
of the soldiers’ equipment. Catalogs of the equipment that soldiers used can be 
found, for example, in Homer’s Iliad 3.328–339.205 I am not aware of any alle-
gorical interpretation of these (or similar) Homeric verses, but if there are any, 
they would provide a good parallel to Ephesians. Ephesians is also recalled in 
Musonius Rufus’ comparison between clothes and the armor (πανοπλία); just 
as one uses weapons (ὅπλα), which protect the bearer, one should also wear 
clothes suited for the protection of the body and not for display (Musonius 
Rufus 19).206 Abraham J. Malherbe notes that some Cynics understood their 
rough cloaks as their armaments.207 There are also clear models for Christian 
writings in the Jewish scriptures:
He put on righteousness like a breastplate,
and a helmet of salvation on his head;
he put on garments of vengeance for clothing,
and wrapped himself in fury as in a mantle.
Isa 59:17
Here, as in Wisdom of Solomon 5:17–40, it is God who puts on the military 
equipment. This imagery is transferred to the Christians in Ephesians.208 Thus, 
military metaphors were known to Christians from scripture and from the 
general Greco-Roman discourse. All three types of military metaphors can 
205   “But goodly Alexander did on about his shoulders his beautiful armour, even he, the lord 
of fair-haired Helen. The greaves first he set about his legs; beautiful they were, and fit-
ted with silver ankle-pieces; next he did on about his chest the corselet of his brother 
Lycaon, and fitted it to himself. And about his shoulders he cast his silver-studded sword 
of bronze, and thereafter his shield great and sturdy; and upon his mighty head he set 
a well-wrought helmet with horse-hair crest—and terribly did the plume nod from 
above—and he took a valorous spear, that fitted his grasp. And in the self-same manner 
warlike Menelaus did on his battle-gear” (trans. Murray, LCL).
206   Lutz 1957, 120, lines 21–25.
207   Malherbe 1983, 157.
208   Best 1998, 587.
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be found in classical texts. In the Christian usage, the metaphors with their 
theological implications are just “christened.” The military element does not 
substantially differ from the non-Christian texts. This fact frames our approach 
anew. One cannot straightforwardly ask whether the Christian use of the mili-
tary metaphors speaks of Christian soldiers. Instead, one has to ask whether 
there is a correlation between the use of military metaphors and some attitude 
toward soldiers.
2.1.3 Do Military Metaphors Speak of Real Soldiers?
In Plato’s case, there is a positive correlation between the military theme of 
the metaphor and actual military life. In the text, the metaphor is developed 
in relation to Socrates’ dutiful service in earlier campaigns. As Epictetus’ echo 
of this metaphor shows, the correlation is not always so clear. In the passage 
cited above, he compares any social position in life (given by God) to the post 
of a soldier (commanded by a general).209 One of those actual social positions 
can be that of a soldier (Disc. 3.24.99). God put Agamemnon in command, as 
he was “able to lead the host against Ilium” (Disc. 3.22.7; trans. Oldfather, LCL). 
Socrates is a great moral example, which includes his military service (Disc. 
3.24.61; 4.1.159–160). Despite these positive sayings on soldiers, there is no clear 
correlation between the use of the military metaphor and a positive attitude 
toward military things. Wars break out due to philosophical lapses (Disc. 1.22.14; 
2.22.22), as was seemingly the case in the Trojan War. In a fictional discussion 
with Agamemnon, Epictetus points out that there is no reason to attack Troy 
(Disc. 3.22.36–37). At last, philosophical training leads to the Stoic indifference 
toward everything, including wars and armies:
How, then, is a citadel destroyed? Not by iron, nor by fire, but by judge-
ments. For if we capture the citadel in the city, have we captured the 
citadel of fever also, have we captured that of pretty wenches also, in a 
word, the acropolis within us, and have we cast out the tyrants within 
us, whom we have lording it over each of us every day, sometimes the 
same tyrants, and sometimes others? But here is where we must begin, 
and it is from this side that we must seize the acropolis and cast out the 
tyrants; we must yield up the paltry body, its members, the faculties, 
property, reputation, offices, honours, children, brothers, friends—count 
all these things as alien to us. And if the tyrants be thrown out of the 
spot, why should I any longer raze the fortifications of the citadel, on my 
209   On Epictetus’ thoughts about social positions, see Huttunen 2009, 24–26.
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own account, at least? For what harm does it do me by standing? Why 
should I go on and throw out the tyrant’s bodyguard? For where do I feel 
them? Their rods, their spears, and their swords they are directing against 
others. 
Disc. 4.1.86–88; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Abraham Malherbe has shown that this Epictetan metaphor has a long tradi-
tion, beginning with Antisthenes the Cynic.210 In Epictetus’ version, concrete 
military things like fortifications turn out to be adiaphora. Actual warfare 
is meaningless to the one whose judgments are right. It is worth compar-
ing Epictetus’ thought with 2 Corinthians 10:3–4, which closely resembles 
the Antishenian tradition, as Malherbe demonstrates. Paul points out that 
“we do not wage war fleshly; for the weapons of our warfare are not fleshly.”211 
Christian warfare is warfare in a metaphorical meaning without any explicit 
connection to actual military operations. There is not one word about actual 
warfare.212 The metaphorical meaning of warfare is repeated in Ephesians: 
“Our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rul-
ers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, 
against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places” (Eph. 6:11). The list of 
soldiers’ equipment is explained with their spiritual equivalents, so that the 
reader cannot miss the spiritual nature of the warfare. This kind of metaphori-
cal usage is already found in Isaiah (Isa 11:4–5; 59:17), but the exact relationship 
between Ephesians and Isaiah is not clear.213
These Pauline words in 2 Corinthians and Ephesians may sound pacifistic,214 
which they are not. The words “we do not wage war fleshly” (2 Cor. 10:3) mean 
that the war Paul is speaking of is not a war in the ordinary sense: “we”—
referring to all Christians—are waging special kind of war. What one should 
think about soldiers waging ordinary wars is left unspoken. It is surely an 
overstatement to see here a claim against ordinary wars. It is only underlined 
that the war under discussion has an unusual meaning. A similar point can be 
made in Ephesians. “Our struggle” underlines the anomalous meaning of war 
210   Malherbe 1983.
211   The translation is a modification of the NRSV. For some reason or other, the NRSV trans-
lates this passage as saying that the weapons are not merely carnal, as if there were also 
carnal weapons.
212   I cannot say if warfare is indifferent to Paul in this passage. He was acquainted with the 
Stoic idea of adiaphora (Huttunen 2009, 26–31).
213   Lincoln 1990, 436. Asher (2014) helpfully illustrates the cultural background of missiles or 
arrows being attributed to the devil.
214   For this reason, it is no surprise that Cadoux (1919, 162–163) noted them.
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in Christian life. In other words, it does not deal with struggle in the ordinary 
sense. One must add that promoting “the gospel of peace” by military means 
(Eph. 6:15) is not a contradiction in terms, as the imperial ideology of the Pax 
Romana was grounded in the Roman army securing the peace.215 This ideology 
is turned toward Christian use without any indication of the attitude toward 
the Empire or its army.
2 Corinthians 10:3–4 and Ephesians 6:10–17 lack any connection to ordinary 
warfare. Thus, they do not say anything of actual soldiers. As the military meta-
phors in the Christian texts clearly belong to the common usage in antiquity, 
they do not create any grounds for a hypothesis regarding Christian soldiers. It 
is noteworthy that Ignatius of Antioch can both use a military metaphor (Ign. 
Pol. 6:2) in the positive sense and paint actual soldiers in a negative light:
From Syria to Rome I have been fighting the wild beasts, through land 
and sea, night and day, bound to ten leopards, which is a company of 
soldiers, who become worse when treated well. But I am becoming more 
of a disciple by their mistreatment. 
Ign. Rom. 5.1; trans. Ehrman, LCL
The military metaphor is woven even into this saying. The expression “From 
Syria to Rome … through land and sea, night and day” resonates with the impe-
rial propaganda by which an emperor or army leader would relate his military 
achievements in the campaigns.216 At the same time, Ignatius’ view of soldiers 
is clearly negative. The passage does nothing more than state the ancient per-
ception, however: rank-and-file soldiers are mean.217 His military metaphors do 
not tell anything of soldiers in Christian communities. The common discourse 
provided these metaphors, which Christians could use for their own pur-
poses. Comparing the domestic and the military metaphors, Raymond Hobbs 
notes that the latter emphasize more the outer and visible aspect of a person’s 
behavior. There is also a strong emphasis on boundary control and heroic suf-
fering in the military metaphors. Hobbs concludes that their use “reflects a 
community which sees itself as a community under threat from human and 
superhuman powers.”218 Hobbs’ claim fits well with the defensive character of 
soldiers’ equipment in 1 Thessalonians 5:8 and Ephesians 6:10–17. Especially 
215   See what I said above about the εἰρηνοποιός (Matt. 5:4).
216   Schoedel 1985, 178.
217   Cadoux (1919, 92 n. 2) understands this as he explicates Ignatius’ words with Edward 
Gibbon’s statement: “The common soldiers, like the mercenary troops of modern Europe, 
were drawn from the meanest, and very frequently from the most profligate, of mankind.”
218   Hobbs 1995, 266–268, 270.
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in the latter text, the Christians are under an attack. In 2 Corinthians 10:3–4, 
however, the reader encounters a more offensive and triumphant metaphor, 
where the enemy is under threat of annihilation. Thus, the military metaphors 
do not always speak of a community under threat, but rather of a situation of 
struggle in general.219
Military metaphors later became quite common in Western Christianity. 
Harnack states that in the third century, Latin Christianity is “filled with 
images of military service, military discipline, and battle. One may flatly state 
that this schema and these images are the most frequent of all.”220 This may 
suggest a greater influence of the army within the Church, but there is also 
another option: the values of military metaphors described by Hobbs were 
intensified by the Church. These two options are not mutually exclusive, and 
the intensified use of the metaphors in early Latin Christianity is an interest-
ing phenomenon which I will examine again in Tertullian’s case, treated below. 
At this point, it is enough to state that the sheer existence of some military 
metaphors in a text does not testify to the existence of Christian soldiers. The 
investigation of the metaphors does not merely lead to a dead end. It is per-
haps enough to say that military themes are not avoided by the early Christian 
authors we have examined. Military life was but one part of the experienced 
world that provided illustrative material for Christian rhetoric. Scholars have 
not always avoided the temptation to read more into it. As we saw at the begin-
ning of this chapter, Shean speculates about the military audience. In contrast, 
scholars with pacifist leanings are eager to read the military metaphors as 
implicating an exclusion of military life in the normal sense. The spiritual 
point of these metaphors would then exclude any actual military invovement.221 
This is far-fetched, as J.J. O’Rourke aptly notes:
[T]he use of a figure of speech merely shows the use of the figure of 
speech; one would scarcely take the comparison of the coming day of the 
Lord with a nocturnal thief (Mt 24,43; 1 Th 5,2), or “Behold I come as a 
thief” (Ap 16,15), as an indication of the early Church’s view of thieves.222
219   Lohse (1990, 13) claims that the battle is just the defensive matter of adherence to the 
victory that Christ has already won, in contrast to the Qumran community, which 
looked forward to the future victory. Yet, even in the metaphorical sphere, we encoun-
ter Christians on the offensive, not to mention in their visions of the future visions (for 
example, Revelation).
220   Harnack 1981, 60.
221   See, e.g., Gabris 1977, 228–229.
222   O’Rourke 1970, 235.
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In some cases, however, one can sense concrete dimensions. First, there is 
sometimes a vague boundary between a metaphor and apocalyptic warfare. 
In Ephesians 6, the war is waged not by real weapons but by spiritual weap-
ons. Nevertheless, there is a real war going on—not in a mundane sense but 
a celestial one:223 “For our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, 
but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of 
this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places” 
(Eph. 6:12). There is also a certain future day given for the battle: “the whole 
armor of God” should be taken in order to withstand “that evil day” (Eph. 6:13). 
If the author means the final day of the eschatological tribulations, he means 
that Christians will really wage war in the end times. Yet, the metaphorical 
meaning of “gearing up” with military equipment makes clear that it is not a 
question of war in the normal sense. In this way, the war in Ephesians differs 
from the apocalyptic wars described in the Christian and Jewish sources.224 It 
is also possible to see the expression “that evil day” as a reference to the whole 
present age, possibly with an idea of “a climatic evil day, when resistance will 
be especially necessary.”225 This turns our perspective back to the idea of con-
tinuous Christian conduct presented as warfare against cosmic forces.
Cosmic military powers are known in the early stage of the Hebrew Bible 
(cf. Gen 32:2–3), but mostly they are combined with apocalyptic visions (cf. 
2 Macc 3:24–26; 1QM XII). There are similar visions in Christian sources 
(cf. Rev 12:7), where Christ can be a commander leading the troops to a vic-
tory in the final battle (Rev 19:11–21). In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus refers to 
celestial legions that are ready to fight when necessary (Matt 27:53).226 The 
visions tell of an army which prevails over all others and, thus, reduces 
the significance of any terrestrial forces. These apocalyptic armies wage actual 
war, though differently and more effectively than mundane ones. In this sense, 
Christian texts do speak of actual warfare. There is also one case where the 
metaphor carries a positive attitude toward the Roman army. Clement of Rome 
presents the Roman army as an example for Christian life within the congrega-
tion. However, the way Clement describes the Roman army betrays more of a 
positive attitude. Clement states, “Consider those who soldier under our own 
leaders” (1 Clem. 37.1; trans. Ehrman, LCL).
223   Harnack 1981, 36.
224   Lincoln 1990, 438.
225   Lincoln 1990, 446.
226   Jesus’ words “Whoever takes the sword will perish by the sword” in the previous verse is 
often used to promote pacifism. This is difficult to defend, however, in the context where 
angelic legions are legitimately clad in armor.
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Harnack notes Clement’s discourse using “our”: “The spokesman of the 
Roman congregation looks upon the Roman army with satisfaction and pride. 
Can he regard an army whose discipline and obedience he praises as in every 
respect the camp of the devil? I think not.”227 Louis J. Swift goes further, stat-
ing that without speaking of Christian participation in war, Clement’s stance 
is difficult to reconcile with pacifism. He continues: “The fact that the author is 
not at all embarrassed by such imagery very likely indicates that the problem 
of a Christian’s serving in the army was not an issue for him.”228 This is a sole 
exception among the early Christian metaphors. Otherwise the metaphors do 
not tell about the attitudes toward the soldiers. The Christian authors used 
the metaphor as their contemporaries did. But if the case is this, we can con-
clude that the views of Christian authors did not greatly differ from those of 
their contemporaries. As I have shown, Epictetus seemed to be slightly nega-
tive toward warfare and soldiering without being an outspoken pacifist in the 
modern sense. Indeed, he shared the common literate view, which is clearly 
visible among the apologists and early Christian theologians, as I argue below.
2.2 The Antimilitarism of Christian Intellectuals and the Christian in the 
Ranks of the Roman Army
2.2.1 Philosophical Disgust toward Wars and Armies
In his The Second Church, Ramsay MacMullen speaks of a divide between 
elite Christians and the common believers, whose life can be reconstructed 
mainly through archeology.229 The literary evidence comes from the elite, 
reflecting their views. If the Christian populace is represented at all, it happens 
on the elite’s terms. I will show that the divide between the theological elite 
and the populace makes understandable why there were both strong anti-
militarists and soldiers among the early Christians. Actually, this divide was 
common in contemporary Roman culture. It is exemplified in a case reported 
by Tacitus, who tells how Vitellius’s army halted Vespasian’ troops in a Roman 
suburb. After successful defense, Vitellius sent several delegations to persuade 
the enemy that a peace agreement would be better than a fight. Musonius 
Rufus, a prominent Stoic philosopher who belonged to one of these,230 found 
that his ideas were strongly rejected by Vespasian’s men.
227   Harnack 1981, 70.
228   Swift 1983, 33.
229   MacMullen 2009.
230   On Musonius, see, e.g., Thorsteinsson 2010, 40–54.
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Musonius Rufus had joined these delegates. He was a member of the 
equestrian order, a man devoted to the study of philosophy and in par-
ticular to the Stoic doctrine. Making his way among the companies, he 
began to warn those in arms, discoursing on the blessings of peace and 
the dangers of war. Many were moved to ridicule by his words, more were 
bored; and there were some ready to jostle him about and to trample on 
him, if he had not listened to the warnings of the quieter soldiers and the 
threats of others and give up his untimely moralizing. 
Tacitus, Hist. 3.81; trans. Moore, LCL
The troops were frenzied, heightening the dissonance between the sol-
diers and the philosopher. Still, I would claim that the situation betrays the 
divide between the moral views of the philosophical elite and the populace. 
Musonius’ antimilitarism won little understanding. This divide is important 
to acknowledge in order to understand why there were both soldiers and 
strong antimilitarists among the early Christians. To be sure, there were also 
upper-class Christian authors (just think of Luke!) who saw nothing wrong 
with the military. Yet, as a generalization, the divide provides an explanation 
for the presence of soldiers, despite certain antimilitaristic traits among the 
early Christians. I will first examine how the philosophical elite viewed wars 
and soldiers. Then I will turn to examine the early Christian theologians, who 
appear to have been negative or hesitant in relation to military issues. Next, I 
will examine both the literary and archeological evidence of Christian soldiers. 
At the end of this chapter, I concentrate on Tertullian, who, despite his anti-
militaristic views, openly discusses Christian participation in the army.
In ancient Rome, the upper-class and literate view on soldiers was some-
what negative.231 In the New Comedy, which flourished before the Empire 
but was still known during it (see, e.g., Marcus Aurelius, Med. 11.6), “the stock 
character soldier of comedy is usually portrayed as swaggering and boastful. 
His masculinity goes to excess, and he does not tend to learn by experience.”232 
Alexander Kyrychenko notes that this negative view of the soldiers is a literary 
topos.233 There were exceptions to this general view. Some within the literate 
elite did not share the negative picture of soldiers. Caesar’s works are examples 
of positive attitudes toward the military. Yet, the literary topoi tell of the gen-
eral atmosphere. Especially the philosophical elite felt some kind of disgust 
toward the military. Harry Sidebottom argues that their “attitudes to soldiers 
231   Campbell 2002, 33.
232   Pierce 1998, 139. I thank Marika Rauhala for drawing my attention to this matter.
233   Kyrychenko 2014, 89–90.
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appear to have usually been a mixture of alienation, contempt, and antipathy.” 
He illustrates his point with examples:
Philosophers’ dislike of soldiers found expression in unflattering com-
parisons. Soldiers were like sheepdogs, which were renowned for their 
viciousness. They were compared to sailors, and the bad company kept 
on ships was proverbial. They were likened to pedagogues, and they were 
generally thought of as being of such low status that they were like hired 
labour for the grape harvest. Serving on a campaign was said to be like 
being a convict.
Epict. 4.1.39; cf. 3.24.29234
There was even some philosophical “flirtation with pacifism,”235 but not with-
out a certain degree of ambiguity. Especially the wars in the remote past could 
be viewed positively and the fulfilling of military duty could be viewed as a 
good thing.236 For example, Epictetus praises Spartans who died fighting in 
Thermopylae (Disc. 2.20.26),237 and he sees it as a duty to serve as a soldier 
(e.g., Disc. 3.22.7; 3.24.61, 99; 4.1.160). This last view contains a certain ethical 
admiration of military discipline—something which legions honored as the 
divine Disciplina.238 Even if certain military features are admired, they are 
mostly presented as a singular point of comparison. The point of these com-
parisons or metaphors is to exhort the civilian audience to lead a better life. 
Military life is not the point but just a vehicle for moral exhortation in civil 
life. Epictetus’ exemplary soldiers are mostly persons of mythology or the 
remote past. In the abovementioned passages, the dutiful soldier is Socrates or 
a person in Homer’s Iliad. In the remote past, there were some brave battles, 
like those waged by the stout-hearted Spartans, who died fighting for freedom 
in Thermopylae (Disc. 2.20.26).239
These brave soldiers were actually figures of literary and cultural traditions, 
not contemporary or real soldiers. Military heroes of recent history or con-
temporary life were lacking. Epictetus presents a former slave, who suffered 
through three campaigns in order to get a higher office, only to find himself 
“in the handsomest and sleekest slavery” (Disc. 4.1.39–40; trans. Oldfather, 
LCL). There was nothing brave about military life here, as the ex-slave was 
234   Sidebottom 1993, 253.
235   Sidebottom 1993, 262.
236   Sidebottom 1993, 254–255.
237   Huttunen 2009, 85–86.
238   Other military virtues honored as deities were Honos, Virtus, and Pietas (Helgeland, Daly, 
and Burns 1981, 48).
239   For this abnormal estimation of warfare in Epictetus, see Huttunen 2009, 85–86.
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emotionally dependent on external things; according to Epictetus, his social 
prestige belonged to indifferent things,240 and his suffering in campaigns was 
futile. Epictetus’ philosophical view of war contains a strong trace of nega-
tivity: wars are due to a lack of philosophical knowledge (e.g., Disc. 1.22.14; 
2.22.22; 3.22.32–37). This philosophical disgust toward wars also seemed to be 
Musonius’ perspective when he tried to inspire pacifism in Vespasian’s troops.
Epictetus’ admirer Emperor Marcus Aurelius could not avoid wars. This 
created an ethical dualism, which he himself noted in his Meditations. He 
lamented that several experiences, including war among others, obliterate all 
the holy principles of philosophy (Med. 10.9). After this notion, he continues 
with an example using self-irony:
A spider prides itself on capturing a fly; one man on catching a hare, 
another on netting a sprat, another on taking wild boars, another 
bears, another Sarmatians. Are not these brigands, if thou test their 
principles? 
Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.10; trans. Haines, LCL
The self-irony is found in the Sarmatians mentioned here. Marcus Aurelius led the 
Roman army in 170 against northern enemies, among others the Sarmatians.241 
He assumed the title Sarmaticus, the conqueror of the Sarmatians, in the year 
175.242 The column erected to the memory of the Emperor and the triumphal 
arch depict prisoners of war that his army captured.243 The divide between 
philosophers and other people is thus embodied in the Emperor’s person. 
Most other philosophers could avoid an encounter with the necessities of the 
political life and thereby maintain their antimilitaristic views in an uncom-
promised manner. Sidebottom notes: “The perception that warfare did not 
impinge directly on the ordinary lives of the majority of the inhabitants of the 
empire, coupled with tenets of Stoic philosophy, led to what can be seen as 
significant omissions in the philosophers’ stated views on warfare.”244 Early 
Christian theologians like Aristides, Justin the Martyr, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, 
and Clement of Alexandria belonged to the intellectual elite with a philosoph-
ical education. It is no surprise that they represent the same philosophical 
attitude in the christened form.
240   Huttunen 2009, 20–26.
241   On these wars, see Birley 1987, 159–183. Birley calls Sarmatians “Jazyges.”
242   Birley 1987, 189; Rutherford 1989, 2–3.
243   See the picture on the opening page of Haines’ edition of the Meditations and the pictures 
in Ferris 2009, 121–126.
244   Sidebottom 1993, 258.
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2.2.2 Theologians of the Early Church
Aristides of Athens, who lived in the first decades of the 2nd century, writes 
in passing that the immoral tales of Greek gods misled people toward several 
disasters, including wars: “So that from these misguided practices it has been 
the lot of mankind to have frequent wars and slaughters and bitter captivities” 
(Aristides of Athens, Apologia 8; trans. ANF 9.269). War belongs to the miser-
ies of the world, yet Aristides provides no further elaboration on the theme. 
Actually, one cannot know what exactly he thought about war and military 
service. The theme seems distant to him. His criticism of polytheism and the 
traditional tales of gods is old, as it is already found in Xenophanes (6th and 
5th centuries BCE).245 Thus, Aristides just modifies an ancient philosophical 
tradition to Christian use.
Justin Martyr (ca. 100–165) is sometimes presented as refusing military 
service.246 He wrote that the fallen angels sowed all kinds of vices among 
humankind: “murders, wars (πολέμους), adulteries, intemperate deeds” (2. Apol. 
5.4; trans. ANF 1:190). One may explain war as a metaphor for the personal 
strivings between individuals. This explanation, however, does not rule out 
war in the literal sense. Justin is namely speaking of any kind of conflict, as 
he says that the fallen angels and the demons did these things “to men, and 
women, and cities, and nations” (2. Apol. 5.5; trans. ANF 1:190). Thus, wars are 
the large-scale version of personal striving. Here Justin belongs to the Greek 
philosophical tradition. For example, both Plato and Epictetus saw personal 
and collective strivings in the same continuum, although they did not speak 
of fallen angels or demons.247 However, middle Platonists knew different 
kinds of demons, both good and evil. Apuleius claims that there are demons 
who are souls that have left their bodies. The souls who have sinned in the 
body are bad demons, creating all kinds of havoc (De deo Socr. 153).248 Plutarch 
describes the activities of certain evil demons as follows:
But as Heracles laid siege to Oechalia for the sake of a maiden, so pow-
erful and impetuous divinities (δαίμονες), in demanding a human soul 
which is incarnate within a mortal body, bring pestilences and failures of 
245   On Xenophanes, see, e.g., Lesher 1992.
246   Cadoux 1919. 103; Bainton 1946, 196; Sider 2012, 23.
247   See Plato, Phaed. 66c and Epictetus, Disc. 1.22.14 (cited above).
248   Dillon 1996, 319.
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crops upon States and stir up wars and civil discords, until they succeed 
in obtaining what they desire. 
Plutarch, Moralia 417D–E; trans. Babbitt, LCL249
Justin gives a Christian character to the generally known philosophical view. 
The Christian side of his argumentation is the reference to the Book of Isaiah, 
which he reads as a prophecy of the Christian mission.
For out of Zion shall go forth instruction, / and the word of the Lord from 
Jerusalem. / He shall judge between the nations, / and shall arbitrate for 
many peoples; / they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, / and 
their spears into pruning-hooks; / nation shall not lift up sword against 
nation, / neither shall they learn war any more. 
Isa 2:3–4
Justin concludes that the prophecy was fulfilled when God sent the disciples 
from Jerusalem. The result is that “we who formerly used to murder one another 
do not only now refrain from making war upon our enemies (οὐ πολεμοῦμεν 
τοὺς ἐχθρούς), but also, that we may not lie nor deceive our examiners, will-
ingly die confessing Christ” (1. Apol. 39.3; trans. ANF 1:175–176). Again, “making 
war” may be a metaphor for personal strivings, and here the metaphorical 
sense seems to be in the foreground. Justin continues by comparing Christian 
readiness for martyrdom to soldiers being ready to die. The metaphorical 
sense seems to be close also in Justin’s other reference to the same prophecy: 
“[W]e who were filled with war, and mutual slaughter, and every wicked-
ness, have each through the whole earth changed our warlike weapons,—our 
swords into ploughshares, and our spears into implements of tillage,—and we 
cultivate piety, righteousness, philanthropy, faith, and hope” (Dial. 110.3: trans. 
ANF 1:254). Justin metaphorically explains the agricultural words as referring 
to piety and other spiritual virtues. Thus, it is also natural to understand “war” 
metaphorically without totally excluding the literal sense. As shown above, in 
Second Apology 5.4–5, personal and national enmity are the same thing, albeit 
on different scales.
Beside his peaceful message, Justin also maintains that the destruction of 
Jerusalem in the Bar Kokhba revolt was a righteous punishment (Dial. 108.1, 
3; 110.6). The Roman rulers and the Roman army seem to be a divine instru-
ment against the unrepentant Jews. Similarly, Luke maintains that the Romans 
249   In this matter, Plutarch seems to be dependent on Xenocrates, a philosopher of the Old 
Academy in the fourth century BC (Dillon 1996, 32).
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punished Jerusalem in the Jewish war (Luke 19:41–44). This thinking reflects 
the Deuteronomistic theology. In the Deuteronomistic history, the Babylonians 
put divine punishment into effect. This does not entail any positive statement 
about Babylonians, however. Thus, the statements about Romans punishing 
Jews are vague, and they can be interpreted in different ways. Justin grants 
recognition to the rulers and expects that they will punish wrongdoers 
(1 Apol. 17; 2 Apol. 9). He requires the emperor to punish even the Christian 
heretics (1 Apol. 16.14). There is a parallel in Epictetus’ thought. Although 
Epictetus is mainly against the violent use of power, he admits in passing that 
rulers rightly punish wrongdoers. Yet, even in this case Epictetus points out 
that rational means are much better for ruling (Disc. 3.22.94).250
Justin and Epictetus did not totally deny the violent use of power. As we saw 
above, the main line of their thought, however, took another direction than 
violence. These views, however, do not explicitly tell whether or not Justin 
accepted Christian soldiers. In general, he does not have much to say about 
soldiers. Justin claims that “your Pilate,” with the soldiers, was against Christ 
(1 Apol. 40.6). This is possibly an echo of the Johannine dualism where sol-
diers are against Christ and his followers. In another place, Justin compares 
the compensation given to soldiers and to persecuted Christians. Soldiers 
put their life in danger without any incorruptible compensation. Why, then, 
would the Christians not do the same if they get an eternal compensation 
(1 Apol. 39.5)? Eduard Lohse comments on this by saying that Christians are 
soldiers in a peculiar way (“Soldaten besonderer Art”).251 Whether or not this 
peculiar art of soldiers can also pertain to an ordinary soldier is left open, how-
ever. Cadoux claims that Justin was against Christian participation in the army, 
but provides an explanation why there was no open antimilitarism. According 
to Cadoux, an open denial of military service would have ruined Justin’s main 
purpose, to win toleration in the Empire.252 One might ask how Cadoux can 
know this. As there is no statement on the matter, I think that it is safer to leave 
Justin’s view open. In any case, it is clear that military matters were not close to 
him. He belonged to the intellectual elite of his time, which had a negative or 
distant relationship in relation to such affairs.
After Justin we find similar slightly negative or distant views in many other 
Christian authors. Tatian (ca. 120–180) shared Justin’s middle Platonist view 
that wars are inspired by demons (Oratio ad Graecos 19.2–4). It is claimed that 
250   For Epictetus’ view on state laws and rulers, see Huttunen 2009, 83–92.
251   Lohse 1990, 15.
252   Cadoux 1919, 103.
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he refused to follow military commands.253 This view is based on an incorrect 
understanding of the text and probably even on an incorrect translation in the 
Ante-Nicene Fathers:
I do not wish to be a king; I am not anxious to be rich; I decline mili-
tary command (τὴν στρατηγίαν παρῄτημαι); I detest fornication; I am not 
impelled by an insatiable love of gain to go to sea; I do not contend for 
chaplets; I am free from a mad thirst for fame; I despise death; I am supe-
rior to every kind of disease; grief does not consume my soul. Am I a slave, 
I endure servitude. Am I free, I do not make a boast of my good birth. 
Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 11.1; trans. ANF 2:69
This text is given in the context where Tatian denies that sinning is up to Fate. 
It is easily seen that, in the Stoic manner, he despises the value of every exter-
nal thing. As I have noted above, for example, Epictetus claimed that external 
things are indifferent, but their use is not. People should not be emotion-
ally dependent on any external thing, but treat them as God wants.254 Thus, 
declining “military command” means only that one is not automatically forced 
to follow the command. Moreover, why should one who despises such com-
mands be a soldier? The case of angareia already shows that soldiers could 
command civilians. There is still one strong reason to doubt that Tatian is 
not speaking of the Christian attitude toward the army. The word στρατηγία 
basically means praetorship or some other high office, which suits well in 
this particular context.255 It is probable that Tatian just denies the value of this 
kind of socially high position, insofar as he despises the position of king. Here, 
Tatian’s reasoning is similar to that of Epictetus, who ridiculed an ex-slave for 
suffering in the campaigns in order to reach a high office (Disc. 4.1.39–40). 
However, Tatian does not combine the high office with warfare. Thus, I cannot 
conclude that Tatian was against Christian participation in the army. The issue 
is left open, which shows a distant relationship to these matters.
Athenagoras (ca. 130–190) claims that punishment in the hereafter is mor-
ally needed. Otherwise those robbers, rulers, and tyrants who have unjustly 
(ἀδίκως) killed myriads are left without their due. Their crimes include, for 
example, razing cities unjustly (ἀδίκως), burning houses along with their inhab-
itants, devastating a country, and destroying inhabitants of cities, peoples, and 
even an entire nation (Res. 19.7). Athenagoras seemingly refers to campaigns 
253   Cadoux 1919, 103; Bainton 1946, 195; Ryan 1952, 17; Shean 2010, 91.
254   On the Stoic theory of value, see, e.g., Huttunen 2009, 20–26.
255   For the meanings of στρατηγία, see Liddell, Scott, and Stuart 2011.
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that led to total destruction, and which are critically described by Tacitus: “To 
plunder, butcher, steal, these things they misname empire: they make a desola-
tion and they call it peace” (Tacitus, Agricola 30.5; trans. Hutton and Peterson, 
LCL). However, Athenagoras uses the word ‘unjustly’ twice, indicating the vio-
lent acts he speaks of as being immoral. This raises the question of whether or 
not some violent acts are just. Cadoux notes that “Athenagoras instances the 
usages of unjust war” without further commentary.256
In principle, Athenagoras may refer to the just war theory, as it was known 
to the Romans. According to Cicero, there is only one justified casus belli: “The 
only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; 
and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have not been blood-
thirsty and barbarous in their warfare” (Cicero, Off. 1.34–40; trans. Miller, LCL). 
The Emperor Augustus boasts that he waged wars in that manner: “I made 
peaceful the Alps from the region near the Ionian bay as far as the Tyrrhenian 
sea, but made war on no tribe unjustly (ἀδίκως)” (Augustus, Res Gestae 26.3; 
trans. Cooley). This text is found in three inscriptions, and it must have been 
widely known. In any case, it transmits the standard Roman propaganda of 
just war repeated later, for example, by Suetonius (Aug. 21.2).257 In the con-
text of this political discourse, it seems probable that Athenagoras shared the 
Roman theory of just war. He only blamed those rulers and tyrants who waged 
unjust wars. His words are vague, as if he is generally not interested in warfare 
or armies. Athenagoras’ attitude toward the military is distant, a stance which 
is characteristic of members of the Roman intellectual elite.258
Irenaeus (c. 130–202)—like Justin before him—thinks that Isaiah’s (2:3–4) 
and Micah’s (4:2–3) prophecies are fulfilled in the Christian proclamation that 
the nations beat their swords and war-lances into peaceful instruments and 
that “they are now unaccustomed to fighting, but when smitten, offer also the 
other cheek” (Haer. 4.34; trans. ANF 1:512). It is, of course, hyperbole to claim 
that nations no longer fought in Irenaeus’ time. He must factually mean that 
Christian individuals do not fight. It is again unclear if “fighting” is a metaphor 
or not. A reference to the Sermon on the Mount gives the impression of per-
sonal quarrels between individuals. Complete peace will be attained only after 
256   Cadoux 1919, 50.
257   Cooley 2009, 223.
258   In another passage, Athenagoras claims that Christians do not endure seeing killing, even 
when someone is justly killed (δικαίως φονευόμενον) (Leg. 35.4). The context, however, does 
not refer to war or to the army. Athenagoras claims that rumors of killings in Christian 
gatherings are senseless, as Christians do not even attend the gladiatorial games. Thus, 
gazing upon just killings refers to what people watching gladiators do.
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the eschatological turn,259 when people are no longer like wild animals but 
tame ones:
[T]hose inflict no hurt at all who in the former time were, through their 
rapacity, like wild beasts in manners and disposition, both men and 
women; so much so that some of them were like wolves and lions, ravag-
ing the weaker and warring on their equals; while the women (were like) 
leopards or asps, who slew, it may be, even their loved ones with deadly 
poisons, or by reason of lustful desire. (But now) coming together in one 
name they have acquired righteous habits by the grace of God, changing 
their wild and untamed nature. And this has come to pass already. 
Epid. 61; trans. Robinson
As the last sentence reveals, Irenaeus thought that Christians had already 
changed from being like wild beasts into tame animals. His starting point is 
Isa 11:6–7; while Isaiah’s text is not clearly metaphorical, Irenaeus’ explanation 
is that animals refer to different kinds of people. The metaphorical use of ani-
mals is known from the philosophical tradition. For example, Epictetus says:260
It is because of this kinship with the flesh that those of us who incline 
toward it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and hurtful, and 
others like lions, wild and savage and untamed. 
Epictetus, Disc. 1.3.7; trans. Oldfather, LCL
Though Irenaeus speaks of “warring on their equals,” this surely meant all 
kinds of violent quarrels. On the other hand, it is clear that there will be no 
wars after the eschatological turn. If Christians already live this peaceful life 
in this era, as Irenaeus assumes, it does logically include conscientious objec-
tion. This conclusion is not accepted by Jean-Michel Hornus, who refers to 
Haer. 5.24;261 here Irenaeus refers to Rom 13:4, where civil authorities are 
claimed to be agents of God’s wrath. He advises Christians not to call the author-
ities into question when they punish wrong-doers legitimately. According to 
Hornus, this suggests that Christians could also be agents of God’s wrath.
Hornus’ interpretation, however, goes too far. Irenaeus probably thought 
that gentile authorities used the sword. He says that those who departed from 
259   Sider (2012, 29–30) restricted the passage so that its eschatological character is no longer 
clear for the reader.
260   More analogies for Epictetus texts are referred to by Dobbin (1998, 88).
261   Hornus 1980, 65.
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God—clearly non-Christians—are “subjected to human authority, and kept 
under restraint by their laws,” so that they can attain “some degree of justice, 
and exercise mutual forbearance through dread of the sword” (Haer. 5.24; 
trans. ANF 1:552, italics added). Unlike Paul, Irenaeus speaks of the laws that 
hold society together, but behind these laws the sword looms large as the 
ultimate restraint. The wrathful sword and its use belong to their life, that is, 
to the life of the gentiles. I do not see here any hint of Christians using the 
sword. Irenaeus seems to acknowledge that authorities legitimately punish 
wrongdoers. Christians do not need such punishment, however, as they are 
tame animals instead of wild beasts. This seems to be in line with Justin and 
Epictetus, who also acknowledge civil punishments but prefer better, non-
violent means.
One can find more concrete information in the writings of Clement of 
Alexandria. There are several passing references to war and soldiers.262 Three 
of them are of greater interest. First, in a series of scattered passages from 
the Bible, Clement cites the exhortation of John the Baptist (Luke 3:14; Paed. 
3.12.91). As I showed above, Luke did not question soldiers as such but only their 
malpractices. This seems to be Clement’s stance, too, as he does not qualify the 
exhortation in any way.263 Another interesting passage is his injunction to use 
shoes. According to Clement, women should not go barefoot, whereas men can 
go barefoot, except in military service (Paed. 2.11.117). Ronald J. Sider comments 
on this: “Given the fact that Clement’s whole book is devoted to describing how 
Christians should live, we should probably assume that Clement is thinking 
of Christians in the army.”264
Sider’s supposition is far from definitive, however, as Clement does not say 
this explicitly. His argumentation for soldiers wearing shoes is just a cryp-
tic word play: ὑποδεδέσθαι τῷ δεδέσθαι, “For being shod is near neighbour to 
being bound” (trans. ANF 2:267). This seems to apply to any soldier, not just 
a Christian one. A passing reference to soldiers with word play can be a side 
comment, which does not necessarily refer to Christian soldiers. However, one 
passage does give more information, and it is sometimes presented as a wit-
ness that “Clement regarded military service as merely another occupation.”265 
In the context, he states that human beings are created to have knowledge 
of God.
262   See a larger collection in Sider 2012, 32–42.
263   See also the Didascalia apostolorum (probably written in Syria around 230), which refers 
to the same exhortation in Luke (Sider 2012, 64–65).
264   Sider 2012, 37.
265   Helgeland 1979, 744; Cf. Harnack 1981, 75; Swift 1983, 52.
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Practise husbandry (γεώργει), we say, if you are a husbandman; but while 
you till your fields, know God. Sail the sea (πλεῖθι), you who are devoted to 
navigation, yet call the whilst on the heavenly Pilot. Has knowledge taken 
hold of you while engaged in military service (στρατευόμενόν σε κατείλη-
φεν ἡ γνῶσις)? Listen to the commander, who orders what is right. 
Prot. 10.100; trans. ANF 2:200
I am hesitant to claim that this text presents military service as “merely another 
occupation.” First, one may note that Clement speaks of those soldiers who 
have become Christians during their service. It is not just an occupation that a 
Christian takes. This may mirror the practice that a Christian should not enlist 
(Trad. ap. 16.9), though Clement does not express it clearly.266 Second, there is 
an interesting difference between the admonitions given to the soldiers and to 
the others. The commander who orders what is right surely denotes God, like 
the heavenly Pilot is God.267 Thus, the peasant and the sailor are admonished 
to do their work with God in their minds, but there is no specific injunction 
for soldiers to fulfill their military tasks. They are only admonished to listen to 
God. What this concretely means is left unsaid. While military service is some-
what problematic, it can be admitted that Clement is not an uncompromising 
antimilitarist.
The philosophically oriented Christian elite did not encounter the problem 
of militarism only in the Roman army but also in the Scripture. Marcion and 
some other theologians rejected the entire Old Testament, partly because of 
its violent and belligerent parts. Others justified the Scripture by allegorizing 
or by thinking that the times of such warfare were over and should be left in 
the past.268 The last stance we saw already in Epictetus, who could praise the 
Spartans’ fighting in Thermopylae while his view of contemporary wars was 
negative. Clement of Alexandria bridged the histories of the Greco-Roman cul-
ture and the Old Testament by claiming that the Greeks learned all their skills 
from Moses—including military tactics and strategy (Strom. 1.24.158–160). The 
266   Similarly, Rordorf 1969, 113. In contrast, Helgeland (1979, 744) claims that “Clement 
never gave the slightest indication that enlistment would be a problem.” The Apostolic 
Tradition is preserved in several versions and details vary between them (see Bradshaw, 
Johnson, and Phillips 2002, 89–90). In each version, it prohibits the catechumen and bap-
tized Christians from becoming soldiers. There were also limitations in accepting some 
high-ranking soldiers (thus interpreted by Bradshaw, Johnson, and Phillips 2002, 94) 
into the Christian community, while other soldiers are not mentioned at all. Seemingly 
those in military service who became Christians were usually not required to leave their 
occupation.
267   Sider 2012, 34. Cf. Rordorf 1969, 113.
268   Bainton 1946, 212.
Niko Huttunen - 978-90-04-42824-9
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2020 03:42:19PM
via University of Helsinki
210 chapter 4
same church father, however, was dubious about the armies of his own time. 
Clement belonged to the intellectual elite of his time and shared their ambigu-
ity vis-à-vis military issues.
All this religious hesitation in the face of military service seems confirmed 
by Celsus, who criticized Christianity in his book The True Word in 170–180. 
Celsus blamed Christians for not taking up arms for the emperor. Origen 
quotes his words:
For if all were to do the same as you, there would be nothing to prevent 
his being left in utter solitude and desertion, and the affairs of the earth 
would fall into the hands of the wildest and most lawless barbarians; and 
then there would no longer remain among men any of the glory of your 
religion or of the true wisdom. 
Origen, Cels. 8.68; trans. ANF 4:665
According to Harnack, Celsus “confirms what we have assumed, that the 
church did not allow its faithful to serve in the military.” Roland Bainton claims 
that Celsus “knew of no Christians who would accept military service.” Origen, 
who wrote 70–80 years later, accepts Celsus’ claim of Christians who did not 
enter the army. This is just intellectual discussion, however. Intellectuals dis-
cussed the ideas of the philosophically oriented Christian elite, not social 
facts. Many literate Christians despised or at least felt religious hesitation 
about military service, while other Christians lived their life within Roman 
society, including the army. Our first evidence of Christian soldiers after the 
New Testament writings come from Celsus’ time. Next I will look at the non-
intellectuals and some intellectual dissidents.
2.2.3 Intellectuals and Other Christians
Tertullian and Eusebius of Caesarea discuss Christian soldiers in Marcus 
Aurelius’ “thundering legion,” Legio XII Fulminata, which fought on the north-
ern frontier in the 170s. Both authors refer to the so-called “rain miracle.” The 
miracle has historical roots, as it is also described in gentile sources without 
any mention of Christians.269 The column of Marcus Aurelius represents two 
anomalous weather phenomena, the rain and the thunderbolt.270 The rain god 
269   The most important ancient sources are Dio Cassius 72.8–10; Historia Augusta, M. Ant. 24.4; 
Tertullianus, Apol. 5.6; Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.5. Kovács (2009, 23–93) provides an extensive 
collection of the sources and commentaries on them.
270   On the incidents described in the column with an overview to the literary sources, see, 
e.g., Ferris 2009, 81–93.
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depicted on the column was a new figure in Roman iconography. The god does 
not correspond to Hermes Aerios, to whom the Roman sources attribute the 
miracle.271 Kovács assumes that “the creator of the visual message of the col-
umn evidently did not wish to identify the figure with any specific Roman god,” 
and suggests that the rain god is an allegorical figure.272
Because the rain god is a totally new figure, one is tempted to see here a ref-
erence to a new divinity for the Romans, that is, the god of Christian worship. 
Tertullian attributes the rain to God, to whom Christian soldiers prayed in dis-
tress. Tertullian refers to what Marcus Aurelius himself would have written in a 
letter: “He bears his testimony that that Germanic drought was removed by the 
rains obtained through the prayers of the Christians who chanced to be fight-
ing under him” (Tertullian, Apol. 5.6; trans. ANF 3:22).273 What imperial letter 
Tertullian has seen is unknown.274 However, he also mentions the rain miracle 
in Ad Scapulam 4.6, maintaining that it is a famous incident. While Tertullian’s 
descriptions are short, they are the earliest preserved written sources.275 These 
testimonies come some decades after the incident. Eusebius is more generous 
with his account, telling that rain and thunder brought victory to the Roman 
army after the Christian soldiers kneeled and prayed for help (Hist. eccl. 5.5). 
Although Eusebius wrote in the fourth century, his words have some reli-
ability, as he used earlier sources, gentile texts, Tertullian and—what is most 
interesting—Apollinaris, the bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, who was a con-
temporary of the campaign. Although one cannot exactly know what comes 
from Apollinaris, Eusebius seems to base his work on a source independent of 
any that has been preserved.276
John Helgeland points out that neither Apollinaris nor Tertullian give any 
hint that the Christian soldiers did something wrong.277 Shean reads this as a 
general acceptance of military service.278 I do not agree. One should keep in 
mind that Apollinaris and Tertullian wrote apologies for the emperor. In this 
context it is understandable that no critical stance toward the military would 
be expressed. They did not wish to raise any suspicion of disloyalty. As I later 
271   Ferris 2009, 84.
272   Kovács 2009, 166–167.
273   Tertullian also mentions the incident in Scap. 4.6; ANF 3:107.
274   There is a letter from Marcus Aurelius to the Roman senate, but it seems to have been 
written in the 4th century (Helgeland 1979, 769; Kovács 2009, 113–121). The text of the let-
ter is given, e.g., by ANF 1:187; see Kovács (2009, 51–53) and Snyder (2012, 140–142).
275   Pace Ferris (2009, 86, 88) who claims that Dio Cassius provides the earliest writing in the 
first decades of the third century. Later, however, he reports that Tertullian wrote ca. 200.
276   Kovács 2009, 47–50.
277   Helgeland 1979, 773.
278   Shean 2010, 191.
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show, Tertullian could also write on Christian soldiers in a totally different 
tone. Tertullian’s (and possibly Apollinaris’) critical stance, however, lends reli-
ability to the information. There was no ideological need to invent stories of 
Christian soldiers. In sum, it seems a fact that there were Christians in Marcus’ 
army. Legio XII Fulminata was recruited in Cappadocian Melitene, and it 
must have trained there rigorously before the campaign. Helgeland suggests 
that “Christian participation in the army at Melitene must have taken place 
long before 173,”279 when he dates the miraculous victory. This dating is not 
universally accepted, but all scholars place the rain miracle in the first years 
of the 170s.280 Thus, there must have been Christians in the legion no later than 
the late 160s.
The Christians of the “thundering legion” are the first Christian soldiers 
after those mentioned by the Gospel of Luke and Acts. It makes no difference 
whether the Christian soldiers referenced by Luke are historical. Luke’s text 
proves that soldiers were welcome to join the Lucan communities. Since Luke 
wrote around 100, the “silent years” between Luke and the rain miracle com-
prise about seven decades. Is it credible that there was no continuity from the 
canonical writings of Luke to the times of the “thundering legion”? I would 
argue that we should not put too much weight on the philosophically oriented 
church fathers, as they did not cover the whole of Christianity of their time. 
The Gospel of Peter, the origin of which is before 150–190,281 gives a very positive 
picture of soldiers, though it does not claim that they were Christians.
Through an analysis of The Infancy Gospel of Thomas, Helgeland has sup-
ported the idea that soldiers were accepted into Christian circles. Its picture of 
Jesus is less peaceful than that of the canonical gospels. This apocryphal gos-
pel attracted the interest of less literate Christians, which brings Helgeland to 
conclude that “a study of the church fathers alone is likely to present a danger-
ously biased impression of the experience of the early church.”282 Though The 
Infancy Gospel does not speak of Christian soldiers, it shows that the common 
Christians did not always share the ideals and values of the intellectual elite.283 
Differences within the Christian communities on the educational level also 
279   Helgeland 1979, 773.
280   Kovács 2009, 265–275.
281   Foster 2010, 172.
282   Helgeland 1979, 762–764. Sider (2012, 129–130) rightly criticizes Helgeland for confusing 
The Gospel of Thomas and The Infancy Gospel of Thomas. However, that does not weaken 
the point that The Infancy Gospel of Thomas indeed presents a more violent picture of 
Jesus than the canonical gospels.
283   On the differences between the literate elite and other Christians, see Shean 2010, 154–162.
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explain why some literary sources are so negative or hesitant toward military 
service, while other texts leak that Christians were soldiers.
I do not to claim that every literate Christian shared the hesitant or negative 
views of many philosophers. Otherwise one could not explain, for example, 
Luke’s views. Later, Julius Africanus clearly differs from the philosophical 
church fathers; he is a deviant figure among the literate Christians of the 
beginning of the third century. That Julius shamelessly promoted the art of 
war embarrassed Cadoux, leading him to claim that Julius was only nominally 
a Christian and thus “represents no one but himself.”284 In fact, he is a good 
reminder that the views of the church fathers did not represent the whole 
truth. Born in Aelia Capitolina some fifteen years after the Bar Kokhba revolt, 
Julius belonged to the high society of the eastern parts of the Empire.285 He 
may have been an officer of Septimius Severus’ army, but if not, he was at least 
well acquainted with military matters.286 This is evident from his book Kestoi, 
which he wrote during his stay in Rome. The book was aimed at insinuating 
himself into the good graces of Emperor Severus Alexander.287
Encyclopedic in scope, it is an assemblage of miscellaneous, practical 
advice about military ruses, armament, horse medicine, weights and 
measures, botany, antidotes, textual criticism, amulets, truth serums, 
hypnotics, aphrodisiacs, fertility drugs, and even family planning. Much 
of what survives from it is a disquieting catalogue of various methods of 
biological and chemical warfare. The tone is strident and merciless. 
Poison the food and water of the barbarians, Africanus urges, just as they 
try to poison us.288
The book belongs to the category of manuals that provided technical details 
supporting the Emperor’s warfare. It is not without parallels, though its 
Christian origin is unique.289 Despite his more clearly Christian writings, Julius 
was a fringe figure in the Church. He “held no church office, formed no sect, 
284   Cadoux 1919, 206–207.
285   Adler 2004, 521–522; Shean 2010, 193–194. Adler (2004, 531–534) denies that the court of 
Edessa was Christian, although the court had close relationships with Christians like 
Julius.
286   Adler 2004, 539.
287   Adler 2004, 540.
288   Adler 2004, 542.
289   Adler 2004, 543–544.
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had no school, taught no students, attracted no following.”290 Hence, he did 
not belong to the philosophically oriented Christians. Yet, his figure reveals a 
side of early Christianity which is so easily forgotten in the shadow of the more 
antimilitaristic church fathers.
While most Christians never wrote a single word, there is fortunately archae-
ological evidence that points to the existence of Christian soldiers at the turn 
of the third century. Some scholars have counted funerary inscriptions as proof 
of this, but very few of the inscriptions are from the pre-Constantine period. 
Even fewer are from the first half of the third century or earlier. I comment on 
only two of the inscriptions, as they are early enough and seem to have a tie 
to Christianity.291 First, there is an inscription which commemorates the wife 
of a certain Cossutius serving in Septimius Severus’ army. The text includes a 
date: April 10, 201.
d(is) m(anibus) Cossutius Eutyches Aureliae Romanae coniugi kar(issimae) 
dulcis(simae) ben(e) m(erenti) fecit cum quo vix(it) ann(os) XXVIII 
secund(a) Parthica Sever(iana) Faviano Muc(iano) con(sulibus) III idus 
April(es).
To the gods and to the shades. Cossutius, spouse of Eutyche Aurelia, made 
this monument for his Roman spouse, dearest and sweetest, with whom 
he lived twenty-eight years, member of the Second Parthian Severan 
Legion, in the consulship of Favianus and Mucius, three days before the 
Ides of April.292
The identification with Christianity is seemingly based on the place of the 
inscription, not on the text itself.293 Actually, the text raises doubts about 
the identification of Cossutius as a Christian. First, there is no hint of 
Christianity in the text. Second, are the opening words of the text something 
which can be expected of a Christian? What are the “gods” that a Christian 
would refer to? Third, if we accept that the place of the inscription determines 
290   Adler 2004, 547.
291   See, e.g., Hornus 1980, 118–122; Helgeland 1979, 791–793; Swift 1979, 862; Shean 2010, 183–
185. Sider (2012, 145–151) gives a series of inscriptions. Among them is one from the year 
217, which is sometimes supposed to be Christian because of the words “welcomed to 
God.” Yet, because it is far from certain that this implies the Christian God (Sider 2012, 
148), I leave this inscription aside.
292   Cf. CIL 6.32877; trans. Owen Evald in Sider 2012, 147.
293   Swift 1979, 826.
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that Eutyche was a Christian, what makes us suppose that Cossutius shared her 
faith? Thus, this inscription does not provide evidence of Christian soldiers.
Another interesting inscription is found in the Christian cemetery of 
Priscilla in Rome. Scholars have dated it to the end of the second century. Thus, 
it might be even earlier than the inscription cited above.294
P(ublio) Marcello beterano | AA(u)gg(ustorum) nn(ostrorum) eq(uiti) 
R(omano).
To Publius Marcellus, a Roman knight, veteran of the army of our two 
emperors.295
Not even this is unambiguously an inscription of a Christian soldier. The 
deceased man is certainly a veteran, but the text does not tell whether or not he 
was a Christian during his active service. Scholars who normally comment on 
all the pre-Constantine inscriptions conclude that the very existence of these 
inscriptions proves the toleration of soldiers in the Christian communities.296 
When looking only at these two inscriptions, however, such a conclusion must 
be made more carefully: there were possibly soldiers among the Christians 
around the year 200. What these funerary inscriptions show, at the very least, 
is that the social network of Christians reached into military life. It was accept-
able to not prohibit military careers in the communities where the inscriptions 
were found.297 This is not much, but an expert of inscriptions would find more. 
Germane to my discussion, Ronald J. Sider writes that a new, up-to-date study 
on this topic would be very useful.298
Fortunately, we also have other archaeological evidence of Christian sol-
diers. In Dura-Europos, a town and military base in Syria, a home church has 
been discovered.299 The town was destroyed in 256, so the church must be 
dated earlier than that. There was a dwelling of soldiers in the same city block 
as the church, as the Greek and Latin inscriptions prove.300 In the church, there 
are some Roman names in the inscriptions.301 One of these, Proclus, is found 
294   Sider 2012, 146.
295   Cf. CIL 6.37273; trans. Owen Evald in Sider 2012, 147.
296   Bainton 1946, 193–194; Hornus 1980, 122; Swift 1979, 862; Shean 2010, 185.
297   Cf. Swift 1979, 862.
298   Sider 2012, 146.
299   For an overview of the church and the Christian community there, see Snyder 2003, 128–
134; MacMullen 2009, 1–10; Mell 2010, 33–105.
300   Mell 2010, 87.
301   Mell 2010, 101.
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in a wall painting that presents the victory of David over Goliath. Otherwise, 
the name Proclus appears only in the military sources of Dura-Europos. The 
name in the painting indicates either the painter or the benefactor.302 Ulrich 
Mell has convincingly shown that the motif of David and Goliath belongs to 
the old Syrian baptismal ritual,303 but one can speculate whether it had a spe-
cial appeal to soldiers. It seems probable that there was a Proclus among the 
Christians of Dura-Europos.
If the case of Christian soldiers is somewhat speculative in Dura-Europos, 
it is not in Megiddo. A Christian prayer hall at Megiddo has an unequivocal 
military character, as both its place and an inscription prove. The construction 
is dated around 230,304 which means that it is earlier than the house church in 
Dura-Europos. The prayer hall is situated in the immediacy of a Roman army 
camp. Besides the prayer hall, the building consists of dwellings of centurions 
and their families. There was also a bakery, which belonged to the army, as 
bread stamps used by the army were found there.305 Thus, it seems that the 
army owned the building.306 The floor of the prayer hall is decorated with four 
mosaic carpets situated around a stone table. All the carpets have geometrical 
figures. In addition, one carpet has two inscriptions and one carpet an inscrip-
tion with a picture of two fishes, a tuna and a bass.307 The three inscriptions, 
written in Greek, prove that the prayer hall is a Christian construction. The 
carpet with the picture of fishes includes the following text:
Gaianus, also called Porphyrius, centurion, our brother (ἀδελφὸς ἡμῶν), 
has made the pavement at his own expense as an act of liberality. 
Brutius has carried out the work.308
This text fits well with the picture of centurions from the gospels and other 
material. As I have shown above, centurions had economic resources, which 
302   Mell 2010, 162.
303   Mell 2010, 169–173.
304   Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 28, 50. The dating is debated (Adams 2008, 64–66). Adams 
compares the construction with a post-Constantine building in Britain, where there is a 
chapel installed in one of the rooms. According to Adams, this similarity with the prayer 
hall in Megiddo “could perhaps lend weight to the view that the Megiddo church is a later 
(post-313 CE) Christian addition” (Adams 2008, 67). This evidence is very weak, however. 
A later survey on the site has not changed the dating (Tepper, David, and Adams 2016, 116).
305   Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 24, 29–30, 45.
306   Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 50–51. The unit there was Legio VI Ferrata, which seems to have 
been present already at Hadrian’s time (Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 14; Pollard and Berry 
2012, 153–154).
307   Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 31–34.
308   Trans. Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 34.
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made them appealing for the Christian communities. Gaianus could afford a 
mosaic construction. Though he is “our brother,” this designation is not enough 
to prove that he was a Christian. This designation was used in Greco-Roman 
associations and in military life, especially among the adherents of Mithraism.309 
The Christian character becomes plain in the other carpet, which includes two 
texts. The first indicates the donor of the stone table:
Προσήνικεν Ἀκεπτους ἡ φιλόθεος τὴν τράπεζαν θ[ε]ῷ Ἰ[ησο]ῦ Χ[ριστ]ῷ 
μνημόσυνον.
The God-loving Akeptous has offered the table to God Jesus Christ as a 
memorial.310
The words “God Jesus Christ” unequivocally proves that the prayer hall is a 
Christian construction. Each of the sacred names appears as a standard 
abbreviation, which we know from papyri of the 3rd–4th centuries.311 As 
the inscription dedicates the table to God Jesus Christ, it was probably used 
for the Eucharist.312 Yotam Tepper and Leah Di Segni interestingly point out 
that the word μνημόσυνον occurs three times in the New Testament (Matt. 26:13; 
Mark 14:9; Acts 10:4). In Acts, the word is used by an angel in speaking to 
Cornelius the centurion: “Your prayers and your alms have ascended as a memo-
rial before God (εἰς μνημόσυνον ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θεοῦ).” In Matthew and Mark, the 
word occurs in the story of a woman anointing Jesus in Bethany. Jesus says that 
the incident should be told to the whole world in memory of her (εἰς μνημόσυνον 
αὐτῆς). Tepper and Di Segni claim that in light of the anointing story, the word 
does not occur by chance in the inscription. There are also women in the other 
inscription of the same carpet. The inscription runs as follows:
Remember (μνημονεύσατε) Primilla and Cyriaca and Dorothea, and more-
over also Chreste.313
Tepper and Di Segni note that the formula is unusual, as the request is not 
addressed to God—which is usual in the memorial inscriptions—but to other 
309   Harland 2005; Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 34–35.
310   Trans. Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 36. Tepper and Segni remark that προσήνικεν is the vulgar 
form of προσήνεγκεν.
311   Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 36.
312   See Tepper and Di Segni (2006, 37), who note that the Greek word used in the inscription 
also occurs in Paul when he refers to the Eucharist (1 Cor 10:21).
313   Trans. Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 41.
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Christians.314 One is tempted to think that, as a woman, Akeptous wanted to 
be remembered like the other women mentioned in the carpet. In this inter-
pretation, Akeptous would have erected the table for Christ so that it would 
also serve as a reminder of her. In the Scripture, there are also examples of a 
memorial (μνημόσυνον) for people in cultic situations (cf. Lev. 23:24; Num. 17:5). 
This interpretation is anything but clear, however. The parallel between the 
woman in the New Testament story and Akeptous is not very close. The for-
mer does not offer a memorial, as Akeptous does. Instead, the story itself 
is a memorial of the woman for people. One should consider other interpreta-
tive options.
Was the table intended to remind the people of Christ or Christ of the 
people? As the table was probably used for the Eucharist, one can associate 
it with the idea that the Eucharist is celebrated in rememberance of Christ 
(1 Cor 11:24–25; Luke 22:19; Justin Martyr, 1 Apol. 66:3). In this reading the 
table would be a memorial of Christ for the Christians. This is, however, not 
very probable. First, in the traditionally transmitted eucharistic words the 
rememberance is not μνημόσυνον but ἀνάμνησίς. Second, it is quite natural 
to understand the word μνημόσυνον as a second object for the verb.315 Thus, 
the table should remind God Jesus Christ of something, probably of the local 
Christians. This idea comes close to the Eucharist prayer of Didache, which 
contains the petition “Remember (μνήσθητι) your church, O Lord” (Did. 10.5; 
trans. Ehrman, LCL). There are analogies for the use of μνημόσυνον in this 
sense. In the story of Cornelius, prayers and alms are a memorial (μνημόσυνον) 
for God. The Book of Tobit speaks of prayers as a memorial (μνημόσυνον) before 
God (Tob 12:12; cf. Sir 50:16). The Septuagint provides analogies of cultic articles 
as a memorial (μνημόσυνον) for God (Exod 28:29; 30:16; Num 31:54). This use of 
μνημόσυνον suits quite well for the table, while the use of the word in the story 
of the anointing woman is more remote. I conclude that Akeptous erected the 
table to remind God Jesus Christ of the believers in the camp. In addition, 
the analogical use of μνημόσυνον in the story of Cornelius may have appealed 
to the Christians congregated in a building that belonged to the Roman army.
The Christian prayer hall in Megiddo is an unequivocal witness that there 
were Christians in the Roman army in the beginning of the third century. 
As the prayer hall is in the building owned by the army, Christians gathered 
314   Tepper and Di Segni 2006, 42. Similar formulations are found in the church of 
Dura-Europos (Mell 2010, 160–161). One could also ask, is it certain that the plural refers 
to Christians and not, for example, to the divine Father and Son? Justin Martyr already 
pointed out that Jesus is “another God and Lord” (θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος), which was the 
explanation for the occasional plural referring to God in the Scripture (Dial. 56.4; 62.1–4). 
That said, I do not know any Christian prayer with an address in the plural.
315   On two accusatives with one verb, see Smyth 1984, 362.
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openly there and their faith was tolerated in the unit. Neither was the church 
in Dura-Europos a secret one; it was generally known.316 These facts fit well 
with the relative tolerance of Christianity in the beginning of the third century. 
A positive peak for the Christians was during the reign of Emperor Alexander 
Severus (r. 222–235). He is claimed to have kept Christ and Abraham among 
his household lares (Historia Augusta, Alex. Sev. 29.2).317 The emperor’s mother 
played an important role in the administration (Historia Augusta, Alex. Sev. 14.7). 
Eusebius of Caesarea reports that she had Origen give her a lecture and that 
the emperor’s household was largely Christian (Hist. Eccl. 6.21.3–4; 6.28). The 
sources may somewhat exaggerate the favor of Christianity in the court, but 
there was apparently a certain degree of peace. The existence of the prayer hall 
in a military area fits with this warmer period for Christians in the Empire.318
As Christianity did not belong to the official cults of the state, it was cele-
brated outside of the army camp. We do not know how the centurion Gaianus, 
“our brother,” and other brothers in Legio VI Ferrata lived with the official cult. 
Neither do we know, for instance, how they reconciled the “gospel of peace” 
with their military profession. They apparently did not concern themselves so 
much with these issues, or at least they found a way to reconcile their profes-
sion with their faith. Tertullian, an educated intellectual Christian, provides 
more information in spite of the fact that he did not accept them.
2.2.4 Tertullian’s Antimilitarism Meets Christian Practice
Tertullian is routinely presented as the pacifist in the early Church. Jean-Michel 
Hornus speaks of “Tertullian and other Christian ethicists,” who rejected all 
compromise with the military.319 As Roland Bainton points out, “In the West, 
Tertullian was the most unambiguous when he said that ‘Christ in disarming 
Peter ungirt every soldier.’ ”320 Tertullian provides two basic arguments against 
Christian participation in the army. First, Christians are not allowed to spill 
blood and, second, the idolatry included as part of military service is strictly 
316   Mell 2010, 81–82.
317   Historia Augusta, Alex. Sev. 43.6–7, 51.7–8 also reports of Alexander Severus’ otherwise 
positive attitude toward Christianity. One can surely see here the tendency of a pagan 
author to propagate religious tolerance in the Theodosian Christian Empire at the end of the 
4th century (Stertz 1977).
318   Adams (2008, 66) supposes that construction of the prayer hall would have invited a 
religious conflict, but in the political climate of Alexander Severus it was not automati-
cally so. Alexander’s successor Maximinus Thrax started persecutions, but these were 
limited to certain leaders of the Church (Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 6.28). Later, Philip the Arab 
(r. 244–249) is reported to be a Christian (Hist. Eccl. 6.34), but this is also an exaggeration. 
However, his reign was evidently mild for the Christians (Pohlsander 1980).
319   Hornus 1980, 158.
320   Bainton 1986, 73.
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prohibited (Cor. 11; Idol. 19).321 While it is right to present Tertullian as an anti-
militarist, he is not representative of the general Christian attitude. His own 
writings betray the fact that all Christians did not live up to his ideals. What we 
encounter again is the discrepancy between the views of the elite Christians 
and the reality among other Christians. For this reason, it is fruitful and illus-
trative to complete this chapter with a survey of Tertullian’s writings.
Jerome claimed that Tertullian was the son of a centurion (Vir. ill. 53), but 
this information is not always taken as fully certain.322 One of the arguments 
for Tertullian’s military background is his dense use of military parlance.323 
“We were called to the warfare of the living God (ad militam Dei vivi) in our 
very response to the sacramental words (in sacramenti verba)” (Mart. 3; trans. 
ANF 3:694), he proclaims in a manner that is not very unusual for him.324 One 
of the original meanings of sacramentum is military oath, to which Tertullian 
clearly refers here. However, the sheer existence of military metaphors does 
not require a military background. I earlier noted that the military metaphors 
in early Christianity have roots in the ancient philosophical tradition. One 
encounters military metaphors in Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, and other phi-
losophers. The same metaphors were present in the Latin literature. Seneca 
admonished: “vivere, Lucili, militare est (Ep. 96.5). In Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, 
a priest of Isis tells that at the end of the initiation rite, Lucius, the main char-
acter of the novel, enlists himself “in this holy army (sanctae huic militiae), 
to whose oath of allegiance (sacramento) you were summoned not long ago” 
(Metam. 11.15; trans. Hanson, LCL).325 Pliny the Younger already spoke of the 
oath (sacramentum) among Christians (Ep. 10.96). He seemingly borrowed 
the word from the military parlance.326
Thus, military language as such betrays nothing of the background in the 
Christian congregation. It is more a question of its frequency than the sim-
ple occurrence of military metaphors. Tertullian used military parlance more 
densely than any other theologian of the early Church,327 but as an antimili-
tarist he framed the military concepts anew. These refer to a lifestyle which 
creates an alternative or even an opposition to the concrete military calling. 
321   See also Rordorf 1969, 124; Gero 1970, 294–295; Shean 2010, 95–98. Helgeland (1979, 741) 
plays down the problem of bloodspilling in a questionable way. Although it is true that 
the biblical references Tertullian uses are not pacifistic, his way of using them is clearly 
against any bloodspilling that included war and the army.
322   On the scholarly discussion, see, e.g., Trilling 2004, 29–31.
323   Trilling 2004, 31, 60.
324   On Tertullian’s military parlance, see, e.g., Bähnk 2001, 58–76.
325   Rordorf (1969, 134) refers to this and other parallels, which, as far as I see, are not so clear 
as this one.
326   Cook 2010, 209.
327   Cancik 2008, 273.
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“For what wars should we not be fit, not eager, even with unequal forces, we who 
so willingly yield ourselves to the sword, if in our religion (apud istam discipli-
nam) it were not counted better to be slain than to slay?” (Apol. 37; trans. ANF 
3:45).328 Why, then, does Tertullian’s writing have this strong military color? As 
Tertullian himself was an antimilitarist, is the parlance due to the influence of 
soldiers in the early Latin Church? According to Harnack, Tertullian’s strong 
militaristic language is located in the tradition of Latin Christianity, which had 
social reasons for this tendency: “the military element was at times very strong 
in some of the earliest Latin congregations.”329 Hubert Cancik notes that there 
is a difference between the intellectual and abstract character of the Greek 
theological concepts and the Latin terms derived from the administrative and 
the military sources.330 Cancik also points out that such military parlance pre-
ceded Tertullian.331
Some scholars have proposed that Tertullian wrote at the time of a growing 
role of the army in the Empire. The military offered more attractive oppor-
tunities than before, and, during Tertullian’s time, the first Christian soldiers 
appeared—or at least their number grew immensely then.332 To claim that 
the first Christians appeared around the year 200 goes against the informa-
tion available from the “thundering legion” in the 170s. Even Tertullian himself 
claims that Christians fought in this legion (Apol. 5.6). The military character of 
the Latin Christian concepts before Tertullian also points to Christian soldiers 
being no new phenomenon in Tertullian’s time. On the other hand, it may be 
true that their number increased, raising ethical and theological questions.333 
This creates a sensible background for Tertullian’s heightened antimilitarism, 
which he unequivocally represented in his works De idolatria and De corona. 
The strength of the resistance against Christian participation in the army is 
thus related to the strength of the phenomenon in Latin Christianity that 
he resists.
328   The word disciplina is noteworthy: while the Christian religion is a kind of regimentation, 
it is not aimed at turning Christians into a disciplined army but into martyrs (Cancik 
2008, 275). To count it better to be slain than to slay is actually a variation on the Platonic 
principle: it is better to suffer wrong than do it (Gorg. 469c, 474b, 475e).
329   Harnack 1981, 54.
330   Cancik 2008, 269–271. Similarly also Bähnk 2001, 61.
331   Cancik 2008, 271–273.
332   Rordorf 1969, 109–110, 119–120; Gero 1970, 289, 291; Trilling 2004, 80. Rordorf denies the 
existence of Christian soldiers before Tertullian’s time. Harnack (1981, 84–85), in contrast, 
claims that the credit of the army was diminishing. This may be true only of the literate 
elite, to which Harnack refers.
333   Rordorf (1969, 107 n. 4, 118) claims that Tertullian refers to the contemporary discus-
sion on soldiers in Idol. 19.1. As Rordorf openly states, this interpretation is not entirely 
unequivocal.
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If Tertullian was a rigorous antimilitarist, why does he not criticize the 
Christian soldiers in the Apologeticum? Instead he presents them as a proof 
of Christian loyalty to the Empire. He says that Christians fill “cities, islands, 
fortresses (castella), towns, market-places, the very camp (castra ipsa), tribes, 
companies (decurias), palace, senate, forum” (Apol. 37; trans. ANF 3:45). A com-
mon view is that Tertullian’s attitude developed from the tolerant views in the 
Apologeticum into more rigorous ones.334 This supposition, however, assumes 
a certain chronology of the works that is hardly clear.335 Actually, the differ-
ences between Tertullian’s views in the books mentioned above should not be 
exaggerated. The problem lies in the Apologeticum itself. Immediately after 
presenting Christians in every area of the society, the army included, he con-
tinues by saying—as we saw above—that according to the disciplina Christians 
prefer to be slain than to slay!
One can try to harmonize Tertullian’s view by a reference to the paramilitary 
tasks of the army. A soldier could have tasks that were not military in the full 
sense of the word. Shean notes that “it was possible for a Christian to serve 
in the army without violating any of the pacifist prohibitions against killing.”336 
Unfortunately, this reading is out of place. As we have seen, in the Apologeticum 
he reported on Christian soldiers of the “thundering legion” on the northern 
front. This can mean nothing but fighting men. The real reason for Tertullian’s 
ambivalence seems to be rhetorical. When writing an apology on behalf of 
all Christians to his non-Christian audience, he toned down his criticism 
of Christian soldiers. The discrepancy between his views and the conduct of 
his fellow Christians became part of his own treatise. Writing the De idolatria 
and De corona for his fellow Christians, he openly expresses his antimilitaristic 
conviction.337 Adolf Harnack put this bluntly, “We cannot exonerate this hot-
blooded man from the charge of keeping two sets of books.”338
The De idolatria rigidly rejects any service in the army. In the treatise, 
Tertullian discusses different cases where a Christian might encounter idolatry. 
Military matters are treated in a passage after he has discussed the idolatrous 
clothing and ornaments required by public offices, which are unsuitable for a 
Christian (Idol. 17–18). Tertullian admits that rank-and-file soldiers can avoid 
334   Gero 1970, 291–293; Shean 2010, 95.
335   On the scholarly discussion, see Bähnk 2001, 12 n. 11. Trilling (2004, 209–211) gives 
Harnack’s chronology (orig. 1904) and T. D. Barnes’ chronology (orig. 1971): both assume 
that the Apologeticum was written around 197. Harnack says that both De idolatria and De 
corona were written between the years 208–212, while Barnes dates De idolatria to 196–197 
and De corona to 208.
336   Shean 2010, 96. Similarly Gero 1970, 292.
337   Cf. Bähnk 2001, 70 n. 125.
338   Harnack 1981, 77. See also Dunn 2015, 100–101, 103.
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idolatry, and then he turns to other arguments in order to rebut Christian par-
ticipation in the army:
But now inquiry is made about this point, whether a believer may turn 
himself unto military service, and whether the military may be admit-
ted unto the faith, even the rank and file, or each inferior grade, to 
whom there is no necessity for taking part in sacrifices or capital pun-
ishments. There is no agreement between the divine and the human 
sacrament (sacramento divino et humano), the standard of Christ and the 
standard of the devil, the camp of light and the camp of darkness. One 
soul cannot be due to two masters—God and Caesar. And yet Moses car-
ried a rod, and Aaron wore a buckle, and John (Baptist) is girt with leather 
and Joshua the son of Nun leads a line of march; and the People warred: if 
it pleases you to sport with the subject. But how will a Christian man war, 
nay, how will he serve even in peace, without a sword, which the Lord has 
taken away? For albeit soldiers had come unto John, and had received 
the formula of their rule; albeit, likewise, a centurion had believed; 
still the Lord afterward, in disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier. No 
dress is lawful among us, if assigned to any unlawful action. 
Idol. 19; trans. ANF 3:73
After illustrating the incompatibility of Christian and military callings, 
Tertullian suddenly turns the discussion to clothing: Moses’ rod (Exod 4:2; 17:5) 
is associated with the rod (virga) of the centurion, Aaron’s buckle (Exod 28:12; 
cf. 1 Macc 14:44) with the buckle ( fibula) of the tribuni militum, and John the 
Baptist’s belt (lorum) with the girdle worn by soldiers.339 Moreover, Joshua led 
the army and “the People” (i.e., Israelites) waged war. How can it thus be against 
Christian faith to serve in the army?340 John the Baptist accepted soldiers, as 
Luke reports, and the centurion of Capernaum believed without receiving 
an admonition to leave his office.341 These references seem to be arguments 
that some Christians have presented for the acceptance of military service.342 
Tertullian shrugs off these scriptural proofs by claiming that the disarming of 
Peter in Gethsemane bears a principal message and, being a later incident, 
is more authoritative than the earlier ones. “A rather artful proof,” Harnack 
339   Waszink and van Winden 1987, 273.
340   Instead of “the People” (populus), Waszink and van Winden (1987, 62–63, 267–269) read 
“Peter” (Petrus), which makes understandable the following claim of a joke. Tertullian is 
probably thinking of Peter using the sword in Gethsemane.
341   Tertullian cannot mean Cornelius the centurion, as he presumes that the centurion 
believed before Jesus’ passion.
342   Harnack 1981, 77.
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ironically states, continuing: “The centurion from Caesarea is also forgotten, 
probably intentionally.” Harnack rightly points out, however, that Tertullian is 
basically not pondering single scriptural proofs. Instead, there is a basic con-
viction that military service belongs to the realm of the devil.343 This is surely 
attested to by the idolatrous army religion.
This discussion of girdles or such things seems to have little to do with idola-
try. Tertullian seemingly detours, as he must admit that the rank and file can 
avoid idolatry; their case must be treated with other arguments. As the end 
of the passage shows, Tertullian reasons that a soldier’s dress is indeed con-
nected to idolatry. In that way, the rank and file also participated in idolatry. 
Helgeland recalls the significance of clothing in the religious festivals of the 
army: every soldier had to wear formal dress on these situations. According to 
Helgeland, idolatry is the basic problem for Tertullian, not the military calling 
as such.344 This is partly true. Idolatrous clothing was the issue in the previous 
passage, and Tertullian returns to it at the end of this passage. Still, Tertullian’s 
negative attitude toward soldiers does not wholly rest in idolatry. Killing is also 
a problematic issue, as the references to capital punishment and the disarming 
of Peter indicate.345
In De idolatria, Tertullian does not directly write about Christian soldiers. 
However, some arguments for the permissibility of Christian military service 
betrays their presence in the army. While there is surely an overstatement in 
the Apologeticum that Christians “fill” (implevimus) fortresses, camps, and 
companies, it certainly contains some truth: there really were Christians in 
the army.346 This is attested to by Tertullian’s De Corona, which opens with an 
incident in the nuncupatio votorum, one of the several religious ceremonies 
performed in the army. This ceremony, held annually on January 3rd, included 
the crowning of soldiers and a recitation of the military oath (sacramentum).347 
This particular year, the soldiers also received a cash bonus:
Very lately it happened thus: while the bounty of our most excellent 
emperors was dispensed in the camp, the soldiers, laurel-crowned, were 
343   Harnack 1981, 78.
344   Helgeland 1979, 739–740.
345   Quite similarly Sider 2012, 50.
346   In the same context, he claims that the majority of the inhabitants in the cities are 
Christians. This is without doubt an overstatement. See also Gero 1970, 292. In Apol 42 
(trans. ANF 3:49), Tertullian says: “We sail with you, and fight with you, and till the ground 
with you.” Gero (1970, 291–292) philologically discusses this passage, but concludes that 
actual military service cannot be ruled out.
347   Kossmann 2008, 135–136, 145–146. Otherwise, the oath was recited after enlisting and on 
the anniversary of the emperor’s ascension to power (Helgeland 1979, 739).
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approaching. One of them, more a soldier of God, more stedfast than the 
rest of his brethren, who had imagined that they could serve two mas-
ters, his head alone uncovered, the useless crown in his hand—already 
even by that peculiarity known to every one as a Christian—was nobly 
conspicuous. 
Cor. 1; trans. ANF 3:93
The opening words reveal that the main character had Christian brothers in 
arms who did not deny the laurel. Tertullian blames them, but also reports 
their arguments:
Thereafter adverse judgments began to be passed upon his conduct—
whether on the part of Christians I do not know, for those of the heathen 
are not different—as if he were headstrong and rash, and too eager to 
die, because, in being taken to task about a mere matter of dress, he 
brought trouble on the bearers of the Name. […] they murmur that a 
peace so good and long is endangered for them. […] they put forth also 
the objection—But where are we forbidden to be crowned? 
Cor. 1; trans. ANF 3:93
Tertullian continues to address the question of forbidden laurels, but later 
opens his argumentation against all military service in Cor. 11–12. His strategy 
is to develop with examples the basic notion in the opening words: Christian 
soldiers try to serve two masters when adding a human oath to the divine one,348 
keeping watch for others than Christ and so on: “The very carrying of the name 
over from the camp of light to the camp of darkness is a violation” (Cor. 11; 
trans. ANF 3:100). In addition to idolatry, killing is against the law of Christ, 
who proclaimed that those who take up the sword will perish by the sword. 
Moreover, a Christian soldier can be laureled after a victorious campaign 
against barbarians, which includes killing and, what is even worse, killing of 
fellow-Christians: “Is the laurel of the triumph made of leaves, or of corpses? Is 
it adorned with ribbons, or with tombs? Is it bedewed with ointments, or with 
the tears of wives and mothers? It may be of some Christians too; for Christ is 
also among the barbarians” (Cor. 12, ANF 3:101).
348   See also Cor. 12 (trans. ANF 3:101): “Lo! the yearly public pronouncing of vows, what does 
that bear on its face to be? It takes place first in the part of the camp where the general’s 
tent is, and then in the temples. In addition to the places, observe the words also: ‘We vow 
that you, O Jupiter, will then have an ox with gold-decorated horns.’ What does the utter-
ance mean? Without a doubt the denial (of Christ). Albeit the Christian says nothing in 
these places with the mouth, he makes his response by having the crown on his head.”
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Unlike in De idolatria, in De corona Tertullian reluctantly finds room for 
Christian soldiers. Now he mentions not only the soldiers, which John the 
Baptist encountered, and the centurion of Capernaum—like in De idolatria—
but also Cornelius. Tertullian consequently reasons: “Of course, if faith comes 
later, and finds any preoccupied with military service, their case is  different”—
but only if they can “avoid offending God,” which Tertullian seems to regard 
as being very difficult (Cor. 11). In allowing military service for those who 
were baptized when serving in the army, Tertullian goes along with Apostolic 
Tradition 16.9.349 Still, he is quite skeptical about whether a Christian can serve 
in the army without “quibbling” over his faith. He argues that a soldier has no 
special liberties in his Christian conduct. The necessities of military life allow 
for no exception to the normal Christian faith and morality (Cor. 11). Seemingly, 
some have allowed exceptions because of the necessities, but Tertullian has a 
profoundly contrary view. If there is any necessity, it is the necessity to suffer 
and die because of faith.350 He remarks with contempt on the reaction of his 
fellow Christians when they saw one refusing the military crown:
They murmur that the peace so good and long is endangered for them. 
Nor do I doubt that some are already turning their back on the Scriptures, 
are making ready their luggage, are equipped for flight from city to city; 
for that is all of the gospel they care to remember. I know, too, their pas-
tors are lions in peace, deer in the fight.” 
Cor. 1; trans. ANF 3:93
The refusing soldier put away his sword and military dress, and thus he was 
“equipped in the apostle’s armour” (Eph 6:11–17) to fight the spiritual fight 
so that he would receive “the white crown of martyrdom” worthier of other 
crowns (Cor. 1; trans. ANF 3:93).351 Yet, Harnack doubts that the soldier was as 
exemplary a martyr as Tertullian claims. Harnack sharply questions why, for 
instance, the soldier suddenly refused to take the crown but has “not resisted 
military authority before on any of a hundred other occasions.”352 Harnack 
points out that Tertullian makes a comparison with worshipers of Mithras 
in the closing section of the treatise (Cor. 15; trans. ANF 3:103). They had the 
liberty to be uncrowned, as they had refused it already in their rites, stating: 
349   See the discussion above on Clement of Alexandria.
350   Bähnk 2001, 71–76. Bähnk speaks of Tertullian’s other treatises, but clearly there are simi-
lar ideas in De corona. See also Dunn 2015, 99.
351   Bähnk 2001, 69–70.
352   Harnack 1981, 83.
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“Mithras is my crown.”353 Harnack concludes that Tertullian’s hero actually 
requires the same freedom of religion as Mithraists: “It is a symptom of the 
increased self-consciousness of the Christians (especially those in the army) 
as a religious group distinct from others. Apparently this Christian soldier did 
not at all want to demonstrate that Christian service and military service were 
irreconcilable.”354
The reader must distinguish between the soldier’s protest as a historical 
phenomenon and the interpretation Tertullian gave to it. It was Tertullian, 
who—as an intellectual—felt aversion toward military life and made this 
soldier into a hero of his own antimilitarism. This reveals his connections 
to the philosophical elite of his time, although he also maintained a certain 
distance.355 It is well known that Tertullian rhetorically rejected philoso-
phy as Athens, which should have nothing to do with the Christian truth of 
Jerusalem (Praescr. 7). Still, he wrote a remarkable text, De pallio, which is 
an encomium on the philosopher’s mantle that he had embraced. Tertullian 
says that his Christianity is “a better philosophy” (Pall. 6; trans. ANF 4:12); this 
simultaneously indicates a connection to and taking distance from “ordinary” 
philosophy. In philosophical terms, Tertullian’s deep disgust toward idolatry 
is surely unique, though there were reserved attitudes among philosophers, 
too.356 For him, idolatry was the clearest reason to reject military service. Yet, 
he also thought that killing was against Christian morality. This reason comes 
closer to the philosophers, who felt disgust toward violence and violent means 
of ruling. In De pallio, Tertullian allows the philosopher’s mantle to list public 
offices where it does not serve, for example: “no judge, no soldier (non milito), 
no king” (Pall. 5; trans. ANF. 4:11). It is symptomatic that it is just the philoso-
pher’s mantle that utters this. As a Christian intellectual, Tertullian shared the 
antimilitaristic ethos of his pagan peers.
2.3 Conclusions
I started the last section’s discussion on military metaphors in order to ask 
whether they tell something about soldiers among the Christians. The result 
was mainly negative. However, the lengthy discussion was necessary to dismiss 
353   This ceremony belongs to the initiation of the grade of miles (soldier). See Merkelbach 
1984, 95–96.
354   Harnack 1981, 83.
355   Cf. Trilling 2004, 36–38.
356   For example, Epictetus ridicules the desire to see Phidias’ statue of Zeus when Zeus 
is everywhere (Disc. 1.6.24; Huttunen 2009, 39). See also Goulet-Cazé’s article (1996) 
on Cynics and their views on religion and van Kooten’s (2008, 347–354) description of 
Roman ideas of the aniconic cult.
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the idea that repeated military metaphors necessarily imply the existence of 
Christian soldiers. I showed that these metaphors belonged to the standard 
philosphical parlance of the day and were used also by persons with antimili-
taristic attitudes. Only 1 Clement seemed to suggest more than this.
In the previous section I pointed out an antimilitaristic tendency in the 
Gospel of John. I showed that this tendency finds its home in the writings of 
the early Christian theologians, Tertullian being the most prominent Christian 
antimilitarist. The antimilitaristic tendency was part and parcel of the intel-
lectual ethos of the time. Antimilitarism was characteristic not only of the 
Christian theologians, but also their philosophical pagan peers. While there 
were exceptions among Christian theologians, like Julius Africanus, most writ-
ten sources reflect antimilitarism or at least a distant attitude to military issues. 
One should not read these sources as the Christian statement, however. The 
reality was more heterogenous. This looms in the antimilitaristic writings, too. 
While being an uncompromising antimilitarist, Tertullian speaks of Christian 
soldiers. In his in-group polemics he criticizes them, but in his apologetics 
for a non-Christian audience, these same soldiers are presented as a proof of 
Christian loyalty toward Roman society. The excavations in Dura-Europos and 
Megiddo suggest that some soldiers were quite openly Christians in the first 
decades of the third century. Tertullian’s De Corona, despite its antimilitarism, 
betrays the same fact from ca. 200 CE. The number of Christians seems to have 
been high enough to require some sort of recognition and freedom from the 
state cult.
The increasing need to recognize Christians led not only to granting of 
recognition but also intensified periods of persecution, that is, until the 
Constantinian turn in the next century. The Decian persecution in the 250s 
seems to have been the result of the rising importance of Christianity in Roman 
society.357 However, these persecutions do not make up the whole picture of 
Christians in Roman society. The remains of a prayer hall in Megiddo suggest 
a considerable degree of toleration or recognition of Christians from the side 
of the Roman army from the beginning of the third century. At the same time, 
many Christians granted recognition to the the Roman army by participating 
in its structures. While admittedly there was an antimilitaristic trait among the 
early Christians, which Tertullian clearly represents, his antimilitarism does 
not represent the whole truth of the relationship between early Christianity 
and the Roman army, since Tertullian had brothers in arms.
357   Rives 1999, 151.
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chapter 5
Conclusions
What was wrong with the state was its old paganism. Change its religion 
and all would be well.1
This is how Henry Chadwick once described the Christian mission in the 
Roman Empire. If we believe Chadwick, Christians were far from a constant 
source of opposition to the Empire. It is true that there were tensions between 
Christians and the Empire, but it is far-fetched to reconstruct anti-imperial 
sentiment as a foundational value of early Christians in general. Romans 13 
and its heritage in early Christianity proves the opposite. In this book I intro-
duced Risto Saarinen’s concept of recognition as a tool to depict Christians 
in the Roman Empire. Apart from periods of persecution, one could say that 
Christians and the Empire tolerated each other. However, toleration is a too 
weak of a concept. There was a kind of commitment, more than toleration, 
which Saarinen calls recognition. Instead of a full agreement, the attitude of 
recognizing could “consist in a commitment to work together, respect other 
convictions, and approve a general societal or ideological framework in which 
the coexistence takes place.”2 I have employed the concept of recognition to 
avoid black-and-white interpretations of Christian-Empire relationships. I 
emphasize that there are alternatives between full denial and full acceptance. 
In this book, I discussed the recognition between the early Christians and the 
Roman Empire on three levels: political, cultural, and practical.
There is no political theory in the New Testament, but Romans 13:1–7 
became a seed for it. This passage had a lasting impact on later Christian 
generations, and it contributed to the approval of the general societal and 
ideological framework. Paul’s imperial theology was not very different from 
the contemporary political theology and philosophy. Indeed, the passage is 
a monotheistic adaptation of the polytheistic imperial theology. Paul did not 
invent this monotheistic variation. He just advanced the Jewish monotheistic 
legitimation of the Empire. Nevertheless, it is Paul’s influence that had such a 
huge impact on the subsequent Christian political culture. Romans 13 is felt in 
1 Peter, in the Pastoral Epistles, in 1 Clement, and so on—until the present day. 
1   Chadwick 1986 [1967], 24.
2   Saarinen 2016, 1. This is already given as part of the longer citation in the introduction of this 
book.
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Paul paved a path for the Christian empires from the fourth century onwards. 
In this sense, the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin’s condemnation of religion as the 
source for all state power seems to be justified. He claimed that God’s author-
ity is repeated in human relations, and seemingly this is just what Paul argued: 
God has the power to appoint some people to govern the rest of humankind, 
and God has delegated his might to the powers that be.
However, it is misleading to read Romans 13 merely from a theological point 
of view. Paul’s argumentation does not rest only on God’s ordinance. At the 
same time, he argues socially. There is a fixed political philosophy behind 
Paul’s words in Romans 13: the law of the stronger. Here he followed the general 
ancient tradition, which could be argued both theologically and socially. Paul 
presents both sides. Theological and social reasonings are not dialectically sep-
arated but integrated. In this theopolitical tradition, divine favor is deduced 
from social facts; divine support reveals itself in supremacy. Ruthless political 
realism is well attested in this line of thought. It is socially hopeless to resist the 
stronger, and theologically such an act entails resistance to God. Earlier studies 
have not noticed this general ancient background of Paul’s thought. I suggest 
that the reason for such negligence is the tradition to take the text as a norm 
to simply be obeyed. Paul’s words are traditionally read as a prescriptive text, 
not a descriptive one. He surely exhorts his audience, but his exhortation is not 
just a commandment. Paul justifies his exhortation by means of a reference 
to the actual reality of wielding of power. He understood the power play in a 
way that was widely shared by the people in antiquity. In this sense, his exhor-
tation was founded on common knowledge. For an ancient reader, Paul’s 
exhortation would have been a natural conclusion based on the social reality 
more than a new light appearing directly from heaven.
The argumentation based on the social reality does not diminish the theo-
logical edge of Paul’s thought. In this sense, Bakunin’s critique is still valid: God 
seems to guarantee the power structure in society. However, what Bakunin did 
not note is the fact that God’s power does not only duplicate itself in human 
relationships. For Paul, the powers that be belong to this world, which is pass-
ing away, and Paul’s own epistles also proclaim the end of all human power 
structures. In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul claims that all authority will be put down 
at the eschatological turn. Indeed, at the end God will be all in all. Thus, unlike 
Bakunin suggested, God’s power does not necessarily repeat itself in human 
relations, but ultimately ends all human power over other people. It is clear 
that the end of human power was Paul’s fundamental view: the present form of 
life is passing away (1 Cor 7:31). Christians did not adapt to society wholeheart-
edly. Here the concept of recognition is apt. Christians saw the provisional 
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value of the Roman imperial order as God’s institution prior to the eschato-
logical turn, after which all human orders are purposeless.
Interestingly, the eschatological end of human authorities is also based 
on the law of the stronger. As a conqueror, Christ will trample underfoot all 
enemies before delivering total authority to God (1 Cor 15:24–28). The Book 
of Revelation gives a vivid picture of this final conflict in universal history. An 
apocalyptic underpinning represented the revolutionary edge of the Christian 
faith, even if it did not lead to practical consequences for centuries. The revo-
lutionary sentiment can be felt in the American political tradition, as seen in 
the constitutional documents of the United States. I claim that this sentiment 
is reflected in American scholarship and its keen interest in anti-imperial read-
ings of the early Christian documents.
However, the apocalyptic hopes really erupted in the revolutionary move-
ments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Marxists stopped 
waiting for the heavenly kingdom; they wanted to create it on earth with a last 
fight. The intention was sooner or later to abolish state and repression, but the 
result was a bloodbath and more repressive states than ever. In spite of oppo-
site intentions, the powers that be remained in a new guise. Paul never named 
the powers; he never spoke of emperors, the Senate, or anything else. He was 
more abstractly speaking of the phenomenon of power that seems to stand the 
test of time. Powers remain even when their abolition is intended.
The phenomenon of power can also be called “the normalcy of civili-
zation,” as Crossan and Reed put it in the passage quoted in the opening of 
this book. Contrary to what Crossan and Reed claim, however, Paul did not 
seem to oppose “Rome with Christ against Caesar.” Instead, he intention-
ally reminded his audience that opposing the authorities is to oppose God, 
while the whole enterprise will ultimately end up in the judgment. According 
to Paul, it is Christ’s task to dethrone “the normalcy of civilization,” while 
the believers can only wait for the eschatological dawn and start to remodel 
their own lives to be worthy of God’s rule. In the process of remodeling, the 
eschatological expectation is reflected in the present life, which, in turn, may 
erode “the normalcy of civilization” in the long run. However, this is something 
other than the straightforward opposition in the apocalyptic-revolutionary 
sentiment visible in Marxism and the American political tradition. Instead of 
revolting, many Christians actually granted recognition to Roman society on 
cultural and practical levels. They more or less adapted to the Empire, both 
culturally and practically. In my study, Christian adaption to the ancient phi-
losophy exemplifies the cultural level, while Christian soldiers represent the 
practical level.
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Irrespective of the contrast that Tertullian constructed between Athens 
and Jerusalem, Christians adopted philosophy and sought recognition as phi-
losophers. The general picture that modern studies provide seems to be that 
of a misrecognition from the side of the non-Christian intelligentsia. Tacitus, 
Suetonius, Pliny, and Celsus are presented as proving the Roman disgust of 
Christians. This is only a partial truth, however. Several non-Christian second-
century philosophers seemed to grant recognition to the Christians; this does 
not mean that they subscribed to everything Christians said and did. Christians 
were recognized in the category of philosophy, whatever their faults. The Stoic 
Epictetus is the earliest of those non-Christian philosophers. His two acknowl-
edgments of Christians (Disc. 2.9.19–21; 4.7.6) date back to the first decades of 
the second century. Quite surprisingly, this early source has won only superfi-
cial attention among academic readers. I have presented the first thorough a 
scholarly analysis of two passages where Epictetus speaks of Christians. Due 
to the text-critical difficulties, scholars have mainly misinterpreted Epictetus. 
He is not speaking of proselytes, but of Christians as real Jews, which shows 
that he is familiar with Christian suprasessionist theology. He can also cite 
Christian expressions. In another passage, he seems to know the Christian 
practice of using short sentences, so-called canons—a practice that was wide-
spread in the philosophical schools, too. Epictetus’ words do not betray any 
deeper interest in Christianity. The Christians are just occasional examples of 
a virtuous life. The passing observations on Christians seem to presuppose that 
Epictetus’ audience knew what he was talking about. I claim that Epictetus’ 
passages are more important sources of early Christianity than scholars have 
realized. A stronger interest in these passages is a desideratum.
In the late second century, more sources recognized Christians in the cat-
egory of philosophers. Marcus Aurelius and Lucian viewed Christians in a 
critical or satirical light, but the standards that Christians are unable to reach 
are those of philosophers. Christians are poor in the class of philosophy, but 
this is not the most interesting thing. What is most important is that Christians 
are measured with the standard of philosophy. Even Celsus’ text betrays this 
tendency, despite his intense aspiration to give an opposite picture. At the 
end of the second century, Galen presents a more laudable view of Christians. 
Although he saw intellectual faults in the Christian doctrine and criticized it, 
he put it above the Stoic doctrine, even calling Christianity a philosophical 
school which has generated such virtuous persons that they surpass many 
genuine philosophers. This is high acclaim for Christians, because in antiquity 
philosophers were not only weighed on the basis of their theoretical doctrines 
but also their practical virtues. Galen’s passages need still further study, not 
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least because some texts have a complex history of transmission and variant 
readings.
I suggest that the philosophical recognition of Christians reflected what the 
Christians themselves sought after. To this end, I pointed to examples of New 
Testament passages that mention philosophy or philosophers. Although one 
cannot avoid an impression of some tension, it is clear that these passages try 
to show Christianity in the category of philosophy. Actually, the criticism of 
human wisdom, present in 1 Corinthians 1–2, is a fixed part of the philosophical 
discourse itself. Several features in those chapters have good parallels in philo-
sophical texts. Thus, 1 Corinthians 1–2 does not present an anti-philosophical 
stance, as is usually suggested, but instead presents a philosophical criticism of 
rival schools. The philosophical elements in 1 Corinthians 7 do not contradict 
the opening chapters of the epistle but are aligned. As the earliest Christian 
documents, Paul’s words show that seeking philosophical recognition was not 
a later development. In sum, the relationship between early Christians and 
philosophers was not one of pure enmity, but more of a mutual recognition.
Mutual recognition can also be found on a practical level in life, where it 
does not appear in concepts or conceptions but actual practices. In this book, I 
presented Christian soldiers as an example of practical recognition. One should 
be careful not to depend on one-sided evidence or rhetorical exaggerations. 
Tertullian eloquently not only rejected philosophy but also military calling. 
This has misled some scholars to imagine that Christians generally dismissed 
service in the imperial army. A careful reading of Tertullian’s own account of 
the Christian soldier in De corona, however, proves the opposite. Tertullian 
praises a soldier for declining a laurel in the ceremony of the imperial religion. 
While Tertullian explains that real Christian conviction makes it impossible to 
serve in the imperial ranks, he nonetheless mentions Christian soldiers who 
disapprove of their Christian brother. Tertullian reproaches them for their lack 
of Christian firmness and see them as apostates. Apparently, those Christian 
soldiers themselves did not see anything wrong in their service.
Tertullian’s value judgment should not lead us astray from the fact that there 
were some serving in the army who thought that they were good Christians. 
One can even question whether the refusing soldier suits the role in which 
Tertullian placed him. The soldier’s protest seems to be more about freedom of 
religion than military service in general. The soldier refusing to wear the laurel 
wreath required a similar freedom of religion as the Mithraists. Thus, he was 
seeking recognition as a Christian soldier. Actually, the protest testifies to the 
increasing number of Christians in the ranks. At the turn of the third century 
they seem to have made up such a considerable religious minority that they 
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could justifiably demand their rights. In turn, they saw military service as being 
compatible with their Christianity and, thus, they recognized the Empire in 
their everyday practice.
Tertullian’s Christian antimilitarism appears to have been more home in 
the literate circles. I showed that many other contemporary Christian and 
non-Christian intellectuals shared his negative view, though not always with 
Tertullian’s vigor and Christian reasoning. Tertullian’s Christian antimilitarism 
was a variation of the common stance among philosophers. The majority of 
Christian literary sources originate in intellectual circles, and therefore the pic-
ture they give is unbalanced. A careful reading may open a window to a reality 
that is different from the ideals of the author. This is the case with Tertullian, as 
we saw. Although antimilitarism is the main line in most of the sources, there 
are also some that openly approve of Christian soldiers. Among the evange-
lists, Luke is the one who likes to present Roman soldiers as Christians or is 
sympathetic to them. Julius Africanus’ Kestoi is a manual for warfare, includ-
ing, for example, biological and chemical methods to poison the enemy. While 
the Kestoi is admittedly a strange and unusual work from a Christian in the 
beginning of the third century, it betrays the fact that early Christian attitudes 
to war and military service were more diverse than one might believe when 
reading the antimilitaristic passages of the early Christian theologians.
Emperor Marcus Aurelius embodies in his own person the two sides: philo-
sophical antimilitarism and personal military service. He ridicules himself for 
being a brigand who catches prisoners of war. The emperor could not combine 
the moral ideals of the philosophical elite and his actual duties. This was easier 
for those philosophers and theologians who could concentrate on their intel-
lectual activities without any disturbing official responsibilities. Accordingly, 
the sources they provide must be read with caution and contextualized 
with the other evidence that is available. The archaeological evidence from 
Megiddo indicates that Christian soldiers could openly practice their religion 
in the beginning of the third century. At least in this case, Christian soldiers 
were recognized by the army.
There is still one aspect of soldiers that scholars have failed to see, namely, 
when a description of soldiers does not necessarily reflect the narrator’s stance 
toward the moral appropriateness of military service—and, even less, warfare. 
The Roman army exercised greater responsibilities of security than large-scale 
campaigns. In the gospels and Acts, a reader finds soldiers in tasks which today 
would be called administration, policing, and war on terrorism. The resulting 
encounters between soldiers and civilians created both tensions and positive 
developments. The military characters in the gospels and in Acts mostly reflect 
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these everyday experiences, and thus they should not be read in terms of a 
value judgment on the appropriateness of a military career for a Christian, 
as many scholars have done. Instead, these characters illustrate how civil-
ians experienced soldiers in their daily life. While John belongs to the group 
of antimilitaristic theologians, the synoptics follow the general ancient view of 
constructing a rough division between rank-and-file soldiers and centurions.
In the division between ordinary soldiers and centurions, the former are 
painted as the bad ones. They extort, rob, and use violence. These are things 
that John the Baptist urges soldiers to refrain from (Luke 3:14). Centurions, in 
turn, are presented in a positive light. The centurion of Capernaum believes 
in Jesus and, according to Luke, is a wealthy benefactor for the local Jewish 
community. In Acts, Cornelius is the ideal Christian. The passion narrative 
illustrates this division: the rank and file torture Jesus, while the centurion 
confesses his status as God’s son. This division is not aimed at expressing the 
appropriateness of military service. It just gives voice to the civil experience of 
soldiers. One can thus conclude that a military career was acceptable. If the 
problem was the threat the soldiers pose to the population, a military career 
as such was no problem. The problem was malpractice in that career. With 
that threat removed, the characterization of soldiers can be laudatory. In the 
synoptic gospels and Acts, the centurions are precisely such positive figures. 
One could legitimately serve in the army if the ethical standards were upheld. 
It was no problem to serve the state. This conclusion, in turn, betrays that the 
authors basically recognized the Empire.
Modern readers have sometimes overemphasized the anti-imperial tones 
in the New Testament. But the potential conflict did not erupt in antiquity. 
It burst into flames in a secular form in the Marxist revolutions of the 20th 
century. Their logic was to put all enemies under the feet of the oppressed; 
however, the result was not the end of state authority, as expected, but a stron-
ger state than those which existed in the first place. The state became the god 
that was all in all.
While the first Christian centuries do not demonstrate revolutionary activ-
ism, the revolutionary element should not be dismissed. It can be found in 
a more subtle or even unconscious form. I showed that the early Christians 
felt the eschatological end of hierarchies “in Christ.” Paul never questioned the 
differences, nor even the hierarchies between any given social positions, but 
claimed rather that these hierarchies and differences have ultimately become 
adiaphora among Christians. Paul admonishes Christians to superficially live 
the normal social life without having deep attachment to it (1 Cor 7:29–31). 
This ultimate conviction of equality in Christ slowly eroded the legitimation 
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of social hierarchies, although the end of hierarchies was projected onto an 
eschatological turn. What has changed in the present is the attitude. Paul’s 
words in the epistle to Philemon demonstrate the expected change in the 
mutual attitudes of master and slave, but the epistle provides no proof of activ-
ism directed at ending the practice of slavery. Of course, attitudes always seep 
into practice and slowly replace indifference. Because Paul did not know how 
long the wait for the eschaton would be, he could not anticipate how much the 
eschatological values would bleed into the social reality. The case of slavery is 
illustrative. Paul never questioned the social practice of slavery, but step by step 
it became increasingly questionable. What Marx ridiculed as a fantasy proved 
its revolutionary power more reliably than the unsubtle armed revolutions of 
the 20th century. Looking at the nightmarish executions of Marx’ apocalyptic 
visions, Paul’s recognition of the powers that be can be seen as having a point.
Chadwick was right. Early Christians recognized the Roman Empire and 
they wished only to change its religion. But this change of religion was later 
reflected in the society. Adaptation to the Empire did not mean political stag-
nation. Instead, it began a process that ultimately changed some of the values 
of the Empire itself. The Christian Empire and its political followers in the 
Western world have not fulfilled all the eschatological hopes. The process is 
ongoing.
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